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This volume aims to contribute to the analysis of the EU in general 
and the background and consequences of its 2004 enlargement 
in particular. This enlargement is by far one of the greatest tests 
for the European Union and its institutions because the process 
of Europeanization is taking place in a variety of countries with 
diverse political cultures and dissimilar perceptions about the 
meaning and commitment to European integration. Given their 
differences in political and economic power, incumbent and new 
members are inevitably altering the functioning and character of 
the EU, a unique polity in the international system. Derived from 
this theoretical challenge, the chapters of this book suggest some 
explanations on six areas related to the 2004 enlargement: analyti-
cal approaches, citizens and identities, debates and regional trans-
formations, external impacts, and the potential Turkey’s member-
ship. The articles included in this publication are the result of the 
academic initiative of the Miami European Union Center, partner-
ship formed by the University of Miami and Florida International 
University since 2000, which was also selected by the European 
Commission as one of the ten European Union Centers of Excel-
lence in the United States for the period 2005|2008. 
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Introduction 
 
Bridges to the East: A Collective Effort for the Enlargement 
 
 
 
Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez 
 
 
 
 
This volume intends to contribute to the analysis of the EU in general and the 
recent enlargement in particular, its background and consequences. From a vari-
ety of angles, theoretical approaches, and a balanced national and regional per-
spective, the chapters included are an updated result of papers presented at a con-
ference held at the University of Miami on April 8, 2005, under the sponsorship 
of the Miami European Union Center, the partnership formed by the University 
of Miami and Florida International University in 2000. This cooperative adven-
ture has now received the high honor of being selected as one of the ten Euro-
pean Union Centers of Excellence for the three-year cycle of 2005-2008. 
The first section of the book reviews analytical frameworks to study the 
enlargement process. Joaquín Roy evaluates the challenges and obstacles that the 
EU has overcome to make possible the enlargement to 10 new members. In his 
view, the difficulties encountered by the EU are not new and the balance as a 
whole shows positive accomplishments and benefits. The second and third arti-
cles of this section present an overview of theoretical approaches to examine the 
EU enlargement. In “Enlargement and the Promotion of Liberal Norms in East-
ern Europe,” Frank Schimmelfennig, professor at the University of Mannheim, 
Germany, elaborates his analysis based on two prominent models in the literature 
on international norm promotion (social learning and external incentives models) 
and uses the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to explain the conditions 
under which the candidates in Eastern Europe have complied with the political 
demands of the EU and other European regional organizations. In the chapter co-
authored by Nuray Ibryamova and Roberto Domínguez, former researchers at the 
Miami European Union Center and graduates of the Ph. D. program at University 
of Miami, the existing theoretical debates dealing with the 2004 enlargement are 
reviewed. Based upon the contributions of both International Relations and Re-
gional Integration theories, the authors identify how competing theories attempt 
to explain the motivations and consequences of the Enlargement for incumbent 
and new members. 
Taking into account that ultimately the success or the failure of the enlarge-8  Roy and Domínguez 
 
ment process (and the EU itself) will be decided by the benefits given or per-
ceived by the citizens, the second section is dedicated to the impact of enlarge-
ment on Citizens and Identities. The article by Willem Maas, professor at New 
York University, deals with one of most sensitive issues of the EU process, es-
sential for its nature, but feared in some quarters as a source of competition: free 
movement of people. In this sense, observers should take into account that the 
full implementation of the complete mobility of labor from the new members will 
be a slow process, well in contrast with the almost automatic accessibility to mi-
gration and residence for citizens of countries in other previous enlargement 
processes. Markus Thiel, a recent Ph.D. graduate from University of Miami, ex-
amines in “European Identity and the Challenge of Enlargement” to what extent 
an assumed common cultural European identity can be drawn upon as a con-
necting link between old and new member states and explore the chances of 
functional integration as a opportunity to build a common civic identity. On the 
other hand, Maria Ilcheva, a Ph.D. candidate at Florida International University, 
presents her views on the situation of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slo-
vakia, and the dynamics of their relations with the respective majority in the dec-
ade after the fall of communism. The last article of the section is written by 
David Abraham, professor at the School of Law at University of Miami, who 
offers his analysis of the transformations of the legal concepts of nationality and 
citizenship in Germany; his argument is that with the new laws in Germany has 
come the abandonment of the previous Aliens Law and perhaps a serious amelio-
ration of the legal marginalization of German-born foreigners.  
The next section is dedicated to the debates implicating regional transforma-
tions of the past and future enlargements. Sebastián Royo, scholar from Suffolk 
University in Boston, explains the experience of the accession of Spain and Por-
tugal into the European Union as an opportunity to reflect on what has happened 
to both countries since 1986 and to draw some lessons that may be applicable to 
East European countries as they pursue their own processes of integration into 
the European Union. Ania Krok-Paszkowska, researcher of Cyprus College in 
Nicosia, in “How Much Diversity Can the European Union Withstand?” de-
scribes how the enlargement has resulted in unprecedented import of political, 
economic and cultural diversity. Despite the intensive process of mutual adapta-
tion there is a fear that the “new” members are not yet truly compatible with 
“old” members. In the article “The EU Enlargement Policy: Can Widening and 
Deepening Be Combined?” Finn Laursen, professor at the University of Southern 
Denmark, presents his analysis revolving around three central questions: Why 
did the largest ever enlargement of the EU take place in 2004? Can it be explain-
ed by rational models or do we need to include more social constructivist mod-
els? To what extent can the answer to this question be used to make predictions 
about future enlargements?  
The next section is dedicated to study the impact of enlargement on the ex-
ternal policies of the EU and its institutions. Francesc Granell, of the University Introduction. Bridges to the East  9 
 
of Barcelona, disserts about the 2004 Enlargement and its effects on the EU De-
velopment Cooperation. He argues that enlargement can weaken the EU’s devel-
opment cooperation due to different elements such as the need for new and in-
cumbent members to increase their low levels of present Aid in favor of devel-
oping countries (0.4 percent of the EU-15). Beverly Crawford, professor at the 
University of California, Berkeley, examines the impact of the EU enlargement 
on the Euro-Med process, raising two main questions: How will the most recent 
enlargement affect progress in the Euro-Med partnership? Will the net impact be 
a stabilizing one, enhancing regional security and economic prosperity, or will it 
be destabilizing? On the other hand, in the article “The Impact of Enlargement on 
the External Relations of the EU,” Roberto Domínguez, of Suffolk University, 
analyzes whether or not the new members can work together with the EU-15 in 
the making of the external relations of the EU. Alternatively, he ponders that 
eventually the new members may act as Trojan horses for the United States in 
some particular junctures, but the overall trend is to increase the cooperation in 
order to strengthen the external relations of the EU. On the other hand, Gaye 
Gungor, graduate student at Florida International University, looks at the situa-
tion in the European Parliament following the eastern enlargement examines the 
partisan activity in the new member states and the European Parliament to high-
light the similarities and differences between them. Likewise, she discusses the 
potential area of conflicts following the enlargement.  
The next section is focused on economic and social transformations. “In 
Search of the Social Europe: The Eastern Enlargement in Political Perspective” is 
the title of the article by Christiane Lemke, Jean Monnet professor at the Univer-
sity of Hanover. She identifies the distinct patterns and problems of the institu-
tionalization of social citizenship and social institutions in Eastern Europe. A key 
argument is that there is greater diversity emerging in the enlarged European 
Union and her hypothesis is built on the assumption that emerging patterns of 
social support and social security diverge from the typology described in the 
comparative welfare state literature, inasmuch as the transformation of post-
communist societies is distinctly different from the building of welfare states in 
Europe. In the chapter entitled “The Political Economy of Baltic States’ Acces-
sion into the EU: The Impact on the Role of the State,” Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, 
researcher at the University of Vilnius, Lithuania, uses the premise that integrat-
ing the results of studies from the transition reforms and EU accession policies 
can provide new insights about the changing role of the state, boundaries be-
tween private and public, and potential implications for the success of public 
policies in the CEECs and growth of their economies. Yusaf H. Akbar, of South-
ern New Hampshire University, in the chapter entitled “Shifting Competitive-
ness, Evolving Multinational Enterprise Strategies and EU Enlargement: The 
Case of Hungary,” examines the recent evolution in FDI and relates it to com-
petitiveness of the CEE region and MNE FDI strategies and motives. In “Envi-
ronmental Consequences of Enlargement,” last article of this section, Monika 10  Roy and Domínguez 
 
Böhm of Marburg University, Germany, studies the legal, political and economic 
consequences on the fragile setting of the environmental scene brought by the 
new members. 
The final section is ironically dedicated to a country that is not, according to 
many observers, a European state, and neither part of the recent enlargement: 
Turkey. However, it is the center of controversy and a focus for the whole the-
matic issue of European identity and future. In fact, fear of effective membership 
in a distant future is signaled as one of the main reasons for distrust towards the 
process of integration. Neill Nugent, professor from Manchester Metropolitan 
University, in “Turkey’s Membership Application: Implications for the EU,” re-
minds readers that while Turkey would probably be admitted as having met the 
Copenhagen criteria, it is also perceived as “carrying” characteristics which po-
tentially threaten core features of the EU’s nature and identity. This paper identi-
fies the “problematic” characteristics of the Turkish application and ponders 
whether they really do pose such a “threat.” A scholar at Middle East Technical 
University, Atila Eralp, in “The Process of Europeanization in Turkey,” focuses 
on the decisions of the EU Summit in Helsinki and discusses the developments 
during the past four years. He shows how the more inclusive approach of the EU 
in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit has helped the acceleration of the reform 
process in Turkey. The text then examines the reform initiatives of the last four 
years and argues that the incentive of membership has been crucial in shaping the 
reform process in Turkey. The closing article of this book is about “The Role of 
Security in Turkey’s European Union Membership Bid.” Its author, Nuray 
Ibryamova, professor at University of North Carolina at Wilmington, argues 
that it is primarily societal security threats that have been securitized in the proc-
ess of enlargement, contributing to the implementation of internal security poli-
cies, whose effects are sometimes conflicting with the overall objective of a 
prosperous and stable Europe.  
In the organization of the conference and the editing of its proceedings, we 
would like to recognize the contributions made by Eloisa Vladescu and Wendy 
Grenade of the Miami European Union Center; Maxime Larivé of Suffolk Uni-
versity, and Soren Triff, production manager of the present edition.   
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Analytical Approaches  
 
The Challenge of EU Enlargement 
  
 
 
 
 
Joaquín Roy 
 
A polemical issue 
  
As it has frequently happened in the history of the European Union, the presi-
dency of the second semester in the rotation system ended in a rush before the 
end of year holidays. In 2005, the uneventful UK presidency reluctantly managed 
to get a budget approved for the period of 2007-2013 with the predictable result 
that no one would be entirely satisfied. The new members of the EU feared to be 
left behind in a shrinking financial perspective caused by the reluctance of the net 
contributors to continue subsidizing members that had considerably improved 
their conditions. Most governments (especially the UK) resisted loosing preroga-
tives gained in the past through deals and compromises.  
In any event, it seemed that business as usual in the EU funding process had 
ended. The reason behind was the new membership profile of the entity after its 
major enlargement executed in 2004. This historical milestone had impacted all 
and each of the dimensions of the EU that were maintained in a rather solid state 
for over half of a century. The failure to ratify the Constitution project was the 
most dramatic sign of the new times.
1  
During all 2005, numerous observers interpreted the constitutional disaster 
encountered by the negative referendums held in France and the Netherlands as a 
sort of protest vote for the enlargement of the EU. The double rejection was read 
as a late regret for the acceptance by the French and Dutch governments of what 
                                                 
1 For a selection of scholarly texts on the background and development of the EU Constitu-
tion: Clive Church and David Phinnemore, Understanding the European Constitution (New York: 
Routledge, 2005); Lynn Dobson and Andreas Follesdal, Politica Theory and the European Consti-
tution (New York: Routledge, 2004); María Luisa Fernández-Esteban, The Rule of Law in the 
European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Christian Joerges, Yves 
Meny, and J. H. H. Weiler, eds. What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Policy? (Florence: 
European University Institute, 2000); Roberto Miccù and Ingolf Pernice (eds.). The European Con-
stitution in the Making (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004); Brendan P.G. Smith, 
Constitution Building in the European Union. The Process of Treaty Reform (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002); J.H.H Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999); Javier Ruipérez, La Constitución Europea y la teoría del poder constituyente 
(Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000); Enoch Albertí (ed.), El proyecto de nueva Constitución Europea 
(Barcelona: Fundació Pi i Sunyer, 2004).  14  Roy 
 
was the most spectacular enlargement of the European Union in its history.
2 
From the existing fifteen members mostly located in western and southern 
Europe, it went to have twenty five partners, with the incorporation of eight for-
mer Soviet pact members and two small Mediterranean states. In addition, two 
more applicants (Romania and Bulgaria) were to wait for 2007 to enter, and a 
third (Turkey) had been knocking on the doors of Europe for years.
3 
It is rather ironic to see that while the EU process seems to be under deep 
questioning while media attention has been caught by the constitutional failure 
affecting the whole structure and aims of the European integration scheme, en-
comiastic analysis coming from outside observers and the most euro-skeptic 
states enjoy stressing in glowing terms the accomplishments and positive future 
prospects of the EU. Some best sellers
4 are only a sample of the confirmation that 
pessimism is absent in the minds of observers who concentrate on a comparative 
perspective and have come to the conclusion that the EU is not the most accom-
                                                 
2 Among the selective bibliography dedicated to the process of EU enlargement, the following 
books should be considered: Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The 
Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Fra-
ser Cameron, ed. The Future of Europe – Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge, 2004); 
Marise Cremona, ed. The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Stuart Croft, et al. The Enlargement of Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999); Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy Towards Central and Eastern 
Europe, 2
nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); José I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of 
Europe: Promises, Negotiations, and Compromises (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2001); Esther Barbé 
and Elizabeth Johanson (eds.) Beyond enlargement: the new members and the new frontiers of the 
enlarged European Union ( Barcelona: Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2003); Bernard 
Steunenberg (ed.), Widening the European Union: the politics of institutional change and reform 
(London/NY: Routledge, 2002). Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka, The road to the European Un-
ion. (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2003); James Hugues. Europeanization 
in the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the myth of conditionality (Houndmills, 
Hampshire/New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004); Milada Anna Vachudova. Europe undivided. 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Presse, 2005); JoAnn Carmin and Stacy D. VanDeveer 
(eds).  EU enlargement and the environment: institutional change and environmental policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (London/NY: Routledge, 2005); Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, Driven to 
change: the European Union’s enlargement viewed from the East (Manchester/NY: Manchester 
Univ. Press, 2004); Geoffrey Pridham, Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change 
in postcommunist Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005); Anatol Lieven abd Dmitri Trenin (eds.) 
Ambivalent neighbors: the EU, NATO and the price of membership (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 
2003); Peter Poole. Europe unites: the EU’s eastern enlargement (Westport, Conn: Preager, 2003); 
Heather Grabbe, Enlarging the EU eastwards (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1998).   
3 For a basic panoramic view of the enlargement process and regulations, visit the website of 
the Commission: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html 
4 Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclips-
ing the American Dream (NY: Tarcher, 2004); Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Cen-
tury (London: Perseus, 2005); T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: the new superpower and the 
end of American supremacy. (NY: Penguin, 2005). The Challenge of EU Enlargement   15 
 
plished of the regional integration frameworks existing, but it has still much to 
offer to its citizens.
5 
However, the record shows an impressive amount of reasons to explain the 
fiasco and deal with the impasse. While there is no clear consensus on focusing 
on the most salient dimensions for blaming the failure to obtain the needed ratifi-
cation, some were frequently mentioned as most relevant and still are on the 
drawing table when dealing with potential solutions. Some are rather philosophi-
cal and very difficult to define in concrete terms, such as the old polemic over the 
need to deepen the European process before widening it. In this sense, the elec-
torates rejecting the referendum feared a loss of identity and were not prepared 
for an “indigestion” before settling the original house in order. Some other ex-
planations point out to the perception that economic problems would worsen with 
enlargement. Problems in racial and ethnic tolerance added to these fears. In his-
torical terms, the new electorates showed to have lost the original aims of the EU 
to stop the European wars.
6 In foreign policy, the prospects of electing (as some 
politicians seem to propose) between a stronger EU and a distance from the 
United States have contributed to confusion and ambivalence. In essence, the 
culprits were the combination of enlargement by itself and the lack of effective 
leadership in explaining it.
7 National interests took over and darkened the sun 
needed to see what was really at stake.
8 French voters felt that the Constitution 
did not sufficiently reflect a more encompassing social Europe, rather a too neo-
liberal project.       
Contrary to a myth that apparently was widely accepted (and abused by in-
terested parties), the enlargement the EU was not executed too fast. In fact, the 
citizens of the new members have their freedom of migration and establishment 
extremely curtailed and delayed, in some cases until 2011 and 2014. The claim 
that enlargement has been costly is corrected by the evidence that trade figures 
are still positive for the original 15 and the moving of certain industries to better 
locations in the new members will only lead to an expanded market for all con-
sumers. Regarding the bill for the enlargement expenses, the fact is that cohesion 
policies have cost only about 0.18% of the EU GDP, something that experts con-
sider a reasonable figure for the closing of the division of Europe.
9 Moreover, 
                                                 
5 John Thornhill, “Europe’s dirty secret: it is doing rather well,” Financial Times, September 
1, 2005; Katrin Benhold, “Old Europe, new ideas: a look at what works,” The International Herald 
Tribune, August 10, 2005. 
6 See Daniel Dombey, “Europe’s growing pains,” Financial Times, September 3, 2005. 
7 Financial Times, “How Europe has lost its way,” March 21, 2005. 
8 George Parker and John Thornhill, “Fighting for their slice of Europe,” Financial Times, 
October 5, 2005. 
9 For the cost of enlargement: Alan Mayhew, The financial and budgetary impact of enlarge-
ment and accession (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2003); Bernard Funck, Expenditure poli-
cies towards EU accession. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002).   16  Roy 
 
blaming enlargement for the rejection of the Constitution does not match with 
scientific evidence provided by surveys showing that only 6 percent of the 
French voters declared acting this way as a protest for the prospects of a wider 
EU. Careful studies have revealed that as high as 82 percent of the voters reject-
ing the text did so for domestic economic and social reasons.
10        
Separate from this polemic, the failure of the constitutional process, or at 
least the impasse produced, has served to generate a considerable volume of pro-
posals to get the EU moving ahead. It is interesting to note, as proof of its relative 
comparative success, that propositions and rational commentaries have not only 
come from Europeans who have much invested in the operation, but also from 
observers in other parts of the world. The EU has become an asset for all to care. 
Significantly, the crisis and its background have not been seen solely in negative 
terms, but also a positive event that will generate solutions not only for the EU 
but for other cooperative arrangements in other regions where the EU is a point 
of reference if not a model.
11 Correcting the notion that fear of a loss of identity 
played a major role, some observers insisted on the need to proceed ahead and 
focus on issues that are identified as crucial for the citizens, much in the tradition 
of the effectiveness of the “civic nation” that has to deliver benefits so the elec-
torate executes a “daily plebiscite” every night, as Ernest Renan said.
12 In this 
direction, seven European presidents drafted a collective letter stressing the ac-
complishments of the EU and the need to deepen it with the conviction placed on 
the common values combining well functioning markets and social justice.
13 This 
contrasts with a rather suicidal and self-serving proposal made by the Czech 
president for the formation of an Organization of European States (supposedly 
following the model of the UN and the OAS, in a intergovernmental manner) to 
replace the EU.    
Far from simply leaving the problem unsolved for the Austrian or Finnish 
presidencies in 2006, or even more expectantly in the hands of Germany in 2007, 
some analysts, EU practitioners, and institutions,
14 have rushed to elaborate suc-
cinct but precise formulas to get the EU process on track. The sane and well-in-
tentioned proposals oscillate between the individual rescuing of some of the most 
innovative institutional reforms included in the EU constitutional project and the 
                                                 
10 José Ignacio Torreblanca, “La ampliación no tiene la culpa,” El País, 21 julio 2005.  
11 William Pfaff, “A good crisis for the EU,” InternationalHerald Tribune, June 4, 2005; Ma-
rio Vargas Llosa, “Europa: ¿Una bella idea?” El País, 12 diciembre 2004. 
12 Financial Times, “Pointing Europe in a new direction,” June 18, 2005; Manuel Castells, 
“¿Reconstruir Europa?,” La Vanguardia, junio 25 2005. 
13 “Getting the ship back on course,” The International Herald Tribune, July 15, 2005.  
14 See, for example,” Plan “D” offered by the Commission. For an evaluation, see comment in 
Euroactive: http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-144593-16&type=News The Challenge of EU Enlargement   17 
 
amendment of the text made by another convention.
15 EU scholars with keen le-
gal analytical tools have shifted through the options and proposals and have come 
to some conclusions, worth taking into account at any time.
16 First, the notion of 
the solution of enhanced cooperation to reform the treaties is illegal. This proce-
dure is feasible to carry out existing legislation, but not for approving new ven-
tures (Minister of Foreign Affairs, voting system). Other options are then divided 
into unfeasible (among them the withdrawal of France and the Netherlands from 
the EU) and very unlikely and cumbersome (implementation for the Treaty only 
for the countries approving it). An alternative is to let time pass and then proceed 
to another ratification process, of dubious outcome in the French and Dutch 
cases. That leaves the options of reforming the constitutional treaty or continuing 
with the existing treaties always open for modifications regarding some of the 
items that seem to be acceptable in the failed project. Meanwhile, the EU is left 
with its existing framework.       
In any event, all these well-intentioned contributions and explanations about 
the constitutional disaster have come too late regarding the reality of enlarge-
ment. First, there is no other way out and the path taken cannot be redrawn, 
unless the unthinkable is contemplated by proceeding to dismantle the European 
Union. In fact, complaints about the supposedly bad timing are inaccurate. In 
fact, steps taken in implementing the recent enlargement have arrived with more 
than half a century of delay. Instead of wrongly equating (according to some) the 
referendum as a vote of confidence on enlargement, the French and the Dutch 
electorates should had blamed the founders of Europe, who initiated the unstop-
pable script for what is wrongly called “enlargement”. In essence, it was the 
“completion” of Europe. 
It is true, anyway, that EU enlargement is the root for the drastic institutional 
development that the EU decided to face with the rolling on of the constitutional 
project. Once the decision was made to embark on the last stages of the incorpo-
ration of the ten new members, the EU train left the station with no intention of 
returning to the old depot, but to arrive at a new, larger, modern mansion. The 
consensus was that the resulting structure could not any longer be governed the 
same way as it was when the old European Community had only six, nine, or 
twelve members. Then more ambitious European Union seemed to be comfort-
able with just fifteen states with a considerable level of development and political 
consolidation. The new members in the EU of 25 states were much poorer and 
they came not simply from old-fashion authoritarian regimes but from the long 
dark era of communism.  
                                                 
15 Peter Sain ley Berry, “Let’s pick up the constitutional bill,” Euobserver, November 11, 
2005; Inigo Méndez Vigo and Alexander Stubb, “A five-step plan to get Europe’s constitution on 
track”, Financial Times, September 30, 2005; Centre for European Reform/Institut Montaigne, “A 
manifesto for Europe,” October 25, 2005. 
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The series of treaties developed by a never-ending process of redrafting 
chapters and making cross-references to articles and clauses was a system that 
showed its exhaustion. Legally, experts could still justify them as serving as a 
“Constitution” for Europe, but the old texts revealed themselves to be insufficient 
to rule a more complex structure in more complicated times full of world insecu-
rity beyond the prospects of the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the EU had de-
cided much earlier to adopt a common currency (the euro, ironically taken as an 
additional culprit for the European malaise) as a penultimate step of pooling of 
sovereignty pointing out towards the fifth stage of integration, a political union. 
Hence, the need was seen to call for the formation of a supreme “convention” to 
study, draft and approve a new text, a “treaty to establish a European 
Constitution”.  
The murky and confusing world scene created by the September 11 attacks, 
in addition to the erratic behavior of the United States as the sole superpower led 
by President George W. Bush, was an added setting to what was the post Cold 
War context that earlier advised the European leadership of the need to tackle a 
new mission. This task had to focus on the strengthening of the perception and 
capability of the only counterpart or loyal partner for the United States that the 
world could offer. EU enlargement was then mirrored by a similar process ex-
perienced by NATO, through a new expanding under the pressure of the United 
States for providing circles of security over the new centers of instability. Conse-
quently, the long historical European integration chapter that was opened by the 
Single European Act of 1986, followed by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that 
transformed the old European Community into the European Union, confirmed 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, had come to a close.           
The legacy of history 
 
The well-deserved reputation of the EU in following a summit-based procedure 
where many businesses are approved in late hours under the threat of vetoes does 
not render justice to the process composed of enlargement and constitutional de-
velopment. In the time development of the EU, while the music may sound 
sometimes as fast as a modern rock-and-roll tune, the lyrics are well entrenched 
in history, written with care, calm, and tenacity. The enlargement of the EU has 
been blamed by many for inviting for more uncontrolled migration towards the 
EU countries, it has been victimized as the cause for the rise of nationalism and 
racism, and it has been identified as the source of inflation, erosion of quality of 
life, and loss of prestige and cohesion.  
The reality is that enlargement has been performed following a mandate that 
is not only framed in the Nice Treaty of 2003. It is well founded in the offer of 
Robert Schuman’s Declaration,
17 drafted by his associate Jean Monnet. It is not 
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by capricious reasons that some observers call this speech with much affection 
the “Declaration of Inter-Dependency”, the rather venerable document issued on 
May 9, 1950, at the “Salon de l’Horloge” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
France located at the emblematic Quai d’Orsay.
18 While it was obviously an offer 
that Germany was in no position to reject, it was also automatically and explicitly 
an open invitation given for the rest of Europe to ponder. In addition, in a mag-
nificent way it was suitable for the cooperation and benefit of the rest of the 
world.  
First, the script written by Monnet and read by Schuman, made the initial 
overture to the perennial enemy, Germany: “It proposes that Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Author-
ity.” But, immediately following, it adds that this entity be placed “within the 
framework of an organization”, and finally, and most important, “open to the 
participation of the other countries of Europe.” That is the original “contract”: 
the EU at its birth is the property of all European countries-that only comply 
with the minimum and irreplaceable conditions of “membership.” 
Moreover, the universal reach of the original offer is permanently enshrined 
in the same crucial paragraph where the ultimate objective of the European Un-
ion is stated: “The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that 
any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but ma-
terially impossible.” And then its adds: “The setting up of this powerful produc-
tive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to pro-
vide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on 
the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification.“  
All this means that even outside members can be associated with the project 
in a special manner distinguishable from full membership that is reserved by the 
foundational statements made to European countries. Having met the geographi-
cal-historical condition, prospective members only have to abide by the implicit 
democratic and economic requirements already present in the original founda-
tional document, which were consequently and explicitly spelled out by the so-
called Copenhagen criteria. The Schuman Declaration reads that the “production 
of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within 
the framework of an organization”, implying that the means considered to be the 
causes of wars (“coal and steel”) are available in an open market economy and 
that the common administration exercised by an entity (High Authority, prede-
cessor of the Commission) is in the hands of an organization (the former ECCS 
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and the current EU) managed by democratic, legal and voluntary decisions. In 
other words, that the original membership requirements were and still are to have 
a market economy and a democratic political system.  
Any doubts about the validity of these original conditions should be dispelled 
on two grounds. First, the terminology used in the subsequent treaties is impec-
cably market-oriented and it is based on the customs of liberal democracy. Con-
ditions for “free trade”, establishing a “customs union”, and following a path to 
guarantee the “freedom of movement of goods, capital, services and people” are 
only the signs of an open economy, without any of the constraints or ambiguities 
of the centralized (“Marxist”) economies, or the ones where the state has unbear-
able advantage. 
Second, the record of accession procedure of the EC is very clear. No Euro-
pean country aiming at membership has managed to get admitted while having a 
dubious political system. As an illustration of this, a review of the customary re-
quirements presented by NATO would suffice. 
This organization is often credited by the United States as contributing not 
only to the security and defense of Europe, but also to “democracy and liberty”. 
Historical rigor advises prudence in this sense when compared with the initial 
aim of the EU (“to make war unthinkable”). NATO was founded unofficially but 
accurately “to keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out.” 
During the Cold War it fulfilled its mission. With Germany reformed, it stopped 
Soviet expansion without firing a missile. Truman’s interpretation of Kennan’s 
containment worked.  
But NATO also consolidated the dictatorship of Oliveira Salazar in Portugal 
(a founding member of the Alliance in 1949). It never raised an eyebrow when 
Turkey (a member along with Greece in 1952) was under the influence of its 
military. And it never moved a finger when Athens fell under “the dictatorship of 
the Colonels”. The oddity of the status of Cyprus (one of the pending businesses 
of the current enlargement) is still the apparently perennial collateral damage of 
the Greek military policy at that time, replicated by the Turkish reaction. This is 
only one of the many pending issues facing Turkey for an eventual membership 
in the EU.  
In stark contrast to the “flexible” membership requirements in NATO (a sort 
of a “coalition of the willing”), Greece, Portugal and Spain had to wait to enjoy 
impeccable democratic credentials to enter the European Union. This shows the 
clear difference in membership conditions, reflecting a deeper philosophical aim. 
Double standards do not work in Brussels. 
 
Remodeling the House 
 
The history of the EU shows that it has suffered periods of stagnation. However, 
shared sovereignty and geographical size have never been reduced. When com-
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the EU is by far the most ambitious experiment in state cooperation. Nonetheless, 
European integration still has a long way to go to complete its architectural 
structure. This was the most dramatic task to face behind the mission to enlarge. 
Architectural similes have been constant in the history of the EU. When it 
was resolved to convert the Community into a Union in the Maastricht Treaty, 
the text explicitly inserted the description of the new framework with the meta-
phor of the Greek-Roman temple sustained by three pillars. The result has been 
the expansion of the first pillar, while the other two are being pressured to shift 
competences to the first, under the resistance of the governments. The EU has 
also been compared with a cathedral for its symbolism in European culture and 
the long time it has taken to be built. The problem is that the cathedral was de-
signed in 1950 for two faithful members (France and Germany), accompanied by 
another four committed to ending European wars.
 A European Union reaching 
the borders of Russia and Turkey is a different entity.  
With this daunting backdrop, it is not surprising that members of the Euro-
pean Convention
19 commissioned by the EU Council to draft a constitution justi-
fied the need for a thorough legal and institutional reform in view that the es-
thetically balanced image of the Greek-Roman temple did not reflect the reality. 
The EU might be comparable to a cathedral in construction, but it was more like 
a baroque conglomerate, the result of the accumulation of elements according to 
the timely circumstances, with no apparent effort to eliminate decorations or use-
ful pieces of the past. In the opinion of Giuliano Amato, Vice President of the 
Convention, cathedrals of other eras are beautiful to see, but Europe demands to 
be able to function through a complete simplification of its structure.
20 
In consequence, the unstoppable enlargement required fundamental reforms. 
The first is the need to strengthen the external role of the EU. To this end, the 
draft Constitution recommended that the rotating presidency be replaced by a 
more stable term of two and half years with the naming of a personality among 
former heads of government.  
The Convention also advocated for a stronger power for the Commission, to 
which all competences still inserted in the third pillar (interior, justice, borders) 
should be transferred, as well as some functions of the second pillar (foreign re-
lations and security). In addition, it recommended the fusion of the positions of 
the High Representative (held by Javier Solana, doubling also as Secretary Gen-
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eral of the Council of the European Union) and the Commissioner for External 
Relations (Chris Patten then and now Benita Ferrero-Waldner), and the subse-
quent inclusion of this new position in the Commission, as Vice President of this 
institution.  
Until a solution is found and a necessary period of reflection has passed, the 
EU institutional structure is set to remain solidly anchored in a legal framework, 
democratically agreed upon.
21 It is a series of treaties that includes the Schuman 
Declaration “of interdependence” (equivalent to the original foundation of the 
ECSC in 1952),
 the Treaties of Rome,
 the Single European Act,
22 Maastricht,
23 
and Amsterdam,
24 the Treaty of Nice of 2000,
25 in addition to the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights,
26 and the decisive Laeken Declaration.
27 They form, in the ab-
sence of another text that reforms, frames or replaces them, the existing European 
“Constitution”, in a “community of law.”
28 T h i s  l o n g  r o a d  towards “an ever 
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closer union” reveals one of the crucial innate characteristics of the EU. The 
problem is that the EU that is contemplated in this “constitutional” framework is 
the one ruled by the Treaty of Nice and this is meant for a Union of not more 
than 27 members. This number included the current 25, plus Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, the two countries scheduled to be admitted in 2007. They have seats allo-
cated in the EU Parliament and a number of votes for the mechanisms of the 
Council. This is not the case of Turkey or any other Balkan state still outside the 
EU. Any rearrangement of the Nice framework would have to be put through an 
elaborate ratification process.  
 
Membership Criteria 
 
Just in case the historical philosophical conditions set in the Schuman Declara-
tion, the economic practice of the European Union in its development, and the 
political custom in the admission process were not enough, the EU crafted a pre-
cise “code” for membership. This is what the European Union decided to set 
when it issued the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, approved during the Euro-
pean Council of June 21-22, 1993, during the Danish presidency.
29 These condi-
tions were political, economic and legal in essence. Democracy and respect for 
human rights, an effective market economy, and the incorporation of the acquis 
are the cornerstones. 
30      
In practicality, the 2004 enlargement began as soon as Berlin Wall collapsed 
in 1989, with the European Community establishing diplomatic relations with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Preparations for a new economic rela-
tion began with the dismantling of import quotas on certain products, the exten-
sion of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and finally proceeded to 
sign Trade and Co-operation Agreements with Bulgaria, the former Czechoslo-
vakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Si-
multaneously, the EC’s Phare Program began to funnel financial support to re-
build the economies. Through the 1990s, the EC and ten Central and Eastern 
European countries signed Association Agreements, similar to the ones existing 
with Turkey (1963, with a Customs Union effective in 1995), Malta (1970) and 
Cyprus (1972).  
In the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, the EU made major decisions 
regarding not only the conditions of admission but its timing: “Accession will 
take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of 
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membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.” How-
ever, the Union reserves the right to decide when it will be ready to accept new 
members.  
The criteria are spelled out: 
•  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
•  functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
•  the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
However, the EU reserved some options regarding final acceptance when the 
Council added the process would have to take into account “the Union’s capacity 
to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integra-
tion”. Subsequently, the Madrid 1995 European Council additionally required 
that the candidate countries make the necessary adjustments in their administra-
tive structures and that the EU legislation be implemented. 
Analysts have observed that, at the end of the day, once a country shows that 
it has fulfilled the conditions, it is virtually impossible to stop or derail its candi-
dacy. The most the EU system can do is to slow down the process to the limits 
that only experience can determine, such is the obvious case of Turkey. 
At this point, it is worth considering that the balance of requirements prime 
the political and economic conditions to be met, over the geographical and cul-
tural that seem to be vague, taken for granted, or understood between the lines. 
On the one hand, cultural and ethnic factors in resisting the approval of the Con-
stitution in France and the Netherlands, latent in other countries, are not the mo-
nopoly of right wing circles. On the other hand, it is significant to note that con-
servative parties and governments have expressed an inclination to advocate for 
adhering to “European values” (religion, culture, languages) and the location in 
strictly European territory. This specification has been obviously targeting Tur-
key. Leftist or liberal parties tend to prime the fulfillment of the economic and, 
above all, political and human rights requirements. 
       
Positive Experiences 
 
One of the peculiarities of the current enlargement is that it is considered as 
something “special” for reasons that are never fully explained but suspected 
(traces of Cold War divisions, disdain for Eastern European countries, underde-
velopment and cultural differences). The first enlargement, for example, was 
judged to be “normal” once the veto posed by De Gaulle for the incorporation of 
the United Kingdom disappeared with the loss of power of the French leader. The The Challenge of EU Enlargement   25 
 
addition of Ireland and Denmark was seen as a good and practical complement 
and a signal of the fading away of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) alter-
native. The third enlargement, with the admission of Greece, was a first step for 
the addition of the less developed countries of the south and act of historical jus-
tice for including as a member a country that represented the cradle of European 
civilization. 
The fourth addition was seen as a triumph of the power of “injunction” that 
was going to star with the incorporation of the former Communists states. Al-
though Spain and Portugal had to go through a lengthy period of negotiations, a 
decade after dismissing their respective dictatorships was seen as a sign that the 
admission requirements of the EC got tougher but with a prize that was within 
reach. Only unorthodox commentators consider the incorporation of the former 
German Democratic Republic into the overall Federal Republic of Germany as 
another enlargement, but in practical terms could be considered as a dress re-
hearsal of what happened in 2004. The admission of the formerly neutrals Aus-
tria, Sweden and Finland was seen as an unstoppable way for the “normalization 
“ of Europe. That only left the 2004 big bold act that has been branded more than 
anything else as a act of political justice to get rid of the remains of what histori-
cally has been an artificial division of Europe as a result not only of World War 
II, but also of the parceling out of zones of influences between the Western pow-
ers (principally the United States) and the Soviet Union as executed in Yalta and 
Postdam.
31 
Domestic experiences of the previous enlargements could only be collec-
tively evaluated as very positive. Although there has been some concrete signs of 
resistance from some member states in endorsing some of the treaties (Maas-
tricht, Nice), the fact is that the insertion of special clauses and the use of opt-
outs have accommodated most of the peculiarities of the problematic members. 
With the exception of Norway rejecting in a referendum to join the EU and the 
perennial cases of Switzerland and Iceland, no other European country questions 
in depth either membership or will of candidacy.
32  
There is no doubt that the present panorama of the European process of inte-
gration can be judged by the popular question: Is the glass half full or half 
empty? According to the optimists, the balance of the EU, after half a century, is 
impressive. From a chronological perspective, it is certain that the EU has never 
taken a dangerous step backwards. Qualitatively, in terms of competences trans-
ferred from the states to the Community pillar, the volume of the common legacy 
has always expanded. The number of members continues to increase. Even in the 
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persistent stage of uncertainty while the enlargement proceeds on schedule, it 
does not seem this will change. Its attractiveness is irresistible. As the late Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez ingeniously de-
tected: “Outside of the EU it’s very cold.” 
Success stories outrank claims of negative results. Ireland went from isola-
tion, dependency and migration producing to a magnet for investment. The 
United Kingdom resists the termination of the rebate (the “check”). Spain and 
Portugal rediscovered themselves with mutual benefits. Germany owes much of 
its international respectability to its fusion with the essence of the EU. Neutrals 
that had little autonomy in the past (Austria, Finland) can now enjoy international 
influence. Even the United States finds that further EU enlargements benefit the 
zone and its own economy, when expressing pressure for the incorporation of 
Turkey and Ukraine.       
While it still is too early to evaluate the benefits and negative effects of the 
2004 enlargement, the balance shows that membership in the EU is by large a 
good business. The new members experienced a growth in GDP of 5 percent in 
2004, compared with 3.7 percent in 2003. Some countries excelled most espe-
cially. For example, Latvia increased 8.5 percent when the median of the EU was 
only 2.4 percent. Lithuania 6.7 percent, Estonia 6.2 percent, Slovakia 5.5 percent 
and Poland 5.3 percent. For 2005 the early estimates were, for example, 5.6 per-
cent for Estonia, 6.0 percent for Latvia, 5.8 percent for Lithuania, and 5 percent 
for Slovakia. The new members median increase was calculated as 4.5 percent, 
while the EU original 15 members grew only 2 percent, and the overall EU of 25 
2.2 percent. For 2006 the growth in the new members is expected to be over 4 
percent, double the figure (2.2 percent) of the collective EU of 25 countries, a 
prediction that is considered as a sign of economic recovery accompanied by a 
decrease in unemployment and the stability of euro exchange rate.
33 Naturally, 
not all the old members are happy either. While most voters in the Netherlands 
resent being the most generous payers of the EU common budget, other countries 
such as Spain have mixed feelings of leaving the group of the less affluent coun-
tries and losing the benefits of the structural funds. 
In conclusion, the difficulties encountered by the EU are not new in the his-
tory of this successful enterprise. The balance as a whole shows positive accom-
plishments and benefits not only for all members but for citizens in general that 
will have to rely on historical records to compare with standard of living and se-
curity in times past. Experience shows that crises are, at times, actually benefi-
cial, as pressure brings new ideas and solutions. The initiative taken by the Aus-
trian presidency at the beginning of 2006 shows a new direction. By facing the 
reinvigoration of the constitutional process, it marks a new path worth exploring. 
Leaving the situation to deteriorate is not a wise move. However, it remains to be 
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seen how the institutional proposal will match the need for economic and social 
improvements that the citizens need in order to follow the leaders.
34 
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Enlargement and the Promotion of Liberal Norms 
in Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
 
Frank Schimmelfennig 
 
Introduction 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the regional organizations of Europe proclaimed 
human rights and liberal democracy the normative foundations of the New 
Europe. Moreover, they defined support for political change as a new core task 
for themselves. They provided expertise and training to the transformation coun-
tries, gave financial support to the emerging civil societies and parties, and medi-
ated in cases of conflict. They monitored the establishment and functioning of 
democratic institutions and the rule of law; they made financial assistance and the 
integration of the transformation countries into the Western organizations de-
pendent upon compliance with their political norms and, in a few instances, in-
tervened militarily to stop civil war and massive human rights violations (such as 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Macedonia). 
Fifteen years later, ten consolidated East European democracies are or are 
about to become EU and NATO members. By contrast, other countries of the 
region (most of them in the Balkans) have not yet achieved democratic stability. 
Others still, mainly successor states of the Soviet Union, are consolidating autoc-
racies rather than democracies. These divergent developments raise the question 
under which conditions European organizations have had an effective impact on 
compliance with liberal norms. 
In answering this question, the chapter starts from two basic models of inter-
national rule promotion: external incentives and social learning.
1 In this chapter, I 
will briefly report results of a research project that tested the causal relevance of 
the explanatory factors suggested by both models in a comparative analysis.
2 The 
                                                 
1 For an explication of these models as explanations of the influence of European regional 
organizations on the transformation of Central and Eastern, see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe” in 
The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedel-
meier, 1-28 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
2 For an extended version reporting the comparative analysis, see Frank Schimmelfennig, The 
International Promotion of Political Norms in Central and Eastern Europe: a Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis, Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper 61 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 30  Schimmelfennig 
 
results largely corroborate the external incentives model. In general, credible EU 
(and, for some countries, NATO) membership incentives and low domestic ad-
aptation costs are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of com-
pliance.  
The External Incentives Model 
 
According to the external incentives model, the relevant strategy of the European 
international organizations is political conditionality: these organizations set their 
liberal democratic norms as conditions that the Eastern European countries have 
to fulfill in order to receive rewards specified in advance. These rewards consist 
of assistance and institutional ties ranging from trade and cooperation agreements 
via association agreements to full membership. Regional organizations pay the 
reward if the target government complies with the conditions and withhold the 
reward otherwise. With a few exceptions only, the political conditionality of the 
European regional organizations has been strictly rewards-based. That is, if the 
target government did not comply with international conditions, the regional or-
ganization simply withheld the reward. It did not coerce target states to introduce 
political reforms, nor did it offer special assistance or support. Rather, non-com-
pliant states have been shunned by the Western international community, ex-
cluded from external resources, and left behind in the “regatta” to membership – 
with, however, the promise of being welcome once the political conditions are in 
place. The only major exceptions to this rewards-based strategy were the interna-
tional interventions and protectorates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In 
these two cases, the Western international community felt compelled to move 
beyond a rewards-based strategy in order to stop “ethnic cleansing,” the most 
massive violations of basic human rights in post-Cold War Europe. 
The most general proposition of the external incentives model is that a state 
complies with the norms of the organization if the benefits of the rewards exceed 
the domestic adoption costs. More specifically, this cost-benefit balance depends 
on the size and credibility of international rewards, on the one hand, and the size 
of domestic adoption costs, on the other.  
The size of the international reward depends on its quality and its quantity. 
With regard to quality, tangible, material incentives – those which enhance the 
welfare, security or power of the target government – are most likely to have a 
sufficiently strong impact to bring about compliance. The underlying logic of this 
proposition is that, to the extent that compliance with liberal democratic norms is 
perceived to threaten the security and the power of the state and the government 
of the day, these disincentives need to be balanced by positive incentives of the 
same kind. By extension, international organizations that are able to offer such 
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incentives are more likely to have an impact than those that do not. Specifically, 
the EU and NATO, which both provide the highest economic and security bene-
fits available from European international organizations – such as access to the 
most important European market, the subsidies of the EU’s agricultural and re-
gional policies, military protection by the most powerful international alliance 
and, most generally, full participation in the decision-making of the most power-
ful organizations of the region – will potentially be most effective in inducing 
compliance. By contrast, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CE) offer mainly 
social rewards – such as international legitimacy – and soft security. With regard 
to quantity, the higher the welfare, security, and power benefits offered by the 
international organizations are, the more likely the target states will comply. For 
example, the offer of EU membership will be more effective than that of mere 
association, and NATO membership with full security guarantees will have a 
stronger impact than NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  
In addition, the international incentives need to be credible – both with regard 
to the regional organization’s threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compli-
ance and, conversely, its promise to deliver the reward in case of rule adoption. 
In other words, effective political conditionality requires, first, the superior bar-
gaining power of the external agency (otherwise threats would not be credible). 
Second, on the part of the target states, it requires certainty about the conditional 
payments (otherwise promises would not be credible). 
The credibility of the threat of exclusion is generally high in the relationship 
between European regional organizations and the target countries of democratic 
conditionality in Eastern Europe. Due to the highly asymmetrical interdepend-
ence that characterizes this relationship, the organizations possess superior bar-
gaining power. Eastern Europe is only of marginal importance to the economy 
and security of the EU and NATO member states. In contrast, the region is heav-
ily dependent on the EU market and will benefit much more strongly from acces-
sion than the EU member states.
3 Likewise, it has faced higher insecurity in the 
post-Cold War era than Western Europe due to uncertainty about the course of 
foreign policy of neighboring Russia and ethno-nationalistic conflict. Thus, the 
region also benefits more strongly from NATO membership than the old member 
states benefit from NATO enlargement. Both asymmetries enhance the bargain-
ing power of the main Western organizations. 
The main issue, therefore, has been the credibility of the promises. To be 
credible, the regional organizations must be capable of paying the rewards (at a 
low cost to themselves). First, promises are not credible if they go beyond capa-
bilities. Second, the higher the costs of the rewards are to the organization, the 
                                                 
3 Richard Baldwin, Joseph Francois and Richard Portes, “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern 
Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe” Economic Policy 24 (1997): 125-176; 
Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power, EU Enlargement” 
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more doubtful their eventual payment to the target countries will be. On the basis 
of this reasoning, intangible, social rewards have been more credible than tangi-
ble material rewards, and assistance and association have been more credible re-
wards than accession. Eastern enlargement involves substantial costs to the EU 
and NATO, which – although far from being prohibitive – are likely to exceed 
the marginal benefits of the member states.
4 It took several years, indeed, to over-
come the reticence and opposition of a majority of member governments in both 
the EU and NATO and to commit both organizations firmly to enlargement. It 
was not before 1993 and 1994 respectively, that both organizations had made a 
general decision to accept CEECs and it took them until 1997 to open accession 
negotiations with the democratically most consolidated states among them.  
In addition, political conditionality must be clear and consistent to be credi-
ble. First, the conditions under which the reward will be paid must be sufficiently 
determinate for the target government to know what it has to do and for the re-
gional organization to be bound to its promise. Second, if international organiza-
tions were perceived to subordinate conditionality to other political, strategic, or 
economic considerations, the target state might either hope to receive the benefits 
without fulfilling the conditions or conclude that it will not receive the rewards at 
any rate. Moreover, the effectiveness of conditionality would suffer if organiza-
tions used different conditions or different criteria for measuring fulfillment.  
Clarity and consistency have been high in general. First, although many of 
the democratic conditions demanded by the EU and NATO were stated in general 
and vague terms, the continuous stream of communications and reports from the 
Western organizations during the pre-accession process made sure that the candi-
date countries received sufficient information on their shortcomings and 
achievements. Second, the accession process has been by and large a meritocratic 
one. For all countries of the region, political criteria of compliance with liberal-
democratic norms have been the core and sine qua non conditions for opening 
accession negotiations. Geographic, economic, or military criteria have not 
played a significant role in the selection process, and target countries have, on the 
whole, been evaluated impartially on the basis of the organizations’ political 
membership criteria. Of course, the political conditions of membership varied. 
The membership criteria of the CE were stricter than those of the OSCE, and less 
strict than those of the EU and NATO. This has not been problematic, however, 
because conditions complemented rather than contradicted each other, and or-
ganizations with stricter conditions also offered higher rewards. EU political 
conditions have been in line with recommendations and demands of the OSCE 
and the CE, that is, those European organizations most directly concerned with 
the human and minority rights situation in the CEECs. Moreover, they were rein-
forced by the fact that NATO had made accession subject to the same conditions 
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as the EU, evaluated the performance of the target countries similarly, and ad-
mitted roughly the same countries during the same time period between 1997 and 
2004. Thus, target countries could not play one organization off against another 
and reap high benefits in spite of non-compliance.  
If target states are confronted with credible conditionality, and if they are of-
fered equally beneficial rewards, the external incentives model postulates that the 
size of domestic adoption costs determines whether they will accept or reject the 
conditions. The most important domestic costs in the context of political condi-
tionality are the power costs of governments.  
First, the liberal democratic norms, which are the subject of political condi-
tionality, usually limit the autonomy and power of governments. They prohibit 
certain undemocratic and illiberal practices on which a government may rely to 
preserve its power – such as suppressing opposition parties or civic associations, 
curbing the freedom of the press, or rigging elections. Moreover, they may 
change power relations between governmental actors – such as increasing the 
independence of courts or limiting the political influence of the military. Finally, 
above all in the case of minority rights, they affect the composition of the citizen-
ship and empower certain social and ethnic groups. This may erode the social 
power base of governments and, in their opinion, threaten the security, integrity, 
and identity of the state.  
Second, in the Eastern European countries, the number of societal veto play-
ers is generally considered to be small.
5 Political parties have been organized top-
down, are weakly rooted in society and social organizations, and depend on the 
state for their resources. Industrial relations are generally characterized by a 
state-dominated corporatism (in many cases even patrimonial networks), and an 
active civil society has failed to emerge despite promising beginnings in the 
revolutions of 1989. Rather, levels of political participation have declined.
6 This 
characteristic of societal weakness also holds for other target countries of politi-
cal conditionality such as Turkey. In sum, I propose the following hypothesis 
based on the external incentives model: The likelihood of compliance increases, 
                                                 
5 Antoaneta Dimitrova, “Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative 
Capacity Requirement” West European Politics 25, no. 4 (2002): 171-190; Frank Schimmelfennig, 
Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, “Cost, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democ-
ratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey” Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 
(2003): 495-518. 
6 For general assessments along this line, see, e.g., Attila Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East 
Central Europe and the Balkans (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 52 and 106; Sarah Birch, 
“Elections and Representation in Post-Communist Eastern Europe” in Elections in Central and 
Eastern Europe: The First Wave, ed. H.-D. Klingemann, E. Mochmann and K. Newton, 15-16 
(Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2000); Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and 
Eastern European Countries: An Overview” in Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, 11 and 19-22 (London: Pinter, 1999); Nick Sitter, “Beyond Class 
vs. Nation? Cleavage Structures and Party Competition in Central Europe” Central European Po-
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as the size and credibility of international rewards increase and the power costs 
of compliance for the target government decrease. 
 
The Social Learning Model 
 
The social learning model follows core tenets of social constructivism. In this 
perspective, European regional organizations represent a European international 
community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common 
values and norms. Whether a non-member state adopts the community’s rules 
depends on the degree to which it regards them as appropriate in light of this 
collective identity, values, and norms. The most general proposition of the social 
learning model therefore is: a state complies with the norms of the organization if 
it is persuaded of their appropriateness.  
The constructivist literature has identified a fairly consistent catalogue of fa-
vorable conditions for social learning:
7 novelty, legitimacy, identity, authority, 
and resonance. 
First, social learning is most likely to be effective, if the target actor is in a 
novel and uncertain environment. Because all post-communist governments in 
Eastern Europe were novices in a changing international environment, this con-
dition has generally been present. That also means, however, that it cannot ex-
plain variation in compliance. 
Legitimacy refers to the normative quality of the regional organizations’ 
norms. According to Thomas Franck, compliance will depend on “the clarity 
with which the rules communicate, the integrity of the process by which they 
were made and are applied, their venerable pedigree and conceptual coherence.”
8 
If the democratic and human rights rules disseminated by the regional organiza-
tions are clearly defined, consensually shared, and consistently applied among 
their member states, their compliance pull will be high. The general rules of lib-
eral democracy and human rights meet the prerequisites of high legitimacy in the 
Western organizations. The major exception are minority rights, which – in con-
trast with individual non-discrimination rules – do not belong to the traditional 
liberal human rights catalogue of Western democracies, are not part of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire, and are not shared and accepted by all Western coun-
tries.
9 Whereas this lack of legitimacy should result in non-compliance according 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change” Interna-
tional Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 562-563; Alistair Iain Johnston, “Treating International In-
stitutions as Social Environments” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 498-499; 
Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’ ….” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 19. 
8 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 38 and 49. 
9 Bruno de Witte, Politics Versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities (EUI Work-
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to the social learning model, it should not matter according to the external incen-
tives model. 
Identity refers to the international community that the target government re-
gards as its relevant “in-group” and that it aspires to belong to. Non-member 
states are more likely to be persuaded by international organizations if they iden-
tify themselves with the community of states represented by these organizations. 
Whereas most post-communist governments of Eastern Europe have strongly 
identified themselves with the West and made the “return to Europe” their over-
arching foreign policy goal, others have developed a predominantly nationalist 
orientation or, in the case of Belarus, even a variety of pan-Slavism. 
In addition, social learning is more likely to be effective if the agency of 
norm promotion is an authoritative member of the international group to which 
the target state wants to belong. Generally, authority is enhanced if regional or-
ganizations rather than individual states engage in norm promotion and if these 
regional organizations have or aspire to have universal membership in the region 
rather than representing just a narrow selection of regional states. However, there 
is no variation in authority in this study because the agencies of norm promotion 
consist in the same set of regional organizations for all the cases. 
Finally, resonance refers to the cultural or institutional match of a specific 
external rule with the already existing domestic values, norms, practices, and dis-
courses in a specific issue-area. The higher the “degree of normative fit” of an 
international rule, the more likely the target government will conceive the norm 
as being legitimate, accept it as an obligation, and subsequently translate it into 
institutional political practice.
10 Despite high general identification with an 
international community, the resonance of a specific rule propagated by this 
community may be low.  
In sum, and excluding the two constant, conditions, I propose the following 
alternative hypothesis based on the social learning model: The likelihood of com-
pliance increases with the legitimacy and resonance of the norms and the identi-
fication of the target state with the international community. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
How have the conditions of the external incentives and the social learning model 
played out in the democracy and human rights promotion of European regional 
organizations? There is widespread agreement in the literature that the external 
incentives model has greater explanatory power than the social learning model. 
                                                 
10 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of Interna-
tional Norms: A Research Agenda” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 69. 
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As for the size of rewards, nothing short of the high material benefits of 
NATO and EU membership has led to compliance in those transformation coun-
tries that violated liberal human rights and basic democratic norms systemati-
cally. Such regional organizations as the OSCE or the Council of Europe that do 
not have major tangible material or political benefits to offer and rely mainly on 
their expertise, persuasion, and social incentives, have not been able to produce 
democratic change – unless their criticisms and demands were taken up by the 
EU and NATO. This is best illustrated in the cases of minority rights in Estonia 
and Latvia. For many years, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Mi-
norities (HCNM) had tried in vain to persuade the governments and parliaments 
of these two countries to liberalize their citizenship laws and grant minority 
rights in favor of the large Russian-speaking minorities. These efforts bore fruit 
only when the EU and NATO subscribed to the recommendations of the HCNM 
and made their fulfillment a precondition of accession in the second half of the 
1990s. 
The 1997 decisions of the EU and NATO to open accession negotiations with 
a small group of CEECs that had advanced the most on the path towards democ-
ratic consolidation greatly strengthened the credibility of both the promise to 
enlarge and the threat to exclude reform laggards. The impact was most visible in 
countries such as Romania and Slovakia that had displayed a strong interest in 
membership and a rhetorical identification with the Western international com-
munity but failed to implement liberal-democratic reforms. In 1997, it became 
clear that membership was not to be had on the cheap. However, the effect of a 
credible membership perspective is best demonstrated by the case of Turkey. 
When the European Council in Helsinki granted Turkey the status of a candidate 
for membership in 1999 and decided to judge the Turkish candidacy by the same 
criteria as that of the Central and Eastern European countries, it triggered more 
serious and thorough democratic reforms than ever before in more than 30 years 
of Turkish association to the EU. 
Yet the empirical record shows that even sizeable and credible EU and 
NATO membership incentives did not work under any circumstances. Power 
costs increase the more that the liberal community rules affect the security and 
integrity of the state, the government’s power base, and its core political practices 
of power preservation. At the end of the day, governments value the security of 
their state, regime, and power higher than membership in even the most attractive 
regional organizations. This is most obvious in the case of authoritarian or auto-
cratic regimes for which compliance with the liberal norms of the Western com-
munity is tantamount to regime change and a permanent loss of political power 
for the ruling elite. For these reasons, the EU and NATO have not had a major 
impact on either Belarus or Serbia under Milosevic. The most telling case, how-
ever, is Slovakia under Vladimir Meciar. This central European country had been 
named together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as a strong candi-
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tives were high and credible. Nevertheless, and although Prime Minister Meciar 
had expressed a strong interest in Slovakia’s membership in both organizations, 
he failed to comply with Western political demands to preserve his coalition with 
his partners from the extreme right and the extreme left and to keep his authori-
tarian grip on the Slovak state institutions. But even in the more democratic 
countries of the region, in which parties stand a good chance of being reelected to 
government within a short time-span, governments have usually been reluctant to 
comply if compliance threatened to lead to their collapse – for instance, if coali-
tion partners announced to leave the government.  
Democratically elected target governments have only accepted such conse-
quences of compliance in the “endgame” of accession negotiations, that is, when 
the decision of the EU or NATO to open or conclude accession negotiations was 
imminent. For instance, the government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus complied with the UN Peace Plan immediately before the referendum in 
2004 that would decide the inclusion of the Republic in the EU. Estonia and Lat-
via complied with demands for more generous rules for naturalization and the 
public use of minority languages just in time for accession negotiations to be 
opened or completed, although in each case, compliance caused coalition crises. 
In these situations, the (moderate) power costs of compliance were discounted 
against the imminent (and thus extremely credible) high benefits of membership. 
In contrast, the conditions of the social learning model are not corroborated 
by this analysis. First, even in the presence of positive identity, high legitimacy, 
and at least neutral resonance, compliance did not follow (see several of the Bal-
tic minority rights cases). Second, target governments complied with norms of 
comparatively low international legitimacy (minority rights) or low domestic 
resonance when they were linked to credible EU and NATO membership incen-
tives. The analysis thus suggests that the size and credibility of external incen-
tives is the most relevant factor for the effectiveness of international norm pro-
motion – at least in the short term. The promotion efforts of European regional 
organizations have not failed when the international legitimacy or domestic reso-
nance of international norms was low, or because of a lack of “ownership,” but 
when external incentives were purely social rather than material, too small com-
pared to the domestic costs of adaptation, or not based on credible promises. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The historical record of democracy and human rights promotion by European 
regional organizations clearly supports the external incentives model and demon-
strates the relevance of sizable and credible incentives as well as domestic politi-
cal power costs. Which conclusions does it offer for policy? On the one hand, 
European regional organizations cannot create and stabilize democratic systems 
alone. As long as target countries are governed by authoritarian governments, 
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costs. What is more, regional organizations could not rely on the electorates of 
Central and Eastern countries to vote overwhelmingly for reform-oriented and 
integration-friendly parties approved by the West. Most often, changes in gov-
ernment have been caused by societal dissatisfaction with the hardships of eco-
nomic shock therapy, economic mismanagement by the incumbent government, 
and corruption scandals, and this dissatisfaction has turned against reform-
friendly and reform-adverse governments alike. However, the EU and NATO 
have been able to make a difference when domestic opportunities presented 
themselves, that is, when authoritarian governments were voted out of office or 
overthrown by popular uprisings such as in Serbia or Ukraine. The core prerequi-
site is a credible conditional perspective of admission to the most attractive or-
ganizations. An open invitation to all European countries to become EU and 
NATO members once human rights and democratic institutions are firmly estab-
lished has the strong potential to lock in democratic reforms and “civilize” au-
thoritarian, nationalist and populist political leaders and parties. 
This policy has its limits and most of its positive effects might have been 
consumed already. The “easier cases” have become members already and in the 
remaining countries, conditions are less favorable. Target countries need to be 
located in Europe, at least in part, to have a membership perspective in both or-
ganizations and they need democratic movements and parties that are able to pro-
duce and sustain an opening for reform and integration. Within these limits, how-
ever, the EU and NATO should, first, act quickly to negotiate first steps of inte-
gration and establish a conditional membership perspective with countries such 
as Ukraine and Georgia in which democratic movements have been able to re-
move authoritarian regimes. This will give a boost to further reforms and make 
authoritarian reversals more unlikely. Second, they need to maintain a credible 
membership promise for a long time. In most of the remaining countries, the 
forces of democratization and democratic consolidation will take long to unfold 
and entrench themselves. In this respect, the recent ambivalence and wavering 
about negotiating full EU membership for Turkey is detrimental to the goal of 
democratic consolidation in this country.  
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Introduction 
 
The process of European integration has been the subject of much scholarly dis-
cussion and explanation in the field of international relations theory. Explaining 
enlargement is complex as it involves addressing questions on the nature of the 
European Union as an entity, the phenomena of European integration, and ulti-
mately, the changing nature of the state in the age of globalization.  
Most of the initial literature on enlargement was overwhelmingly descriptive 
and empirical in nature.
1 These empirical analyses were valuable for accumulat-
ing detailed information on the process and politics of enlargement. As the ques-
tions about enlargement proliferated, a body of literature placing these facts 
within a theoretical framework, or within the broader theoretical exercises on 
integration,
 2 began to emerge. As Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy have argued, 
even though there is a broad literature on enlargement, “due to its largely atheo-
retical character, it tends to be disconnected from that on the development of the 
union. Enlargement is generally treated as an appendix to the overall develop-
ment in the Union or as a ‘ghetto’ within European Studies.”
3 In the recent years, 
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nonetheless, the space for theoretical interpretations of enlargement has grown 
both in an attempt to place these processes within the larger process of integra-
tion as well as to engage in a dialogue with other schools of thought. This paper 
reviews some of the main theories on European integration and their contribu-
tions to the explanation of the enlargement of the European Union.  
 
Integration Theories and Enlargement: 
From Rationalism to Constructivism 
 
Integration processes have stimulated a rich “menu” or “mosaic” of concepts and 
theories in the field of International Relations.
4 From the outset of European 
reconciliation in the aftermath of World War II to the 2004 enlargement, a diver-
sity of scholars have debated their theoretical assumptions in an attempt to ex-
plain the integration process. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez suggest that the 
development of integration theory can be divided into three broad phases. The 
first started with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and was based on rational 
assumptions with two theoretical approaches dominating the debate, namely, 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. In the 1980s, the second phase 
brought comparative and institutionalist approaches to the foreground of integra-
tion theory, developing concepts such as multi-level or network governance, as 
well as Europeanization of governance rules, institutions and practices across the 
EU. The third phase, which began in the 1990s, was inspired by the influence of 
social constructivism and other alternative approaches in International Relations 
Theory.
5  
This chronological classification does not necessarily mean that one phase 
replaced the previous one. In fact, integration theories are constantly competing 
to provide the most convincing explanation of the dynamic of the integration 
process. As a result of the debates in IR theory, the most influential contempo-
rary integration theories can be grouped in two main groups which represent the 
ends of a continuum. On the one hand, rationalist theories help us understand the 
exogenous constraints on the integration process and EU governance; on the 
other, relativist and reflectivist approaches, such as constructivism, show promise 
in analyzing integration beyond the traditional systemic level of analysis.  
According to rationalist logic, decisions on membership in international or-
ganizations are based upon criteria derived from exogenously given and stable 
egoistic preferences of both existing members and candidates for membership, 
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and which reflect the material conditions of the international system. Interna-
tional organizations are seen as voluntary “clubs” where members derive mutual 
benefit from sharing restricted and divisible goods. Thus, international organiza-
tions expand only in those cases where the losses can be compensated through 
cost reduction resulting from the contributions of the new members. In other 
words, in order to agree to expansion each current member as well as a candidate 
expects a clear net benefit from that enlargement.
6  
The “middle ground” in IR theory is occupied by social constructivism. Em-
manuel Adler defines social constructivism as “the view that the manner in which 
the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction de-
pends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material 
world.”
7 Constructivism does not give primacy to structure or agency; instead it 
argues that they co-constitute each other within the process of social interaction. 
Norms, values, identity, and rules are all variables that can play the role of de-
termining factors, rather than only secondary ones. As Steve Smith points out, 
“constructivist accounts offer a way of studying European integration that is dif-
ferent from that of rationalist theories, in that they see ideas and norms as in part 
constituting the political realm, rather than being essentially intervening variables 
as in rationalist accounts.”
8 The following sections will take a brief look at the 
strengths and weaknesses these different approaches encounter in explaining the 
eastern enlargement of the EU. 
 
Neorealism 
 
From a neorealist perspective, international institutions reflect the interests of the 
most powerful states in the organization. Hence, the EU would expand only if it 
served the interests of its member states. Enlargement, in other words, would be 
necessary if the EU was not able to balance by itself against superior or rival 
economic powers, such as the United States, or against perceived threats. How-
ever, as we have seen both the internal market program and the monetary union 
have been successful, and even if the European Union needed external help in 
order to balance against the United States – or other emerging superpowers - 
economically, it would have hardly chosen the eastern enlargement, considering 
that at least in the short term, Central and Eastern Europe will not be a substantial 
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contributor to the European Union in financial terms. Furthermore, in the absence 
of an external threat in the present day world, increasing EU membership is even 
harder to explain with neorealist accounts. Hence, from a neorealist point of 
view, the eastern enlargement is neither necessary nor useful for balancing pur-
poses.  
Another realist explanation for enlargement suggests that member states 
might seek enlargement in order to balance against another member state that 
appears to have become dominant. In the context of the European integration, 
France and Germany have been the two largest and most important actors, having 
an equal number of votes in the Council of the European Union. French military 
might – especially its possession of nuclear weapons – gave France advantage in 
strategic terms, while Germany was considered to be Europe’s economic “pow-
erhouse.” In the aftermath of the Cold War, when nuclear weapons lost some of 
their significance and Germany reunified, becoming the largest state in the Un-
ion, it could be hypothesized that enlargement was a way for the rest of the 
member states to balance against growing German power. However, in view of 
the fact that Germany was the keenest of all members to see enlargement happen 
and stood to benefit the most from it, this option does not appear to stand empiri-
cal scrutiny.  
 
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 
 
Neorealism and neoliberalism have many things in common, such as rationalism, 
the pursuit of self-interest, the assumptions of anarchy, and the primacy of the 
state, among others. In contrast to neorealists, however, neoliberals argue that 
anarchy and relative gains are challenged by cooperation, particularly in Western 
Europe. The neoliberal view of institutions can be roughly described in the collo-
quial of Dag Hammerskjold that institutions exist “not in order to bring us to 
heaven but in order to save us from hell.”
9 While international institutions cannot 
eliminate anarchy completely, they do provide opportunities and incentives for 
their members to pursue common interests through cooperation. States are still 
rational interest maximizers, but institutions may help change what they perceive 
to be their interests.
10  
The distinction between relative and absolute gains is perhaps the most sali-
ent difference between neoliberalism and neorealism. Absolute gains are thus a 
defining component of liberalism, and as such, key in the neoliberal accounts of 
the world. In addition to the possibility of increased benefits from cooperation, 
the success of cooperation within an international institution is directly related to 
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the number of member states in it – the smaller the number, the higher the 
chances of success. Institutionalist argue – and neorealist agree – that since the 
shared good from which members benefit is divisible, more members means less 
benefits; hence, enlargement leads to a reduction in the benefits received by the 
current members. Expanding the membership reduces the voting power and mar-
ginal policy contributions of members, increases the administrative costs and the 
likelihood of free riding, as well as the costs for reaching an agreement. This is 
the argument that is directly relevant to the enlargement of the European Union 
as well. An increased number of member states suggests more possibilities for 
clashes of interests, and more problems of coordination, administration, and 
communication. Stuart Croft notes that the issue of enlargement may lead to 
opening of divisions among the existing members of an institution. “All of this is 
not to say that enlargement is treated suspiciously by institutionalists – in fact 
quite the reverse, as the process also entails rewards as well as losses. However, a 
basic dilemma is apparent: enlargement versus cohesion.”
11 These dilemmas 
were present in the case of EU enlargement as well, and contributed to a slow 
and protracted process, often blamed for its lack of vision and policy coherence.  
According to the neoliberal logic, then, the European Union would expand 
only if its members expect absolute gains from enlargement. However, the rela-
tively small overall effects of increased trade with the CEECs, at least in the 
short term, the uneven distribution of the effects of trade integration, the fact that 
the EU members were already able to gain most of the benefits of trade integra-
tion without giving the CEECs the benefit of full membership, and the relatively 
low opportunity costs of non-enlargement,
12 suggest that the EU would expect to 
receive benefits only marginally higher than what it was receiving without hav-
ing to bear the burden of admitting a large number of poor and transitioning 
states. These were all factors that in the neoliberal perspective would dictate that 
the European Union not enlarge. From the point of view of the current member 
states, the association with the CEECs was an efficient institutional solution that 
enabled the EU to benefit from the economic integration of markets without 
paying the price of full membership for the CEECs. Since the costs and benefits 
of enlargement would be disproportionately distributed among the existing mem-
ber states, support for enlargement would be uneven. Hence, the higher the costs 
and the more asymmetrically distributed they are, the more controversial the de-
cision to enlarge would be, with accession criteria oriented toward transferring 
the costs on the candidates, and a slower accession process.  
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism enters liberal ground in its analysis of preference 
formation and the importance of institutions, while its realist roots are evident in 
the stress on relative national power capabilities and national interests. The most 
influential contribution to integration theory came from Andrew Moravcsik, who 
argued that the primary source of integration is the interests of the states and their 
relative power. Moravcsik’s key theoretical contribution is the combination of 
two general international relations theories: a liberal theory of national preference 
formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and in-
stitutional creation.
13 
The main argument that Moravcsik puts forward is that European integration 
is where it is because of the very rational decisions of the national leaders of the 
member states and their economic interests, particularly commercial ones. The 
combination of economic interests, relative power of the member states, and 
credible commitments accounts for the form, substance, and timing of major 
steps toward European integration.
14 
Moravcsik and Vachudova explain the interstate bargaining process as fol-
lows: “Those countries that gain the most through more intense interstate coop-
eration – more precisely, those for whom cooperation is most attractive relative 
to unilateral (or mini-lateral) policy-making – have the most intense preferences 
for agreement and thus are willing to compromise the most on the margins to 
further it.”
15 This assumption would suggest that it is the applicant countries – 
particularly those for which accession is an important goal – that would be more 
willing to make concessions, because of the expectation of future, long-term 
gains. 
This pattern of bargaining predominated in the negotiations between EU 
member states and candidate countries: specific interstate concessions and com-
promises usually reflect the priorities of the largest and most powerful states, 
whereas the candidates have little or no room for negotiation. Hence, it was the 
internal negotiations that determined whether and the European Union would be 
ready to accept new member states,
16 while the accession negotiations were the 
least important. Moravcsik and Vachudova point out that in all previous 
enlargements, “bargaining demands by applicant countries for recognition of 
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their particular circumstances were stripped away one by one until a deal was 
struck that disproportionately reflected the priorities of existing member states.”
17 
On the other hand, given the context of the EU’s internal bargaining process, lib-
eral intergovernmentalism would lead us to expect that those member states that 
are least supportive of enlargement will make the most of their negotiating goals, 
because of the realistic possibility that they may bloc the project, lest they are 
able to get their demands. Hence, while the candidate countries would by and 
large have to accept the terms proposed by the EU with very little room to ma-
neuver, those member states that did not have an interest in seeing the Union 
enlarge – such as Spain - would make the most gains in internal negotiations. An 
illustration of the importance of the internal or inside negotiations was the estab-
lishment of the Union’s preparedness to accept new members as a precondition 
for enlargement. Thus, the real negotiations that determined the timing and con-
ditions of enlargement were not those between the EU and the candidates, but 
those among the EU member states. As a result, the EU’s readiness was the most 
fundamental hurdle that had to be overcome, and a condition for accession that 
was entirely independent of the preparedness of the candidates. 
 
Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration that places a major emphasis 
on the role of non-state actors, as well as the interest associations and social 
movements that form at the regional level.
18 The relationship between states and 
regional actors remains very important due to the fact that regional bureaucrats 
seek to exploit the inevitable “spill-over” and “unintended consequences” that 
take place when states agree to assign supranational responsibility to the comple-
tion of certain tasks.
19 This idea becomes important to regional integration when 
evaluating the effects that states have on the often autonomous activities of re-
gional organizations. 
Philippe Schmitter states that national governments find themselves increas-
ingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by con-
ceding to a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organiza-
tions which they initially created. Ultimately, this shifts more power to the re-
gional level as civilians increasingly come to depend on regions to build-up do-
mestic economic and social development, which neofunctionalists believe will 
eventually ‘spill-over’ into political development and growth.  
According to Schmitter, the contribution of neo-functionalism to the expla-
nation of enlargement remains limited because its theoretical premise is based 
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upon new functional tasks, not more territorial units.
20 Increased membership 
brings greater diversity as a pressure on transnational group formation, hence, 
enlargement “attenuates and delays the probability of spill-over—unless such 
spill-over in authority is built into the negotiations surrounding the accession 
process…” (71). He adds that the issue of enlargement is not resolved when a 
candidate country is admitted. Unlike the prior enlargements, the Eastern 
enlargement may shake the functioning of the EU because the conditions de-
manded were more onerous and the willingness to pay compensations much less 
forthcoming.
21  
  
Governance and Institutional Development 
 
The concept of governance is increasingly used in domestic and international 
politics based on the ideas that a governance perspective is able to link policy-
making and institution-building, re-introduces the competition for political power 
into the analysis, and allows for discussion of normative issues of a good political 
order for the EU.
22 This becomes especially relevant when analyzing the increas-
ing role of Eastern European countries within the EU. The governance perspec-
tive focuses on the foreseeable consequences of enlargement in terms of EU gov-
ernance, EU institutional development, and governance within applicant coun-
tries.
23 Also as a result of enlargement, the increased diversity among member 
states will result in their divergent preferences and the decisions made by the EU 
Council will become more difficult to reach. Enlargement will also make strict 
and uniform rules harder to adopt, leaving possible room for flexibility in deci-
sion-making to avoid institutional deadlock.
24  
The enlargement of the EU will increase the intensity of communications 
amongst member states, where new members will most likely be under heavy 
surveillance by old members, as well as the Commission. This could cause po-
tential conflicts within the policy-making process because further expansion may 
cause the EU to lean more towards the principle of autonomy than its current 
principle of community, which could eventually lead to competition within the 
decision-making realm. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch believe that this potential 
emphasis on autonomy stems from the basic principle that European constitu-
tionalism is the relative increase of transgovernmentalism as compared to supra-
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nationalism.
25 This inevitably poses more problems for the parliament as the 
executive would then possess the majority of power, which would only place 
even more strain on negotiations and the decision-making process. 
   
Social Constructivism 
 
Constructivism assumes that the structures of international politics are outcomes 
of social interactions.
26 This interpretation argues that international organizations 
are in effect “community representatives,”
27 “their goals and procedures are 
shaped by the values and norms of the international community they represent. 
Correspondingly, enlargement is value- and norm-driven.”
28 
According to the constructivist logic, the process of enlargement would be 
more consensual if the shared identity, constitutive norms of the EU, and intense 
social interactions led to convergence of member states’ preferences. The deci-
sion to enlarge, then, would be reached with eagerness, the accession criteria im-
posed on the candidates would be principle- rather than cost-oriented and non-
discriminatory, and the existing member states would gladly accept the costs of 
enlargement.
29 
Constructivist accounts would suggest that community representatives (the 
supranational bodies of the EU) would play a decisive role in the decision-mak-
ing process. The costs of enlargement, instead of being transferred to the candi-
dates, would be borne by the existing members. The accession criteria would be 
the “transmission belts” of the liberal values that the EU represents and those 
candidates that are better able to absorb the values of the community would be 
the first ones to accede. 
One of the most important accounts of the European Union’s eastern 
enlargement put forward by Frank Schimmelfennig
30 suggests precisely such a 
constructivist reading. Schimmelfennig argues that the enlargement was value-
driven, i.e., the Union chose to admit those countries that had come closest to 
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internalizing its liberal identity values. The mechanism through which this hap-
pened, he submits, was “rhetorical entrapment,” where the EU’s leaders were 
caught up in their own promises of support for enlargement, which they were 
relentlessly reminded of by the leadership of the CEECs. In other words, rather 
than looking at the balance sheet of material costs and benefits, the European 
Union appears to grant membership to those countries that come to share the val-
ues that lie at the core of its liberal collective identity, namely, liberal human 
rights as expressed in individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights.
31 
By insisting on the internalization of these values, the project of enlargement also 
serves to fulfill the EU’s foundational myth of ensuring peace and prosperity, 
thereby enhancing the Union’s legitimacy.
32  
 
Language- Oriented Constructivism 
 
This more radical form of constructivism focuses on the role of language in the 
construction of the European Union. In its essence, this approach adds discourse 
analysis to the array of theoretical tools in the study of the EU. Language not 
only informs us about the European Union, but also it is through language, and 
speech acts specifically, that much of European integration is constructed, or as J. 
L. Austin points out it is “in saying something that we do something.”
33 Informed 
by the speech act theory, this type of constructivism emphasizes the embedded-
ness of any type of governance, including the European one, into a time-specific 
and contextual discourse, broadly defined as a set of articulations. Reality, its 
proponents argue, cannot exist outside of the language with which it is described. 
The very nature of European governance with its treaties, directives, and regula-
tions, to name just a few of the instruments through which the EU makes itself 
present, is through language, and within a specific politically-informed discourse. 
Academics and scholars, along with politicians, play part in the construction of 
contested concepts, such as “Europe,” and the terms and theories we employ to 
analyze European integration privilege one reading of it over another. A few ex-
amples of that include, among others, the justification of the Maastricht and Con-
stitutional Treaties, the eastern enlargement, the calls for European unity in their 
opposition to the Iraq war, and the debate on Turkish membership. The discourse 
on all of these events has been framed around the perils, security, sovereignty, 
and indeed the very existence of “Europe,” an entity whose definition is more 
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nebulous than ever, but which is evoked in defense of projects from opposite 
ends of the political spectrum. 
The use of constructivism in European Union studies in general is indeed 
widespread. Even though the value and norm-based type is more prevalent, 
analyses based upon speech-act and other communicative theories have gained 
considerable ground in European IR in recent years. As Thomas Diez points out, 
“the various attempts to capture the Union’s nature are not mere descriptions of 
an unknown polity, but take part in the construction of the polity itself. To that 
extent, they are not politically innocent, and may themselves become the subject 
of analysis, along with articulations from other actors.”
34 The choices that schol-
ars make in their efforts to capture the nature of the EU contribute to the Euro-
speak, and the politics of discourse that go along with it. Thus, the language, 
ideas, and values that are used to describe, defend, or discuss the process of 
enlargement may indeed have an effect on how this process is viewed, as “within 
the language in which we operate lies a set of choices about the political deci-
sions of the day.”
35   
Markus Jachtenfuchs succinctly summarizes the opportunities and problems 
presented by this more radical constructivist approach: “It rejects causal explana-
tions, the need or even the possibility of formulating testable hypotheses and of-
ten claims that social reality is accessible to research only in the form of dis-
course. Science, in this view, can have no direct grip on reality.”
36 Based largely 
on post-structuralist assumptions, the claims made by this theoretical approach 
are difficult to test against empirical findings, which a rigorous scientific analysis 
requires. Despite this significant shortcoming, however, these findings are com-
plementary to the more testable propositions of rationalism and provide insights 
into the study of European governance, including the politics of enlargement dis-
course.  
 
Conclusions: The “Double Puzzle” of Enlargement 
 
This brief overview of the theoretical approaches suggests diverging expectations 
for the process of enlargement and its outcome. It appears that albeit neither of 
these theories can fully account for the eastern enlargement, a synthesis of these 
can illuminate the extending of the Western liberal democratic order to the east 
of the continent as consistent with the EU political, security and economic inter-
ests, as well as with the sense of moral and historic responsibility. 
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Even if the decision to enlarge was largely underpinned by normative con-
cerns, as argued by constructivism, the initial decision-making process that led to 
the opening of negotiations was marked by rationalist, self-maximizing tenden-
cies in the behavior of the current member states.
37 The bargaining process show-
cased a divide among existing members toward enlargement and only the reluc-
tant acceptance of the demands of Central and Eastern European countries for 
full membership, especially by those countries that were least likely to gain from 
enlargement, such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Progress in the accession ne-
gotiations was incremental, with the EU members conducting very self-interested 
bargaining during the internal decision-making on the opportunity-cost distribu-
tion of the effects of enlargement.
38 Even after the accession process began, na-
tional and sectoral interests within the Union undermined its ability to deliver on 
its promises, making it a slow, difficult, and frustrating exercise. Rather than 
acting upon the principles the EU purportedly stood for, the primary goal of its 
member states was to minimize their losses. The evidence suggests that this pat-
tern continued throughout the accession process. The normative outcome of this 
very rationalist process came to be known as the “double puzzle” of the Eastern 
enlargement.
39  
As José I. Torreblanca
40 points out, national preferences, transnational coali-
tions, and overlapping policy games, as well as the interaction between constitu-
tional decisions and day-to-day politics in the EU, resulted in this policy gap 
between the normatively-driven decision to enlarge and the highly rationalist ap-
proach toward the accession process. Ultimately, the diverging preferences were 
slowly and costly accommodated within the “template provided by norms, shared 
beliefs, and collective identity.”
41 
In another landmark study of the eastern enlargement as a foreign policy of 
the European Union, Karen E. Smith argues that the making of the policy toward 
Eastern Europe can be explained by a combination of neofunctionalism and con-
structivism. Neofunctionalism can help explain phenomena such as spillover, the 
Commission’s role, and the supranational (problem-solving) style of decision-
making. The emphasis on the process of interaction and its explication of the 
transformation of identities and interests in constructivism, on the other hand, can 
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illuminate the development of the problem-solving style of decision-making and 
also helps explain why the self-styled logic can partly apply in this case.
42 
Constructivist explanations are invaluable to the extent that they can illumi-
nate the degree to which norms and values are integral to a process of transfor-
mation in what is arguably the most thickly institutionalized political body in the 
world. While constructivism can explain the presence and role of normative fac-
tors in the enlargement process and the mechanisms of socializing new members 
into the workings of norms and principles-based body as well as the internaliza-
tion of liberal democratic values, it cannot account for the clearly interest-based 
conduct of the negotiations, both internal and external, the prolonged and incre-
mental nature of the process, the limited role of the Commission at the expense 
of the member states, as well as the transference of the costs on the candidate 
countries. Hence, a variety of approaches that focus both on the processes as well 
as the outcome of enlargement contribute to our understanding of the “why” and 
“how”of the eastern expansion. As in much of social science, however, there are 
no general explanations of the “meta-reality,” rather theoretical approaches that 
help us to understand one or several aspects of the complex and multifaceted re-
ality. 
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Free Movement and EU Enlargement 
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Introduction 
 
For individual citizens in the postcommunist states that joined the Union in 2004, 
freedom of movement symbolized the “return to Europe” of EU accession.
1 By 
contrast to the restricted movement that citizens of many of these states had ex-
perienced under Communism, EU citizenship promised a right to reside and work 
anywhere within the territory of the Union. Experience with the Spanish and 
Portuguese accessions in 1986—and German reunification—quashed the objec-
tion in the discussions leading to Maastricht that extending mobility rights to all 
categories of member state nationals would lead to chaos. Yet the enlargement 
negotiations with the central and eastern European states witnessed a renewal of 
similar objections. There was a significant disjuncture between the existence of 
EU citizenship and the reality of the accession negotiations, in particular the tran-
sition arrangements passed to render enlargement more politically palatable in 
the existing member states. The negotiations disappointed those who hoped that 
European integration heralded a gradual move away from a focus on economic 
integration towards an increasing emphasis on individual rights. Because of 
largely unfounded fears of mass migration from accession countries to existing 
member states, full freedom of movement will be introduced only gradually. The 
addition of new member states with traditions of citizenship that differ from 
those of the existing member states alters the political dynamics affecting the fu-
ture development of EU citizenship. 
 
Consequences of Free Movement for Enlargement 
 
All three Copenhagen criteria—the criteria formulated by the member states at 
the Copenhagen summit in June 1993 by which the membership applications of 
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candidate states are judged—affect freedom of movement. The first criterion—
that EU member states must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities—affects 
free movement most notably in the area of human rights and protection of mi-
norities. The second criterion—the existence of a functioning market economy 
and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
EU—means examining an accession state’s ability to deal with immigrant work-
ers from other EU member states. The third criterion—the ability of a candidate 
state to take on the obligations of membership, most notably by transposing and 
applying the entire corpus of EU legislation known as the acquis communau-
taire—affects the entire legal framework, and thus the existing provisions for 
free movement. 
As a consequence of their gradual development, European free movement 
rights categorize individuals by personal attributes and economic activity. Thus, 
for example, students, retirees, and professionals are covered by different pieces 
of legislation, which obfuscates the similarities in their rights. Even within the 
category of free movement of employed persons, an individual can be covered by 
one of five different regulatory frameworks. Self-employed workers exercise 
freedom of establishment when they move to another country to work; they are 
covered under cross-border provision of services when they continue to reside in 
their home country while providing services abroad. Employees are frontier 
workers if they work for a company that is not located in the same country as 
their residence; they are migrant workers if they move to another country to work 
for a foreign company; and they are posted workers if their home-country com-
pany sends them to work abroad. This separation of rights into different catego-
ries has struck some as odd and in need of change, particularly since the intro-
duction of EU citizenship. Thus the 1998 High Level Panel argued that the 
“piecemeal development of EU rights on free movement of people [is] no longer 
consistent with the all-embracing status of European citizen created by the Treaty 
of Maastricht.”
2 
A significant difference between free movement and other issues is that the 
former is a central component of EU citizenship while the latter are not. EU citi-
zenship confers the right of entry and residence to all citizens of member states. 
As an individual right, if EU citizenship is to be taken seriously, it must be re-
spected by all member state governments. In theory, then, all citizens of new 
member states should have gained residency rights throughout the EU and all 
citizens of existing member states should have gained the right to move into the 
territory of the new member states when these states acceded to the EU. But this 
was not the case. Official documents relating to European enlargement scrupu-
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lously avoided mention of EU citizenship. Instead, the accession and enlargement 
debates focused on the four freedoms: free movement of goods, capital, services, 
and persons. 
Negotiations concerning free movement of goods proceeded very smoothly 
compared with the politically sensitive discussions regarding free movement of 
persons. In much the same way, free movement of goods had been guaranteed in 
the Treaty of Rome, while free movement of persons (rather than simply of 
workers) was fully achieved only after years of debate, with its recent imple-
mentation as a right of EU citizenship. The free movement of capital was more 
politically contested than free movement of goods, particularly on the question of 
the acquisition of secondary residences. Recognizing the “high political sensitiv-
ity” of this issue, the Commission proposed granting certain candidate countries a 
seven-year transitional period for the purchase by citizens of other EU member 
states of agricultural and forestry land, and a five-year transitional period for the 
purchase of secondary residences.
3 Certain individuals, such as self-employed 
farmers who wished to establish themselves and reside in the future new member 
states, were not covered by the proposal. But rather than declaring that the right 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services are fundamental freedoms 
for EU citizens, the Commission simply asserted that the exemptions would pro-
tect “integrity of the single market.”
4 Under the right of establishment, any self-
employed individual, along with his or her family, can move anywhere in the 
Union to establish a business. Thus, for example, a Polish citizen can move to 
Berlin or London as an independent contractor. Unlike free movement of work-
ers, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services have always 
been effective immediately upon accession. 
Of the four freedoms, the free movement of persons was the most hotly con-
tested. This is evident from the timeline for the negotiations on the various chap-
ters of the acquis: free movement of persons was left until the end. The negotia-
tors relied on economic reasoning, and offered transitional arrangements to as-
suage those worried about workers from the candidate accession countries mi-
grating to the existing EU member states. In April 2001, the Commission pro-
posed phasing in full rights for the free movement of workers for all new member 
states other than Cyprus and Malta, acknowledging that the “aim of this proposal 
is to meet concerns where they arise and where they are justified, while allowing 
for mobility of workers,” and that instituting a transition period rather than im-
mediately recognizing free movement rights would “ensure the widest possible 
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public acceptance of enlargement.”
5 During a general transition period of five 
years, member states would continue to operate their own national measures on 
accepting workers from the new member states. After no more than two years, 
the Commission would conduct a review on the basis of which the Council, fol-
lowing consultation with the Parliament, could unanimously decide to shorten or 
lift the transition period. Another review could be requested by any member 
state, existing or new, with a view to further relaxation of controls. If any mem-
ber state experienced serious disturbances in its labor market, it could maintain 
its national provisions for a further two years, meaning that full free movement 
rights for workers could take as long as seven years to take effect. 
The perceived necessity of these transition periods was curious. Before the 
2004 enlargement, approximately 300,000 nationals of candidate countries were 
legally employed in the EU. They accounted for just 0.2 percent of the total EU 
workforce, and roughly 6 percent of the 5.3 million EU workers who were not 
EU citizens. In Austria, which had the highest share of workers from candidate 
countries, they accounted for 1.2 percent of the workforce; in Germany, 0.4 per-
cent. Seven out of every ten accession state workers lived in Germany and Aus-
tria, but even in these two countries they represented only about 10 percent of all 
workers from outside the Union. There were also an estimated 600,000 undocu-
mented workers and migrants from the candidate countries living in the EU.
6 
Most studies predicted that few people would move from the new member states 
to the existing ones after enlargement, and the bilateral migration arrangements 
between candidate and existing member states were often not fully utilized: there 
were already more spaces for workers from candidate states to move to existing 
member states than there were workers willing to move.
7 Yet, despite the exis-
tence of EU citizenship, domestic political concerns trumped European rights. In 
the months preceding accession in May 2004, every member state except Ireland 
and the UK had decided to restrict access to its labor market, while Ireland and 
the UK restricted access to social benefits for citizens from the new member 
states. Proponents of transitional arrangements—primarily the governments of 
Germany and Austria—pointed to precedent for support. The accessions of 
Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 1986 had indeed featured transi-
tional arrangements, but the 1995 accessions of Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
had not. Citizens of those states became EU citizens upon accession and immedi-
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ately enjoyed the full range of rights of EU citizenship. In fact, they had previ-
ously enjoyed free movement rights under EEA agreements. 
The focus on transitional arrangements was oddly incomplete: the transition 
covered only workers seeking employment with a company from an existing 
member state. Workers posted abroad by their companies, independent contrac-
tors seeking to relocate to the existing member states, and independent contrac-
tors wishing to provide services in the existing member states were not covered. 
Indeed, anyone not seeking employment from an existing member state company 
gained rights of residence immediately upon accession. This fit with precedent. 
Even in the accession of Spain and Portugal, the provision of services and the 
right of establishment of self-employed persons was not subject to transition 
periods.  
Nevertheless, the European Parliament urged the introduction of transition 
periods in “regions where workers are likely to commute across borders,” in or-
der to “secure an urgently needed socially sustainable integration process.”
8 By 
contrast, Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein argued that “in a healthy 
economy it is better to prepare for competition than to erect new barriers. After 
all, the freedom of people to move is a central pillar of the single market.”
9 
Rather than justifying freedom of movement in terms of European citizenship, 
Bolkestein, like most opponents of transitional arrangements, reverted to an eco-
nomic logic. 
Domestic politics explains the opposition to granting full free movement 
rights immediately upon accession. In Austria, anti-immigration rhetoric had re-
cently increased and was invoked by Euroskeptics and others to argue against EU 
enlargement. Fears of waves of economically disadvantaged easterners flooding 
over the borders once they were lowered—aqueous metaphors are common in 
immigration fears—were present in other member states as well. For example, 
the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party), a populist party with an anti-im-
migration platform, regularly campaigns against free movement. It won twelve 
percent of the vote in 2001, becoming the third largest party in Denmark. Several 
years earlier, a poster for the “No” campaign against the Amsterdam Treaty 
warned about the coming enlargement: “Welcome to 40 million Poles in the 
EU.”
10 In Germany, some businesses and unions and opposed admitting workers 
from candidate accession states because they feared competition from lower 
wage laborers. Yet it would seem more logical for German firms to demand tran-
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sition periods for Polish firms (right of establishment) which might compete with 
them rather than workers (freedom of movement) that they could hire for lower 
wages than their current workforce. 
The key exception to freedom of movement for individuals applied to people 
needing public assistance. The fact that social welfare arrangements differ in the 
candidate accession states as well as in the existing member states led some to 
revive the worry that freedom of movement between the existing member states 
and the accession states would lead to “social dumping,” whereby companies 
move to the countries with the lowest wages and least regulated labor standards. 
But an erosion of standards of welfare provision in the more established EU 
member states appears unlikely. Indeed the Europe Agreements signed with the 
candidate accession states appeared to lead to a race to the top rather than a race 
to the bottom in terms of the benefits provided under national social services 
regimes.
11 
 
Minority Rights 
 
Migrations are problematic for prevailing theories of citizenship, which generally 
assume a fixed political community whose members reside within one state’s 
territory and possess ties of citizenship to one and only one sovereign. This “ter-
ritorial assumption” leads many to regard migrations as one-time events in which 
immigrants move to a new country to remain there for the rest of their lives.
12 
The assumption that citizenship refers to a bounded, stable, and exclusive form of 
political community continues to inform political philosophy, and thus issues of 
justice and community membership. In this context, the extent of assimilation or 
acculturation which can be requested or required of new citizens is a key con-
cern.
13 But the assumption of bounded political communities is empirically un-
sound, particularly in central and eastern Europe. 
The existence of many overlapping ethnic groups defines central and eastern 
Europe. Anyone studying the region’s history is struck immediately by the 
wealth of literature on minorities. There are countless detailed ethnographic 
studies of the history of various minorities, including studies of the situation of 
minorities under Communism. A glance at a historical atlas containing maps of 
ethnicity shows a patchwork quilt in central and eastern Europe. This pattern has 
been simplified somewhat, particularly following the Second World War, but 
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important minority populations still exist both within and beyond the new mem-
ber states. 
One reason for the insistence that candidates states protect minority rights 
before accession was to diminish the chance of an exodus of minority popula-
tions. A pertinent example of what worried existing member states is attempts by 
Roma residing across the region to emigrate west. Following Czech commercial 
television station TV Nova’s 1997 broadcast of a misleading documentary about 
how Roma could easily emigrate to Canada, there was a dramatic increase in the 
number of Roma launching immigration and refugee claims, and the Canadian 
government reintroduced a visa requirement for Czech citizens. Shortly thereaf-
ter, when a similar TV Nova documentary promoting the UK as an immigrant’s 
paradise for Roma led to a spike in immigration claims, the UK imposed a visa 
requirement on Slovak citizens.
14 Various EU member states subsequently reim-
posed or refused to lift visa requirements on citizens of the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. This affected not only immigration visas 
but also travel visas. The reimposition of visa requirements for citizens wishing 
to travel in the EU increased tension between the majority populations, who gen-
erally perceived Roma emigration as economically motivated, and the Roma, 
who pointed to discrimination as a key factor for their desire to emigrate.
15 As the 
risk of high levels of Roma immigration seemed less likely, EU member states 
gradually lifted the visa requirements, but the emphasis on promoting minority 
rights in candidate states as a means to discourage emigration persisted through-
out the accession negotiations.
16 
Most of the studies of freedom of movement focus on the potential for mi-
gration from the accession states to the existing EU member states, but freedom 
of movement is not necessarily a one-way flow from the new member states to 
the existing ones. Some member states were apprehensive about immigration 
from the existing member states. For example, Malta was concerned that large 
numbers of nationals of existing EU member states will move into its territory 
following enlargement. Given Malta’s small population, the existing member 
states were not worried about immigration from Malta. But Malta pushed for and 
obtained a “safeguard mechanism to be adopted on the freedom of movement of 
workers taking into consideration the disruption of the labour market in Malta in 
the event of a high inflow of workers following accession.”
17 Similarly, it is con-
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ceivable that, for example, municipalities in the Czech Republic might worry 
about German citizens moving to border areas and gaining control of the munici-
pal councils.
18 A final type of free movement is possible: movement between the 
new member states. Consider, for example, the potential impact of granting Slo-
vak citizens the right to live and work in Hungary—and vice versa.  
 
Consequences of Enlargement for Free Movement 
 
How will enlargement affect the future development of freedom of movement 
and, more generally, of EU citizenship? On the one hand, enlargement might not 
change the nature of integration. New states periodically joining the Union com-
plicates the ways in which decisions about how best to further integrate are made, 
but this does not change the speed or scope of integration. On the other, enlarge-
ment might require slowing down integration. The meaning and development of 
citizenship in central and eastern Europe raises special problems. With the ex-
ception of Malta, all of the new member states developed out of the decay and 
fall of three empires: the Russian empire, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the 
Ottoman empire. Demographic movements and developments within these impe-
rial realms were complex, and the relationship of the individual to political au-
thority equally so. Recalling the distinction between state formation and empire 
building, some question the extent to which “western” notions of citizenship ap-
ply within the new member states.
19 
Again with the exception of Malta, this time expanded to include Cyprus and 
Turkey, all of the accession countries were until 1989 part of the Soviet bloc. 
Communist rule has certainly affected central and eastern European law, but the 
effects on citizenship policy are unclear. It is true that there is no single model of 
central and east European citizenship, just as there is no single model of west 
European citizenship. In terms of policy convergence, however, existing member 
states may have to start grappling with the legacies of Communist-inspired or 
pre-existing collectivist notions of the relationship of the individual to political 
authority. Some authors are argue that the “Central-Eastern European countries 
have preserved (frozen, as it were, through the socialist period) a pre-World War 
Two version of the state and citizenship, in which the former is clearly the lead-
ing actor.”
20 Taking this seriously, the new accession states may have even more 
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difficulty applying the acquis communautaire regarding individual rights than the 
existing member states. 
Another key issue is border security. There is a perceived tension between 
the demands of upholding the safety and confidence of the existing EU citizens 
and the desire to maintain current levels of cross-border interactions in the re-
gions that will come to constitute the new frontiers of the EU. As the Commis-
sion notes, on “the one hand, enlargement should not cause any new division of 
Europe, especially in regions where close links exist. On the other hand, the fu-
ture external border of the Union must meet the security needs of today’s EU 
citizens.”
21 In other words, the eastern borders of the new member states will take 
on new significance upon accession. 
States that currently participate in the Schengen system—removing internal 
border controls while coordinating external border controls—are likely to resist 
the adhesion of the new member states until these can demonstrate that they are 
able to fully apply Schengen standards.
22 In order to speed the process and ease 
the fears of existing Schengen members concerning the candidate accession 
states’ ability to control their borders, the Commission has spent considerable 
resources to support the central European candidate countries in adopting and 
implementing the body of EU law in the field of migration, visa and external 
border control management.
23 The Schengen system will eventually apply to all 
new member states, but full participation in it will be based on a two-step proc-
ess. “The new Member States will first need to achieve a high level of external 
border control upon accession whereas the lifting of internal border controls with 
current Member States will take place only at a later stage, subject to a separate 
decision by the Council.”
24 
Borders which were established and have been enforced since the decline of 
the three empires—those between the new member states—will once again fade 
in importance. After a century of very restrictive border controls, those areas of 
central and eastern Europe which have joined the Union will once again become 
a space in which migrations can occur with little hindrance from political author-
ity. The demographic and political consequences of this development remain to 
be seen. 
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Enlargement and Citizenship 
 
Historical parallels can illuminate the proper relationship between enlargement 
and citizenship. Take, for example, US President Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 pur-
chase of territory from the French government of Napoleon Bonaparte, doubling 
the size of the US. Although the Louisiana Purchase treaty stipulated that the in-
habitants of the territories would “be incorporated in the Union of the United 
States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Fed-
eral constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities 
of citizens of the United States,” there was a lengthy debate in Congress about 
whether the treaty could grant US citizenship.
25 As one Senator noted, bestowing 
citizenship by treaty was unconstitutional: “We can hold territory; but to admit 
the inhabitants into the Union, to make citizens of them, and States, by treaty, we 
cannot constitutionally do.”
26 In response, newly elected Senator John Quincy 
Adams proposed a constitutional amendment giving Congress the authority to 
incorporate new territories into the Union and bestow citizenship on the inhabi-
tants of those territories.
27 His proposal was rejected, and there followed lengthy 
debates before the issue was finally settled. The question of whether the EU can 
simply bestow citizenship with the enlargement treaties was not raised, although 
the underlying dynamic is the same as it was with the Louisiana Purchase: the 
extension of the polity to new territory, and the granting of rights to the inhabi-
tants of those territories. 
The accession of new member states is not a one-time event but rather a 
gradual process, as the protracted negotiations on implementing the acquis com-
munautaire indicate. Though it is difficult to conceive of citizenship in terms of a 
gradual process, the extension of EU citizenship rights to citizens of new member 
states is proceeding in stages, as this paper’s discussion of the free movement of 
workers demonstrates. Yet citizenship is usually seen as a unitary status: either 
one is a citizen or one is not. That is not the way to think of citizenship in this 
case, because the current enlargement involves step-by-step extension of rights to 
individuals. 
Most analyses of EU enlargement focus on economics. This chapter’s focus 
on citizenship opens up a wide range of social and political factors. Analyzing 
citizenship means going well beyond describing the “technical, depoliticized 
process of exporting the Union’s acquis communautaire.”
28 Enlargement forces a 
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new examination of the content and meaning of EU citizenship. The question of 
whether there are some core rights and some auxillary ones is raised when the 
key right of EU citizenship—the right to move and take up residence—is denied 
to at least one important category of individuals: migrant workers from accession 
countries. EU citizenship is not a fixed category. Its meaning is contested by the 
various EU institutions, national governments, groups, and individuals, and this 
contestation is a key to understanding European integration. By highlighting the 
contestation, the enlargement process illuminates the nature of European 
integration. 
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Introduction 
 
Previously exclusive national identities in the established member states of the 
European Union (EU) have been transformed through economic as well as politi-
cal measures and developed a common transnational European identity rooted in 
culture and history but now further developed by civic measures initiated by the 
Union. The new member states and some of the ones accessing in the future can 
only rely on a common cultural European identity and have few experiences with 
the adaptation pressures effected through Europeanization. This essay will look 
at the extent an assumed common cultural European identity can be drawn upon 
as a connecting link between old and new member states and explore the impact 
of continued enlargement for the definition of a European identity, arguing that 
ongoing enlargement will dilute state-centric ideas of commonalities and pres-
sure the EU to adapt to a looser configuration of European integration and 
identity. 
As a citizen of Germany, I have seen the transformation initiated through 
German unification first-hand and am well aware of the multifaceted challenges 
facing political systems that gain additional entities. After more than 15 years, 
Germany is still deeply affected by disparities that mark not only the economic 
and political realities of Western and Eastern Germans, but also (maybe most 
importantly), their differences concerning a common national identity. A new 
gesamtdeutsche identity is only very slowly evolving and has to overcome issues 
of historical differences, political representation and social cohesion. 
Similarly, the process of EU enlargement - the widening aspect of European 
integration - has to deal with similar obstacles. Last year’s monumental enlarge-
ment is still high on the agenda of European policy-makers and their constituents 
and already, more successive enlargements are planned influencing the course of 
future integration today, as can be seen in the debate surrounding the ratification 
of the EU constitution and the role Turkey’s accession plays in it.  
Therefore, the question to what extent old and new member states in the EU 
are willing and able to transform their transnational European identity is of ut-
most importance for the future of the Union. In this paper, I will first lay out 68  Thiel 
 
some theoretical aspects of the term and then look at some of the issues sur-
rounding the necessitated change in identification with Europe, arguing that if the 
Union is to retain their citizen’s approval, it will have to decide how ‘civic’ and 
diverse it wants to become and communicate these objectives more clearly to its 
constituents.  
 
European Identity or European Identities?  
 
While research about the existence of a cultural European identity, based on his-
torical, religious and other commonalities exist in abundance, there is no concise 
definition available that would capture all essential elements. Few scholars focus 
specifically on the formation of a European identity on a socio-political level. 
Only recently Michael Bruter investigated attitudes towards the separate civic 
and cultural components of a European identity, finding that European identity 
does not automatically translate into support for EU integration but is linked to 
mainly civic ideas about the EU.
1 In general the literature on post-national 
citizenship and identity proposes that the transformation of identities in the EU is 
occurring as a result of various factors: differentiation and ascription from out-
side, below and above (e.g. how Europeans see themselves as such and how they 
distinguish other ‘non-EU’ Europeans as well as non-Europeans), internal ho-
mogenization (e.g. the convergence of standard of living, of law or of culture) 
and inclusion (e.g. of the societal peripheries to the center).
2 It also highlights the 
changes in identity through the media and the perceived value gained from pos-
sessing a European identity. An ‘identity’ growth is postulated that enables peo-
ple to maintain their identity as nationals as well as Europeans. In this respect, 
the EU has actually achieved a identity hegemony in the sense that the EU has 
occupied, over the period of only 50 years, the political and social space which 
was previously regarded as solely European.
3 
Juergen Habermas strongly proposes a transformation of (Western) European 
societies from national to transnational communities, moving from ‘ethnos to 
demos.’ This approach is linked with his ideal of a constitutional patriotism, ac-
cording to which citizens should not identify with a cultural or ethnic identity but 
rather with constitutional principles that guarantees their rights and duties.
4 The 
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step to create a common constitution for the EU revived Habermas’ theory. Co-
incidentally, it clashes with some of the real existing problems such as the exclu-
sion of third-country nationals and minorities living in EU member states. Does 
the EU’s Constitution apply to these collectives as well? And how can a common 
constitution, as an instrument of nation-building, be reconciled with a call for a 
civic patriotism? These are just a few questions that are left open to discussion. 
The idea of liberal contractualism as a way to bind European citizens closer to 
the EU has been explored by other scholars who maintain that citizens accept 
institutions as legitimate if they can be justified by some kind of social contract.
5 
So far, this principle has been mainly applied in the national arena, since there 
are few instances in which the EU established a social contract with its citizens; 
treaties are not recognized as such. While this theory is helpful in dealing with a 
diversified Union, unfortunately it remains an academic approach without signifi-
cance for the day-to-day politics of the Union or its citizens. 
The inclusive principle of identity transformation is essential for theorists who 
maintain that a new European identity is emerging that encompasses national 
sub-identities and at the same time allows for cultural and ethnic differences em-
bedded in a broader societal context. This multi-cultural, inclusive conception 
clashes with the argument that the way the EU is promoting European identity is 
that of an official ‘Euronationalism,’ the promotion of an exclusive political 
block. Analysts generally agree in doubting the suitability of the nation-model for 
a just and plural system of transnational governance.
6 Even though common 
characteristics are certainly helpful in fostering an identity, past examples have 
usually been exclusive and oppressive and thus cannot provide a model for an 
acceptable transnational identity structure.  
Many scholars agree that in current EU member states the Europeanization of 
domestic collective identities occurs according to nation-specific characteristics 
of their nation and Europe.
7 “Specific concepts of the nation and collective 
identities that emerged in each country are associated with specific modes of in-
tegrating immigrants and integrating Europe as well as integrating the country 
into Europe.”
8 That is why France has pursued a more ambitious but also more 
transnational concept of Europe and the EU than for example, Britain. But while 
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this has been true for the last 50 years of integration, I want to make the point 
that in recent years, this process also started to work in a reverse mode. It is not 
exclusively the states’ conception of their view of Europe anymore that has a 
monopoly on domestic identity discourses, but the EU as an active player in-
forms collective identity formation as well. Firstly, the EU has developed a tight 
network of competencies and policies that tangibly influence domestic political 
spheres in an unprecedented way. Secondly, there now are too many member 
states cooperating in the Union as that a nationalized notion of Europe or the EU 
could prevail in one state. The Franco-German dominance in EU policy making, 
for example, is increasingly clashing with differing views of other member states 
seeking equal power. The recent enlargement negotiations made this process al-
ready apparent, in which Europeanization informed national identity in the can-
didate countries to quite a large extent, e.g. with the debate about how much new 
member states should compromise their national interests during integration into 
the EU.  
 As a political integration project planned by European elites, the European 
identity propagated by the EU lacks the ‘natural’ foci of identity as maintained 
by the essentialists. Most citizens of the EU aspire in some way or another to 
profit from the Union’s policies, showing more instrumental support and less af-
fective identification. Even so, it cannot be generalized that purely material inter-
ests determine public support for the EU.
9 A stable ‘permissive consensus’ 
among the majority of the EU public existed, thereby constraining or facilitating 
but not determining the future direction and/or pace of European integration.
10 
However, this is not the case anymore since the approval of European integration 
has suffered significantly in the last 10-15 years, marked by the electoral gains of 
nationalistic parties in member states as well as low popular support for Euro-
pean elections and treaties. Skeptics also call attention to the absence of popular 
approval for the EU, the democratic deficit and constitutional problems.
11 Others 
state that the functional logic, which postulates a spillover of economic integra-
tion into the politico-institutional level, doesn’t apply to the identitive layer of 
integration. For once, because it is too complex of a task and secondly, EU poli-
ticians have failed in achieving this goal.
12 
The identity of Europeans, which for the sake of a working definition should 
be regarded here as a cultural-political European collective identity, is obviously 
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a very complex and abstract phenomenon. It is remarkable to find in this context 
on the one hand a particularistic call for common identity factors such as history, 
politics and economics and other socio-cultural aspects and on the other hand, a 
pluralist-minimalist definition of Europe that wants to create an inclusive, civic 
conception of European values. The reality lies in a combination of both tenden-
cies: so far, EU citizens posses a capacity to tolerate intra-European cultural di-
versity but still want to maintain their own national culture, which is consistent 
with the socio-psychological group-identity model. At the same time, the neces-
sity of more common policy actions under conditions of enlargement conflicts 
with the ideal of European unity as well as with the reality of the own culture and 
national interest under integration pressure. 
 A conceptualization of the idea, identity and reality of Europe differentiates 
between those three aforementioned approaches to Europe with regard to their 
ideological content. Nonetheless, one has to be wary about the chances to create 
such a transnational identity in current societies of the Union. Critics contends 
that the post-war European project was born as a model of economic, not explic-
itly political, integration resulting from the wish to overcome the disastrous 
European hegemonic history in the first half of the 20
th century, an argument that 
is still hotly debated in EU studies because it goes to the core of what European 
integration is about. That is why some call for an ‘alternative’ collective identity 
built on multi-culturalism and linked to a post-national citizenship in the Union.
13 
Delanty’s work demarcates well the notions and ideologies behind the goal of a 
united Europe but does not reflect on the current re-nationalizing conditions in 
the EU’s public spheres.  
Other researchers depict identity formation and integration as a rather divi-
sive and excluding process, either within countries of the European Union or 
between them. With regards to the processes inside the affected states, European 
integration is theorized as a catalyst for disparities between socioeconomic dif-
ferent constituencies of the population. “European integration is going to open up 
a new gap between the mobile elite of people moving toward a European identity 
and the less mobile people sticking to national solidarity.”
14 While this view is 
generally true, it presupposes that mobility – which is not further specified here 
either in literally or metaphorical sense – is the decisive factor. This dichotomy is 
oversimplified and should also include other influential factors such as knowl-
edge, political involvement etc. 
Especially in view of European countries that are not (yet) part of the Union, 
the exclusionary idea is preeminent for researchers of collective identities. They 
raise question about the future self-understandings of Europeans with regard to 
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the impetus of widening.
15 Enlargement makes changes in identifications neces-
sary, in the existing member states as well as in the accessing ones. The last 
enlargement could be seen as an EU-internal test for cultural plurality still under 
conditions of a homogeneous attachment to Europe - something that is bound to 
change with successive enlargements. 
 
European Identity and Enlargement 
 
The ongoing enlargement process of the EU forces policy makers and citizens in 
both, the acceding and the established member states of the Union, to reflect 
upon their existing identity. On first sight, enlargement seems to be a relatively 
unproblematic feature of European integration since in theory the EU receives 
more power with the addition of new markets and states, and the accession coun-
tries have much to gain from joining an economically and politically well-devel-
oped entity such as the EU. In practice, however, there are many factors that need 
to be considered in the process of enlargement, in particular with regards to 
questions surrounding national and European identity. Most problems with the 
accessing countries so far have tended to focus on rather practical issues related 
to the disparity in wealth and problems arising from intra-European competition 
of these new members.
16 There was no real discussion about the compatibility of 
the newcomer’s cultural identity with the existing ideas of (Western) European 
identity, nor a much needed debate about the finality objective of the Union. For 
once, the added member states so far are securely located within the geographical 
and cultural boundaries of the continent and particularly the last enlargement to 
the East was seen as a political necessity justified by detrimental post World-War 
II developments. In addition, the Central and Eastern European countries even 
display a higher (self-professed) level of cultural European identity than their 
Western counterparts.
17 
In view of further enlargements to the South-Eastern edge of Europe, a social 
science perspective on the enlargement process started asking where the geo-
graphical and ideational borders of Europe are and how far the integrating poten-
tial of the EU with regards to common identification really is.
18 Particularly now 
that the EU’s external borders reach neighboring countries such as the Ukraine or 
Georgia that are setting their goals on possible EU accession, in addition to the 
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‘big’ question of Turkey’s membership in the Union, the debates setting condi-
tions for belonging to Europe and having a common identity have intensified. 
Others added that rather than developing a popularized distinct European iden-
tity, Europe is simply taking over the globally spread Americanized (pop-) cul-
ture, and the real identity of concern should be the EU’s institutional one.
19 The 
role of the United States is also notable when looked at the EU’s differentiation 
with North America. Despite the infiltration of U.S. cultural elements, Europe 
has distanced itself to the markedly different cultural and political identity that 
the States represent, particularly under the administration of George W. Bush. 
Most new member states in Central and Eastern Europe have a more pro-Ameri-
can attitude and therefore altered previously existing identity-dynamics within 
the EU. 
The shared-heritage argument citing common cultural and historical roots, 
proposed by conventional wisdom and used by many EU politicians as a means 
to construct European identity, is of limited use in a political Union trying to 
cope with 25 or more member states that might be considered remotely Euro-
pean. Often enough, this argument has been discounted by opponents stating that 
Europe was more often than not torn apart by rivalries and split between com-
peting powers, churches and governments.
20 A single demos for the EU as in the 
development of the collective national identities in Europe in the 19
th century is 
not a viable option for the development of a transnational community. And if the 
recently admitted countries’ ‘return to Europe’ was a sign of reconciliation with 
Europe’s often unjust past, how can the same principle be applied to countries 
such as Turkey that were historically Europe’s ‘other’ and are still perceived as 
such in the EU in spite of Turkey’s changes?
21 Cultural convergence with Europe 
is impossible in the case of Turkey, and is doubted by some in the case of the 
Balkan countries. This is not to deny that fact that there are already some link-
ages between these countries and the existing EU members, be it in the form of 
association agreements or the existence of immigrants from these countries in the 
EU member states. In fact, the inclusion of culturally different states such as 
Turkey or civil-war torn states like the Balkan countries into the EU could serve 
as a more peaceful and successful counter-model to the prevailing US model of 
democracy promotion and nation-building. 
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In addition, the increase in membership and population of the EU will result 
in greater heterogeneity with respect to national interests and national identities.
22 
Inevitably, the conflict potential for decision-making at the institutional Union 
level will increase, even with the augmented qualified-majority voting as spelled 
out in the Constitution. While Europeanization processes will over time lead to a 
convergence of diverging national interests, the simple fact remains that it will 
become more difficult to reach agreement if more member states are involved, in 
addition to the need for continuous institutional reform necessitated by future 
enlargements, as there are at present no provisions for future candidates beyond 
Bulgaria and Romania to be included in the EU institutions. 
The diversity in national interests, as a result of the widening of the Union, 
will inevitably lead to a weakening of federalist and supranational approaches of 
European integration. It has even been argued that “those in favor of looser forms 
of European co-operation may advocate a speedy and wide-reaching enlargement 
as a means of undermining the federalist ambitions of other member states, and 
this in turn leads to fears that the latter will be tempted to pursue more advanced 
forms of integration within a smaller and more convergent European core.”
23 
Obviously, the calls for enhanced cooperation and more generally, the develop-
ment of variable geometry integration for some core European states attest to the 
validity of this thinking, leading in the long run to a less supranational federation 
of member states but a rather loose model of cooperation. As noted above, this 
approach to integration will find more support in intergovernmentally oriented 
old and new member states, and will also be positive for the economic perform-
ance of the Union: “a loose, diversified and flexible European polity will be bet-
ter than a rigorously homogenized and centralized one at coping with the chal-
lenges posed by cascading interdependence in a world of rapid change.”
24 
In order to retain and augment public support for an increasingly diverse 
Union, traditional models of European identification built upon cultural com-
monalities will not suffice anymore. The EU’s identity as a model of regional 
integration will have to focus on delivering effective and democratic political and 
economic governance, deserving of the allegiance of EU citizens, instead of re-
lying on the cultivation of state-centric models of loyalty to a political entity. A 
‘thick’ cultural identity as evident in many of Europe’s nation-states has never 
been achieved by the EU and further widening will only enable a ‘thin’ version 
of common identification based on common civic values, democratic practices, 
respect for diversity and for human rights. Interestingly, in the debate about Tur-
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key’s accession, many Turks, in view of the some of the opposing arguments 
citing cultural differences, reply that if the EU stands for the civic values men-
tioned above, a narrow definition of its own identity based on religion, ethnicity 
or culture would negate those fundamental principles.
25 
The creation of a European citizenship as a promoter of European identity 
has been introduced with the Maastricht Treaty.
26 However, this measure has had 
no significant impact on the ability of the EU to gain popular allegiance since, 
aside from the freedom of movement, it did not add significantly to the rights of 
EU citizens. Rather, the complementarity of the EU’s citizenship to the national 
one needs to be stressed because people tend to see the overarching transnational 
citizenship as a threat to their national one. While EU citizenship in theory has 
become generally more open and flexible through the enlargement’s inclusion of 
additional nationalities, it remains insignificant for the EU’s identity to cope with 
the centrifugal implications of future enlargements as long as it is contingent on a 
priori citizenship of a member state. The member states’ hesitancy in creating a 
common regulatory framework for immigration and asylum policy shows that 
European citizenship is still too strongly attached to national citizenship to be an 
effective transporter of the civic ideas of pan-European unity. While the former is 
a problem dealing with the basic idea behind European citizenship, another unre-
solved would be how to communicate a real transnational citizenship to the EU 
public if it already displays xenophobic reactions to its new EU citizens? 
 
Conclusion 
 
The last, fifth enlargement challenges the institutional capacity and economic 
cohesion of the EU to a dramatic extent. More importantly, the increase in mem-
bership will make it more difficult to achieve socio-political cohesion, let alone a 
common cultural identification. The impetus of widening starkly contrasts with 
the Union’s attempt to construct and preserve a common cultural identification 
for Europe. It is my conviction that continued enlargement, particularly with 
countries of different religious and ethnic-cultural backgrounds, will lead to a 
weakening of common reference points for a European identity, therefore making 
it less useful as an instrument for European integration. A multi-level govern-
ance, based on (neo-)functional integration will continue to internally homoge-
nize the various member states of the EU, but any approach of developing a 
transnational identity from above, based on cultural commonalities, will be sub-
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ordinated to the various interests and diverging national identities of the many 
member states.   
Moreover, these developments make any attempts of European integration 
along lines of nation (-state) building more difficult and unpopular. That is why, 
for example, the constitutionalization of the European polity receives only lim-
ited popular support: besides other arguments against it, the constitution is seen 
as an instrument of furthering state-centric integration at a time when the EU is 
more diverse than ever before. The widening of the EU has reached a critical 
mass in terms of identity-construction, therefore deepening will have to be rede-
fined as to reflect the changed identity of the Union, which will need to be more 
intergovernmental and less federational to (re-)gain and retain popular support. 
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Introduction 
 
Ten days before the Copenhagen European Council summit in December 2002, 
the EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement praised the Central and East-
ern European candidate countries for their successful transformation: 
 
  We see clearly success-stories regarding the system transformation. Human rights 
were respected and minorities protected. Nothing within this process is self-evident but is 
a fantastic result of a human driving-force for reform, mainly driven forward by the 
enlargement perspective.
1 
 
The Commissioner’s assertion that progress in minority rights protection is a 
direct result of the countries’ aspirations to join the European Union illustrates a 
popular perception, within the candidate countries and among outside observers, 
that the drive towards Europe has a profound impact on their domestic develop-
ments. The enlargement impact on majority-minority relations and minority 
rights developments is particularly important considering the ethnic conflicts that 
plagued some of these countries in the 1990s. The focus of this article is on the 
role of the European Union’s representatives and institutions in inducing coop-
eration between ethnic groups for the purpose of minority rights expansion and 
implementation by means of the promise of integration.  
As early as 1993, the European Council had formulated economic and politi-
cal criteria for the evaluation of a country’s preparedness to gain membership in 
the Union. The political conditionality for the Central and Eastern European 
countries’ membership was articulated in the concluding document of the Co-
penhagen summit on 21-22 June 1993, when the European Council put forward 
the “Copenhagen criteria” for EU admission: “Stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
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minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” were em-
phasized as essential conditions for integration.
2 While minority rights were 
never specifically referred to or clearly outlined, the European Union continu-
ously played a critical part in the expansion of minority rights through the state-
ments of its representatives and official reports European institutions issued re-
garding the candidate countries’ progress towards accession. 
The main part of this article focuses on the role of the European enlargement 
strategy in the adoption of laws that favor minority rights, with an emphasis on 
laws in the areas of education, local government and language rights. The focus 
on these particular areas is warranted by the fact that they are the ones most con-
tested both by ethno-national minorities and by nationalistic majorities. While in 
some cases the European strategy is genuinely considered to require reform in 
minority policies, and in others it is mostly used to conceal or justify contested 
acts of governance, the European Union played a role through the signals it sent 
to the candidates.  
 
Europeanization and Domestic Change in Candidate Members 
 
Europeanization  is primarily used to denote institutional and policy changes 
within the European Union.
3 However, as “a process of change in national 
institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration,”
4 
Europeanization can and should also be applied to explain the adoption of poli-
cies in candidate members. Within  the Union, Europeanization refers to processes 
of interpenetration between the supranational and the domestic level, whereas the 
Europeanization of the candidate countries occurs under the pressure of condition-
ality that includes their adoption of the acquis communautaire “as is,” without 
having control over it.   
Political conditionality is “the idea to use the fulfilment of stipulated political 
obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most-favored-
nation treatment, access to subsidized credit, or membership in coveted regional or 
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global organizations.”
5 In this view, conditionality requires the articulation of a set 
of agreed upon desirable practices and recommended, or sometimes even manda-
tory, objectives. But herein lies the problem – the European Union lacks a precise 
and unanimous understanding of what minority rights include. Then, can we talk 
about EU imposed conditionality on Central and Eastern Europe with regards to 
minority rights? If Europeanization is a policy transfer, what are those policies 
related to minority rights that the candidate countries should endorse and apply?  
Minority rights protection has remained the domain of national, rather than 
supranational policies. Therefore, compared to economic and institutional pre-
requisites for accession, requirements for minority respect and protection towards 
the candidate countries are predictably less direct. They do not include specific 
models for improvement, but developed over time and were influenced by devel-
opments external to the EU. The unraveling of Yugoslavia, with violent conflicts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia, had a significant 
impact on the visions of European elites for the development of the region. The 
strength of majority and minority nationalism in Europe’s own backyard caught 
the EU unprepared, but political learning occurred over time. The vagueness of 
the initial requirements for minority protection allowed the European Union to 
formulate and re-formulate its recommendations. The initial hesitance and confu-
sion as to what Europe can do to alleviate ethnic conflicts was gradually replaced 
by a more confident approach of steering the candidate countries’ nationalistic 
majorities towards cooperation. The approach varied from country to country, 
depending on the country’s internal conditions, but European involvement in 
promoting stability and encouraging ethnic cooperation was always on an ad hoc 
basis, shaped by internal as well as external developments.  
Variations in the EU strategy for minority protection reflect EU’s attempts to 
balance between a formal recognition for collective minority rights and the need 
to minimize security threats on the borders of the Union or between its members. 
The Union started screening majority-minority relations, and adjusting its advice 
and involvement in the domestic affairs of candidates. But EU’s views of minor-
ity rights were also subjected to the processes of reception and projection.
6  The 
specific reference to the “rights of persons belonging to minorities” in the Euro-
pean Constitution signed by the Heads of State and Government of the EU mem-
bers and the three candidate members at the time – Bulgaria, Romania and Tur-
key – is indicative of this change. There is no earlier reference to minority rights 
in official European documents except for the concluding document of the Co-
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penhagen summit on 21-22 June 1993, but that document was aimed at influ-
encing the conflict ridden CEECs, not the member states.  
Despite the existing vagueness of the European Union regarding minority 
rights, the expansion of minority rights has continued due to the actions and de-
mands of minority groups. In many cases, the European Union has played a re-
active, rather than proactive role in encouraging majority-minority cooperation. 
For example, in March 2001, amidst fighting between Macedonian security 
forces and Albanian rebels in Macedonia, the Macedonian government was bom-
barded with pledges by EU officials for financial support and technical assistance 
in minority-related issues, like the funding of Albanian-language university, as-
sistance for a new census, and development of infrastructure projects in the 
Western, Albanian-populated regions of the country.
7 In contrast, in Bulgaria, the 
ethnic political party never actively pursued demands for higher education in the 
mother tongue of the Turkish minority. Therefore, European representatives and 
institutions never even offered recommendations for the introduction of higher 
education in minority language.
8 The dynamics of ethnic accommodation in these 
countries demonstrates the remarkable nature of EU involvement in minority-
related problems. 
 
EU’s Involvement in Majority-Minority Relations: 
Ambiguity, Caution, and Pragmatism 
 
The European Union utilized two approaches to influence minority policies in 
candidate countries. First, the EU encouraged positive change by the very prom-
ise of European integration. In the period between the fall of communism and 
1995, however, when there were no official new membership applications, the 
European dream influenced the decisions of Eastern European elites indirectly, 
which allowed undemocratic, corrupt and nationalistic elites to “capture” the 
early years of the transition in some countries. In Slovakia, the nationalistic 
Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, endorsed European integration in official 
statements but did little to introduce or speed up reforms required for it. His gov-
ernment submitted the official EU membership application, but his “European” 
drive was marred by political corruption and endemic nationalism aimed against 
minorities. The European Union could do little to change Meciar’s policies. Slo-
vakia became an independent state only in 1993, and its heterogeneous character, 
with almost 10 percent of the population being Hungarian, provided populist 
leaders with ample ground for exploiting societal differences and the “Hungarian 
threat.” But Slovakia is not an exception. Croatia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania 
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experienced a similar transition period characterized by the exacerbation of eth-
nic tensions. European integration was only given a lip service. 
The second approach was adopted by the EU mostly after 1995 in response 
to new membership applications. The commission started publishing official pro-
gress reports periodically, and the Union used demarches to show its opinion on 
reforms in the candidate countries. In its November 1994 and October 1995 de-
marches, the EU criticized Slovakia for the excessively antagonistic relations 
between the ruling coalition and the opposition, the purges in the state admini-
stration and the insufficient respect shown for the principles of democracy and 
human rights.
9 The European Parliament also issued statements concerning 
“negative” developments in Slovakia. In those official opinions and statements 
the European institutions held the candidate countries accountable to higher stan-
dards than those adhered to by its member states, by encouraging them to adopt 
international documents like the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. The Commission also consults the High Commissioner for 
National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organizations for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), and incorporates his recommendations in its opinions. Some 
scholars even claim that the EU has “in effect delegated to the HCNM the task of 
judging whether countries have ‘done enough’ in terms of minority rights.”
10  
The effect of the European Union’s official positions should not be sought 
only in the legislation and policies the candidates adopted after those opinions. 
Political elites in Romania and Slovakia acted strategically, adopting very con-
troversial legislative acts a short period of time before the Commission’s report. 
In many cases, the timing of minority related legislation is one of the main mani-
festations of EU’s influence. 
 
EU and Romania 
 
The period between 1990 and 1996 in Romania was characterized by the strength 
of Romanian nationalism and the adoption of laws that, according to the Hun-
garian minority, were restrictive of their rights. The first important legislation 
was the Law on Local Public Administration adopted in 1991. According to the 
Law, local council decision could be published in Romanian and in the language 
of minorities which were of “significant numerical importance,” but Romanian 
would be the official language of council meetings. The most contested part of 
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the law was its provision that in settlements where a minority group was no less 
than 30 percent of the population, the language of that minority group could be 
used in official matters with the local administration. According to Hungarians, 
the 30 percent requirement was too high. DAHR also contested the paragraph of 
the Law, which stipulated that prefects would promote "the national interest," 
believing that they should, in accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution, 
represent and defend local interests.
11 
The second important legislation, the law on education, was adopted in June 
1995 amidst Hungarian protests. According to article 124 of the Law, university 
entrance examinations had to be taken in Romanian, except for subjects in which 
university instruction in the mother tongue is provided, such as teacher training 
and the arts. In addition, Article 123 stipulates that at the secondary level of edu-
cation the language of instruction in the subjects of “history of Romania” and 
“geography of Romania” was to be Romanian.  
Unlike the law on public administration, the education law produced a fast 
response from the Union, the main reason being that in April 1995, Romania had 
signed the “Stability Pact for Europe” committing itself to minority protection. 
The European Union now had clauses to which it could refer in evaluating re-
forms in Romania. In July 1995, the European Parliament passed a resolution 
condemning the law, which “led to a further deterioration of the situation of mi-
norities in Romania.” The resolution also stated that the law “arbitrarily restricts 
the educational rights of minorities” and urged the Romanian legislature to repeal 
it, otherwise it may be disqualified from joining the European Union.
12 Bela 
Marko, the chairperson of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
claimed that the law was “in complete disregard of the national minorities’ inter-
ests” and asserted that “the law is not only discriminative as regard to the native 
language education of minorities, but even more restrictive – in this respect – 
than the law in force under Ceausescu.”
13  
Under a new government, Romania renewed its attempts to alleviate ethnic 
tensions regarding minority education and language use. As regional specialists 
noted, “membership incentives contributed to positive changes in Romania after 
the change of government.”
14 This goal was strengthened as July 15, 1997 ap-
                                                 
11 East European Constitutional Review, “Romania Update,” 5, no. 4 (Fall 1996). 
12 European Parliament, Resolution on the protection of minority rights and human rights in 
Romania – B4-1025/95, July 13, 1995. Full text available at http://www3.europarl.eu.int/ omk/ 
omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PV2&LANGUE=EN (accessed on March 15, 2005), 
13 Qtd. in Istvan Horvath, “Facilitating Conflict Transformation: Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993-
2001.” Centre for OSCE Research, Working Paper 8. (2002): 93. 
14 Judith Kelley, “Norms and Membership Conditionality,” Paper presented at the Workshop 
‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe, Florence, European University 
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proached. On this date, the European Commission was to issue its “Opinion” on 
the eligibility of each associated country for the start of accession negotiations. 
December 12-13, 1997 was a similarly important deadline, when the EU Heads 
of State would support or reject the Commission’s Opinions. The government 
adopted an emergency decree on July 10, 1997, to remove the anti-minority pro-
visions of the education law but its approval by the legislature was protracted for 
two years. Another emergency decree, 22/1997, modified the public administra-
tion law and stipulated that authorities should make their decisions public in the 
language of a given minority if that minority represents at least 20 percent of the 
population in the municipality. In case of such population composition, the Hun-
garians also had the right to address the authorities in their language. A few days 
later the European Commission's Opinion of July 16 recognized that Romania 
had signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and had established a national council for minority issues. The Commission also 
emphasized the ordinances mentioned above as improvements of minority 
rights.
15 However, the Commission did not recommend the start of negotiations 
with Romania. With the prospect of participating in the first enlargement wave 
vanished, on December 9, 1997, the Senate rejected an appeal from the president 
and adopted amendments to the education law, which are much more restrictive 
for minorities than the emergency decree.
16 
Finally, in 2001 a new law on public administration was adopted with the 
provision for the use of minority languages in administrative units with at least 
20 percent minority population. DAHR’s President described the law as being the 
most important triumph for ethnic minorities in Rumania in the past 10 years 
along with the educational law amended in 1999. The European Commissioner 
for Enlargement once again praised Romania for improving its treatment of eth-
nic minorities.”
17 In addition, DAHR also succeeded in achieving another of its 
major goals. In October 2001 was the formal opening of a Hungarian-language 
university that DAHR had pushed for. The university was private and therefore 
not state-funded but its legalization was a considerable success. 
 
EU and Slovakia 
 
In Slovakia developments regarding minority-related legislation followed a 
similar path. The new legislature created after the November 1994 elections 
adopted a law on the State Language which centralized control over education by 
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16  East European Constitutional Review, “Romania Update,” 6, no. 2-3 (Spring/Summer 
1997). 
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allowing the Education Minister to dismiss principals deemed incapable. The 
new Education Minister announced that “incapability” involved lack of fluency 
in Slovak and advocated that language, literature, history, geography etc. “are 
taught only by ethnic Slovak teachers.”
18 In addition, the law stipulated that 
“proof of proficiency in speaking and writing the state language is a condition of 
employment or engagement in other work-like situations, and is a prerequisite to 
completing contractual work for public bodies” (Article 1, Paragraph 3). Fol-
lowing the implementation of the law, one Hungarian leader claimed that the law 
was used to remove ethnic Hungarians from official positions. The law was also 
bashed both by the Hungarian minority and the European Parliament because it 
was not explicit on the use of minority languages.
19  
The actions of the European Parliament and Commission were somewhat 
contradictory in the following years. In its 1997 report the Commission asserted 
that minority rights have been recognized in Slovakia, but also pointed to the “in-
stability of institutions and their lack of rootedness in political life.” In 1998 the 
European Parliament requested “the Slovak Republic to give absolute priority 
to… human rights and the rights of minorities, democracy and the rule of law.”
20 
First the Commission and then the Council agreed that minority-language use 
specifically, and the developments of policies and institutions protection the 
rights of minorities were a priority.
21 The treatment of the Hungarian minority 
was removed as an area for improvement from the Commission’s 1999 report. 
In 1999 the Slovak legislature approved a Language Law establishing a 20 
percent threshold for the use of minority languages in an administrative region.
22 
Hungarians were not fully satisfied but the amendments they proposed were re-
jected. Some observers noted that “the bill had to be rushed through Parliament 
in a shortened parliamentary session because of an impending meeting of Euro-
pean Commission officials, at which they will decide on the countries to be in-
cluded in first-round EU entry talks at the Helsinki summit scheduled for De-
                                                 
18 John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe. (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: 1998); See also Ondrej Dostal, “Minority Languages and Minority Education.” The 
Slovak Spectator, June 18, 1998. 
19 European Parliament resolution on the political situation in Slovakia, 9(e) B4-0849/97 
20 European Parliament resolution on the Slovak Republic, O.J. C 328, 26/10/1998, p. 190. 
21 Council Decision 98/262/EC of March 1998 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objec-
tives and conditions contained in the accession partnership with the Slovak Republic, O.J. L121, 
23/04/1998, pp. 16-20. 
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cember.”
23 After 1999 the Commission referred to need for improvement of 
minority rights only in reference to the Roma minority. 
 
Decentralization in Romania and Slovakia 
 
Decentralization is seen by the Hungarian minorities as a way for them to expand 
their rights. Since Hungarians are concentrated in specific regions, they would 
benefit from the devolution of power to local governments. Fortunately for them, 
decentralization and devolution of power are goals endorsed by the European 
Union. The Commission actively promoted decentralization in its reports, but 
without a specific reference to it as a goal that would improve inter-ethnic rela-
tions.  
Decentralization in Romania started progressing at a fast pace since 1998 
when important laws regulating local financing were adopted, following the Law 
on Regional Development, which divided the country in eight development re-
gions. One law aimed to decrease the dependency of local budgets on state budg-
ets, and to establish stable resources for local administrative units. Earmarked 
subsidies and transfers were replaced by revenue sharing of a national tax, with 
the revenues allotted directly to local budgets. Local governments started re-
ceiving a percentage of the income tax at the moment they were collected. Be-
tween 1991 and 1998, more than 70 percent of local revenues came from the 
state budget, while for 1998 and 1999, the same dropped to less than 30 per-
cent.
24 Yet, in 2004 the DAHR leader urged for further decentralization which 
would help the Hungarian minority in Romania achieve the administrative auton-
omy it seeks.
25  
Public administration reform in Slovakia was also continuously debated, es-
pecially after 1998 when the Hungarian coalition participated in the government. 
However, even in 1996, Hungarians in Slovakia were expressing demands for 
“self administration.” Gyla Bardos, a member of the legislature from the Hun-
garian Christian Democratic Movement, explained that “autonomy, or self ad-
ministration, is a legal framework enabling a citizen, or several citizens to decide 
                                                 
23 Michael J. Kopanic, “The New Minority Language Law in Slovakia,” Central Europe Re-
view, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 5, 1995. http://www.ce-review.org/99/2/kopanic2.html (accessed March 
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24 Clare Romanik and Francis Conway, “Grant Transfers and Financial Supervision in Roma-
nia: A Focus on Major Reforms Introduced by the Law on Local Public Finance.” United Nations 
Online Network in Public Administration and Finance (UNPAN), (2002). 
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about their own matters. It has nothing to do with national minorities.”
26 Bardos 
put the idea in European terms that liberal democratic politicians would find hard 
to disagree with. Yet, the regional structure of the country created in 1996 was 
designed so that none of the eight regions that were created would have any con-
siderable share of Hungarians. In 2000, the Hungarian leader Bela Bugar an-
nounced his plan for redrawing the country so that Komarno County, where the 
majority of Hungarians live, would be a separate development region and there-
fore a direct recipient of EU funds.
27 The cabinet approved the proposal but the 
law that came out of the legislature on July 4, 2001, divided the country once 
again in eight regions, in none of which Hungarians had a majority. In its Annual 
report the Commission did not take a stance on Hungarian demands and com-
mended the new law urging that “the reform is implemented without delay, en-
suring the functioning of a democratic, efficient and sustainable self-administra-
tion.”
28 
In its reports on progress in Romania and Slovakia the Commission has un-
derstandably taken a minority-neutral stand regarding regional development. The 
principles of regionality and subsidiarity according to which decisions should be 
made at the level closest to the citizens of the Union do not contain any direct 
reference to minority rights. The local administration reforms in Romania and 
Slovakia are driven by the need to harmonize their policies with the principles of 
regionality and subsidiarity on one hand, and on the other, reform is required by 
the European Union in order those regions to qualify for financial and technical 
assistance from the Union’s structural and cohesion funds. According to the last 
report of the Commission on Slovakia in 2003, the divisions of responsibility 
between the central and local authorities was still underspecified and there was 
lack of coordination between the central level and the regions. The 2004 report 
on Romania was critical of the local authorities’ administrative capacity. Nothing 
was mentioned on Hungarian demands for further decentralization. 
 
EU and the New Minorities 
 
The issue of minority rights protection will continue to be important for future 
developments in the Union if enlargement continues and includes other ethnically 
homogeneous states. The protection and participation of minorities is implicitly 
incorporated through the notion of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
European Council of Copenhagen and the Stability Pact for Europe. However, 
the Union still shies away from endorsing minority rights as “collective rights.” 
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The “Balladur” plan, proposed in April 1993, explicitly referred to the possibility 
of `minor border modifications' and `collective minority rights.'
29 However, the 
Copenhagen criteria endorsed by the European Union a few months later only 
called for “respect for and protection of minorities.” This specific reference to 
minority rights, in conjunction with broader human rights is an important recog-
nition.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights was another opportunity to incorpo-
rate minority protection explicitly into EU legislation. However, in the Charter 
adopted at Nice in December 2000, relevant provisions were limited to a prohi-
bition of discrimination (Article 21) and to the following brief provision: "The 
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" (Art.22). Once 
again, there was no explicit mention of "minorities". There was no subsequent 
reference to minority rights neither in the Amsterdam Treaty, nor in the Nice 
Treaty, but the drives towards a creation of a Constitution for Europe, indicated 
that protection of minority rights is still part of the European Union’s future 
strategy. As Kymlicka argues, “Western countries have moved along two differ-
ent and somewhat contradictory tracks. On the one hand, they have maintained 
but weakened the commitment to a universal, justice-based, minority rights track; 
on the other hand, they have created a new contextual, security-based minority 
rights track.”
30 As the European Union continues to expand, the presence of a 
group of countries with national minorities demanding greater autonomy is likely 
to change the approach of the Union towards minority rights.  
Launching this paper with a statement of the EU’s Enlargement Commis-
sioner specifically referring to minority rights, it seems fitting to finish it with a 
statement by the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, Rolf 
Ekeus. After all, looking at the ambiguous stance of the European Union, 
OSCE’s Commissioner seems to be the one most fervently pursuing what the 
Union preached. In a 2002 speech in Copenhagen, Rolf Ekeus stated unequivo-
cally: 
 
…standards on which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be universally applica-
ble within and throughout the EU, in which case they should be equally – and consis-
tently – applied to all Member States. Otherwise, the relationships between the existing 
and aspiring EU Member States would be unbalanced in terms of applicable standards.
31 
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Can the European Union move towards a more integrated and consistent mi-
nority policy? With countries like Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and a 
number of other states with significant national minorities expected to join 
eventually, it will be hard not to. 
 
  
 
After Ethnicity and “Constitutional Patriotism:”  
Searching for Capacious German Membership in a Period  
of Neo-Liberalism and Europeanization 
 
 
 
 
David Abraham 
   
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Immigration policy” in Germany over the past five years has focused on three 
issues: the new labor migration from the East; efforts to encourage immigration 
of highly-skilled foreigners, especially entrepreneurs and high-tech Asians, and 
the ongoing problem of citizenship and nationality for the German-born children 
and grandchildren of an earlier generation of mostly Turkish and Balkan guest-
workers. 
The impact of the Eastward EU expansion on wages and employment in 
Germany may turn out to be severe. In principle, the Germans won a 7-year 
break-in period, which was intended to delay and dampen the impact of labor 
migration and competition from the East, especially Poland. In reality, through 
permissible subcontracting, service-sector exemptions, and outsourcing, the ef-
fects are already real. It seems likely that the erosion of Germany’s welfare state, 
already well underway in the name of “reform,” will be accelerated by the influx 
of labor, both legal and illegal. Indeed, if the educated popular press is to be be-
lieved, some areas, like poultry packing, have already been overrun by cheap for-
eign labor paid less than half the union wage and saving corporations (and con-
sumers?) substantial sums. Current tendencies are very redolent of the U.S. ex-
perience and American highly deregulated labor relations seem to threaten –for-
eign workers (many of them illegal), free markets, collapsing wages, outsourcing, 
deunionization.
1  Important as this topic is and will continue to be, it is not the 
topic of this paper. 
Likewise, there has begun a debate over a real Immigration Law, that is to 
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say a law intended to encourage and regulate skilled immigration to Germany 
from outside the EU. This debate often takes place under the misnomer of “Green 
Card” and has pit “Kinder statt Inder” –encouraging Germans to reproduce, or at 
least to become more flexible and study for and do the right high-tech jobs, ver-
sus encouraging a new group of foreign migrants, presumptively prosperous or 
well educated Asians. Important as that topic also is, it too is not the topic of this 
paper. 
The main issue to address here has been the ongoing struggle, now success-
fully concluded in a compromise form, over the contours of a National-
ity/Citizenship law encompassing naturalization and the recognition of jus soli 
principles. With that new law has come the abandonment of the previous Aliens 
Law and perhaps a serious amelioration of the legal marginalization of German-
born foreigners.  
Alongside that ongoing legal struggle, there has been a protracted debate, 
mostly on the left and in liberal circles, between advocates of multiculturalism, 
supporters of group recognition and some group rights, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, integrationists, those persuaded that improved legal access to the 
German nation would lead to a greater voluntary integration of “foreigners” into 
an evolving (and I do stress “evolving”) German society. It seems now that the 
integrationists have won, though there has been no parallel massive flow of adult 
former resident aliens into the ranks of naturalized Germans. The readiness to 
welcome aliens, especially Turkish-origin Muslims, into German society appears 
to be not in synchrony with developments in the Turkish sector itself. The situa-
tion and preferences of a more hybrid, Germany-born, Turkish-German younger 
generation is more difficult to ascertain and portray. 
 
Pre-Reform Law 
 
The 1913 Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz guided entry and naturalization 
in Germany until 1998. Even once shorn of its Nazi glosses, it was characterized 
by a very draconian and ungenerous jus sanguinis conception of membership and 
identity.
2 Until 1978 there was no legal provision for a more-than-temporary stay 
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on German territory by a non-EU foreigner (Verfestigungsregelung) and until the 
1980's there were no rules for family unification. Finally, until 1998, children 
born in Germany simply took the nationality of their parents. Naturalization of 
the latter was presumed to be a rare thing, highly discretionary, requiring a spe-
cific public interest in taking in the applicant, administratively cumbersome, and, 
putatively, a sign of complete Germanization (Hinwendung zum Deutschtum).  
Into the 1990's, naturalization required: a) a handwritten essay showing a 
good command of German and explaining why the applicant wanted to give up 
his current citizenship to build a future exclusively as a German; b) a minimum 
10 years of continuous residence in Germany; c) the absence of a criminal record 
and good moral character; c) non-dependence on social welfare benefits; d) uni-
form nationality for all family members; e) proof of abjuring or discharge from 
former citizenships, whenever possible; and f) payment of a fee equivalent to a 
month’s income for the head of the household and half a month for each addi-
tional family member. The 1990 reform of the Ausländergesetz (Aliens Act) 
added §§85-90, which offered dispensations to those guestworkers who had lived 
in Germany for at least 15 years. They did not have to have a strong command of 
the language or emerge with a uniform nationality for all family members. Fi-
nally, family members of a guestworker could be naturalized with him, even if 
they themselves had been resident in Germany for less than 15 years. 
§85 of the final 1990 iteration of the pre-reform Aliens Act permitted “sec-
ond and third generation” young adults to naturalize more easily. (In 1990, about 
1 million of the 7 million foreigners in Germany were born there.) In order to be 
naturalized, those born in Germany who applied between the ages of 16 and 23 
needed only to show: a) that they had attended a German state school for at least 
6 years; b) had lived in Germany permanently for at least 8 years; c) had no 
criminal convictions; d) could prove release from any previous citizenship; and 
e) paid a much-reduced fee of 100DM.  
The combination of legal hurdles and cultural resistances on both sides led to 
an average of only 15,000 naturalizations annually between 1974 and 1989. With 
the reduction in discretion in 1984 the number climbed to 35,000 in 1985. Under 
the pre-Reform reforms, naturalization numbers grew rather noticeably: by 1997 
they had reached 80,000 and by 2000 they were well over 110,000 so that by 
2000 over 1 million people had naturalized as German in the Bundesrepublik.
3 
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Reform Laws 2000/2005 
 
By 1999 parliamentary resistance to accepting the fact that Germany is "a land of 
immigration" had been largely overcome,
4 and acceptance of the multicultural, or 
at least pluralist, composition of German society had been gaining ground in the-
ory as well as in practice. Notwithstanding some setbacks and dilution, Germany 
in 1999 saw the passage of its first immigration and naturalization law since the 
Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1913 and the first ever embodying 
some jus soli principles. 2003 then saw the formulation of the first immigration-
attracting immigration law in modern German history, a Zuwanderungsgesetz 
(not discussed here). The combination of these two concerns –citizenship and 
immigration– led the Red/Green coalition government to focus first on the issue 
of introducing the jus soli principle and easier naturalization requirements into 
the law. Due to various court and electoral setbacks, it is only now, in 2005, that 
the law has gone fully into effect.
5 
As noted earlier, the central goal of the reformers was to ease access into 
German society for all those born in Germany. Legally, that meant introducing 
birthright citizenship to the children of long-term resident aliens and easing the 
naturalization process for those residents not born in Germany. By thus distanc-
ing, if not divorcing, citizenship and membership from ethnicity, the reformers 
sought to facilitate integration into a more capacious German identity and soci-
ety. Immigrants would more easily and more willingly become German while 
“German” itself would come to mean something broader– more on that, below. 
Naturalization provisions and citizenship criteria were, symbolically, moved 
from the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz,  now renamed the Residence Act, or 
Aufenthaltsgesetz) to the Citizenship and Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeits-
gesetz, §§10-12b). Consequently, too, the chief object of the new legislation was 
to institute the following rules: 
 a)  jus soli: If a child has at least one parent who has lived in Germany for 
at least 8 years and is now in an unlimited status,
6 then the child automatically 
                                                 
4 Article 8 of the Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1913, providing for naturalization, 
was in effect (not counting the Nazi interregnum) until 2000. The last version of the guidelines 2.3 
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enjoys citizenship from birth; and if that child has inherited another citizenship 
through his or her parents (jus sanguinis), the child may retain both citizenships 
until age 23, by which time a choice must be made. §4¶3. 
 b)  naturalization as of right: An alien living in Germany for at least 8 
years who possesses an unlimited status settlement or residence permit is fully 
entitled to obtain German citizenship if he or she can show that s/he can guaran-
tee his/her livelihood without recourse to social welfare benefits, possesses ade-
quate knowledge of German, has not been convicted of a serious crime, pledges 
adherence to the free and democratic values of the Constitution (Basic Law), and 
is prepared to abjure other citizenships.
7 
 c)  a minimalist integration commitment: Applicants for citizenship must 
commit themselves to having or acquiring a sufficient and adequate knowledge 
of German, e.g. by undertaking a public school language course in “everyday 
life” German. 
 d)  no financial burden: All fees are to be reduced to virtually token or 
cost status, 255 euros per adult and 50 euros per child. 
What effects have these new principles had to date? The German jus soli 
principle is clearly not the absolute US version: “All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States” are citizens of the United States, but it does mark a remark-
able change and brings Germany quite close to the French standard. And this 
change is paralleled by the change in naturalization requirements and opportuni-
ties. Naturalization is now possible under §10(1) of the new Act for those who 
have lived in Germany for 8 years and declare their loyalty to the “free and de-
mocratic values” of the Constitution and to the German language. 
If the goal is better and fairer integration, then the initial results seems am-
biguous. Jus soli does operate quickly: already in 2000, the first year of the law, 
nearly 41,000 newborns became German citizens this way, and the number will 
grow notably each year.
8 But the more volitional naturalization numbers are per-
haps puzzling. In the last year under the reformed old law, about 140,000 aliens 
naturalized, about 100,000 of them Turkish citizens. Rather than unleashing the 
expected torrent, however, the new law changed little: 187,000 naturalizations in 
2000; 178,000 in 2001; 155,000 in 2002; and 140,000 in 2003 with about 40 per 
                                                                                                                         
free of serious crime or welfare dependency, a minimally adequate residence, and some rudimen-
tary knowledge of German. In other words, an alien must be in “unlimited” status for 3 years before 
there is eligibility.  
7 Importantly, this entitlement is a matter of right and not subject to the capricious discretion 
common under earlier law. Spouses and children may be naturalized with the main applicant, even 
if they do not themselves meet the 8-year requirement.  Foreign spouses of German citizens must 
be married for two years and have lived in Germany for three years prior to naturalizing. Successful 
asylum seekers may also naturalize after 6 years, which is similar to the 1+5 requirement in the 
U.S. 
8 The 41,000 figure is reported by Holger Hoffmann, “The Reform of the Law on Citizenship 
in Germany” European Journal of Migration and Law 6, no. 3 (2004): 203. 94  Abraham 
 
cent being Turkish.
9 Perhaps the pent-up desire was overestimated by the liber-
als; perhaps the system is significantly backlogged; perhaps the language re-
quirement is more onerous than it seems.  
Or perhaps being German isn’t what it’s cracked up to be or what it used to 
be. 
 
The New Membership: From Rights to Citizenship in a Neo-Liberal World 
 
Juxtaposed to the ethnic or ethno-cultural model throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
was Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism), the term at the center of 
German and other liberal discourse over citizenship. It is meant to signal some-
thing civic, voluntary, non-biological, and, in principle, a matter of reciprocity. 
Constitutional or civic patriotism makes of national belonging a form of rational 
attachment that is compatible with liberal commitments to individual rights as 
well as with social commitments to equality. The Constitution is, in Germany, a 
democratic and social democratic commitment available to all.  
Verfassungspatriotismus became a kind of Habermasian buzzword in Ger-
many of the pre- and early-post-unification years, but one that proved a histori-
cal, proceduralist, formalistic and cold –one now demands either more than that 
or less yet. The civic is necessary but not sufficient. Even constitutionalism can 
become more substantive, embedded, thicker, and exclusionary.
10 By the end of 
the 1990s, Habermas became aware that even constitutional procedural principles 
required some historical, cultural embeddedness. This is a difficult adjustment to 
make since historically embedded cultures belong to some yet must be learned 
by others; they are not as contractual as constitutional and procedural agree-
ments. 
Even civic national identities are culturally inherited artifacts, developing as 
they pass from generation to generation. For Germany, but not only for Germany, 
national belonging is more than rational attachment; it encompasses “the contin-
gent inheritance of distinctive experiences and cultural memories that is an in-
separable part” of every national identity.
11 It assumes some measure of shared 
                                                 
9 These are Hoffmann’s figures, rounded. Münz’s figures, see below, are lower all across the 
board. 
10 Habermas developed the concept of constitutional patriotism over a number of years; for a 
full statement, see Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and De-
mocracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 491-515, 566-567. For Habermas’s revised views, see his 
The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 105-154.  
11 Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation” Critical Review 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 
197; cf. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, 
1993). As Yack notes, it is hard to understand German reunification, as opposed to the democrati-
zation of East Germany, along Habermas's lines. Popular sovereignty is, Yack insists, more than 
“consensus achieved in the course of argument...from an identically applied procedure recognized 
by all”, Yack, p. 201, quoting Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity” in Theorizing Citizen-After Ethnicity and ‘Constitutional Patriotism’  95 
 
prepolitical community arching over any agreement on legal-procedural rules and 
making a nation more than a political community organized around voluntary 
association. Perhaps it demands integration, not just mutual respect. 
Who would want to become a German anyway? What impetus would there 
be to naturalize, especially if the natives are suspicious and unwelcoming? Mil-
lions came from abroad to work in the Germany of the Economic Miracle. By the 
time recruitment was stopped in 1973, there were already four million foreigners 
in West Germany. Family unification and formation could be made difficult but 
not stopped, so the numbers continued to grow. And life without citizenship was 
not exactly life without rights or without solidarities. In 2000 there were ap-
proximately 7.5 million foreigners living in Germany or nearly 10 per cent of the 
population --of these nearly 1.5 million or 20 percent were born in Germany. In 
fact, 1/3 of all foreigners have been in Germany for over 20 years; 40 percent for 
over 15 years, and half for over 10 years. About 30 per cent of foreigners are 
Turkish, 15 per cent Yugoslav, and 24 percent EU, with a third of that being 
Italian. For most of them, life as denizen semi-outsiders was rather comfortable 
compared not only to their places of origin but also compared to most of Europe. 
Long-term foreign residents, denizens, have enjoyed the same labor market 
preferences enjoyed by Germans and the same social benefits as well.
12 Given 
much higher union density than in the United States and a more centralized bar-
gaining regime, as well as tougher government enforcement of labor standards, 
the disparities between domestic and foreign workers are less than in the United 
States, though real. Indirect wages are high by American standards, just as they 
are for native workers: child benefits, health insurance, school and job education 
allotments, long vacations, pensions etc. Shopkeepers and other petit bourgeois 
and business people are eligible for and protected by the same programs as the 
famously security-obsessed Kleinbürgertum. As to civil and political rights, the 
picture resembles that of the United States: on non-immigration issues, foreigners 
enjoy the same civil liberties as Germans; with rare exceptions non-EU foreign-
ers may not vote or occupy upper-reach civil service or political offices. 
With security of residence, moderate family unification rights, social rights, 
civil liberties, and a high standard of living, why take the extra step of becoming 
German? Why risk losing benefits and rights in one’s country of origin --as is 
often the case, for example with land ownership in Turkey-- in order to become 
part of a people who seem ambivalent about having you? For one thing, Germany 
is now home to many, and the new Nationality Act finally recognizes that: 
 
Children born in Germany to foreigners living here permanently are to be given the 
chance to grow up in Germany as German nationals from the outset.... The acquisition of 
nationality marks the beginning of social integration. If children born in Germany go to 
                                                                                                                         
ship, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 259. 
12 Thomas Faist, Social Citizenship for Whom? (London: Aldershott, 1995). 96  Abraham 
 
nursery school here and receive all their schooling and vocational training in a German 
environment and already grow up in the awareness of being Germans with all the rights 
and obligations this entails, they will develop important bonds and feelings of identifica-
tion with Germany and the German way of life.
13 
 
Repeatedly, however, one is struck by the emphasis on foreigners “integrat-
ing,” something “both sides” must “want.” Less clear is whether foreigners are 
being invited to join an ongoing German project as it currently exists or to join 
Germans in charting a future course for themselves as "equal partners" in some-
thing new. The difference is important, and meeting halfway is not always the 
answer. Nevertheless, an emerging consensus situates “nationhood in distinc-
tively nonethnic terms revolving around social norms” so that non-ethnic criteria 
at least complement descent.
14 
The German Basic Law (Constitution) anticipates and facilitates a strong 
welfare state.
15 Social minima and social consumption require social consensus 
and solidarity. The distributive logic is one of closure, not of market-style open-
ness. Citizens and resident foreigners must be inside the same closed system. The 
welfare state “seeks to take care of its own;” it is “a kind of safe house in which 
to shelter its members from the outside world” so that they may be immune from 
competitive disadvantages and capital flight.
16 The segmentation of labor markets 
must be avoided. In the end, it is primarily the social wage that turns labor mi-
grants into permanent immigrants, and this collective social wage is a product of 
politics and community, not the capitalist labor market as such.
17 Inadequate inte-
gration may threaten it in times of stress or “reform.” 
Part of what we are seeing in Germany, with surprising delay (occasioned 
primarily by the strength of the trade unions and broad constituency for the wel-
fare state,) is the breakdown of the Guest Worker System. Once guest workers 
became families, rather than healthy single young males, their presence became a 
                                                 
13 Now, furthermore, “all those wishing to identify with... Germany as a democratic and 
constitutional state are welcome as citizens with equal rights.” Bundesministerium op cit., p. 54. 
14 Daniel Levy, “The Transformation of Germany's Ethno-Cultural Idiom” in Levy and Weiss 
eds., p. 230 documents both elite and popular sentiment.  
15 The ways in which this is true and in which a more communitarian and solidaristic society is 
mandated cannot be addressed here. See David Currie, "Positive and Negative Constitutional 
Rights"  University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 864. David Abraham, “Liberty without 
Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a ‘Negative Citizenship’ Regime” Law & Social In-
quiry 21, no. 1 (1996): 32-38. 
16 Gary Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (1986): 51, 54. 
17 See Stephen Castles, Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities (London: 
Pluto Press, 1984). Single young men are followed by family reunification that then leads to per-
manent settlement. After Ethnicity and ‘Constitutional Patriotism’  97 
 
net drain on the welfare state.
18 Either their presence would undermine the wel-
fare state for everyone else, or they would have to integrate and be integrated 
more fully into solidaristic social life. Failure to integrate would be an invitation 
to reaction
19 among both natives and foreigners, a development and danger 
exacerbated by German reunification. 
An accelerated dismantling (“reform”) of the German welfare state has coin-
cided with the end of the Guestworker Regime over the past half-dozen years. 
This dismantling has been going on for years now throughout the capitalist 
countries, but the process was slower and less complete in Germany, where a 
positive-rights Constitution provided welfarism a stronger anchorage
20 and where 
paternalistic Christian Democrats were as wedded to social security as strong 
trade unions. Yet the post-Fordist project or the “Schumpeterian Workfare State,” 
as it has come to be called, is concerned with the promotion of production, or-
ganization, and market innovation; the enhancement of competitiveness in open, 
free-trading economies, mainly through supply-side intervention; the subordina-
tion of social policy to the needs of labor market flexibility; the removal of mar-
ket rigidities generally– whether they lay in the realm of production or circulation 
(trade); and absolute factor (capital and labor) mobility. 
Factor mobility wreaked special havoc on more developed welfare states. 
The presence of semi-members, like guest worker denizens, could threaten social 
rights because history and culture (and increasingly religion) do not effectively 
link them to the full members. To lessen the distinction between aliens and citi-
zens, without integrating the former into a “closed shop” where labor costs are 
removed from competition, risked serious deterioration of the social wage that 
had been so central to equality within the welfare state and national community. 
As an incipient form of social citizenship, the democratic welfare state enabled 
“justice and the rule of law, the democratic demand for voice and equal rights, 
and the communitarian concern for solidarity and collective identity” to come 
                                                 
18 Guest worker families were, and continued to be, larger, less well educated, not as healthy, in 
need of housing, family-allowance oriented with stay-at-home mothers, and more frequently unem-
ployed, as well as less well adjusted socially. 
19 Freeman put is this way: 
...reduce the power of organized labor by dividing the working class into national and 
immigrant camps, by easing tight labor market[s]...and by provoking a resurgence of 
right-wing and nativist political movements.... By making racially diverse socie-
ties...migration has complicated social and political cleavages. [and] helped shift the 
ideological center of European politics to the right. 
Gary Freeman, “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (1986): 61-62. 
20 For an introduction to the constitutionalization of welfare, see Donald Kommers, “German 
Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,” Emory Law Journal 40 (1991): 837. 98  Abraham 
 
together.
21 Social policies in the welfare state operationalized citizenship and pro-
vided a domain where it was constituted-- albeit not equally for everyone-- 
through a political economy. Over the last generation, the social rights that were 
part of being or becoming a citizen, of enjoying a citizenship that took class war-
fare off the agenda, have begun to vanish. The lifeboat of citizen security turned 
out to be chained to the ship of capitalist insecurity. 
In the German case, a much more individualized, neo-liberal “thinner” soci-
ety, such as the Hartz neo-liberal reforms currently in the works would produce, 
would maybe be in a better position to pursue integration around civic-constitu-
tional and cultural principles. What has been called an “anthropological opti-
mism” allows for a new social contract that “generates trust by its members and 
...predictability for those who aspire to become members.”
22 This understanding 
has recently and, very interestingly, led the German left away from multicultur-
alism and toward “mainstreaming.”
23  
The dominant impulse of the 1990s was an enlargement of the citizenry and 
of the nation and a recognition of its diverse membership –joined to recognizing 
the diminution of the state's ability to redistribute. A greater diversity of life 
forms, identities, and life-ways was recognized (gender, sexual, ethnic, religious 
etc.) but obligations of mutuality were attenuated. The politics of diversity and 
recognition emerged from a situation where the Right would not redistribute re-
sources and civil rights forces would not push for integration or, as regards im-
migrants, assimilation. Group recognition and group rights offered a tempting but 
costly alternative
24 –one from which the liberal Left is beginning to distance 
itself. 
                                                 
21 Jean Cohen, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos” 
International Sociology 14, no. 3 (1999): 252. 
22 Sabine von Dirke, “Multikulti: The German Debate on Multiculturalism” German Studies 
Review (1999): 513 and 528. Unresolved is whether there is a lead culture (Leitkultur) in this new 
anthropology. There is certainly a less protected future. 
23 See Migration und Bevölkerung 7 (Sept. 2002), 6; Contrast the earlier praise of 
multiculturalism in Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, Heimat Babylon: Das Wagnis der 
multikulturellen Demokratie (Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1992) and Claus Leggewie, MultiKulti: 
Sprachregeln für die Vielvölkerrepublic (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1993). 
24 On the social costs, see Claus Offe, “Group Rights and Constitutionalism” Journal of Politi-
cal Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998): 1. For a sympathetic German treatment of the abandonment of 
“color blindness” in the U.S, characteristic of the period, see Chistoph Scherrer and Lars Maischak, 
“Abschied von der ‘farbblinden’ Gesellschaft?” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 12 
(1995): 1451. See also, David Abraham, “Solidarity and Particularity: E Pluribus Unum? A Com-
ment on Claus Offe, ‘Political Liberalism, Group Rights, and the Politics of Fear and Trust,’” Ha-
gar 6, no. 1 (2005): 137.   
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Introduction 
 
After decades of relative isolation under authoritarian regimes, the success of 
processes of democratic transition in Portugal and Spain in the second half of the 
1970s paved the way for full membership in the European Community (EC).
1 For 
Spain, Portugal, and their European Community partners this momentous and 
long awaited development had profound consequences and set in motion com-
plex processes of adjustment. The Iberian enlargement strengthened Europe’s 
strategic position in the Mediterranean and Latin America, and led to the further 
development of a European system of cohesion and solidarity. Spain and Portu-
gal offered a new geo-political dimension to the Union, strengthening it south-
wards, and ensuring closer ties with other regions that have been peripheral to the 
EC. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the experiences of Portugal and Spain in 
the European Union (EU) to draw some lessons that may be applicable to Eastern 
European countries. Entry to the EC has brought many benefits to both countries. 
Their experience will illustrate some of the opportunities and challenges associ-
ated with EU membership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
This is an expanded and updated version of a section of a chapter published in Sebastián 
Royo, “The 2004 Enlargement: Iberian Lessons for Post-Communist Europe,” in Spain and Portu-
gal in the European Union, ed. Sebastián Royo and Paul C. Manuel, (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
1 The terms ‘European Community’ (EC) or ‘European Union’ (EU) are used indistinctly to 
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Iberian Lessons for Post-Communist Europe
2 
 
The Iberian enlargement provides useful feedback for the new member states, not 
only for their negotiation strategies, but also as regards the consequences of 
membership.
3 What are the Iberian lessons for post-Communist Europe? 
First, the democratic pre-requirement for membership is a powerful incentive 
for democratization and institutional reform.  European integration had a very 
important effect on the Iberian democratisation processes. Europe had a symbolic 
impact (i.e. “the identification of EU with liberal democracy and political free-
dom”), and the pressures induced by the democratisation pre-requisite for mem-
bership, the effect of membership prospects on domestic policies and policy di-
rection, and the involvement of political and economic elites in European institu-
tions during negotiations as well bas their participation in European transnational 
networks all had a very positive impact on the transitions to democracy.
4 More-
over, the EC had important indirect levers, particularly during the negotiations 
for accession, to influence the direction of events and the decisions of policy-
makers and economic actors (i.e., economic incentives). As a result Portugal and 
Spain undertook deep processes of institutional, social and cultural reforms. 
Hence, from a political standpoint EU integration has been an unmitigated suc-
cess, as both countries have consolidated their democratic regimes and institu-
tions. The two processes—European integration and democratisation—were 
thoroughly intertwined.  
Second, EU membership paves the way for the complete incorporation of 
new member states into the major international structures of Europe and the 
West, as well as the normalization of their relations with their European partners. 
Portugal and Spain have become, again, important players in Europe. More im-
                                                 
2 I would like to thank Jeffrey Kopstein, Ramón de Miguel, Kalypso Nicolaidis, George Ross 
and Francisco Seixas da Costa for their valuable comments during the last roundtable of the confer-
ence From Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the European 
Union. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, November 2-3, 2001. 
Their comments inform this chapter. 
3 Some observers have noted that these new members may learn even more from Greece than 
from Portugal and Spain. In Greece for instance, the government was reluctant to cede control of 
vital economic sectors, it was behind in consumer protection, environmental and competition poli-
cies, and corruption was a systemic problem. In addition, Greece had weak civil institutions, which 
slowed the convergence process. For years Greece squandered the opportunities of EU membership 
through poor fiscal management, corruption, political cronyism, justice mismanagement and mis-
administration and mismanagement of domestic and European funds. While fiscal discipline has 
been achieved, the change of attitudes and values is still a pending issue.
 See: ‘Is Poland the new 
Greece? Why Warsaw’s entry into the European Union may be rough,’ in Financial Times, Mon-
day, December 9, 2002, 11. 
4 See Geoffrey Pridham, “European Integration and Democratic Consolidation in Southern 
Europe,” in Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, ed. António Costa Pinto and 
Nuno Severiano Teixeira, 185-86 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). The Challenges of EU Integration: Iberian Lessons  105 
 
portantly, accession has allowed them to influence European policies from within 
as both countries now participate on decisions taken at the European level, which 
affect them, and over which before accession they had little influence, and in any 
case, no voting power. This is very important because some of the decisions 
adopted by the EU have an even greater impact over countries than some deci-
sions of their national administrations. 
Furthermore, the Iberian experience also illustrates that any negotiations 
within the EU should not be based on an ‘us against them’ approach but on a 
‘them versus them’ stance. The new member states should take advantage of di-
visions among older member countries. The Iberian experience shows that de-
spite similar interests and objectives, after sixteen years there has not been a con-
sistent approach to EU negotiations between Portugal and Spain. They have often 
cooperated, but they have also worked separately and with other EU members. 
Portugal and Spain choose alliances depending on the issue at stake. Hence, al-
though the new members (like Portugal and Spain before) will find themselves 
on the same side on many issues (e.g., social questions, EU structural funds and 
the concept of cohesion), each new member should develop its own ad hoc coa-
litions with other members based on common interests.  
Fourth, one of the most important lessons from the Iberian enlargement is 
that the terms of accession are not always final. Renegotiations after accession 
are possible and compensatory mechanisms can be developed. Therefore, what-
ever the accession terms for 2004-06, the focus of the new member states should 
be on 2006, when the EU will start its next seven-year budget period. The focal 
point should be accession economics and not development economics. The EU 
will pursue stability and homogenization, but the new member countries will 
want growth. In this regard, the Iberian experience shows that the aim of the new 
entrants should be to find the best ways to maximize the benefits of membership 
once they are in. A nakedly selfish strategy that satisfies only particular needs is 
also bound to fail. The new members also need to look at their potential contri-
bution to the EU and the model of European integration they want to build. Para-
phrasing President Kennedy, they should ponder, not only what the EU can do 
for them but also what they can do for the EU. This should not be a zero-sum-
game but instead a positive-sum-game. 
Portugal and Spain also show that EU membership has both benefits and 
costs. EU membership has improved the access of both countries to the European 
common policies and the EU budget. At the same time Portugal and Spain's trade 
with the Community has expanded dramatically over the past fifteen years, and 
foreign investment has flooded in. One of the main consequences of these devel-
opments has been a reduction in the economic differentials that separated each 
country from the European average. Since 1986, Portugal's average per capita 
income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 74 percent, while 
Spain's has grown to 98 percent. The culmination of this process was the partici-
pation of both countries as original founders of European Monetary Union in 106  Royo 
 
1999. EU integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of 
economic adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenisation. In addi-
tion, accession has also brought more integration but also fears (exacerbated by 
issues such as size, culture, and nationalism). 
Six, the Iberian experience also illustrates that economic success drives pub-
lic opinion. The decision to join the European Union in both countries was sup-
ported by most of the political parties. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer polls 
consistently indicate that the overwhelming majority of the Iberian people sup-
port the process of European integration. Originally, this support hinged largely 
on the expectation that EC membership would increase economic growth and 
standards of living. Subsequently these polls indicate that this support has re-
mained largely instrumental (particularly in Spain) because Iberian citizens have 
a very utilitarian concept of the European Union—that is, they evaluate the con-
sequences of membership in terms of costs and benefits. Up to this point since 
the membership benefits have been explicit (i.e. EU funds) and much larger than 
the costs, it is not surprising to find a comparatively high level of consistent sup-
port for the EU among Portuguese and Spanish citizens.  
An additional lesson is that membership may give countries a better com-
petitive position. Indeed, EU integration has been a catalyst for the final conver-
sion of the Iberian countries into modern Western-type economies. The idea of 
Europe became a driving force that moved reforms forward and it was a funda-
mental factor for bringing together political stabilization and economic recovery. 
One of the key consequences of their entry into Europe has been that it has fa-
cilitated the modernization of the Iberian economies, as well as the implementa-
tion of the micro and macro economic reforms that successive Iberian govern-
ments undertook throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
5 In a context of strong support 
among Iberian citizens for integration, membership became a facilitating mecha-
nism that allowed the Iberian governments to prioritize economic rather than so-
cial modernization and hence, to pursue difficult economic and social policies 
(i.e., to reform their labor and financial markets), with short-term painful effects. 
Moreover, as a result of enlargement Iberian producers gained access the Euro-
pean and world markets, which provided additional incentives for investment and 
allowed for the development of economies of scale, resulting in increasing com-
petitiveness. Furthermore, both countries gained access to the EC market, thus 
attracting investment that would help build these new industries. Finally, Portu-
gal and Spain also benefited from the EU financial assistance programs−i.e., the 
European Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Agriculture Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund, and the new created Integrated Mediterranean Pro-
gram for agriculture, and later on from the Cohesion Funds. 
                                                 
5 See: Alfred Tovias “The Southern European Economies and European Integration” in South-
ern Europe and the Making of the European Union, ed. António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano 
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The Iberian economic record also shows that nominal convergence is faster 
but that real economic convergence is a slow process.
6 The process of financial 
liberalization, economic reforms, and the significant decline in real interest rates 
permitted Portugal and Spain to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. There-
fore, on January 1
st, 1999 Spain and Portugal became founding members of the 
European Monetary Union and both countries, which as late as 1997 were con-
sidered outside candidates for joining the euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, inter-
est rates, debt, exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established by the 
Maastricht Treaty. This development confirmed the nominal convergence of both 
countries with the rest of the EU.  
 
Table 1 
Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria, 1996-2004 
   Spain Portugal 
   1996 1997 2004 1996 1997 2004 
Inflation* 
 
%  3.6 1.9 3.3 2.9 1.9 2.6 
General Government 
Deficit 
% 
GDP 
4.6 2.6 -0.3 3.2 2.5 -2.9 
General Government 
Gross Debt 
% 
GDP 
70.1 68.8 62.6 65.0 61.4 58.6 
Long-term Interest 
rates 
%  8.7  6.4 3.64 8.6  6.4 3.64 
Source: Commission and EMU Reports. 
 
However, their income levels still remain behind the EU average: 
 
Table 2 
Divergence of GDP per Capita 1980-2000 
  1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 
EU  Totals  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0%* 
Spain  74.2 72.5 77.8 81.0 98.0 
Portugal  55.0 52.0 55.7 74.0 73.0 
 Source: European Union. 
* EU25 
 
This data shows that nominal convergence has advanced at a faster pace than 
real convergence. Indeed, twenty years have not been long enough. Portugal and 
Spain’s European integration has revealed both convergence and divergence, 
nominal and real. Since 1997 inflation in Spain has exceeded the EU average 
every year. In Portugal real convergence has been slowing down each year since 
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1998, actually turning negative in 2000 and with both real and nominal diver-
gence expected to increase until 2006. Since the adhesion of Spain to the EU in 
1986 per capita income has increased "only" 11.5 percent and Portugal's 14.2 
percent. Ireland's, in contrast, has increased 38 percent. Only Greece with an in-
crease of 6.8 percent has had a lower real convergence than Spain and Portugal. 
A possible explanation for this development has been the fact that while Spain 
has grown between 1990 and 1998 an average of 2.1 percent, Portugal has grown 
2.5 percent and Ireland 7.3 percent over the same period. This growth differential 
explains the divergences in real convergence. Other explanations include: the 
higher level of unemployment (15.4 percent in Spain); the low rate of labor par-
ticipation (i.e., active population over total population, which stands at 50 per-
cent, which means that expanding the Spanish labor participation rate to the EU 
average would increase per capita income to 98.2 percent of the EU average); the 
inadequate education of the labor force (i.e. only 28 percent of the Spanish po-
tential labor force has at least a high school diploma, in contrast with the EU av-
erage of 56 percent); low investment in R&D and information technology (the 
lowest in the EU, with Spain ranked 61-spending even less proportionally than 
many developing countries including Vietnam-in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Report of Information Technologies 20002-2003); and inadequate infra-
structures (i.e. road mile per 1000 inhabitants in Spain is 47 percent of the EU 
average and railroads' 73 percent). The inadequate structure of the labor market 
with high dismissal costs, a relatively centralized collective bargaining system, 
and a system of unemployment benefits that guarantees income instead of fos-
tering job search, have also hindered the convergence process.
7 
Nine, the experience of Portugal and Spain demonstrates the limits of peer 
pressure and the ability of the acquis communautaire to force change. The com-
mission has pointed out in successive enlargement overviews of the new ten to 
the need to combat corruption and economic crime, strengthen independent judi-
ciaries and develop the capacity to implement the acquis. However, both Spain 
and Portugal (and Greece) have encountered (and still do) problems in all of 
these areas. 
In addition, the Iberian enlargement also shows that patterns of migration can 
be reversed. Both Spain and Portugal were made to wait for accession in the 
1980s, partly over immigration fears that never materialized. As in 1986, the new 
treaty of accession has established a period of seven years for the new member 
states of Central and Eastern Europe. Fears of uncontrolled migration were not 
substantiated after 1986 (or even after the seven-year transition period). On the 
contrary, as a result of improved economic conditions in the Iberian Peninsula, 
one of the key results of EU access was that by 1995 there were 100,000 fewer 
Spaniards and 110,000 fewer Portuguese living in other EU member states than 
before enlargement. Furthermore, the reverse process took place, with thousands 
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of Europeans (particularly from Germany and Britain) migrating to Spain. Such 
concerns are likely to prove to be unfounded again. 
Indeed, the European Commission estimates that from 70,000 to 150,000 
workers (of a population of 350 million) could migrate from Eastern Europe to 
the older member states. This is hardly a large number. The continuing existence 
of language, cultural and structural barriers will most likely continue to hinder 
labour mobility in an enlarged Europe. In addition, the rapid economic growth of 
Eastern European countries (particularly compared with some of the EU’s scle-
rotic members, such as Germany) is likely to have the same effect that it had on 
migration patterns in Spain and Portugal after 1986. Finally, although it is likely 
that migration will cause difficulties in specific regions (especially on the eastern 
borders zones of Austria and Germany) and industries, the problem may not be 
excess migration from the east but too little. Given the EU’s ageing population 
and its low fertility rates it will be important to facilitate the migration of young 
people from Eastern Europe. In the end, instead of displacing local people from 
the labour market or lowering wages, immigrants from the new members states 
should contribute to the host country’s economy by adding value, creating jobs 
and pushing up wages because they will be able to work legally (as several hun-
dred thousand workers are currently illegally in the EU).
8 
It is also necessary to note that the success of the Iberian countries was very 
influenced by the support they received from EU funds. During 1994-99, EU aid 
accounted for 1.5 percent of Spain’s GDP and 3.3 percent of Portugal’s. EU 
funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively stable since 
the mid-1980s. The percentage of public investment financed by EU funds has 
been rising since 1985, reaching average values of 42 percent for Portugal and 15 
percent for Spain. Moreover, the European Commission has estimated that the 
impact of EU structural funds on GDP growth and employment has been signifi-
cant: in 1999, GDP rose 9.9 percent in Portugal and 3.1 percent in Spain. These 
funds, which amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, have contributed 
significantly to reduce regional disparities and foster convergence within the EU. 
As a result, major infrastructure shortcomings have been addressed and road and 
telecommunications networks have improved dramatically both in quantity and 
quality. In addition, increased spending on education and training have contrib-
uted to upgrade the labour force. In sum, these funds have played a prominent 
role in developing the factors that improve the competitiveness and determine the 
potential growth of the least developed regions of both countries.
9 The new mem-
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ber states should not expect the same level of aid. Therefore, adjustment costs 
will higher and it will take them longer to catch up. 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the critical role played by EU funds in the 
success of Iberian integration, it is also important to stress that successful inte-
gration is not only a budgetary issue. On the contrary, the Iberian experience 
demonstrates that the main benefits of integration derive from the opportunities it 
generates in terms of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Portugal and 
Spain show that a critical factor to determine the final outcome of integration will 
depend on the pattern of investment, which should bring about important dy-
namic effects. Dynamic effects should be more important than static ones. In-
deed, the opening up to international trade improves the potential for growth, 
lowers production costs and reduces the risk premium in response to a brighter 
macroeconomic outlook, which results from economic reforms. These develop-
ments help account for the increases in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Por-
tugal and Spain (where it reached a peak of 2.7 percent of GDP in 1990). FDI, in 
turn, has had very positive implications for the Iberian economies because it has 
facilitated the transmission of technology, has paved the way for advances in 
productivity and has thereby fostered an increase in the potential GDP growth of 
both economies. 
Indeed, receiving EU funds is by no means a guarantee of success. Ireland re-
ceived a larger transfer per head than the other 3 cohesion countries (Greece, 
Portugal and Spain). Yet its GDP per head grew only from 52 percent of the 
French levels to 60 percent in 1990. Then in 2000 it passed France. Why did it 
take two decades to accomplish this goal? The key was the process of reforms of 
the 1990s. In Spain GDP per head grew from 62 to 74 percent and in Portugal 
from 53 to 69 percent of the French levels from 1986-01. Greece, for its part, re-
ceived millions of Euros in EU funds but experienced more than a decade of de-
cline after accession. While it had a higher GDP per head than Ireland until 1986 
and a higher one that Portugal until 1987, by 2004 it was the EU poorest country. 
What really matters is not so much how much money you receive but how you 
spend it. This evidence illustrates that success is contingent on the good use of 
regional projects and structural funds (i.e. transport projects). Spain is perceived 
as a case of success based on its regional policy and structural projects. Portugal, 
in contrast, has suffered from insufficient matching funds and implementation 
challenges. This will be particularly critical for the new member states because 
they will have fewer resources available: The EU has allocated only 10.3bn euros 
for the new states the first 3 years in regional aid and farm subsidies, and Poland 
will receive 67 euros per capita and Hungary 49. In contrast, Greece received 437 
per head and Ireland 418.
10 
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The experience of member states also shows that while access to markets is 
important, EU membership is not enough. Success is not automatic. On the con-
trary it is largely determined by how countries exploit the advantages of member-
ship, namely, access to EU markets and free movement of labor and capital. For 
instance between 1985 and 2002 the ratio of the stock of inward FDI to GDP 
grew in Spain from 5 to 33 percent; in Portugal from 19 to 36 percent; whereas in 
Greece it fell from 20 to 9 percent. In addition, fiscal and monetary discipline, 
planning, as well as reforms are also critical. The countries that have performed 
the best within the EU are the ones that have followed this policy mix. This is so 
because stability influences the rate of growth and gives confidence to investors. 
For instance, Greece, one of the worst performers, ran fiscal deficits close to 10 
percent until to 1996, and its public debt increased from 48 percent of GDP in 
1986 to 111 percent in 1996. On the contrary, in Ireland one of the best perform-
ers, the debt fell from 112 percent in 1987 to 38 percent by 2000. It is also criti-
cal not use funds to prevent economic reforms and support failing industries. The 
best models are Ireland with its investment in education (technical colleges), low 
corporate taxes, and flexible industrial relations; and Finland with its focus on 
innovation. Finally, it is also important to minimize expectations: Austria gener-
ated too many expectations to oversell EU membership to its citizens and when 
they failed to materialize, it created a backlash. 
The difficulties the Iberian economies experienced in the early 1990s provide 
an additional lesson for new members, namely that ‘automatic pilots’ do not 
work. The credibility of monetary and economic authorities cannot be built up by 
linking it to semi-rigid institutional mechanisms (as Spain and, to a lesser extent, 
Portugal tried to do in the late 1980s and early 1990s with EMS membership). 
On the contrary, it has to be earned through the adequate management of existing 
discretionary powers. Furthermore, the Iberian EMU integration shows that the 
consolidation of integration processes is contingent on the adequate coordination 
of macroeconomic policies among members prior to the (possible) adoption of a 
monetary currency. In Portugal and Spain EU integration required a set of meas-
ures including increased competition, the privatization of public enterprises, in-
dustrial restructuring and deregulation. These measures translated into efficiency 
gains, which were reinforced by a more stable macroeconomic framework. At the 
same time, lower inflation and fiscal consolidation led to lower real (and nomi-
nal) interest rates, which, in turn, resulted in a higher sustainable growth. How-
ever, there have also been short-term costs associated with monetary integration. 
Indeed, the losses of the exchange rate and of monetary sovereignty require a 
process of nominal convergence and fiscal consolidation, as well as higher cycli-
cal correlation, for Euro membership to be successful. This should be taken into 
account for the Eastern European economies. 
The Iberian enlargement also shows that prior to monetary integration, candi-
dates must carry out a process of modernization and nominal convergence with-
out fixing their exchange rate. An additional lesson is that the reform of financial 112  Royo 
 
institutions does not necessarily bring about institutional changes in other areas 
(e.g., the labour market and fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European 
Monetary System in 1992, caused in part by successive devaluations of the 
Iberian currencies, showed the limits of financial and monetary instruments to 
impose institutional reforms in other areas and to balance domestic and external 
economic objectives. Institutional reforms require active policies by the 
governments that are willing to pay the short-term political price for unpopular 
policies. The jury is still out regarding the domestic institutional impact of EMU. 
Finally, while Portugal and Spain had feverishly pursued their integration in 
the Community, the effects of EU integration have not always been favourable to 
the two countries. As we have seen, in manufacturing and in agriculture there has 
been both trade diversion and trade creation, implying further adjustment prob-
lems, since greater import penetration led to a contraction in domestic produc-
tion. This was particularly true in the case of the Iberian manufacturing sector. 
Factors such as exchange rate movements and the strategies of multinational 
companies with subsidiaries in both countries also played a critical role in the 
final outcome of integration. This analysis proves that the expected static effects, 
which were not always favourable to Spain and Portugal, should not be the main 
economic expectation behind the ten countries’ entry to the EU. Based on the 
Iberian experience, dynamic effects, on the contrary, provide an important ra-
tionale for supporting integration.
11 Over the long term, they will affect the new 
member states’ rate of economic growth, which will be largely influenced by in-
vestment patterns, by the efficiency with which these resources are used and, fi-
nally, by their distributional effects among regions. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The examination of the Portuguese and Spanish experience in the EU leads to 
three main conclusions. 
First, EU membership brings challenges and opportunities. While Spain and 
Portugal have benefited enormously from EU membership, they have also had to 
implement painful reforms and some sectors of their economies (i.e. some Span-
ish agriculture and farms) have suffered.  
Second, success is not automatic and there are no guarantees. The economic 
performance of the Iberian economies has diverged. While the Spanish economy 
is currently booming driven by internal demand and a bubble in the real state 
sector, Portugal is experiencing one of the worst recessions of the last two dec-
ades. 
Finally, EU membership helps those who help themselves and prepare to ex-
ploit the benefits of membership. The countries that have performed best (i.e. 
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Ireland or Spain) are the ones that have used the EU funds wisely and have im-
plemented the necessary economic reforms to take advantage of EU membership 
and attract foreign direct investment.  
 
How Much Diversity Can the European Union Withstand? 
 
 
 
 
Ania Krok-Paszkowska 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The most recent enlargement bringing in ten new member states has been the 
largest and most challenging so far. The accession process was long and com-
plex. The candidates strove to meet the membership criteria while the Union 
aimed to improve its ability to absorb the new members, but there is still a lin-
gering fear that the “new” members are not yet truly compatible with “old” 
members. 
There has been growing scepticism within the Union about the ability of its 
institutions to cope with the challenges of such a large and increasingly diversi-
fied entity. It has been argued that a 25-member Union is likely to resemble a 
multi-functional, multi-layered, and highly diversified empire rather than a clas-
sical Westphalian state with clear borders, coherent institutional structure, and a 
single foreign policy.
1 A Constitution for Europe was drawn up which attempted 
to address some of the challenges facing European governance, but it failed to be 
accepted in referenda held in two founding member states, France and the Neth-
erlands and it is now unlikely that it will come into force. 
This paper will analyse how the welfare gaps between “old” and “new” 
member states, differences in democracy and political culture, as well as foreign 
policy and attitudes to the US and Russia are likely to affect the functioning of 
EU institutions and structures. It will argue that to cope with such diversity, there 
needs to be a culture of accommodation and compromise and a degree of trust in 
European institutions.  
 
Eastern Enlargement and Institutional Adaptation 
 
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe opened the way to a 
far larger potential membership of the EU. However, in the early 1990s it was 
still far from certain whether these countries would become stable and prosper-
ous democracies. If their transitions to democracy and a market economy were 
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unsuccessful, their problems could seriously affect the western part of Europe.  
In 1994 the first two newly democratic Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (CEEC’s), Hungary and Poland officially submitted their applications for 
EU membership. By the mid-1990s ten CEEC’s (as well as Cyprus and Malta) 
had formally applied for membership and it was clear that successful enlarge-
ment on this scale would require a radical rethinking of core EU policies and its 
institutional design.
2 Already in 1994, just prior to the accession of Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden, the European Parliament (EP) had threatened to block 
enlargement unless an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was held on institu-
tional reforms. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty had specifically provided that a 
further IGC should take place in 1996. This resulted in the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty which provided for the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, 
security and justice, extended the scope of communitarian policy-making in jus-
tice and home affairs, and came up with a new set of tools in the field of foreign 
and security policy. It also introduced the notion of “flexibility” – aimed at in-
creasing the scope of action within the Union’s institutions by less than the full 
compliment of member states. However, many of the institutional reforms neces-
sitated by impending enlargement, the so-called Amsterdam leftovers (i.e., size 
and composition of the Commission, weighting of votes in the Council and ex-
tension of qualified majority voting) were postponed until the next IGC in 2000. 
The EU had committed itself to “maintaining the momentum of European inte-
gration” but the 2000 Nice Treaty did little to reform the decision-making capac-
ity of the Union. The difficult compromises reached in Nice complicated rather 
than simplified the EU’s decision-making process and did little to improve effi-
ciency or transparency.  
  
Conditional Accession 
 
Diversity in the fields of economics, democracy and foreign policy is usually 
seen as being a challenge and even a threat to integration. Much of the literature 
on the progress of European integration has judged its success by the degree of 
“cohesion,” “convergence” or “integration” achieved.
3 Accession negotiations 
were aimed at making applicant states compatible with the EU. The candidates 
were first assessed or “screened” and then regularly monitored to ensure that ac-
cession could only take place once they had met the envisaged targets. However, 
accession conditions turned out to be difficult to apply in an objective and con-
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sistent way. In the end, many of the decisions taken within the process of 
enlargement were the result of hard and largely unpredictable political bargaining 
rather than a carefully worked out design. 
There are still worries that the CEEC's may not fit in well with Western 
European states. The new members are functioning democracies which share the 
core values of the EU. However, upon joining the Union they had been democra-
cies for just over one decade. Of the ten new members, six are newly 
(re)established states, and one, Cyprus is still divided. Although candidate states 
had to adhere to the Copenhagen political criteria, there are no guarantees that 
liberal political values will continue to be implemented once a country is a mem-
ber. Moreover, although the CEEC’s transformation to competitive market 
economies has been virtually completed, they are much poorer than West Euro-
pean states. Their institutional infrastructure constitutes the basis for good gov-
ernance, but their economic, legal and administrative structures are less devel-
oped. They also have their own distinct histories, societies and cultures. They 
have different foreign and security preoccupations. The European Union is thus 
now a much more diversified entity. 
 
Cost of Enlargement and Welfare Gap 
 
When Spain and Portugal joined the European Communities in 1986 they had an 
average per capita GDP of 70 percent of the existing EU (at purchasing power 
parity). In the most recent enlargement, the ten new members had an average of 
only 40 percent. It has been argued that such economic disparities will create 
pressure for large financial transfers from rich to poor member states, prevent the 
new members from fully implementing the existing acquis, and disrupt the 
smooth functioning of the EMU and the single market. However, it should also 
be remembered that that there is a vast difference in the economic size of the EU-
15 and the 10 new member states. The small economic size of new members - 
less than five per cent of the GDP of the EU-15 - means that relatively small 
amounts of funding will go a long way and make a difference to the new mem-
bers. Moreover, growth rates have been generally higher in the CEEC's than in 
the old member states. Experience with previous enlargements shows that EU 
membership is a powerful factor fostering growth rates in new members, and this 
in turn helps to achieve convergence in income. Welfare gaps existed within the 
EU of 15 and they caused few economic problems. For instance, Austria’s GNI 
per capita is more than double that of Portugal. And Luxembourg’s GNI per cap-
ita is nearly twice as high as that of Austria. Most CEEC’s are “small, dynamic 
economies with institutional frameworks and financial sectors that are adequate 
and in some cases even better than could be expected for their level of 
development.”
4 
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Nevertheless, it is this very dynamism which is beginning to worry some of 
the older EU members. There is a fear that the new members are taking over the 
economic agenda, introducing “aggressively liberal market reforms, including 
lower taxes to lure foreign investment and promote growth.”
5 Just as Ireland was 
in a previous enlargement, the new periphery of the EU may prove to be more 
dynamic than the core. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have introduced 
flat tax rates on corporate and personal incomes. This has led to fears that jobs 
will be lost and investment will be lured to low tax countries. The reaction of 
countries such as France and Germany with sluggish economies and over-regu-
lated social systems and labour markets has been to warn the new members of 
unfair competition, to demand that they raise taxes, and to block a draft directive 
to allow service businesses from any member state to operate throughout the 
EU.
6 Other "old" members have also voiced concerns. 
However, the EU-15 had already tolerated a large degree of diversity. The 
accession of the CEEC's is making a difference, disparities are more visible, 
more striking and probably more challenging, but the changes that need to be 
made are not restricted to new members only. Indeed, competition from the new 
members is putting pressure on “core” EU economies such as France, Germany 
and Italy to carry out significant reforms in their labour markets and pension 
systems. Several of the new members have been more successful in making pro-
gress towards meeting the goals of the EU Lisbon economic reform agenda to 
become “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world by 2010.”
7 
 
Political Culture and Democracy 
 
In the field of democracy and political culture, there is no clear East-West divide, 
at least from the formal point of view. All new members are either parliamentary 
or semi-presidential republics. They all have constitutions providing checks and 
balances between different branches of power. Citizens’ basic rights and free-
doms are also guaranteed by law. NGO membership density per million of 
population, although it varies from country to country, does not show particular 
differences between the Eastern and Western parts of the Union. In sum, a com-
parison of formal laws and institutions does not reveal any particular pattern of 
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divergence between old and new EU members. Nor is there a striking East-West 
divide when we look at independent evaluations of democracy, rights and free-
doms.
8  
However, it has proved to be rather difficult to achieve a participatory politi-
cal culture. Successive governments have pursued neo-liberal economic policies 
and largely ignored their social impact. This has led to a wide gulf between po-
litical elites and their electorates. Political parties are weak and often alienated 
from society. Party competition has been rather confrontational. There is a dan-
ger of charismatic leaders emerging with promises of easy solutions to economic 
and social hardship by preaching intolerance, exclusiveness and a rejection of 
compromise. So far, however, such populist appeals have resulted in limited 
electoral success. And several Western European states such as Austria or Bel-
gium have also seen the rise of populist politics based on symbols, myths and 
nationalism. Moreover, inclusion in a Union of countries with established democ-
ratic traditions would help them overcome the legacy of decades of dictatorship 
and weak democratic heritages.
9 
There is of course greater cultural diversity after enlargement. This again is 
nothing new. There were considerable differences not only between, but within 
the national cultures of the old EU member states. After 50 years cultural plural-
ity still persists and enlargement is unlikely to make that much of a difference to 
the emergence of a single or easily identifiable European demos or even pan-
European identity. However, the EU can hardly become a democratic polity 
without a distinct community sharing certain beliefs and values. This does not 
necessarily have to be a shared ‘single’ identity but the various peoples must 
have enough in common to agree to manage their affairs collectively.
10 
 
Foreign Policy and Attitudes Towards the US and Russia 
 
The different policy agendas within an EU of 25 means that a great deal of time 
and energy must be spent within the CFSP framework to diffuse internal con-
flicts. The new external borders of the EU are likely to leave it more exposed to 
external shocks. 
For the EU-15, enlargement was the first foreign policy priority. This has 
now been achieved.  There is now likely to be a shift in emphasis to relations 
with neighbours in the immediate vicinity. For reasons of history and geography, 
the CEEs are more sensitive to possible security threats than western Europe. 
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There is a more tough-minded attitude to territorial security. This is in marked 
contrast to the EU-15, which tended to see security more in terms of international 
organized crime and immigration. 
New member states are thus likely to promote a more assertive stance to-
wards Russia and its role as a regional power. There is greater emphasis on the 
new eastern borders of the EU, with Poland in particular pushing the so-called 
“Eastern Dimension” aimed at greater political and economic cooperation and a 
wider scope of collaboration with Eastern neighbours. For instance, Poland and 
Hungary are keen to see Ukraine start membership negotiations in the short to 
medium term, a stance which is not shared by “older” member states. 
The CEEs have also tended to see alliance with the US as a means of escap-
ing from centuries of domination by Germany and Russia. The pro-American 
stance of new members such as Poland led to it being described by some as an 
“American Trojan Horse” within the Union. Nevertheless, there is little evidence 
of a clear and consistent cleavage between old and new EU members when it 
comes to America with individual member states pursuing a complex set of dip-
lomatic relationships within and across EU borders. There is indeed considerable 
heterogeneity both within and between the former EU-15 and the10 new member 
states.
11 
 
How Much Diversity 
 
How much diversity can the EU withstand? The answer depends on what kind of 
EU one wants to emerge. If unity is the aim of integration, differences in struc-
ture and behaviour will be seen as being undesirable and as an obstacle to be 
overcome. However, a highly centralised and unified EU super-state is now 
rather unlikely. “Federalism” disappeared from the ICC agenda in 1996-7 after 
the failure at Maastricht to introduce greater elements of federalism. Uniform 
models of European integration have been countered by the development of con-
cepts of subsidiarity and flexibility. An EU made up of 25 member states is likely 
to be an EU made up of ad hoc alliances and shifting sub-groups. Even before 
enlargement the finance ministers of the twelve Euro-zone countries met sepa-
rately before the full meeting of 25. More recently in the field of foreign policy, 
the so-called big three, Germany, France and Britain have been conducting talks 
with Iran. France, Germany and Spain held a mini-summit with President Putin. 
Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain meet to discuss matters of JHA. 
All this fits in well with the preferences of new members who have only re-
cently emerged from communist rule and Soviet hegemony. The new members 
want the security and cooperation as well as economic growth provided by the 
EU, but they also want to keep their sovereignty and independence. They also 
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question one-fit all models of EU integration, calling for looser cooperation and 
less interference from Brussels.  
It is clear that the nature of integration is changing. Diversity will not be lim-
ited to differences between the old and new or east and west. There are differ-
ences between north and south, small and large, rich and poor, original six and 
later entrants, unitary states and federal states, states with strong regions… In-
deed the more differences there are the fewer clear cut divisions there will be. 
Each member is likely to belong to several categories at the same time and op-
pose some countries on some issues while agreeing with them on others. Ways of 
doing business will also inevitably change. It is quite impossible for 25 members 
to have meaningful exchanges on complex issues in a plenary session. We may 
see the emergence of “committees” of groups of countries with common interests 
fleshing out positions. There is a possibility of “enhanced cooperation” through 
the creation of “core” groups of states willing and able to push integration for-
ward in certain policy areas. However, new members worry that any move to-
wards a “core” Europe would lead to differentiation and de facto exclusion, while 
some older members are not that happy about any moves towards deeper 
integration.  
 
An Ethos of Accommodation 
 
The increased size and diversity of an EU made up of 25 states thus poses sig-
nificant challenges. The EU institutional structure was originally designed for a 
much smaller community. It was already difficult to get 15 states in line; adding 
ten more states will only make the task more difficult. The Commission, but also 
member states, have been very resourceful in finding ways out of and around 
deadlock situations. This has included creating imprecise or ambiguous frame-
work legislation which only later reveals its binding power, searching for new 
partners or greater support by redefining or slightly shifting the focus of planned 
policies, or changing the legal basis of policies in order to avoid demanding deci-
sion-making rules.
12 In a very diverse polity, accommodation and compromise 
seeking becomes the key feature of decision-making. However, in a consensus 
based decision-making system there has to be a willingness to make things work. 
Negotiations have been traditionally conducted in a spirit of cooperation rather 
than confrontation.
13 Of course this was easier in a small community where per-
sonal relations could be built up at various layers. It was also easier when there 
was some sense of where one was going. Up until the mid-1990s most member 
states actively endorsed the objective of deepening the process of integration, 
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although a minority has been somewhat reluctant to embrace this wholeheartedly.  
Working together in the enlarged EU will require a process of mutual adap-
tation. Among some of the founding members there is a feeling that this is a Un-
ion they no longer quite recognise. There is no longer a clear sense of direction. 
Little is left of the vision and commitment of the founding fathers. Nor is there 
anything resembling the triumvirate of Delors, Kohl and Mitterand in European 
affairs. The shared feeling of common purpose leading to an “ever closer union,” 
even if that aim was never clearly defined, has been replaced by concepts such as 
effectiveness, openness, distance from citizens and their concerns.  
With respect to concerns of citizens which shape government agendas and 
therefore national attitudes towards Commission policies, the import of greater 
economic and political diversity does present considerable challenges for policy 
formulation. The reaction of founding members such as France and Germany, 
when confronted with what they perceive as challenges from new members (in 
the form of unfair competition or “social dumping” from new members) has not 
been to seek deeper cooperation within a “core” group but to retreat into pro-
tecting their national interests. In particular they have leant heavily on the Com-
mission to get their way on the Stability and Growth Pact, to introduce a greater 
commitment to Europe’s social model in the Lisbon Agenda, and to dilute the 
proposed liberalisation of services directive. This attitude stung the European 
commission president, José Manuel Barroso into remarking that some of the 15 
old member states had not yet adapted to the idea of an enlarged Europe.
14 But 
new states have also taken an instrumental stance towards the Commission, ac-
cusing it of bias and unreasonableness in matters which they claim affect their 
national interests. For instance, Cyprus has consistently blocked any progress on 
two proposed Commission regulations aimed at lifting the economic isolation of 
Turkish Cypriots. The government of the Republic of Cyprus has accused the 
European Commission of taking positions that did not conform to the acquis 
communautaire and even considered taking legal action against it.  
There is also a lack of understanding of how things are done in the EU. There 
is a tendency to view any difference in opinion in terms of zero-sum games. In-
formal understandings are vulnerable if members do not play the game according 
to unwritten but commonly accepted rules. In May 2004 agreement was reached 
on a draft directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions. 
However, formal adoption of a common position was repeatedly delayed when 
Poland dropped its support. This was followed by a request from the European 
Parliament that the Commission re-submit its proposal so that the legislative 
process would start again from scratch. This set a worrying precedent. One offi-
cial put it as follows: “If we break political agreements, the system will stop 
working.” Another insisted: “Loyal cooperation is an important principle of EU 
law that we have to respect. […] We cannot bring governments before the Court 
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of Justice for such a thing. We have to rely on trust.”
15 A number of Czech mem-
bers of the EP criticised the European Convention’s internal procedural mecha-
nisms for being undemocratic since decisions were arrived at by “consensus” 
rather than by democratic vote.  
There is still a learning process to be gone through. There is no habit yet of 
pooling sovereignty, especially since many of the new members are also rela-
tively new states. With so many competing but also overlapping interests, there is 
a danger of parochial interests holding the rest to ransom. Of course, national 
interests have always been paramount in the Union. However, basic acceptance 
of the impartiality of EU institutions is essential if the whole edifice is not to 
collapse. Moreover, the recent tendency, especially on the part of larger member 
states, to question or change rules - often put in place largely upon their initiative 
or which were strongly supported by them - once they no longer suit them, does 
not augur well for the EU project. 
 
Trust in EU Institutions  
 
To deal with the increased diversity engendered by enlargement, European actors 
may need to become more imaginative about future structures and functions and 
it may be better to have a loose, diversified and flexible European polity, with 
various layers of governance and cooperation across different policy fields.
16 
What is needed most though is what McDonagh has described as “…the collec-
tive ethos in the European Union [which] combines the pursuit of interests with 
the accommodation of difference.”
17 It is what the Kok Report referred to as “act-
ing together as Europeans” to deal with political and economic diversity and turn 
this into an attribute and advantage rather than a threat.
18 It involves a basic trust 
in the European institutions to work for the collective good. 
There are a great many different fault lines within the EU, rich and poor, 
small and large, more competitive and less competitive, founder members and 
later entrants. In essence, this latest enlargement has brought nothing new, only 
possibly in some cases greater differences in degree. The sheer number of actors 
in institutions designed for smaller numbers is certainly a challenge but if the 
Union can find creative means of dealing with the increase in size and continue 
to work in a spirit of accommodation then the diversity should be manageable.  
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The EU Enlargement Policy:  
Can Widening and Deepening Be Combined? 
 
 
 
 
Finn Laursen 
 
 
 
Introduction
1 
 
On 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) became a Union of 25 Member States 
(EU-25). Eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as well as Cyprus 
and Malta joined the EU in its largest enlargement ever. Before this could happen 
the 10 newcomers and the EU itself had to go through various reforms in the hope 
that the new much larger Union will be able to function in a satisfactory way in the 
future. In this paper we shall look at this process and discuss the current situation 
where Bulgaria and Romania expect to join in 2007 and other states hope to join as 
soon as possible. Why does the EU keep enlarging and what are the implications for 
the future of European integration? Can deepening be combined with continuous 
enlargement? Or may fragmentation set in? 
In connection with EU enlargements in the past there has often been a debate on 
“Deepening versus Widening.” Widening, or enlargement, was linked with 
deepening by many political actors. The first enlargement agreed at the summit in 
The Hague in 1969 was for instance linked with the creation of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), the foreign policy cooperation among the member states, which 
started in 1970. So EPC was in place when the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the 
then existing European Communities (EC) in 1973. Greek membership followed in 
1981 without similar reforms, but Spanish and Portuguese membership in 1986 
came in parallel with the Single European Act (SEA), which was the first major 
reform of the EC. In order to complete the internal market qualified majority voting 
(QMV) was made the normal decision rule for adopting internal market legislation. 
The SEA thereby contributed to giving the process of European integration a new 
momentum in the mid-1980s. The enlargement which brought Austria, Finland and 
Sweden into the EU on 1 January 1995 was made on the basis of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which had created the EU in 1993. It deepened integration in various ways, 
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inter alia by outlining the phases towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
by giving the European Parliament a right of co-decision in a number of policy 
areas, by adding several new policy chapters, even including education and culture, 
and by upgrading EPC to become Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
which for the first time also included defense policy.
2 Further, Maastricht started a 
more formalized Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation. 
The Maastricht Treaty foresaw an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to 
review the treaty in 1996. This conference, which produced the Amsterdam Treaty, 
was seen as the conference which would make the next enlargement(s) possible, 
including the accession of the CEECs that had now applied for membership. In the 
end Amsterdam failed to solve the institutional issues.
3 This explains that there was 
yet another treaty reform in 2000, the Treaty of Nice, which officially made 
enlargement possible.
4 But still, the Fifteen had doubts, so a further reform 
followed, producing a so-called Constitutional Treaty in 2004. After the French and 
the Dutch voted ‘No’ to this treaty its future has become rather uncertain. So the 
question is, will a much larger union be able to function on the basis of the Treaty of 
Nice? 
 
The Development of EC/EU Enlargement Policy 
 
From the start of the European integration process, from the Schuman Plan in 1950 
and the creation of the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1952, the idea was that other European states that so wished 
could join, and after the creation of the two other Communities, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) in 1958, the European Communities (EC) went through three 
enlargements before the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU), in 
1993. The enlargement in 2004 was the fifth, and certainly not the last. 
The Maastricht Treaty in article O stipulated: “Any European State may apply 
to become a Member of the Union.” Article O was procedure oriented. The basic 
procedure has not changed. The European Parliament (EP) must give its assent, 
which is a power it has had since the SEA in 1987. It means that the EP has a veto 
on enlargement. Given the fact that unanimity is required in the Council each 
Member State also has a veto. A Member State must be European. Morocco, which 
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applied in 1987, was told that it cannot join because it is not European. Although the 
Commission opinion on Turkish membership in 1989 was negative, the question of 
eligibility was answered in the affirmative.  
The European Council meeting in Maastricht in December 1991 also issued a 
short statement on enlargement, saying "that any European State whose system of 
Government is founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become a 
member of the Union." In reality democracy has been an implied principle from the 
beginning. This condition was confirmed by the Amsterdam Treaty, which added a 
reference to a new article 6 which states: “The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law” (Art. 6). 
At the time of the Maastricht negotiations none of the CEECs had applied for 
membership, but it was known that they wanted to join. Association agreements, 
called Europe Agreements, had been negotiated with Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, and negotiations on similar agreements were taking place with 
Bulgaria and Romania. Trade and Cooperation Agreements had been signed with 
the three Baltic States and Albania. 
The Europe Agreements acknowledged that membership was the goal of the 
CEECs, but the EC side did not offer such membership at the time. 
Concerning membership for the CEECs a break-through came at the 
Copenhagen meeting of the European Council, 21-22 June 1993, where the Heads 
of State or Government agreed, that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union." The 
economic and political conditions were listed in the following way: 
 
  Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union.
5 
 
The Presidency conclusions then went on: 
 
  The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of 
European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the 
Union and the candidate countries. 
 
Put differently, both the EU and the candidate countries had to be ready. Widening 
was linked with the EU’s capacity to continue the process of integration, although 
different Member States had different ideas of what that meant. 
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Agenda 2000 and Accession Negotiations 
 
Agenda 2000 was the name given to the opinions and composite documents on 
enlargement published as a series of communications from the Commission on 15 
July 1997.
6  
Concerning the applicants the Commission concluded in 1997 that Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia were closest to meeting the mem-
bership criteria set up at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 
1993. It was therefore recommended to start accession negotiations with these five 
CEECs. The remaining five should receive further assistance through a reinforced 
pre-accession strategy. 
The differentiation proposed by the Commission between the five front runners 
plus Cyprus (5 + 1) and the remaining five in a second group led to a fair amount of 
discussion during the second part of 1997. (At this point in time Malta had with-
drawn its application). The European Council decided in Luxembourg in December 
1997 ‘to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European 
applicant States and Cyprus.’ Bilateral intergovernmental conferences would be 
convened in the spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. At the same time “the preparation of ne-
gotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria will be speeded 
up in particular through an analytical examination of the Union acquis.” There 
would be a review procedure. “From the end of 1998, the Commission will make 
regular reports to the Council, together with any necessary recommendations for 
opening bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each 
Central and East European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Co-
penhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis.”
7 
The Helsinki summit in December 1999 decided to start accession negotiations 
with the remaining CEEC applicants plus Malta, which had reintroduced its 
application for membership in 1998. It was also decided to make Turkey a formal 
candidate. The European Council welcomed “recent positive developments” in 
Turkey,” and went on to say: “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union 
on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.” Turkey 
would from now on “benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support 
its reforms.”   
During the years 2000 and 2001 negotiations then took place with 12 applicant 
countries. Each autumn the Commission issued its ‘report cards’ on progress on the 
31 chapters that were covered in the negotiations.  
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In its Strategy Paper put out on 9 October 2002 the Commission concluded that 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia fulfilled the political and economic criteria for membership.
8 
The meeting of the European Council in Brussels 24-25 October 2002 en-
dorsed the recommendation from the Commission that the 10 candidate coun-
tries already singled out for membership fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and 
would be able to “assume the obligations of membership from the beginning of 
2004.” Concerning Bulgaria and Romania the European Council expressed its 
support for the two countries’ “efforts to achieve the objective of membership in 
2007.” And concerning Turkey the Union welcomed “the important steps taken 
by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” which had 
“brought forward the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.”
9  
After the Brussels meeting of the European Council intense individual nego-
tiations with the 10 candidate countries took place up to the meeting of the Euro-
pean Council in Copenhagen in December, where the final agreement was 
reached about enlargement.  
At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002 intense negotiations took 
place especially with Poland about money and Turkey about a date for the start of 
negotiations about membership. It was agreed that Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia would 
be able to join from 1 May 2004. For Bulgaria and Romania the EU set 2007 as 
the target date for accession.
10  
Concerning Turkey the Commission had concluded in its annual report in 
October 2002 that progress was being made towards fulfilling the political Co-
penhagen criteria – requirements for democracy, protection of minorities and the 
rule of law – but that the country did not fully meet these criteria. 
Turkey was pressing for a date. In the end, Copenhagen at least offered a 
date for a decision about a date. The Commission would present a report to the 
European Council in the autumn of 2004 and make a recommendation concern-
ing Turkey’s fulfillment of the political Copenhagen criteria. If the European 
Council decides then, on the basis of the Commission report, that Turkey fulfils 
the criteria the EU will initiate accession negotiation with Turkey ‘without de-
lay.’ It was also decided to increase pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey. 
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The Turkish leaders present in Copenhagen were not satisfied. Their US ally 
had also put pressure on the EU leaders, with President Bush personally calling 
some of them, including the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  
 
The EU’s Institutional Issues 
 
A central aspect of the EU’s capacity to absorb the applicant countries is 
institutional. We have now moved from a Union with 15 to a Union of 25 Member 
States, and more candidates are waiting to join. Could such a Union function on the 
basis of the original institutions designed for a Community of Six? Collective action 
considerations suggest that decision-making becomes more difficult as the number 
of members increases if decision-making procedures are not improved in parallel.
11 
The question of voting in the Council had been on the agenda of the 1996-97 
IGC. Some of the larger countries tried to get their number of votes increased 
relative to the smaller countries.  
The composition of the Commission was also discussed during the Amsterdam 
negotiations. In EU-15 the Commission had 20 members, two from Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and the UK, and one from the remaining 10 members. Many 
reform proposals have suggested that the Commission is getting too big, and that a 
possible solution would be just one member per country. But most large member 
states now called for a smaller Commission. 
In the end the Amsterdam negotiations did not solve these issues. The Dutch 
presidency suggested a re-weighting of the votes in the Council, but no agreement 
could be reached. The Cologne meeting of the European Council in June 1999 
therefore decided: “In order to ensure that the European Union’s institutions can 
continue to work efficiently after enlargement, the European Council confirms its 
intention of convening [an IGC] early in 2000 to resolve the institutional issues left 
open in Amsterdam that need to be settled before enlargement.” Three topics were 
singled out: 
 
-  size and composition of the Commission; 
-  weighting of votes in the Council (re-weighting, introduction of dual 
majority and threshold for qualified-majority decision-making); 
-  possible extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council.
12 
 
The Helsinki summit in December 1999 confirmed this agenda, leaving open 
the possibility of adding other matters during the IGC, which started in February 
2000 and which was concluded in Nice in December 2000. The Treaty of Nice 
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introduced new weights of votes in the Council starting with 29 votes for the four 
largest member states, Germany, France, the UK and Italy, followed by 27 for 
Spain and Poland and graduated down to three for Malta. Further, a certain num-
ber of policy issues were moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting 
(QMV). Concerning the Commission the decision was that from enlargement 
each member state would nominate one Commissioner, but once Member State 
number 27 joins there must be a reduction in size and some system of rotation 
must be introduced. 
As the Heads of State or Government left Nice some of them had their doubts. 
They decided to have yet another IGC in 2004 in order to make the EU more effi-
cient and legitimate. The Laeken summit in December 2001 decided that this IGC 
should be prepared by a Convention, with relatively large representation by the EP 
and national parliaments.
13 By July 2003 this Convention produced a draft Constitu-
tional Treaty, which was then sent to an IGC that started on October 4, 2004. A 
meeting of the European Council in Brussels in December 2003 failed to reach a 
final agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Especially the question of voting in 
the Council was controversial. The Convention had proposed a simple double ma-
jority; a majority of states which should also represent at least 60 percent of the 
EU’s population would constitute a QMV. But Spain and Poland defended the more 
cumbersome system of weights agreed in Nice because Nice gave then a relatively 
high number of votes. In the end an agreement was found by June 2004. The double 
majority system was accepted, but the thresholds were increased to 55 percent of the 
states representing 65 percent of the EU population. This system was to start from 
2009 if the Constitutional Treaty was ratified by all 25 Member States.
14 It now 
looks as if the Constitutional Treaty will not be ratified, so the EU will have to live 
the Treaty of Nice for some time. 
 
Current Candidates
15 
 
As mentioned earlier both Bulgaria and Romania how concluded accession 
negotiations and are expected to join in 2007. On 13 April the European Parliament 
voted to give green light to membership. The Commission will publish its annual 
report in November 2005 and this report is expected to determine whether the two 
countries will join in 2007 or 2008. 
Croatia is next in line. Membership negotiations should have started by now, 
but have been put on hold by the EU on 16 March 2005 because Croatia has not 
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cooperated sufficiently with the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Croatia has 
failed to hand over General Ante Gotovina to the court. Gotovina is wanted by the 
court for alleged killing of over 150 ethnic Serbs and for expelling about 150,000 at 
the end of the 1991-1995 war. He is considered a national hero in Croatia. The 
government claims that it does not know where he is. The decision to shelve the 
talks with Croatia, which was mainly pushed by Britain, has upset Croatia and its 
supporters inside the EU, especially Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Croatia still hopes to join in 2007. But the Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso thinks 2009 is more realistic. 
The most controversial among the current candidates is Turkey. But in 
December 2004 Turkey was promised that membership negotiations will start on 3 
October 2005. One condition is that Turkey takes steps to recognize Cyprus before. 
This was expected to be done through Turkey signing a protocol to its association 
agreement with the EU which would extend the agreement to the 10 new member 
states, including Cyprus. It is expected that negotiations will take at least a decade. 
The aim is full membership, but that outcome is not guaranteed. But, according to 
the December agreement, Turkey must in any case be “anchored in European 
structures through the strongest possible bond.” A Turkish accession agreement 
may in the end include longer transition periods than seen in the past. Free 
movement of labour/persons is an extremely sensitive issue in many member states. 
Some kind of permanent safeguard clause may have to be included in an accession 
treaty. Turkish membership will also have a big impact on CAP and structural 
funds. But those financial problems will only have to be dealt with in the financial 
framework following the 2007-2013 framework currently being negotiated. But if 
Turkey keeps on with ongoing reforms and implement them fully and sort out the 
Cyprus issue the prediction must be that Turkey will eventually join. The prediction 
is complicated by the fact that France has decided to have a referendum on the issue. 
And popular support for Turkish membership has fallen after the ‘No’ votes to the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. 
 
Future Candidates – Where Will it End? 
 
The remaining states of former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia have been promised membership in the future on the 
basis of the Copenhagen Criteria. Also Albania is in this group. The future status of 
Kosovo is still uncertain. 
In 2000 the EU started the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the 
Western Balkan states designed to encourage and support the domestic reform 
process. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was the first country 
in the region to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001. It 
entered into force on 1 April 2004. Macedonia submitted its application for EU 
membership on 22 March 2004. The EU Enlargement Policy  133 
 
Recently the Commission has recommended that negotiations on a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (SAA) start with Serbia and Montenegro. An SAA 
could be the first step towards membership. One condition is full cooperation with 
the UN war tribunal in The Hague. 
The latest development is that other states from the former Soviet Union - other 
than the Baltic States that have joined in 2004 - have started expressing an interest 
in membership. This includes especially the Ukraine after its change of government 
in January 2005. The new president Viktor Yushchenko quickly stated full 
membership of the EU as his “strategic goal.” For the moment Ukraine has a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in 1998. 
Ukraine also falls under the EU’s 2004 so-called European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP). Neither the PCA nor the ENP open up the prospect of membership. 
However, Commission Vice President Margot Wallström has called the Ukraine 
vision of membership “realistic.” And Ukraine’s membership is supported by 55 
percent of the voters in the EU’s largest member states, in example Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland, while Turkey’s bid is only 
favoured by 45 percent. 
But what about Moldova, Belarus, etc.? If Europe is a geographic concept it 
stretches to the Urals and includes part of Russia.  
Moldova has a PCA that entered into force in 1998. Solution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict in the eastern part of the country is considered important by 
the EU. But the government, led by the Communist Party is pro-European. 
There are no contractual links between the EU and Belarus. The country’s 
current regime is considered too authoritarian.  
For the moment the prospect of Ukraine’s membership suggests that the EU at 
some stage will have to decide where the EU’s future eastern border will go.  
 
Policy Implications: Looking into the Future 
 
Predictions are difficult, but we now have a much wider EU, and we expect further 
enlargements in the future. Are the current institutions up to the job of making it 
function? Many feel that the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would be a 
help, partly because it includes more majority voting. If, as it now looks, the 
Constitutional Treaty will not be ratified one possibility is one or more mini-reforms 
over the years, which at some point might include more majority voting. 
Day-to-day decision-making will surely be made more difficult when you have 
a greater number of players with more diverse interests. A number of policy areas 
will be affected. We suggest: 
 
1.  Changing the CAP will become more difficult. The CEECs benefiting from 
the current CAP will resist change the way especially France has resisted 
change in the past. 
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difficult than they already are. Most of these decisions still require 
unanimity (and will so according to the draft Constitutional Treaty) and the 
net payers are not willing to contribute more. The financial framework for 
2007-2013 will be a huge political battle. 
3.  Developing a ‘progressive’ environmental policy may well slow down. The 
CEECs do not want measures that will increase production costs. 
4.  Something similar may happen in the areas of social and labour market 
policies and taxation. The CEECs are eager to try to follow Ireland’s 
example. They want to attract investments. So regulation of production will 
be kept at the required minimum and corporate taxes will be low. 
5.  In the area of CFSP the CEECs will join the UK in a rather pro-American 
group, making it difficult for the EU to speak with one voice 
internationally. The development of an autonomous EU defense policy may 
be hampered. 
6.  The issues of border controls and migration will remain on the EU agenda 
for a number of years. There is a fear that there will be more illegal 
immigration from further east. Some of the EU’s new eastern neighbours 
are to a large extent failed states that have not succeeded in policies of 
transition to democracy and market economies. They could therefore 
produce refugees and this is combined with a fear that the new member 
states will have lax border controls. 
 
Towards Multi-Speed Integration? 
 
So the question remains: Will the EU be able to manage the increased diversity? If 
not, will there be a risk of a return to the kind of power politics that Europe knew in 
the past? Some Realist scholars have predicted such a development. But liberal 
institutionalists point to the important role played by institutions in Europe today.
16 
It will indeed take good, efficient, democratic and legitimate institutions to get the 
new EU to function. The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would be a step – 
but only a step – in such direction. 
Some observers who see the basic philosophy of the founding fathers of 
European integration, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and others, with its emphasis 
on the role of ‘supranational’ institutions, as important for Europe’s future, are 
worried that the new members have not fully understood and accepted that 
philosophy. That philosophy puts emphasis on ‘upgrading the common interest’ and 
not just stubbornly defending national interests. The EU has created a polity. It is 
more than purely intergovernmental cooperation. 
                                                 
16 Robert Keohane; Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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Should EU-25 not be able to solve the problems, then the main alternative may 
be ‘enhanced cooperation’ between a smaller group of states. After the failure of the 
IGC in December 2003 the French and Germans again talked about the possibility 
of an avant-garde, a pioneer group of states that could move ahead and leave the 
laggards in a more peripheral situation. We can hope such a scenario can be 
avoided. The fact that the French and Dutch voted ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty 
has complicated the situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Impacts on External Politics and Institutions 
 
Can the Fifth Enlargement Weaken 
the EU Development Cooperation? 
 
 
 
 
Francesc Granell
1
 
 
 
The 2004 Enlargement of the EU and the “Development Challenge” 
 
In accordance with the Athens Act of Accession signed on April 16, 2003, the 
new member States of the European Union participate actively in the Acquis 
Communautaire regulating all areas of the Community action in accordance with 
the solutions and adaptations negotiated with the new Member States on the basis 
of the principle of a wholesale taking over of the Acquis subject to transitional 
measures and temporary derogations when agreed, as in earlier accession acts. 
Development has not been a contentious issue in the accession negotiation 
process. The main reason of this limited interest in the topic is the fact that de-
velopment co-operation of the accession countries have been practically negligi-
ble until now. The new member States represent about 25 percent of the EU 
population, about 5 percent of the EU income (about 11 percent in purchasing 
power parity terms) but only 0.43 percent of the Aid flows from the EU to devel-
oping countries.  
Formal negotiations on the chapter related to development cooperation 
(Chapter 26 – External Relations) have been closed with no exceptions agreed, 
therefore the new candidates have been obliged to apply the relevant Community 
Acquis and enforce the legal and institutional framework of the “Development 
Cooperation Acquis” as an integral part of the EU’s external policies since mem-
bership. From the date of their accession, the new Member States joined the cur-
rent EU in supporting all of the objectives and instruments of the EC’s develop-
ment policy. 
The basic legislative framework for EU development cooperation is provided 
in Articles 177-181 A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity (Title XX). It sets out common objectives for the EC external assistance 
                                                 
1 The author was Chief Negotiator for Finland with the European Commission in the 1995 
Enlargement exercise. He explained his experience in Francesc Granell, “The EU Enlargement 
negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden” Journal of Common Market Studies 
(March, 1995). The author has been representative of the Commission’s DG Development in the 
works driven by Directorate General Enlargement and conducive to Athens Treaty for the 2004 EU 
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to developing countries: sustainable economic and social development, integra-
tion of the developing countries in the world economy, the fight against poverty, 
consolidation of democracy, human rights and the Rule of Law, etc.. The instru-
ments through which the EC meets these objectives include external agreements, 
trade preferences to exports from developing countries and financial and techni-
cal support to developing countries, international bodies and NGOs.
2  
The EC aid is complementary of the aid programs of its Member Countries 
and the EC Policy does not affect the authority of the member countries to inde-
pendently act in bilateral and multilateral development actions. The EC bodies 
and the EU Member Countries coordinate their approaches to the development 
policy and harmonize their programs of assistance including their positions in 
international organizations and international conferences. 
The main challenges for the new member states resulting from enlargement 
relate to how development policy is made, funded and implemented and how 
they accommodate within the governance structures related to the EC’s develop-
ment policy. 
In this context the fifth EU’s enlargement presents enormous opportunities 
for the new member states in political dialogue and trade policies regarding de-
veloping countries as well as development cooperation; but it will also present 
certain problems and challenges for them and for the whole EU as a donor. 
 
The External Agreements 
 
According with Article 6.2 of the Act of Accession the new Member States are 
part to the agreements or conventions applied by the Community, the EU’s many 
cooperation, partnership and association agreements as well the EU’s Council 
Regulation associating the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) under 
Britain, France, the Netherlands and Denmark to the EU.  
This includes cooperation agreements with Asian and Latin American devel-
oping countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the comprehensive 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific Coun-
tries (ACP) comprising the political dimension, economic and trade co-operation 
and development and financial cooperation. 
The last of these, the Partnership Agreement known as the “Cotonou Agree-
ment” signed on 13 June 2000 replaced the previous Lomé EU-ACP Convention 
on April 1, 2003 for a period that covers 20 years with a clause allowing for revi-
sion every five years and a financial protocol for five year periods. Although the 
new Member States became members of all elements of Cotonou from the date 
of their accession to the EU, they will only contribute to the EDF after member-
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2005 by Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, is giving a detailed 
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ship. When and how much they will contribute to the EDF to be adopted in 2006 
is still to be negotiated in due time unless the Council decides the “budgeting” of 
the EDF in the context of the Financial Perspectives beyond 2007. 
In due course and along with current EU Member States, the new Member 
States will become party to the WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) created by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, on which negotia-
tions started between EU and the ACP countries in September 2002 to define the 
new trade system with a view to implementation from 2008.  
Article 6.12 of the Act of Accession points out that the New Member States 
shall take appropriate measures, where necessary, to adjust their position in rela-
tion to international organizations, and to those international agreements to which 
the Community or to which other member states are also parties.  
 
Trade Acquis  
 
Beyond cooperation agreements with Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean 
and the Cotonou partnership agreement, the new Member States already assumed 
the rest of the EC’s trade acquis and trading policies, including the tariff prefer-
ences in favor of developing countries under the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) and specially the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) - agreed in the 
Eve of the Brussels Third UN LDC Conference (May 2001)- as well as the “ex-
ternal face” of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
As Desai
3 pointed out it is a risk that the new members consider trade as a 
zero-sum game adding to the autarchic lobby in the EU that would work against 
the interest of the developing countries that are Western Europe’s trading 
partners.  
In preparation for accession, the candidate countries have been required to 
align their tariffs and other trade related rules and regulations with the EU and to 
co-ordinate positions in view of the Doha WTO Development Round launched in 
November 2001. 
The most significant trade liberalization factors in enlargement have been the 
removal of remaining non tariff barriers to trade, to liberalize their markets and to 
reduce industrial tariffs. 
In terms of tariff protection, accession resulted in a significant reduction of 
the Candidate Countries' level of Protection except for some countries (Baltic 
States) which had tariffs below the EC average and except for products included 
in the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Quota adjustments have been necessary in areas where the EC maintains 
quotas with third countries. Standards for some products in most of the candidate 
countries rose as compared with pre-membership situation. 
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They, of course, take on the EC Protocols in Sugar, Veal and Beef and Ba-
nanas under the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP Countries as well the transi-
tional Lomé/Cotonou tariff preferences accepted by the waiver of the WTO dur-
ing the Doha Ministerial until the new “Economic Partnership Agreement” Sys-
tem created by Cotonou is implemented in conformity with article XXIV of 
GATT at the end of the current ACP-EU negotiations. 
In the field of trade preferences the influence of the new Member States may 
lead to changes in the EC’s trade policy over the longer term. This may lead to 
pressure to restrict benefits that the EC offers to better off developing countries 
or to avoid new concessions.  
That means that there might be a change of policy towards certain sectors 
where the new Member States have defensive or offensive interests. Similarly, 
there might be a change of attitude towards some developing countries that the 
new Member States perceive as a threat to domestic industries. 
Some of the new member states might wish to challenge current arrange-
ments that bring benefits to countries better off than they are. Malta and Romania 
are currently classified in the WTO as developing countries. This is based on 
self-classification and they will have to renounce this upon accession.
 In terms of 
EC trade policy, Bulgaria and Romania- which will become members of the EU 
in 2007- will have to offer GSP access to Malaysia, which has a higher per capita 
income than they do. All of the candidates except for Cyprus are poorer than Ko-
rea, Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, who benefit from preferential access to the 
EC. 
 
Financial Acquis: Total ODA, the EC’s Budget, the EDF and the EIB 
 
Total ODA of the new Member States 
 
All the candidate countries together only represent 0.4 percent of the EU ODA 
flows to developing countries.
4 The current levels of the financial aid which they 
are providing to developing countries are very limited and far away from the UN-
endorsed target of 0.7 percent of the Gross National Income (GNI) dedicated to 
Aid. The average ODA/GNI of the “15” reached 0.35 percent in 2003 while the 
average for the EU New Member States reached merely 0.04 percent. 
The Official Development Assistance (ODA) of Poland (the biggest donor in 
absolute terms) represents only 0.02 percent of its GNI. Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic (the biggest donors in relative terms) declared an amount equivalent to 
0.08 percent and 0.11 percent of the GDI). Even if no comprehensive and reliable 
data on ODA of the new members is still available (it is a mixture between 
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humanitarian assistance provided to the Balkans with the assistance provided to 
poorest countries), fragmented date indicates that the aid provided by them to 
developing countries is not sufficient for an EU Member State. Greece -the EU 
member with a lowest ODA/GNI ratio- reached a level of 0.21 percent after 
improving quantity and quality in its commitments since its access to the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in 1999. 
The EU currently provides just over 54 percent of global development 
assistance provided by the DAC members, of which about 20 percent is at EC 
level. This is set to increase further following the commitments on aid volumes 
agreed in the European Council held in Barcelona in March 2002, in advance of 
the Monterrey Financing for Development UN Conference. According to these 
commitments the EU, collectively, would reach an average ODA/GNI ratio of 
0.39 percent by 2006 and each Member State will strive to reach at least 0.33 
percent by the same date in view of reaching the UN-endorsed target of 0.7 
percent per cent of GNI dedicated to aid. That means that the Enlarged EU would 
be obliged to reach an additional $7.1 billion of ODA by 2006 from which about 
1.3 billion of contribution by the new Member States. 
It is not clear at this stage what the EU’s Monterrey commitment on 
increased aid volumes will mean for new Member States, nor what impact 
accession will have on the EU’s average ODA/GN ratio. Some of the candidates 
have signaled an intention to increase their bilateral aid expenditure in 
connection with the commitments made to contribute to the Millennium 
Development Goals but, as one of the New Member States put in during the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council which met in Brussels on 19-20 
May 2003, “We are committed to the Monterrey Conference goals, but we have 
not taken part in those negotiations and are not expected to “deliver on 
commitments made by the 15.” A Roadmap to Monterrey targets is presently 
negotiated.  
The net disbursements of ODA made in 2001 by the new Member States 
reached (according OECD/DAC figures) a total amount of only $114 millions 
with a ratio ODA/GNI of 0.03 
In order to compare ODA disbursements made by some EU members in 
2001, it reached $1599 million (1.01 percent) for Denmark, 1576 (0.8 percent) 
for Sweden, 748 (0.30 percent) for Spain, 389 (0.32) for Ireland, 194 (0.19) for 
Greece, and 142 (0.80) for Luxemburg.   
In accordance with the projections made by the Austrian experts during the 
Regional Partnership Workshop organized in the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna 
in February 2003
5 the 0.33 ODA target will suppose for the new Eastern member 
States in 2006 a national allocation of Euro 254 million for the Czech Republic, 
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233 for Hungary, 790 for Poland, 92 for the Slovak Republic, 84 for Slovenia, 61 
for Bulgaria, 178 for Romania, 24 for Estonia, 34 for Latvia and 54 for Lithuania.  
The gap with the present situation is enormous and it would be very difficult 
to reach the target given the low profile of development issues and the fact that 
no political parties or personalities are leading such a move in the new EU 
members and the fact that most of the new Member States are still at a stage of 
establishing the appropriate legal framework for development assistance, is a mix 
between development and humanitarian aid and contributions to multilateral 
bodies (UN Agencies and Development Banks) are supported by several 
Ministries in a disperse way. 
 
Contribution to the EC’s Development Financing 
 
The contributions to the EC budget and the European Development Bank are also 
increasing the new Member States ODA figures. The EU’s budget include 
budgetary lines for development expenditure (which represents 4.68 percent of 
the total budget and covers expenditure in Asia-Latin America and 
Mediterranean Countries and specific policies like NGO support, food security, 
democracy, tropical forests…). One problem for expecting any of the candidates 
to be able to meet the Barcelona target figure within the timeframe agreed for 
existing Member States is that according to the Act of Accession the size and 
timing of the candidate countries’ contributions to the EC’s budget are subject to 
some temporary budget compensations 2004-2006 that makes it difficult to 
establish the “development budgetary effort” to be attributed to them.  
The new Member States became party to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
by deposing an act of accession to the Agreement with the Secretariat of the EU 
Council but they will not contribute to the current 9th EDF that is financing the 
period until 2007 and will only contribute to the 10th EDF to finance EU-ACP 
co-operation, although the size and timing of their contributions will be subject to 
negotiation in the Council between present and future EU members after the 
present discussion assessing the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating 
the EDF in the Budget: the final decision on it, would depend on the current 
negotiations about the 2007-2013 EU´s Financial Perspectives.  
According the scenarios for meeting the Monterrey ODA targets and the es-
timated amount of the Second Financial protocol of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agrement, the European Commission has estimate contributions to the five years 
10
th EDF after 2007 to reach a global amount of some €15000 million (against 
13.800 the current 9
th EDF) with contributions between € 55 and 60 million per 
year for Poland (level between the present contributions of Denmark and 
Finland), between 16 and 18 for the Czech Republic (present level of Ireland), 
between 15 and 17 for Hungary (level of Ireland), about € 7 million for the Slo-
vak Republic (level of Luxemburg) ,6 for Slovenia, 4 for Lithuania, and Cyprus, 
3 for Latvia, 2 for Estonia and 1.5 for Malta, under the assumption that in the Can the Fifth Enlargement Weaken the Development Cooperation?  145 
 
framework of the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 the EDF will not be 
“budgetized.” In addition and considering that the EDF financial means are used 
gradually, the new member States will not pay the financial sum immediately 
subscribed but only after the call to pay (probably starting in 2009-2010). 
 
The Development Procedures and Machinery 
 
In considering the potential implications of enlargement for the new member 
states and the EU whole position regarding Developing countries, the EU is 
helping the new Member States to overcome their lack of experience in 
development cooperation. 
There is an enormous effort underway in order to get New Members to 
actively participate in EU development assistance. There are legal, procurement, 
regulatory and financial obligations to be adopted at national level. Enterprises 
and NGOs from the new Member States are quite not still participating in the 
tendering to participate in the delivering of European Aid to Developing 
countries. Officials from new Member States must be better trained to participate 
in development-related Committees, Joint EU-ACP institutions and consultations 
regarding development issues. 
During the Enlargement Negotiations the European Commission created a 
Task Force for preparing the Development administrations and the staff of the 
Foreign Ministries, the NGOs and other economic and social actors of the new 
Member States to the Community procedures. This Task Force organized “Road 
Shows,” Training Courses and Workshops in the new member countries to meet 
and inform all the actors to be involved in development and humanitarian issues.  
In the preparatory process the EU has contributed to building institutional 
capacity for development in the new Member States not only to participate in the 
EU development process but also for delivering aid at bilateral and multilateral 
level. 
  This “capacity building” in the new EU members must consider the 
distribution of competences between the EU and its member states; strengthening 
links with and within international organizations, and with partners in developing 
countries; encouraging awareness and understanding of the EC’s development 
policy and wider development issues, not just among government officials in 
candidate countries but also amongst parliamentarians, NGOs, enterprises, 
academics and the public. 
In most of the new member states there is still a lack of central authority re-
sponsible for coordination. Therefore development and humanitarian assistance 
is provided to UN agencies and beneficiaries by different ministries and bodies 
without a national coordination which can ensure complementarity between na-
tional actions and Community action in this field and facilitate participation in 
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It is also a lack of methodology concerning management of assistance to 
developing countries both at the level of the capitals and the embassies on the 
spot: systems of information, monitoring and tendering.  
Projects funded by EU (PHARE and TAIEX), the OECD (Sigma Project), 
the Canadian International Development Agency and UNDP have suggested 
improvements of the institutional mechanisms for Aid awareness and 
management in the New Member States.  
The periodical meeting of Directors General for Development of the 
Commission and Member States is now creating a “de facto” training in these 
matters among the Governments of the new Member States. 
 
The Challenge of the Different Traditions 
 
The enlarged EU faces potentially different attitudes to development and 
developing countries – stemming from differences in history, experience, 
location and culture. New members have accepted the EC’s development policy 
as it stands, but major differences could lead to pressure to shift the policy in new 
directions over the longer term, because: 
a) There are real differences in levels of income between the EU-15 and 
some of the new and future Member States. Some ACP, Mediterranean, Latin-
American and Asian EU partners receiving EC assistance have higher income 
those new member countries. 
b) The new members’ traditional ties – and the focus of their aid 
programs – are with countries that share their communist past and on neighboring 
countries. Considering that EC and Member States have committed to improving 
operational coordination between their external assistance policies and programs, 
these efforts could be made more difficult by a significant disjunction between 
the bilateral programs of the new EU members and the approach being pursued at 
the EC level and by existing Member States. 
c) Until the end of Communism, the most advanced new Members in 
foreign assistance ranked well in delegating experts to some international 
development bodies in sectors like Education (UNESCO), Health (WHO), 
Agriculture (FAO) and others. Is this a tradition to be recovered in the 
Millennium Development Goals context?  
d) All of the new Member States received substantial financial resources 
in preparation for accession. All except Malta and Cyprus are still officially eli-
gible for World Bank (IBRD) borrowing, and have been recent borrowers. 
Would this imply difficult coordination for the EU? 
e) Most of the new Member States consider Asian and African Countries 
merely as recipients of Humanitarian Aid with a few exceptions. This may 
influence their views on the regional focus of the EC’s development policy. 
These differences in approach - as well as practical differences between the 
focus and policy/legal/administrative infrastructure of the aid programs of pre-Can the Fifth Enlargement Weaken the Development Cooperation?  147 
 
sent and new Member States - represent an additional challenge to promote co-
herence, co-ordination and complementarity within the EU (as required by the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in a 
difficult process of ratification).  
This different tradition means that the new Member States accepted the EC 
development policy as it stands but in the long term they may well influence its 
future direction.  
 
The Complementarity  
 
Most of new Member States and the candidate countries’ development programs 
have evolved a lot in the past few years, and will continue to do so in the period 
leading up to and as a result of accession. Moreover it seems to be unrealistic and 
inappropriate to expect them to adopt copies of the EC or the traditional Member 
States’ programs for themselves. Instead, the focus should be on promoting 
complementarity – drawing on their comparative advantage as providers of 
technical assistance regarding political and economic transition.  
Encouraging and helping the candidate countries to strengthen their policy 
frameworks and administrative infrastructure related to development and to be 
accepted by DAC should be a key priority for action particularly because of its 
role in developing best practice guidelines and key development issues.
6  
The new member states and the candidate countries are all members of the 
IMF and the World Bank and some of them of IDA and several Regional 
Development Banks. Consequently the Enlarged EU would increase voting 
power in international development institutions. 
 
The Need to Involve Development Actors 
 
Beyond government officials, it is important for Candidate Countries to build a 
broad awareness and some understanding of development issues among 
parliamentarians, civil society, the academic community and the general public 
where possible. 
Several of the candidate countries already use NGOs to implement humani-
tarian aid, and are taking steps to accredit NGOs (along with other bodies) as 
official implementation agencies for their limited development assistance 
Enterprises, Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Trade Associations of 
the new member states must be progressively involved in the development 
cooperation process and be aware of the loans and projects to which they can 
participate in the context of the assistance to the developing countries 
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(Procurement rules applicable to EC external aid contracts, call for proposals…) 
or reinforcement of the private sector in developing countries. 
 
Enlargement Is Not the Only Threat 
 
But the new Enlargement is not the only concern regarding the future of the 
European development co-operation. An additional concern relates to the general 
trend to subordinate development policy to other policies (CFSP, trade, 
migration, anti-terrorism, drugs and money laundering, fishery agreements, 
agricultural policy...). On the other hand, the abolition of the Development 
Council of Ministers decided in the Sevilla European Council in June 2002, 
downgraded the profile of the coordinating EU´s machinery in this field. 
The European Commission launched in 2005 a broad Consultation on 
Development Cooperation to improve the “profile” of the development policy but 
could the “non ratification” of the European Constitution a threat for the required 
action. 
Other questions are also on the table: Should the Commission maintain its 
powers to handle one fifth of the combined grants from the European taxpayers 
to the developing countries? Should the EDF be integrated into the Community 
budget?
7 Should the development regulations be unified as proposed by the Prodi 
Commission in its very latest days? Should the European Parliament be more 
involved in the development assistance issues concerning sanctions against 
countries, negotiation of trade agreements and coherence between development 
and other policies? Would the movement to change the aid coordinating and 
delivering bodies within the EU institutions launched in 2000 be successful?  
 
The Way Ahead 
 
In this context the Enlargement is not to be seen as the only threat to the future 
Community Development Policy policies, practices and funding. In fact the 
accession of ten new members provides an ideal opportunity to open new 
creative approaches to development assistance, to enhance its effectiveness and 
to identify possible new synergies based on the experience of the EU new 
members and candidates from their former communist tinctured foreign 
assistance and from their political and economic transformation in the last ten 
years  
The enlarged Europe must have the potential and the interest to ensure 
stability, prosperity and poverty reduction around the World, in our troubled 21
st 
Century, so the challenge of the enlargement in the field of development is not 
just how to accommodate new members or just to have more money to be spent, 
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rather it is how to enhance the EU’s international position and how to do more 
things and more efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The Impact of Enlargement 
on the Euro-Med Partnership 
 
 
 
 
Beverly Crawford 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The EC/EU’s concern with stability on its southern borders and its relationship to 
enlargement stretches back to the 1970’s. But its most important policy initiative 
burst on the scene in 1995 when the Spanish presidency of the EU organized a 
conference in Barcelona, with the 15 members of the EU and 12 countries of the 
South Mediterranean. The outcome was the Barcelona Declaration or Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Initiative. In launching this initiative, EU for-
eign ministers recognized a need to respond to “new” security issues emanating 
from the region, such as drug trafficking, human rights violations, and environ-
mental degradation.
1 In addition, many EU officials saw the EMP as a strategy to 
compete with other trade blocks, without having to invite non-European Mediter-
ranean countries to join the EU. Finally, EU ministers believed that the initiative 
would “add another layer in a comprehensive European effort to help settle the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.”
2 
Backed by the largest EU financial commitment ever made outside the Un-
ion, the Barcelona Declaration launched a set of economic, political, cultural, and 
social initiatives whose stated purpose was to extend southward the European 
area of stability. The EMP became the EU’s main Middle East policy instrument; 
indeed, it became the only regional organization in which both the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel are included. It also was designed as the EU’s preferred tool 
for engaging Islam in a “dialogue of civilizations,” and its central foreign eco-
nomic policy in the region as a whole.
3 
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Most importantly, however, the EU Commission represented the EMP as an 
ambitious attempt to invent a region that does not yet exist and to create a re-
gional identity that would rest, neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society, 
economic interdependence, voluntary networks and civic beliefs. The stated aim 
of this experiment was to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic secu-
rity community whose practices are synonyms of peace and stability.
4 
This essay assesses the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on the aims of 
the Euro-Med Partnership and the prospects for its success. Does the Mediterra-
nean policy of an enlarged Europe herald a new era of foreign policy behavior—
as stated in the Barcelona Declaration—or does it represent the continued politics 
of power and domination? Either way, will the net impact be a stabilizing one, 
enhancing regional security and economic prosperity, or will it be destabilizing, 
widening the gap between Europe and its southern neighbors?  
It is still too soon to amass definitive evidence that would provide credible 
answers to these questions. Nonetheless, some trends are coming to light. In pro-
viding what I hope to be informed speculation on the impact of enlargement on 
the EMP, this essay begins by briefly tracing the history of the Barcelona Proc-
ess. It does so by first briefly examining the impact of previous EC enlargements 
on the Mediterranean, beginning with the accession of the UK in the 1970s as the 
impetus for the creation of a Mediterranean region. It then provides a snapshot of 
the Southern enlargement, which led to the de facto partition of the Mediterra-
nean. In this historical context it looks to the creation of the EMP in 1995 and 
assesses its achievements, failures, and the obstacles to success. Finally it turns to 
an assessment of the 2004 enlargement, with its corollary, the notion of a Wider 
Europe--New neighborhood and its goal of extending European norms beyond its 
borders.  
 
The Role of EC Enlargements in the Mediterranean “Region” 
 
The first step in the stabilization of Europe’s southern borders through the pro-
jection of “Western” values was to invent a Mediterranean “space” within which 
Western values could be projected.  In the early life of the EC, before the region 
was invented, the Commission and the member states had related to the EC’s 
southern neighbors through widely divergent bilateral policies and agreements.
5 
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In fact, it was the first EC enlargement that initially spurred the idea of a single 
region.   
 The run-up to the UK’s accession raised the issue of the EC’s relationship 
with third countries. Before its admission into the EC, the UK had very low im-
port duties, benefiting not only its former colonies but also countries around the 
Mediterranean. When the UK joined the EEC, it had to adopt the common exter-
nal tariff, which was much higher. Thus, non-member Mediterranean countries 
who had been traditional exporters to the UK saw the writing on the wall: they 
would lose the UK market to member states whose exports to the UK would be 
duty free and subsidized by the common agricultural policy. As this issue rose to 
the top of the EC agenda, the Commission and member countries began to debate 
the appropriate adjustment of existing agreements with Mediterranean countries. 
Should there be a common tariff for them? Or should bilateral relations continue 
to prevail?  
Other problems raised the visibility of the issue: concerns over terrorism and 
oil defined the European Community’s key interest in the stability of the Medi-
terranean region. Terrorism had been on the rise in Europe, spilling over from the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and all member states began to tighten immigration controls 
in order to prevent terrorist networks from taking root on European soil. The 
gathering oil crisis jarred Europeans into a reconsideration of their dependence 
on Arab oil, the need for secure supplies, and the maintenance of good relations 
with Arab countries.  154  Crawford 
 
Driven by all of these concerns, the EC launched the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (GMP). The goal was to create a free trade area covering all of the coun-
tries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, excluding Albania, Yugoslavia, and 
Libya, and including Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The GMP offered trade con-
cessions for the non-member Mediterranean countries (NMMCs) in their eco-
nomic relations with the EC, aid, and social provisions for migrants from the 
Maghreb in Europe. It also offered agricultural concessions and eliminated its 
own tariffs on industrial imports originating from the MNMCs while allowing 
them to retain their own tariff barriers.  
Because this policy applied to all targeted states equally and was an EC pol-
icy rather than that of a member state, the concept of a “Mediterranean Region” 
was codified. Bicchi
6 reports that EEC documents addressing trade policy toward 
the Mediterranean basin clearly show the evolution of the idea of a single “re-
gion.” For example, a 1971 report originating in the European Parliament argued 
against the approach of ‘agreements à la carte’ that had prevailed until this time, 
because they did not create among Mediterranean peoples “this certainty of be-
longing to one and the same region of the world, having its own personality, its 
brand image.” 
This view, however, was undercut with the accession of Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal. The inclusion of these three states took them out of the GMP and thus 
divided the “region” that the Commission was trying to cultivate. Tovias
7 goes so 
far as to argue that the inclusion of the three new members was obtained at the 
expense of the economic stability of the western and eastern Mediterranean non-
members. Although there were similarities among the economies around the 
Mediterranean in the agricultural sector as well as many industrial sectors, non-
members lost trade revenue when trade was diverted to the new members. For 
example, Morocco’s citrus and tomato exports to the EC were replaced by ex-
ports from Spain and Portugal. This lost trade expanded the economic cleavage 
between EC members and Mediterranean non-members. The gap grew even 
wider as EC development policies targeting the new members began to take ef-
fect, leaving the Mediterranean non-members in the dust. In short, as Nicolaidis 
and Nicolaidis
8 argue, the southern enlargement undermined the ‘regional 
promotion policy’ and the idea of ‘Mediterranean’ as it was conceptualized in the 
GMP. Even then, it appeared that the EC was attempting to create a region of 
predominantly “Muslim” or “Arab” states separate from “Europe.” This, then, 
represented a de facto partition of the Mediterranean. 
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Reviving the Mediterranean “Region?” 
 
Throughout the 1980s, with global politics still dominated by East-West con-
frontation, the creation of a Mediterranean region of cooperation and stability 
was a low priority for the world’s powerful states. The end of the Cold War, 
however, presented new challenges and promised to eliminate the obstacles to a 
renewed regional initiative. Xenophobia triggered fears of massive immigration 
from North Africa, and the cold war’s end gave rise to the new security threats 
emerging from militant Islamic fundamentalism, its link with terrorism and the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. As early as 1992, the European Council 
of Lisbon had expressed its unease at the “advance of extremist forces... in vari-
ous North African countries.” Two years later, the European Council of Essen 
elevated the Mediterranean to a “priority zone of strategic importance to 
Europe.” 
To combat these perceived threats, and because France feared that Europe 
would drift eastward with a reunited Germany and the prospect of EU 
membership for the countries of East Central Europe, the European Community 
began an initiative called “Renovated Mediterranean Policy,” which dealt mainly 
with financial aid to NMMC’s, aiming to boost regional economic development 
through cooperation, and to increase regional trust and transparency. And at the 
behest of France, Italy and Spain, NATO formulated a Mediterranean policy in 
1994, promising to work with non-members to strengthen regional stability, and 
began to lobby the EU to concoct a new policy towards “Islam.”  
Encouraged by progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the idea of re-
creating a “Mediterranean Region” crept higher on the policy agenda, and the EU 
became formally involved in the project of creating regional stability. The first 
major steps were taken at the European Council Summit of 1992, which were 
followed by the Barcelona Declaration creating the EMP in 1995. The basic 
premise of that initiative was that the Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a 
“common space,” or at least that it possessed enough of the precursor elements of 
a region (geographic contiguity, common values, traditions, or interests) to make 
regional building a possibility. Stephen Calleya writes that  
 
from this premise flowed two other assumptions: that the member-states or re-
gimes were equally committed to the goal of regional cooperation as a tool to 
promote peace, stability and prosperity; and that they were also receptive to the 
kinds of political, economic and social liberalization that makes transnational 
(as opposed to inter-governmental) cooperation possible.
 9   
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The Barcelona Declaration established 3 baskets, (a) security on the basis of 
mutual confidence and partnership, (b) a zone of shared prosperity through 
economic integration, and (c) the rapprochement between peoples through social 
and cultural links leading to the creation of a Mediterranean civil society. 
Economic proposals in the Barcelona Declaration included the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area between the Union and Southern Mediterranean countries by 
2010 and the removal of their tariff and non-tariff barriers. The creation of a free 
trade zone was intended to shift the adjustment costs of trade to the NMMCs, after 
20 years of EC/EU trade concessions enshrined in the GMP. Through the 
agreement to create a Free Trade Zone, the Keynesian ideas of development 
contained in the GMP gave way to the neo-liberal ideas of the Washington 
Consensus.
10 
Economic aid and loans from the European Investment Bank were to benefit 
the NMMCs’ private sector and to encourage structural reform and privatiza-
tion.
11 The central financial instrument for EMP is the MEDA (Measures 
d’Accompagnement) program, offering technical and financial support as incen-
tives for social and political reform. MEDA II (1999) created the "structural ad-
justment facility" financed under MEDA I to target more specifically the reforms 
necessary for free trade with the EU on the one hand and to streamline EU deci-
sion making on the other.
12 The Barcelona process also aimed at encouraging 
“good governance,” namely democracy and human rights, and advanced the de-
velopment of confidence-building measures to enhance regional security. The 
political element of the Barcelona declaration includes a list of principles con-
cerning respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-
determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful 
resolution of disputes.  
Some progress has been made on each of these three fronts. In April 2002, 
the Euro-Med partners adopted the Valencia Action Plan, making sustainable 
development the guiding principle of the Euro-Med Process. The action plan in-
cluded reinforced credit facilities for Mediterranean partner countries through the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Foundation to promote cultural exchange.
13 EMP is acting as a catalyst for the 
                                                 
10 Alfred Tovias, Economic Liberalism in Theory and Practice, Working Paper, Institute of 
European Studies, UC Berkeley, 2004)  
11 For early assessments of the economic basket of the EMP see J. Marks, “High Hopes and 
Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative” Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 
(1996): 1-24, and Ahmed Galal and Bernard Hoekman, eds. Regional Partners in Global Markets: 
Limits and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Agreements (Cairo: CEPR, 1997).  
12 The MEDA Regulation was adopted in 1996, and the beneficiaries were Algeria, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  
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improvement of bilateral cooperation; bilateral economic agreements have been 
signed, and EU-Med trade has increased every year. Furthermore, in 2003, a Fa-
cility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) was created. 
The FEMIP supplements MEDA in supporting private sector development of the 
Mediterranean partners in order to attract investments to the region. In 2004 the 
EU devoted € 1 billion to development of the Mediterranean region, a large in-
crease over previous years. As a result, there have been substantial improvements 
in infrastructure throughout the region (transport, telecommunications and en-
ergy, as well as the interconnection of the Mediterranean partners’ infrastructures 
with the Trans-European networks).  
Other areas have achieved positive results as well. There has been an in-
crease in regional cooperation in the field of Justice, and agreements to combat 
terrorism and drug trafficking have been signed.  EMP enthusiasts have patiently 
built a host of civil society networks to promote common cultural and security 
understandings, including EuroMeSCo, a security think-tank, which has become 
an important example and leading promoter of public diplomacy in the region. 
Finally, the EMP has begun its own process of “enlargement,” with plans to inte-
grate Libya and enlarge the free trade zone to six Gulf countries, as well as the 
conclusion of an agreement with Syria. 
Despite these achievements, however, to date, the disappointments have 
overshadowed the successes. The objectives of the EMP were slated to be con-
firmed by twenty-seven Mediterranean states in Malta in 1997. But the stalled 
Middle East peace process and ensuing tensions in the Middle East overshad-
owed the meeting and cast grave doubts on the partnership’s success. Subsequent 
meetings, including at Stuttgart, Marseille, and Valencia did very little to push 
the EMP forward. Negotiations began on a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Sta-
bility and Peace, but because Mediterranean governments had divergent percep-
tions of threats and challenges to political stability, they were short-lived.
14 On 
the economic front, private sector investment has only trickled into the NMMC’s, 
and a huge economic gap between EU and the NMMCs remains and continues to 
grow. Indeed, the sum of the GDP of the 10 partner countries is as high as the 
Spanish GDP alone. In contrast to the EMP Mediterranean partner countries, the 
new member states of the EU have grown much faster: the combined income of 
the 10 NMMCs is only one tenth of combined income of the new EU members. 
Likewise, progress toward democracy in the southern Mediterranean states has 
been slow compared to the pace of democratization in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.  
                                                                                                                         
Agreement (FTA) by 2010 and to promote regional development by attracting foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). 
14 The original plan was to launch the document at the Marseille Conference in November 
2000, but progress on the Charter stopped at this very meeting. Fulvio Attina, The building of re-
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Obstacles to success in EMP 
 
Why these disappointments? As noted above, the Israeli-Arab conflict, in gen-
eral, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, together with the events 
that were unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provide two of the most visi-
ble obstacles to the realization of the goals of the Barcelona Declaration. Since 
the EMP’s inception in 1995, the Middle East peace process has been halting and 
uncertain, and the higher the tensions, the more the EMP has been disrupted and 
weakened. 
But the failed Isreali-Palestinian peace process has not been the only road-
block to EMP progress. A number of other obstacles have emerged to block or 
distort the realization of EMP goals. Within Europe we have seen a move to the 
right and the rise of nationalism, with frightening implications for the EU’s rela-
tions with the Arab world and specifically for the Euro-Mediterranean process 
and its multilateral agenda. In recent years, anti-immigrant parties have enjoyed 
alarming success in elections throughout Europe. Their decidedly anti-liberal 
stance, nationalism, xenophobia, and commitment to territoriality, sovereignty 
and self-reliance spell a rejection of “multilateralism,” openness, and construc-
tion of a regional identity--principles which lie at the heart of the Euro-Mediter-
ranean partnership.  
Despite the fact that Europe will need to revitalize its labor force with immi-
grants in the coming years
15 and youth unemployment in the Mediterranean part-
ner countries is a growing scourge, anti-immigration sentiment continues to 
grow. Fears that right wing majorities would demand a “Fortress Europe” were 
deepened in 2002 when EU members of the European Council appeared deter-
mined to strengthen border controls to stem immigration from the Mediterranean 
region. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had even suggested that the British 
Royal Navy might be willing to use gun boats in the Mediterranean in order to 
halt immigrants from entering the EU.
16 
A third obstacle is the persistence and strengthening of authoritarian regimes 
in North Africa and in the Middle East. These regimes reject the liberal orienta-
tion of the Barcelona process and resist any kind of “conditionality” imposed 
                                                 
15 By 2023, the ratio of working to retired people in the EU will fall from 4:1 to 2:1. During 
the 1990s employment increased three times more in Europe than in the Southern Mediterranean 
partner countries (9.8 percent per year as opposed to 3.4 percent.) Unemployment in the NMMCs is 
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combined with labor market pulls from Europe have increased the pressure on migration. See Heba 
Handoussa and Jean Louis Reiffers. “The Impact of EU enlargement on the Mediterranean Part-
ners.” Femise Contribution to the 7
th Annual Meeting of Experts on Economic Transition in the 
Southern Mediterranean countries (April 23-24, 2003). 
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upon them. As Calleya
17 writes: “many of the requirements of free trade and 
greater foreign investment (abolition of monopolies and licensing arrangements, 
reduction of customs and excise fees, legal security and transparency, autono-
mous civil society organizations and institutions) threaten the revenue-base and 
even the power base of neo-patrimonial authoritarian regimes.” Many of these 
states are also torn by internal schisms and by blurred territorial definitions. Their 
very existence is tenuous, and their own national identities are uncertain. It is 
questionable whether, without a secure national identity, these states will be able 
to assume the regional identity believed to be necessary for the success of the 
EMP.
18  
A fourth obstacle lies in the divergence of expectations and goals that the 
various partners bring to the table. While European countries seek stability 
through the “careful Westernization” of the Arab world,
19 or the “convergence of 
civilizations” toward the European model, the Arab world seeks preferential ac-
cess to European markets and development aid, resisting Europe’s vision of con-
vergence.  
Two historical legacies—colonialism and economic “backwardness” provide 
a fifth obstacle. Colonial domination and exploitation have bred deep-seeded re-
sentment and created cultures of victimization in North Africa and the Middle 
East. The economic “backwardness” of the Arab states around the Mediterranean 
has been perpetuated and deepened by colonialism and European domination. 
The trade dependence of the NMMCs on the EU has increased in recent years, 
while Europe’s trade dependence on the NMMCs is negligible and consists pri-
marily of dependence on energy supplies. Even that dependence is likely to 
weaken as the EU enlarges and begins to look eastward to the former Soviet Un-
ion to fill its energy requirements. The economic inequality between Europe and 
the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical interde-
pendence, giving the EU the upper hand in all negotiations in the Euro-Mediter-
ranean process.  
The imbalance is reinforced in the Euro-med negotiating process: despite ef-
forts to overcome bilateralism, European countries negotiate as a bloc through 
the EU, while the Southern Mediterranean countries sign agreements and negoti-
ate bilaterally with the EU (as well as individual member states) on all issues. 
Thus, the Barcelona Process, despite its multilateral dimension, did not amend a 
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negotiating process that reinforced the power imbalance between the EU and its 
Euro-Med partners.  
Clearly, the management of the EMP by the Commission perpetuates and 
recreates an asymmetry between EU member states and the rest in a manner that 
continues to generate the critique of neo-colonialism; there is no equivalent man-
agement structure among the non-member partners of the EMP. The Euromesco 
Joint Report of 1997-98 suggested that while the Commission should retain a 
management role, stopping short of the creation of a Secretariat, a ‘ProMed’ 
group of civil servants from the NMMCs should be constituted to act in a man-
agement capacity as a partner of the Commission. However this form of institu-
tionalization has yet to be implemented or discussed.
20 With regard to the eco-
nomic basket, all decisions are in the hands of the EU, where decisions on trade 
and aid are reached through compromises among the 25 members.
 21 
Aid is disbursed directly from the EU budget on a bi-lateral EU—individaul 
NMMC basis. Tovias notes that the term “bilateral” is perhaps a misnomer 
because all aid is given on a unilateral basis from the EU to the NMMCs. There 
have been no negotiations between the EU and NMMC within an EMP forum over 
how that aid is disbursed or how much aid will be offered to each MNMC. Before 
the Valencia meeting in April 2002, Spain advocated the creation of a Euro-
Mediterranean Bank that would place EU members and non-members on an 
equal footing, a suggestion that found favor in several countries of the Maghreb. 
But because of opposition from the northern European countries, the idea was 
diluted into increased credit provision via the European Investment Bank, where 
decisions on aid would continue to be made unilaterally by the EU.
22 
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Region, Lisbon (June 6- 9, 2002): 2. 
21 There is no voting mechanism for EMP decisions. Although the European Parliament pro-
posed the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly at the Velencia meeting 
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Enter the 2004 “Enlargement” and the “New Neighborhood” Policy 
 
Will the 2004 Enlargement and the “New Neighborhood” policy contribute to 
progress in strengthening the Euro-Med partnership, or will it present yet another 
obstacle to cooperation? Will it inject new life into the Barcelona process and its 
projection of “civilian” power? Or will it feed into a relationship of dominance 
and dependence between the EU and the southern states of the Mediterranean? 
Whether positive or negative, there will certainly be an impact. The 2004 
enlargement of the EU created the largest internal market and the largest regional 
bloc in the world, a region that rivals the United States in population, gross do-
mestic product, and scientific and technological capabilities.  
Recognition of that influence is embodied in the “Wider Europe-New 
Neighborhood” policy (ENP). In 2003, the European Commission published a 
concept paper, entitled title "Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework 
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors.” Directed explicitly to 
countries “that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU,”
23 
its intent was to set forth an initiative that would “avoid drawing new dividing 
lines in Europe,”
24 but at the same time would stipulate relations with neighbor-
ing states who would have no concrete prospect of accession. These states were 
“Russia, the countries of the Western Newly Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union and the Southern Mediterranean”, which “should be offered the 
prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liber-
alisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and 
capital.”
25 
Despite the stated effort to avoid divisions, the ENP divided the EU's 
“neighborhood” into three areas. In the first are the four official accession coun-
tries – Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Turkey – as well as the applicant country 
Macedonia. Because they are potential accession countries, they are excluded 
from the “policy,” although they are presently in the “neighborhood.” In the sec-
ond, to the East, are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. Finally, to the south, 
10 Southern Mediterranean countries in the EMP are grouped as potential part-
ners "to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood." The explicit 
goal in regard to these countries is “to anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits 
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and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to 
progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform.”
26 
After the enlargement, in May 2004, the Commission published a further 
strategy paper on the EU’s “neighborhood policy.” This paper added the South-
ern Caucuses as “neighbors” for purposes of the policy and included Action 
Plans calling for “political dialogue and reform; trade measures preparing part-
ners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home 
affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and in-
novation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.”
27 Echoing the earlier 
paper, the EU would offer incentives to the neighboring countries in return for 
successful implementation of political and economic reform and adoption of EU 
rules.
28 In the Fall of 2004, the Commission added financial incentives, providing 
something like the EU structural funds in return for compliance with the Action 
Plans. These incentives would, in turn, influence internal developments in the 
EU’s neighboring states. Finally, the strategy paper strongly encouraged sub-re-
gional cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.
29 It names several 
issue areas where sub- regional cooperation is considered useful, for example in 
the realm of economic cooperation, environment, nuclear safety and natural re-
sources, migration, civil society etc. 
Many analysts and the EU Commission itself have proclaimed that the most 
recent enlargement and the attending “New Neighborhood” initiative will 
strengthen the goals of the Barcelona process.
30 Consequently, the EU may be 
able to exert more muscle in bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a peaceful 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Council and the European Parliament. European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 
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solution. And the membership of Malta and Cyprus—and later Turkey—might 
be important in keeping Mediterranean issues high on the EU agenda.
31 Gilles-
pie
32 suggests that the new member states may support the Euro-Med process if 
they conclude that “democracy promotion in particular is an area of EU activity 
in which they have a rare opportunity to underline their own national achieve-
ments.” He goes on to report that “the new initiative may encourage the intro-
duction of instrumental reforms by ‘reluctant democratizers’. . . and could even 
strengthen the local appeal of pro-democracy political elements within North Af-
rican countries.” Finally, it has been suggested that the NMMCs need not fear 
that migration from the new member states will further block the “free movement 
of people” from the Southern Mediterranean: although the new members add 
new workers to the EU population, the demographic characteristics of the new 
member states are very similar to the EU 15,
33 and migration will be restricted.  
Thus the new members will not add significant weight to current migration flows 
and will not affect the flows of migration coming from the Southern 
Mediterranean. 
34 
 
Economic Benefits or Costs? 
 
In fact, however, the most obvious impact of enlargement will be economic. 
Enlargement not only opens new markets to the Southern Mediterranean coun-
tries, it has changed tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, abolishing non-tariff 
barriers for new members, and keeping them in place for the EMP countries 
linked to the EU through a Free Trade agreement. This means that the NMMC’s 
will have to enhance their competitiveness and pay even more attention to eco-
nomic reform. Private investment decisions will be affected by changes in market 
prospects. And labor market considerations will change, influencing migration 
patterns. Public financial flows will also be affected. In preparation for the 2004 
accession, the EU devoted the bulk of its technical and financial aid to the pro-
spective new members. To date, the volume of EU aid for the Euro-Med region is 
miniscule when compared to what was disbursed in the accession countries be-
fore May 2004. By 2003, EU funds allocated to the accession countries averaged 
€ 545 per capita per year compared to €14 per capita per year for the Euromed 
partners.
35 The hope among some southern Mediterranean analysts is that now 
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the EU can devote more resources to the EMP, in particular, its economic 
basket.
36  
As noted above, the “New neighborhood” policy includes a proposal for 
deeper integration of the neighboring countries, including the Mediterranean 
partners, in the EU Single Market, not only for goods (an aspect that is largely 
covered by the Association Agreements) but also for services, capital movements 
and (as a long-term objective) movement of persons. Harmonization of the regu-
latory environment and liberalization of trade in services may potentially have 
even stronger positive economic effects than liberalization of trade in goods. 
But some analysts are skeptical. Tovias argues that as the EU looks eastward 
for products that currently come from MNMCs, EU non-tariff trade barriers will 
“bite” more than before. This will deepen Arab suspicions of European neo-colo-
nial intentions in the Euro-Med process. Agricultural competitors from the new 
member states are already slowing Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU to a 
trickle. Despite claims to the contrary
37 enlargement is likely to have an adverse 
impact on Mediterranean countries' export access and market share in the EU.  
Some trends in this direction have already emerged. Handoussa and Reif-
fers
38 report that NMMC exports to the EU increased by 7.2 percent per year on 
average since 1990 (8.4 percent for non-oil exports) versus 4.2 percent toward 
the rest of the world (6.9 percent non-oil). This increase drove up the share of 
total exports from the Mediterranean Partners to the EU from 45 percent in 1990 
to 51 percent in 2001. On the other hand, the exports of the accession countries to 
the EU increased by 10.5 percent per year on average since 1995, versus 8.7 per-
cent with the rest of the world, thus increasing the share of the accession coun-
tries’ exports to the EU to 67 percent in 2001. This differentiated progress led to 
a significant growth of the accession countries’ market share in the EU (10.9 per-
cent of EU non-European imports in 2002 versus 7 percent in 1995) larger than 
the growth in the share of the NMMCs (6.6 percent in 2002 versus 5.6 percent in 
1995). 
Furthermore, with EU enlargement, most Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
from the EU 15 is now flowing to the new member countries in Eastern Europe. 
Without an infusion of capital, non-member countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) will most likely remain low-wage raw materials suppliers 
and export platforms for the EU’s industrial machine. To the extent that FDI 
flows into the region, it will be attracted by low-cost labor and will concentrate in 
labor-intensive production methods across the industrial spectrum. In modern 
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sectors, plants in these countries might be simply “screwdriver factories”—as-
sembling final products, importing key components, and using few local suppli-
ers. Other foreign investments might be in “services”—sales, marketing, and 
distribution outlets for imports produced in the EU. Or investments will flow to 
low-technology extractive sectors, like oil and gas. All innovative activity would 
continue to be concentrated in the EU as the “core.” This means that prospects 
for rapid economic development of the NMMCs are bleak.  
Will the new member states support the EMP? Gillespie
39 suggests that, hav-
ing undergone the stress of transforming their own political and economic sys-
tems in order to qualify for EU membership, they may be reluctant to support 
economic programs that bolster North African and Middle Eastern states that do 
not reform their regimes and address the root causes of political instability. At 
best, because they must continue to focus on their own economic growth and po-
litical reforms, and they may show little interest in the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership. After all, they are potential competitors in trade, and only 2 percent of 
total EMP exports are now bound for the new member countries of the EU.  
Although certainly not all of the evidence is in, and the impact of enlarge-
ment will vary for the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, I believe that EU 
enlargement is unlikely to help close the economic gap between North and South 
in the Mediterranean region. As noted above, in the run-up to enlargement, as the 
economies of the accession countries grew, most of the EU`s Mediterranean 
partners moved ahead very slowly. Indeed, the economic gap between the EU 
and the NMMCs is widening at an alarming rate. And as Stephen Calleya
40 has 
noted, in the run-up to enlargement, “the prosperity gap with Europe, especially 
Central European countries . . . would have widened even further without the re-
cent rise of oil prices and a significant slowdown of demographic growth, the 
only positive developments in the [Mediterranean] region.” 
 
“New Neighborhood”: Integration or Exclusion? 
 
Contrary to the EU’s claims above, the “New Neighborhood” Policy accompa-
nying enlargement seems to signal exclusion rather than closer integration into 
the European “space,” and—like the enlargements of the 1980s—to again pre-
vent the creation of a Mediterranean “region.” Indeed, efforts to design and build 
a “New Neighborhood policy” may subvert the region-building project of the 
EMP. Four indicators of subversion are likely to appear: 1) new divisions in the 
Mediterranean region resulting from enlargement, 2) the weakening of sub-re-
gional cooperation, 3) perceptions of exclusion on the part of the NMMCs, and 
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4) contradictions in the conditionality requirements that may push the NMMCs 
further from Europe. Each of these indicators deserves brief discussion. 
First, this most recent enlargement, like earlier enlargements before it, has 
gathered some Mediterranean countries into its fold while explicitly espousing a 
policy of exclusion for others, since there is nothing in the ENP that offers the 
prospect of accession. This means that the NMMCs must bear the burden of ad-
justment to the EU’s rules and norms without the prospect of membership. And a 
new class of economic winners and losers may be created by the ENP, dividing 
the region further. 
Secondly, the ENP may inhibit cooperation among the countries of the 
Southern Mediterranean. In April 2000, Chris Patten, in an effort to build reliable 
regional negotiating partners, advocated the creation of sub-regional free trade 
areas, offering EU support for any efforts to establish multilateralism as a princi-
ple of South-South Cooperation. In 2001, the Arab League established an Arab 
Free Trade Area to be completed by 2007. In addition, the Agadir Declaration of 
May 2001 announced the establishment of a free trade area between Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. The EU offered technical assistance to the “Agadir 
Process,” and the Valencia Action Plan supported efforts on the part of North 
African countries to revive the Arab Maghreb Union.  
But the ENP is very likely to undermine these efforts. As Fischer
41 has 
pointed out, “although the ENP strategy paper strengthens the idea of sub-re-
gional cooperation, ENP remains by and large a bilateral approach to the region.” 
And as Gillespie writes:  
 
In the absence of a strong Maghrebi or North African regional bloc, some 
countries may obtain material benefits from a substantial increase in integration 
with Europe (so long as the policy is adequately funded) . . . Others may fail to 
qualify for—or decide not to seek—a comparable place on the revised ‘pyra-
mid of privilege’ (the metaphor traditionally used when classifying EU rela-
tions with third countries); in response, they may become more inward-looking 
and reliant on traditional sources of cohesion and identity, or may look for al-
ternative international alignments.
42   
 
Third, Shaaban
43 reports that one of the most pressing concerns generated by 
EU enlargement in the Southern Mediterranean is the inevitable feeling of exclu-
sion from the EU. And this exclusion is based only on geography - the “simple 
fact of being located on the "wrong" side of the Mediterranean.” Feelings of ex-
clusion can produce hostility, fuel social discontent, and strengthen perceptions 
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of discrimination upon which radical political elites like to feast. This slippery 
slope of exclusion, hostility, and backlash can generate friction around the 
Mediterranean Sea that will further cause a fragile “regional identity” to 
disintegrate. 
Finally, the liberal agenda of the Barcelona Process and of the ENP carries 
with it its own problems and contradictions that exacerbate the consequences of 
perceptions of exclusion. In the short run, economic inequities are exacerbated by 
the conditionality policies of economic liberalization. In this way, economic lib-
eralization can undermine the process of political liberalization envisioned at 
Barcelona and in the ENP by exacerbating economic inequality and thus endan-
gering liberal democracy.  George Joffe’s
44 discussion of the effects of the 
imposition of the “Washington Consensus” in Algeria provides an apt example. 
There, economic liberalization facilitated the growth of an unaccountable elite, 
feeding on patronage and outside of the control of the democratic state.  
Furthermore, liberalism is considered by many Muslim critics to be an unat-
tractive blueprint for social and economic life. Its relentless insistence on indi-
vidual freedom and competition weakens community. Community provides pro-
tection, cooperation, and mutual obligation, but strong community also interferes 
with the operation of the market and its principles of individual self-interest and 
competition. Markets, in turn, breed insecurity and inequality, feeding the long-
ing for human community. Many Muslim critics regard the market as deficient 
and flawed for these reasons.  
And many Muslim leaders eschew democracy, arguing that many democra-
cies pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and inde-
pendent judicial review. With its “tyranny of the majority,” repression of minori-
ties, and absence of a binding system of values, democratic systems, they argue, 
can actually exacerbate social and cultural conflict. In periods of economic un-
certainty and political transition, when states that once provided entitlements pull 
back or are dismantled according to neo-liberal demands, when democracies are 
so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and when the introduction of mar-
kets leads to deep insecurities, the strong values and rich symbolic resources of 
community and religion offer hope in their promise of collective power to those 
populations who feel powerless.
45  
In short, Europe's liberal identity and its liberal discourse and practices are 
out of step with the reality that Europe's interaction with Arab world has helped 
create. Thus, the Barcelona Process and the ENP may be caught between the 
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language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism.  What this 
means is that Europe’s insistence on liberal practices embodied in the Copenha-
gen criteria, which were so successful elsewhere, for example in eastern Europe, 
are out of step, not only with Muslim states and Europe's negative legacy in the 
Muslim world, but, also with Europe's own political objectives and its turn to the 
right. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Euro-Med partnership for the creation 
of stability and prosperity on Europe’s southern border is the idea of “region 
building” contained in the Barcelona Declaration. Theorists of regionalism point 
to regional integration in the post-cold war context as a key indicator of interna-
tional change because regional integration changes the character of state sover-
eignty and national identity. Regions are conceptualized, not in terms of geo-
graphical contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, 
and economic interaction among states that often (but not always) inhabit the 
same geographical space.
46 Theorists of the new regionalism hypothesize that the 
purposeful guidance of these interactions can lead to the creation of a regional 
political culture and a regional “identity” that will have important implications 
for peace and stability.
47 Applied to the Mediterranean region, the hope is that the 
EuroMed process could serve as a laboratory for new forms of “mutual recogni-
tion in deep conflict prone settings . . . a laboratory for the honing of overlapping 
identities binding together groups and individuals. . . [inspiring] a different, truly 
universal, kind of international politics.”
48  
But the arguments made here suggest that a number of factors, including the 
protracted Israel-Palestine conflict, the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe, 
the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Southern Mediterranean and the 
tensions between economic and political liberalization militate against success in 
building a stable and prosperous Mediterranean region. The enlargement of the 
EU and the accompanying “new neighborhood” policy may exacerbate these 
problems by limiting NMMC exports to Europe, by diverting resources from the 
EU 15 away from the Mediterranean region, by a lack of interest on the part of 
the new East European members in Mediterranean stability, by dividing the re-
gion again between members and non-members, and by inhibiting the growth of 
sub-regional cooperation. 
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If this pessimistic scenario is correct, it is unlikely that the EU’s Mediterra-
nean policy in the context of enlargement and the ENP signals a new era of “ci-
vilian power” with region-building as the longest pole in the tent. The perpetua-
tion of core-periphery relations, bilateralism, exclusion, conditionality, and per-
ceptions of exploitation militate against region-building, possibly leading to the 
Mediterranean “tent’s” collapse.  
The factors that have weakened the Barcelona Process all suggest that the 
“realist” view of Europe’s relationship with its neighbors may be the more cor-
rect one. It is not Europe’s “magnetic allure,” as Robert Cooper calls it, that 
draws Europe’s neighbors to accept its human rights standards, its liberal democ-
racy, or economic openness, but rather conditionality requirements for aid that 
place its neighbors at the bottom of a “pyramid of privilege,” that is likely to in-
hibit the kind of region-building that those who prefer the exercise of “civilian 
power” would like to see. From the vantage point of the Southern Mediterranean, 
Europe’s behavior is that of a neo-colonialist. 
Of course, there are good reasons to attempt region-building within the real-
ist paradigm of international relations. As Brooks and Wohlforth
49 have re-
marked, “states often build regional partnerships in order to balance against the 
overwhelming power of another state.” The Euro-Med process was part of the 
EU’s effort to balance the influence of the United States. If the EU could not yet 
aspire to be world hegemon, it could be a regional one, a power that would assert 
its preeminence over the US in North Africa and the Middle East. This preemi-
nence would not be induced by direct political action, mediations, and missions, 
but rather by a systematic use of economic tools to create a region for political 
ends.  
But the project of EU enlargement has overshadowed the process of region-
building in the Mediterranean—whether that process is motivated by “realist” 
goals or by the desire to pursue the system-changing goals of a civilian power. 
EU enlargement has provided Europe with resources and markets that were al-
ways elusive in the Euro-Med process. It has given the new members the badge 
of a European regional identity.  The Euro-Med process will continue within the 
context of the ENP but the Europe’s only viable region will be built by the pro-
ject of enlargement.  
Nonetheless, despite this suggestion that there is an unhappy connection be-
tween the EMP and EU enlargement, it is not clear that the Southern Mediterra-
nean would be better off without the Euro-Med partnership. After all, MEDA has 
poured billions of euros into the Southern Mediterranean but very little into 
countries of the eastern “neighborhood,” such as Ukraine. One could argue, of 
course, that countries to the east of the EU are potential members of the Euro-
pean “club.” As such they may have privileged access to EU resources that will 
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never be available to the NMMCs. Nonetheless, to date, the Southern Mediterra-
nean receives more aid than ever envisioned for Europe’s eastern neighbors in 
the ENP.  
Furthermore, as suggested above, it is not entirely the fault of the EU that 
sub-regional cooperation has faltered in the Southern Mediterranean. Because of 
their exclusive focus on Europe for aid and trade, Southern Mediterranean coun-
tries have not been eager to cooperate among themselves. The EU is quite happy 
to work with other regional groupings, such as ASEAN and MercoSur; and, as 
noted above, has offered to help stimulate sub-regional cooperation in the Medi-
terranean. Indeed, if the NMMCs would resolve to create a cooperative sub-re-
gion, they would be a more powerful negotiating partner for the EU. EU 
enlargement and the ENP may, in the end, not be helpful to the Barcelona Proc-
ess, but the process itself is clearly in need of reform and its disappointments 
have many causes. As for the ENP itself, we can expect it to be a weak policy 
instrument—whether used as an instrument of power or as long as the prospect of 
EU membership is not offered to Europe’s “neighbors.”  
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Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of the fifth enlargement on the European Union 
Foreign Policy (EUFP). In the context of the U.S attack on Iraq in 2003 and the 
rhetorical image of the “old” and “new” Europe, a pervasive perception emerged 
that the voice of the EU would be weakened after May 2004. The EU-25 is now 
11 months old and many questions are still up in the air. Will the new members 
act together as a block? Are the new members likely to become Trojan horses for 
the United States and thus prevent the development of a European security pol-
icy? The preliminary answer is that the EU has undergone a gradual process of 
adaptation, which was initiated prior to the formal enlargement and continues in 
the context of the participation of the new members in the EU foreign policy 
making. Rather than derailing the EUFP and despite the intrinsic differences 
among national foreign policies, it seems that new and old members negotiate on 
a daily basis to find consensus and implement the objectives of the EUFP. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
Ulrich Sedelmeier has argued that EU enlargement “should not be only consid-
ered the dependent variable in an analysis of EFP or EU identity politics, but also 
as an independent variable that affects both EU identity and EFP.”
1 The point 
highlighted by Sedelmeier reflects one of the analytical challenges of the 
enlargement process for the EUFP: the transition from candidate country (out-
sider) to member state (insider). These two stages are part of the same process; 
however, both have different implications for EU policy making.  
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The first dimension of enlargement comprises the ten candidate countries 
(outsiders) as objects of the policies of the EU. After May 1, 2004, however, the 
shift to the second dimension indicates that the new members are not outsiders 
any more and participate in the policy making of the external relations of the EU.  
Based upon this premise, the dependent variable of this analysis is the EUFP. 
In this paper, the EUFP is understood as the web of decisions, actions, and prin-
ciples taken by European Union institutions in order to carry out interests and 
policies in world affairs.
2 Unlike the broad concept of external relations, the term 
“policy” reflects a “course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an or-
ganization or individual.”
3  
On the other hand, the independent variable is the enlargement process, 
which is understood, based upon Schimmelfenning, as a “process of gradual and 
formal (informal as well) horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules 
and norms.”
4 As previously mentioned, the fifth enlargement of the EU presents 
two different characteristics in the pre- and post-accession stages.  
In the pre-accession stage, the enlargement of the EU has been the most im-
portant event on the old continent in the past fifteen years. The uncertainty 
caused by the end of the Cold War was guided by an EU-lead process of rein-
venting the constitutional structure and political practices of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Certainly, in terms of norms and practices, former centralized economies 
moved towards the EU model as reflected in the 80,000 pages of the acquis 
communitaire. In the words of two realist scholars, “The resulting negotiations 
have until recently been more than a process of checking off a massive and es-
sentially non-negotiable list of EU laws and regulations, chapter by chapter.”
5 
This stage was “mostly, but not exclusively, a one way” relationship, from the 
center (EU) to the periphery (CEEs).  
The post-accession stage is taking place in a new legal and normative envi-
ronment. As members of the EU, the newcomers are able to participate in the 
policy making of the integration process and negotiate their interests from a bet-
ter position than in the prior stage. Depending on the issue to be negotiated, they 
form alliances with other newcomers, big or Atlanticist members, just to mention 
a few examples of the “multiple lane highway” of interest interaction. Thus, the 
                                                 
2 Roberto Domínguez, European Union Foreign Policy: Agents, Structures and Preferences 
(Ph D Dissertation, University of Miami, 2005). 
3 Pearsall, Judy, ed. “Policy.” The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e55183. Ac-
cessed September 13, 2004.  
4 Frank Schimmelfenning amd Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Fo-
cus, Hypothesis, and the State of Research” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (Ausgust 
2002): 503. 
5 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlarge-
ment and the Future of European integration” EUSA Review 15, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 1. The Impact of Enlargement on the External Relations of the EU  173 
 
convergence between old and new members’ foreign and security policy behav-
ior is likely to increase in this stage as the socialization effect of EU governance 
on the accession countries grows.
6 
Thus, EUFP has undergone an adaptation process in order to respond to the 
challenges of the fifth enlargement. By policy adaptation, Michael E. Smith 
means “either a change of an existing position or the creation of a new position 
on an unsettled policy problem thanks to the state’s participation in the 
EPC/CFSP system. This system imposes specific foreign policy obligations on its 
member states, by virtue of EU membership in general and particularly when 
holding the EU presidency or representing the EU abroad.”
7 Under this premise, 
what has been the EU foreign policy adaptation in the pre- and post-enlargement 
stages? 
 
Pre-Accession Stage and Foreign Policy  
 
In this period, there are four main features. The first is the historic trend of re-
gional shifting in some areas of foreign policy every time the EU has enlarged. 
The UK, with its Commonwealth experience, pressed to change the EC’s links 
with the third world; the result was the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention, 
which gave birth to the Lomé Convention. On the other hand, in 1986, Spanish 
and Portuguese membership also prompted a more active approach toward Latin 
America whereas the membership of two Nordic states in 1995 led to the empha-
sis on the Northern Dimension.
8  
The regional or policy orientation new members bring into the EU foreign 
policy agenda does not vanish during the first years of their membership; it re-
mains on the agenda. As part of the current institutional structures, the rotating 
presidency system is an opportunity for the member states to pull the EU’s exter-
nal priorities in different directions. French, Italian and Spanish presidencies in 
the mid-1990s attempted to re-balance EU attention from the east to the south 
(Barcelona Conference), whereas the Finnish and Swedish presidencies launched 
a series of northern initiatives (Northern Dimension).
9 
The second characteristic in the pre-accession phase is the definition and ne-
gotiation of the terms of accession as well as the supervision of the internaliza-
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tion in the candidates of the acquis communitaire. Out of 31 chapters set by the 
EU to negotiate the accession of new members, three are closely related to the 
external relations of the EU, namely, Chapter 25 (Customs Union), 26 (External 
Relations) and 27 (CFSP). 
Since the first day of accession, the customs administration of the new mem-
ber states manage and control their borders, which are the new external borders 
of the Union. The acquis in Chapter 25 refers to the Community’s Common 
Customs Tariff, which includes trade preferences, tariff quotas and tariff suspen-
sions, and other customs-related legislation outside the scope of the customs 
code, such as legislation on counterfeit and pirated goods, drug precursors and 
the export of cultural goods. Transitional arrangements were negotiated in only 
two cases. Hungary negotiated the imports of aluminum, and Malta was granted a 
five -year transitional period for the import of woven fabrics of combed wool or 
of combed fine animal hair, denim, woven fabrics of artificial filament yarn and 
other clothing accessories.
10 
On the other hand, Chapter 26 covers the Community’s economic and trade 
relations with third countries and international organizations as well as coopera-
tion and assistance. The common commercial policy has particular political sig-
nificance as the external aspect of the single market and as the policy of the larg-
est trading power in the world.
11 No transitional arrangements were negotiated in 
this chapter. 
Due to the particular intergovernmental nature of the acquis in Chapter 27 
(CFSP),
12 no transposition into the national legal order of the then candidate 
countries was necessary. Nevertheless, “as member states they must undertake to 
give active support to the implementation of the CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and 
mutual solidarity. Member states must ensure that their national policies conform 
to the common positions and defend these common positions in international 
fora.”
13  
The third feature is the approximation of positions between the EU and can-
didate members on world affairs issues. The general trend is that with “any move 
closer to membership, countries become increasingly socialized in the EU’s ways 
of doing business.”
14 In 1994, a dialogue was established at all CFSP levels to 
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familiarize the newcomers with the system, which meant informing them about 
the CFSP acquis politique. Based upon Elfriede Regelsberger’s research, align-
ments with EU Statements of the Presidency grew from 25 percent in 1995 to 71 
percent in 2002 in the period from 1995 to 2003. Once the Accession Treaties 
were signed in 2003, the ten acceding countries enjoyed the status of active ob-
servers and explicitly shared the contents of all CFSP declarations approved 
since April 17 2003.
15 In the case of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
even before the signature of their Accession Treaties, most of the candidate 
countries had already achieved 100 percent alignment with EU positions and the 
EU voted unanimously on average four times out of five.
16 
 
 
Alignments of the CEECs with EU Statements of Presidency 
on Behalf of the EU 1995-2002 
Year  Total Number  Alignment CEEC  Percentage 
1995 106  27  25.2 
1996 110  30  27.3 
1997 122  35  28.7 
1998 149  58  38.7 
1999 115  59  51.3 
2000 175  122  69.7 
2001 175  124  70.9 
2002 181  130  71.8 
Source: Elfriede Regelsberger, Are the Problems arising from enlargement and the Draft Treaty 
leading to paralysis instead of synergy? (Introductory remarks for the Fornet Group B Institutional 
Reform and Enlargement, Brussels 23 April 2004): 2-3. 
 
As a result of this process of approximation, the EU-25 has strengthened its 
multilateral approaches in world affairs. On most foreign policy issues, the 
CEECs tend to side with the EU not the United States. Having fresh memories 
from the Soviet domination during the Cold War, they support the EU on issues 
such as non-proliferation, the Kyoto Protocol, the death penalty and the ICC, de-
spite strong US pressure. Even in the case of Iraq and the alliance with the United 
States, the Polish-Spanish multinational force has been weakened. Spain’s deci-
sion to withdraw troops from Iraq was followed by Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras, which were also part of the multinational force. Hungary 
ended its mission in December 2004 and the Netherlands withdrew its troops in 
March 2005. Poland announced in April 2005 that it would withdraw all its 
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troops from Iraq once the United Nations mandate for the multinational force 
expires in December 2005.
17 
The fourth element in the pre-accession stage is the creation of new borders. 
With the first wave of EU eastward enlargement in 2004, the eastern and south-
ern borders of the new member states became the new external borders of the EU 
(only the Czech Republic is entirely surrounded by EU member states). This is 
why the Commission proposed a “Wider Europe” policy for its neighbors. Then 
Commissioner Patten stated that Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the 
Southern Mediterranean should be offered “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s 
internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).”
18  
In this regard, there is a recurring question about the limits on accepting new 
members. The Moroccan Government has twice, in 1987 and 2000, expressed its 
ambition to apply for EU membership. Prime Minister Berlusconi has also spo-
ken about a future Israeli application.
19 Thus, the Wim Kok Report has tackled the 
issue of the limits of the enlargement. This report states that: 
 
The positive results of the present round of enlargement show that stability and security 
can be achieved very effectively by means of the extension of the EU. The prospect of 
EU accession –through the conditionality of the criteria for membership—has been ex-
traordinarily successful in Central and Eastern Europe in driving economic and political 
reforms. But this process cannot be extended indefinitely. The EU cannot simply accept 
every neighboring country that wishes to join, on the logic that enlargement brings peace 
and prosperity. This logic is ultimately in contradiction with the logic of cohesion (em-
phasis added).
20 
 
In order to provide concrete steps to manage the dilemma of the new borders, 
the General Affairs Council in April 2002 requested the Commission and the 
High Representative for CFSP to propose ideas on the relationship with its 
                                                 
17 Judy Dempsey, “Poland sets date for Iraq Pullout,” International Herald Tribune, April 13, 
2005. 
18 Christopher Patten, EU Enlargement: Implications for the EU and Australia (Keynote Ad-
dress on European Union Foreign Policy, National Press Club, Canberra, Australia, April 17, 
2003). 
19 William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 (Groupe-
ment D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 6. Wallace states: “The 
Moroccan Government has twice, in 1987 and 2000, expressed its ambition to apply for EU mem-
bership; during the King of Morocco’s state visit to Paris, in March 2000, his official spokesman 
declared that the Helsinki European Council’s formal acceptance of Turkey’s candidate status has 
‘lifted a taboo’ on the eligibility of other Muslim Mediterranean states.” In reaction, the Portuguese 
Prime Minister suggested that Moroccan membership could be considered within a ten-year per-
spective. 
20 Wim Kok, Enlarging the European Union. Achievements and Challenges (Florence, Italy: 
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neighbors. The then Commission President, Romano Prodi, suggested some ideas 
on “A Policy of Proximity,” in which he argued that the enlarged EU needed “a 
ring of friends. We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less 
than membership without excluding the latter categorically…. offering the con-
cept of sharing everything except institutions (emphasis added).”
21 
Thus, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aims to share the benefits of 
the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, 
security and well-being for all concerned… “It is designed to prevent the emer-
gence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and offer 
them the chance to participate in various EU activities… The ENP is distinct 
from the issue of potential membership.”
22 In other words, “The EU’s post-2004 
eastern neighbors thus constitute what officials in Brussels now describe as the 
gray zone: neither accepted as definite candidates, nor clearly denied the long-
term prospect of membership.”
23 
In the same realm of borders, another area where the new member states may 
have an impact on external policy is Russia. In general, the new members are 
more suspicious of Russia due to recent history
24 and the “the legacies of the 
twentieth century live on, not just in people’s memories but in practical issues.”
25 
For example, the EU pushed to make fair treatment of the large Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia part of the accession criteria for those countries. 
It also negotiated transit arrangements and a visa regime with Russia for the peo-
ple living in the enclave of Kaliningrad. 
 
Post-Accession Stage 
 
As of mid-2005, no major crisis has risen as a result of the 2004 enlargement. In 
fact, it might be speculated that the entry of new member states is more likely to 
reinforce existing trends in EU politics. Certainly, it is expected that the new 
member states will form a unified block on some issues such as increased budget, 
less social and environmental legislation, euro and Schengen accession.
26  
                                                 
21 Quoted in William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-
25 (Groupement D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 2. 
22 European Commission, What is the European Neighborhood Policy? (http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm, accessed January 26, 2005). 
23 William Wallace, Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25 (Groupe-
ment D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper 4, July 2003): 4. 
24 Fraser Cameron, “Enlargement. The Political Impact,” EPC Issue Paper no. 13 (European 
Policy Centre, April 21, 2004), 4-5. 
25 Heater Grabbe, “The newcomers” in The Future of Europe. Integration and Enlargement 
ed. Fraser Cameron (New York: Routledge, 2004), 74. 
26 Fraser Cameron, “Enlargement. The Political Impact,” EPC Issue Paper no. 13, (European 
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As to the impact of enlargement on EU foreign policy, the first feature is the 
accommodation of national priorities in the making of the EUFP, a process that 
already began to take place in the pre-accession phase. The EU is in its initial 
steps of designing a Grand Strategy, although it remains to a great extent focused 
on the immediate regions. Thus, the new members’ foreign policies - which have 
been mostly focused on the regional neighborhood with the accession to the EU 
and NATO as a priority- will emphasize the management of pending problems at 
the regional level. In fact, this accommodation of priorities is a common practice 
in the EUFP. For instance, in the case of German relations towards Latin Amer-
ica, Detlef Nolte has insisted that the German policy towards Latin America fits 
into the EU general approach since “many in the foreign policy community argue 
that German interests are better represented as part of a common European Latin 
America policy than individually. Others argue that this could be a way to get rid 
of a minor topic in foreign relations in order to save time for more serious foreign 
policy matters.”
27 In this regard, Spain and Portugal consider Latin America and 
the Mediterranean area at the top of their priorities. 
Therefore, as an old pattern of the EUFP, it is expected that each member 
state will be more assertive in those areas in which there are more national inter-
ests involved. The Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2004 was a test for both the 
enlarged EUFP as a whole and the border EU countries (more affected by the 
likelihood of a crisis in Ukraine) as well. In that regard, the mediating role played 
by Javier Solana, HR for CFSP, Alexander Kwasniewski, Polish President, and 
Valdas Adamkus, Lithuanian President, “was physical embodiment of the new 
EU that has emerged, confident of its interest and values and willing to act on 
them. Far from weakening it, enlargement has strengthened CFSP.”
28  
Another example in which the newcomers are defending their own views in 
the EU foreign policy making is the disagreement of Czech Republic and Poland 
with the recent EU policies on Cuba. In the March/April 2003 political crack-
down, Cuba arrested 75 dissidents and sentenced them to long prison terms. In 
response, the EU imposed diplomatic sanctions and after the Cuban government 
released 14 of them, the EU agreed on January 31, 2005 to end the diplomatic 
freeze against the Communist regime. The decision, strongly pushed by the 
Spanish government, found some opposition from other EU members. The 
wording of the Council conclusions was changed, following strong opposition by 
the Czech Republic and Poland, who argued in favor of further support and pub-
lic recognition for Cuban dissident leaders. Former Czech anti-communist dissi-
                                                 
27 Detlef Nolte, Problems of Latin America Security and its Implications for Europe: A Ger-
man Perspective (Jean Monnet /Robert Schuman Working Paper Series, University of Miami Vol. 
4 No. 11, October 2004). 
28 Dov Linch, “A New Eastern Question, Newsletter, Institute for Security Studies (January 
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dent and ex-president Vaclav Havel joined the debate about the EU’s future pol-
icy towards Cuba and strongly criticized the member states for their diplomatic 
shift towards the Castro regime. “It is hard to find a better way for the EU to de-
stroy its ideals of freedom, equality and respect for human rights,” Mr. Havel 
said.
29 
A second element most visible in the post-accession phase is the leverage 
each country can exert, once they have been socialized into the EU rules and 
norms. In the organizational environment of the EU-25, Poland has started play-
ing its role as a new big member. After lending unconditional support to the 
United States in 2003, Poland’s attitude towards the idea of a group of bigger 
member states “began to evolve as soon as it became clear that Poland could ac-
tually be one of the ‘ins’… Poles believe that they could be able to play in 
Europe’s first division.”
30 Some facts reinforce the view of Polish assertiveness 
in the first division European foreign policy: a) support to the idea of structured 
cooperation, b) welcome the creation of battle groups, and c) initiative in the 
Eastern Dimension of the EUFP.
31  
On the other hand, the more assertive role of Poland may contribute to 
strengthening the role of Germany, France, and the UK in global affairs if they 
can agree to work together. The trilateral initiative of the UK, France and Ger-
many on Iran has temporarily mitigated U.S. attempts to expand military action 
in the area and thus far represents a success for European diplomacy. Certainly 
the idea of a core Europe is not welcomed by medium and small states.
32 How-
ever, at least in the area of foreign policy, Poland, as a new big country, is push-
ing in that direction. 
On the other hand, Poland’s Atlanticism is becoming more cautious and less 
unconditional in its support of the United State in light of two major issues: a) 
EU membership and b) disappointment with America’s leadership in Iraq.
33 
                                                 
29 Lucia Kubosova, “EU Lifts Sanctions on Cuba,” Eurobserver, January 31, 2005. 
30 Marcin Zabotowski, From America’s protégé to Constructive European. Polish Security in 
the Twenty-First Century (Occasional Paper no. 56, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 
2004): 21. 
31 The Non-Paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards Eastern neighbors after EU 
enlargement was published in January 2003. See EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy (War-
saw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003). 
32 Heather Grabbe and Ulrike Guérot, Could a Hard Core Run the Enlarged EU? Briefing 
Note (London: Centre for European Reform, February 2004), 5. The author states: “France, Ger-
many would need to include the UK, not only to get access to Britain’s diplomatic resources and 
military capabilities but also because without the UK a foreign and security policy venture would 
lack political credibility… Britain is not only one of the EU’s two serious military powers, it is also 
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Thus, in September 2004 over 70 percent of Poles wanted their troops to be 
pulled out of Iraq and President Kwasniewski was disappointed with the firm 
rejection from the Bush administration to give a visa waiver status to Polish 
citizens.
34 
A third element in the post-accession phase comprises the formalization of 
the new wave of enlargement and the Eastern Dimension of the EU, enshrined in 
the ENP. For the time being, the European Council meeting of 16-17 December 
2004 set the course for the EU’s continuing enlargement process in 2005-07. It 
was decided that Bulgaria and Romania should sign the Treaties of Accession in 
April 2005, and that full accession would take place in January 2007. Although 
Croatia got the date of 17 March 2005 for the opening of negotiations, these were 
postponed in light of the Croatian failure to comply with the very explicit condi-
tion to take the necessary steps for full cooperation with the ICTY. The most im-
portant point for Turkey is that it got a date -3 October 2005- for the opening of 
negotiations.
35  
On the other hand, the ENP has moved forward in its development and im-
plementation. Based upon the ENP’s Strategy Paper, on December 9, 2004 the 
Commission presented a first draft Action Plans with Partners countries. On 
March 2, 2005, the Commission recommended an intensification of relations 
with Egypt and Lebanon, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Council 
will decide whether to develop Action Plans under the ENP with the three Cau-
casus countries since Action Plans have already been negotiated with Israel, Jor-
dan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine.
36  
In the context of the Eastern dimension, the European Agency of External 
Borders was created in March 2005. In addition to Poland, Estonia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Malta were in the running to hold the agency, which is supposed to 
begin operating in Warsaw on May 1, 2005, with an annual budget of €10 mil-
lion. According to the rule the Council adopted on 26 October 2004, the 
European Agency for External Borders is supposed “to facilitate the application 
of existing and future Community measures concerning management of the EU's 
external borders by coordinating Member States' actions to implement those 
measures.” 
A fourth element in the policy making is the pressure that the member states 
and the EU institutions can exert over specific issues or member countries. This 
is the case of Cyprus. In contrast with Greek Cypriots, the Northern part of Cy-
prus voted ‘yes’ on April 24, 2004, and let open a window for a solution. High 
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Representative Solana was clear when he stated: “For that reason (the Turkish 
Cyprus yes), the EU is determined to put end for a solution…..”
37 and the added, 
“Now, I can say that the island is no longer an obstacle for Turkey-EU Relations. 
Turks tried to contribute to the solution. … The real trouble for me was the posi-
tion of the leaders from the South of the Island. They snubbed the gentlemen’s 
agreement.”
38 
The EU strategy is to support economically the Northern part of Cyprus until 
a political settlement is put in place. There is a proposal of financial aid for €259 
million for Northern Cyprus and another to allow direct trade to the EU. Cyprus, 
supported by Greece, has objected to the latter. However, such objection seems 
to be an issue of negotiation within the EU legal framework.  
 
Some conclusions 
 
The analysis presented above suggests the following conclusions:  
 
1.  New members are unlikely to import and maintain destabilizing policy 
agendas into the EUFP. If that is the case, a process of policy adaptation 
takes place. 
 
2.  The real challenge of disruption, however, comes not from the diversity 
of policy agendas, but from fixed preferences of EU member states.
39  
 
3.  The EU institutional framework facilitates the accommodation of na-
tional priorities in the EUFP.  Participation in the Council and the Com-
mission offers an opportunity to make use of the EU’s leverage in inter-
national affairs.  
 
4.  In the policy making of external relations, the pattern is not to forge fixed 
alliances between incumbent against acceding states. Rather, alliances 
take place between the larger countries and the smaller states and also 
between supporters of the retention of as much national independence as 
possible, and Europeanists and Atlanticists.  
 
5.  The socialization of the norms and practices of the EUFP has been taking 
place since the pre-accession stage.  
 
                                                 
37 Interview to Javier Solana by Imerissia (Greece), May 1, 2004. 
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6.  In terms of foreign policy, the fifth EU enlargement has led to a shift to-
wards the Eastern Dimension and the development of the Neighborhood 
European Policy. 
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Introduction 
 
On May 1, 2004, the European Union (EU) underwent its largest expansion ever, 
accepting ten new members, primarily from the former Soviet bloc,
1 at a single 
stroke. This enlargement is by far the greatest test for the European Union and its 
institutions. These new members, many from only recently democratized states, 
often differ markedly from existing members in their understandings of politics 
and distinct norms of political activity. These newly democratized countries have 
only incipient party systems with young and fragile political parties, low levels of 
party identification and party loyalty, unpredictable structures of party competi-
tion and low levels of female representation in political life.
2 Given these differ-
ences and the sheer size of the enlargement, the influx of new members could 
profoundly alter the functioning and character of the EU’s institutions, as of this 
unique polity itself. 
This project focuses on the potential impact of the EU’s eastward enlarge-
ment on its only directly elected body, the European Parliament (EP), and in par-
ticular on its supranational party groups and party system. The European Parlia-
ment has undergone a significant change in membership: 162 new members, rep-
resenting twenty two per cent of its total membership, joined an institutionalized 
and professionalized body. How will the eastern enlargement impact the party 
system? How will the eastern enlargement affect the party groups? And more 
                                                 
1 In May 2004, the EU accepted eight former Soviet bloc countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) to-
gether with Cyprus and Malta.  
2 See Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, Political Parties in the European Union (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1997); John T. Ishiyama, “The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organ-
izational Development in Post-Communist Politics” Political Research Quarterly no. 1 (1999): 87-
112; James Toole, “Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe” 
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generally, what do the answers to these questions tell us about the process of in-
stitutional change?  
In the following pages I seek to answer these questions. I do not intend to test 
any theory or develop one. Based on the analysis of the EP following the 
enlargement, I generate predictions. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I look 
at the situation in the European Parliament following the eastern enlargement. 
Then I examine the partisan activity in the new member states and the European 
Parliament to highlight the similarities and differences between them. In the third 
section, I discuss the potential area of conflicts following the enlargement. And 
in the final section, I conclude with a discussion of institutional change.  
 
The First Parliament (6
th Parliament) After the Big Bang Enlargement 
 
Just six weeks after the Union accepted ten new members; the citizens of Europe 
made their way to the polling booths to vote for their representatives at the 732-
member European Parliament. The turnout throughout the Union was 45.5 per-
cent, well below than the one predicted by opinion polls in the run up to the elec-
tions. The results from around the EU varied from one country to the other; how-
ever, one common trend throughout the Union was the way the electorate used 
the elections to punish the incumbent governments.
3  
Following the elections, the first Parliament after the enlargement met in 
Strasbourg for its first plenary session, with changes in the number, and compo-
sition of the parties. One hundred and sixty two new members from new member 
states joined the Union (See Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Members of the European Parliament from new Member States 
Country  Total Number of MEPs 
Cyprus  6 
Czech Republic  24 
Estonia  6 
Hungary  24 
Latvia  9 
Lithuania  13 
Malta  5 
Poland  54 
Slovakia  14 
Slovenia  7 
Total 162 
 
Unlike what is expected, newly elected Members of the European Parliament 
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(MEPs) joined the ranks of the largest party groups in the EP, instead of forming 
their own. The three largest party groups-the Group of the European People’s 
Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED); the Socialist 
Group in the European Parliament (PES); and Group of the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)- saw an increase in their membership of ap-
proximately 14.3 per cent (PES), with the EPP-ED increasing by 10 per cent and 
the ELDR by 34 per cent. The influx of new members by far outweighed what 
had occurred in any of the previous enlargements. 
The number of seats held by the party groups in the 6
th Parliament is dis-
played in Table 2 (See Table 2). The success of the liberal parties in the elections 
made the ALDE the third largest party with eighty eight seats in the Parliament. 
The EPP-ED kept its position as the largest party in the Parliament with two hun-
dred and sixty eight seats. The PES has remained as the second largest party with 
two hundred and two seats. The most important development was the formation 
of Independence/Democracy Group, a Euroskeptic party group which is made up 
mainly by the UK Independence Party (UKIP).  
What requires special attention however is the internal composition of these 
supranational party groups, especially the largest ones. When they are broken 
down into their component national parties, major party groups display a great 
amount of diversity. The most internally diverse party group among all is the 
EPP-ED. The EPP-ED is composed of some fifty different political parties from 
twenty five member states (See Appendix for details). It includes such ideologi-
cally diverse parties (e.g. conservatives, nationalists, social democrats, and of 
course Christian Democrats) that it risks a decrease in its ideological cohesion. 
The Liberal group (ALDE) experiences the same problem but it is not as severe 
as the EPP-ED. The Socialist group, on the other hand, might benefit the most 
since the national party delegations that joined the PES are those communist suc-
cessor parties that have been noted as being the most cohesive and well-organ-
ized at the national level.  
The general picture that emerges from this brief examination is that the in-
flux of new members might have some destabilizing effects on the EP party 
groups. This seems mostly the case for the EPP-ED, which experiences a great 
deal of internal diversity. However it is important to note that this is not new to 
the EPP-ED. Even prior to the enlargement, the EPP-ED has had the British and 
Danish Conservatives along with Forza Italia within its ranks. What is different 
with this round of enlargement is the differences in the character of the political 
parties and party systems between new and old members. The political parties of 
Central and Eastern are still a set of elite driven, ideologically vague and malle-
able parties that exist more as cadre organizations within the parliament than as 
social organizations with deep roots within civil society.  
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Table 2 
The seat distribution in the European Parliament as of February 26, 2005 
  PPE
-DE  PSE ALDE Verts/
ALE 
GUE/
NGL 
IND/
DEM  UEN NI  Total 
Austria  6  7  0 2 0 0  0  3  18 
Belgium  6  7  6 2 0 0  0  3  24 
Czech Rep  14  2  0 0 6 1  0  1  24 
Cyprus  3  0  1 0 2 0  0  0  6 
Denmark  1  5  4 1 1 1  1  0  14 
Estonia  1  3  2 0 0 0  0  0  6 
France  17  31  11  6 3 3  0  7  78 
Finland  4  3  5 1 1 0  0  0  14 
Germany  49 23  7  13  7  0  0 0  99 
Greece  11  8  0 0 4 1  0  0  24 
Hungary  13  9  2 0 0 0  0  0  24 
Ireland  5  1  1 0 1 1  4  0  13 
Italy  24  16  12  2 7 4  9  4  78 
Latvia  3  0  1 1 0 0  4  0  9 
Lithuania  2  2  7 0 0 0  2  0  13 
Luxembourg  3  1  1 1 0 0  0  0  6 
Malta  2  3  0 0 0 0  0  0  5 
Netherlands  7  7  5 4 2 2  0  0  27 
Poland  19  10  4 0 0  10  7  4  54 
Portugal  9  11  0 0 3 0  0  0  23 
Slovakia  8  3  0 0 0 0  0  3  14 
Slovenia  4  1  2 0 0 0  0  0  7 
Spain  24  24  2 3 1 0  0  0  54 
Sweden  5  5  3 1 2 3  0  0  19 
UK  28 19  12  5  1  10  0 3  78 
 
 
The following section is therefore devoted to the analysis of political parties 
in the region. The formation and development of the political parties, their inter-
nal organization and recruitment patterns will be reviewed with the goal of mak-
ing comparisons to their Western European counterparts. Then the partisan ac-
tivity in the European Union will be examined. 
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Partisan Activity in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
 
Parties are the political intermediaries of a given political system acting as me-
diators between the citizens and government.
4 The role of parties in the transition 
to democracy and later in its consolidation is generally considered to be critical. 
However, this was not the case in Central and Eastern Europe in the early phase 
of political transition because there were almost no parties other than the ruling 
communist party and its satellites. With some exceptions
5 political parties gener-
ally had formed after or during the first democratic elections throughout the re-
gion and had become major actors in the political arena.
6  
Throughout the region opposition forces grouped in the form of social 
movements rather than institutionalized formal organization.
7 Most of the new 
political elite preferred diverse interests to be organized under broad social 
movements, forums and networks of friends, rather than political parties: Soli-
darity in Poland, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia, 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Slovakian Public Against Violence etc. This 
was mainly a reaction to the communist party and the monopolistic system of 
rule it maintained in each of central and eastern European countries. The only 
political opposition that could possibly come out was “one of society against the 
state,” and basically “its organization took the form of social informality in con-
trast to officialdom and patterns of authority set by party bureaucracy.” Resis-
tance to party politics was particularly strong in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The 
anti-party sentiment was reflected in the electoral slogans of these movements 
such as the famous one adopted by the Civic Forum: “Parties are for party mem-
bers, Civic Forum is for everybody.”
8  
This anti party sentiment had slowly eroded at the time of the first free elec-
tions throughout the region. They started to disintegrate and split into new or-
ganizational forms that constituted the basis of new parties. Four types of parties 
                                                 
4 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1954); Giovanni 
Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976). 
5 Hungary was the only country where the political parties were both the initiators and primary 
movers of the transition process (Attila Agh, “The Hungarian Party System and Party Theory in the 
Transition of Central Europe” Journal of Theoretical Politics, no. 2 (1994): 234).  
6 Almost all the countries in the region adopted parliamentary forms of government. See Paul 
G. Lewis, “The ‘Third Wave’ of Democracy in Eastern Europe” Party Politics, no. 5, (2001): 543-
565. 
7 Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing 
New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996). 
8 Petr Kopecky, “Parties in the Czech Parliament: From Transformative Towards Arena Type 
of Legislature” in Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe, Paul G. Lewis, ed. 66-
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have emerged throughout all East Central Europe: 1) The Communist successor 
parties, 2) the former satellite parties of the Communist period, 3) the historical 
pre-Communist parties banned by the Communists and reformed after the col-
lapse of the regime, and finally 4) newly formed political parties with no prior 
political history.
9 Among these different types of parties, post-communist parties 
resembled more to the western ones in terms of their levels of membership and 
party organization. In the following section we will therefore be examining the 
formation and development of the new parties of the region.  
 
Party Formation and Early Development 
 
The actual way in which parties came into being corresponded very closely to 
“the elite, intelligentsia-focused politics which were in fact practiced and the 
prominent role that personality and individual relations played in them.” Party 
formation was therefore a “top-down” process, as opposed to “bottom-up” grass-
roots movement.
10 Post-communist political parties of East Central Europe 
emerged at an elite level and usually within parliaments as their western counter-
parts did some hundred years ago. In the first few years of their formation, most 
of the party activity of the region, with the exception of the post-communist suc-
cessor parties, was therefore confined to the parliament and a very minimal role 
was played by party membership whereas a dominant influence was exerted by 
party leadership. In many cases the conception of “rank-and-file membership” 
did not exist and recognition of what party members were and what they might 
do was often lacking. In addition to that, it was not very appealing for the foun-
ders of the party to have a large membership, and therefore create a major source 
of potential internal conflict that might lead to division.
11 As Olson suggests 
political parties of post-communist Europe were “more cadre than mass, more 
general than specific in their target audiences and more concerned with votes 
than with members.”
12 
Today post-communist central and eastern European parties and party sys-
tems are much more institutionalized and consolidated than they were a decade 
ago. They have survived many critical junctures and made significant develop-
mental progress. They have been working to strengthen their ties with society, 
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and gain membership. The picture in the region of course is not undifferentiated. 
The process in the so-called Visegrad four
13 has been more successful than in the 
rest of the region. The political parties of Hungary, Poland, and the two successor 
states of Czechoslovakia have come to resemble their western European counter-
parts in their support for democratic rule and commitment to democratic princi-
ples however they tend to break markedly with them in terms of party 
organization.
14 
Central and eastern European parties resemble more their Latin American 
counterparts than their western European ones. Only the communist successor 
parties look like the western traditional mass parties with a large membership, 
ideological homogeneity, good finances and material resources and a high degree 
of organizational development. Unlike those, the newly formed political parties 
of the region are characterized by an ideological incoherence and low levels of 
membership.
15 This has important implications for the party groups in the EP. 
First we would like to look at the ideology. Although the EP resembles more the 
US House of Representatives than its member states’ parliaments, the party 
groups in the EP have been highly cohesive compared to the U.S. Congress and 
any other separated-powers system.
16 However a closer look at the party group 
cohesion in five parliaments after the direct elections reveals that the cohesion 
patterns differ considerably from one parliament to another and from one party 
group to another. While most party groups were less cohesive in the first and the 
fifth parliament compared to the second, third and fourth parliaments, this pattern 
was reversed for the EPP-ED. The EPP-ED was less cohesive in the second, third 
and fourth parliaments than in the first and fifth. This was mainly due to the im-
pact of successive EU enlargements, which brought new members (especially the 
new Southern members, and then the Nordic members). The EPP-ED will face 
the same difficulties more than any other party group with the current enlarge-
ment where “Christian Democrats” in Central and Eastern Europe have very little 
in common with their counterparts in Western Europe. We can therefore argue 
that the ideological cohesion will be a major issue for party groups in the EP, and 
this will be more evident in the EPP-ED.  
While the ideology seems to be the major problem, party membership and 
organization are also important issues that need to be addressed. Although they 
do not possess any control of membership recruitment, the EP party groups have 
                                                 
13 Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
14 James Toole, “Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central 
Europe” Party Politics no. 4 (2000): 441-461. 
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been extremely powerful, well-organized and well-staffed in terms of resources 
and personnel. They have been similar to party groups in member states’ parlia-
ments in all this sense. They even enjoy more financial and practical advantages 
compared to some national parliaments of the EU member states. Approximately 
one sixth of the EP’s internal budget is devoted to the party groups. They also 
benefit from payments of a European Information Campaign fund.
17 Whereas the 
political parties of post-communist Europe, except the communist successor par-
ties, are understaffed and weakly organized. They do not possess the resources, 
and personnel that are owned by either the communist successor parties, or the 
EP party groups. They are still too young and fragile with weak organizational 
structures and without a solid party identity. They are characterized as the elec-
toral parties, which are likely to offer programmes to win the elections as op-
posed to western European “programme parties,” which concentrate on winning 
elections to implement their programmes. Political parties of the region also pre-
fer their privileged existence within the parliaments, which became a “political 
theatre of sensational political battles.” In this sense, parliaments are not only the 
central place for politics, but almost “the only one, where parties, which have 
tried to monopolize their roles as political actors, concentrate their activities on 
the interparty ideological struggles. Parliamentarization of parties increased the 
gap between the elite and the rank-and-file members when the party and its frac-
tion leaderships merged very closely. Along with “parliamentarization,” we also 
see “overparticization,” where the parties are growing politically too strong but 
remaining organizationally weak and unable to penetrate into social life.
18 As 
Kopecky hypothesized parties in the region have come to resemble the catch-all 
party and develop as formations with very loose electoral constituencies, which 
appeal to “a wider clientele of voters…rather than opt for the representation of 
well-defined segments of society.”
19  
Finally in terms of candidate selection, almost all countries in the region 
adopted western European experience (mostly German experience) where many 
aspects of nomination procedures are determined by party statutes, and can be 
changed if the party wishes to do so. In this regard, the parties of Central and 
Eastern Europe resembles more their western counterparts than their American 
ones where nomination procedures and any change to them are realized by 
changing state law itself. With regard to the issue of centralization and decen-
tralization of candidate selection, the parties of the region are located at different 
points of the spectrum. One extreme is complete centralized selection, where 
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party candidates are nominated by central units. The other extreme is complete 
decentralized selection, where decisions could be made by local units without 
any interference from the central organs. However post-communist European 
parties do not easily fit one of these extremes. The practices of most parties of 
Central and Eastern Europe (as it is in the West) fall in between these two ex-
tremes of complete local control and leadership domination.
20  
 
Partisan Activity in European Parliament 
 
The party EP groups were created a year after the formation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When the Common Assembly (the prede-
cessor of the EP) first convened in 1952, there were no party groups in today’s 
sense. Unlike today where MEPs sat according to political affiliation, before 
1953, appointed Members of the Common Assembly sat in alphabetical order.
21 
The Common Assembly was organized along national lines. However members 
soon acknowledged the necessity of the establishment of cooperation on political 
affiliation instead of nationality. The party groups were given formal recognition 
in the Common Assembly (CA) of the ECSC in January 1953. As Kreppel sug-
gests had the EP was organized along national lines like other international as-
semblies, it would not have become the major actor in the EU decision making as 
it is today.
22  
There were three party groups in the new Assembly corresponding to the 
three traditional Western European party families: the Christian Democrats, So-
cialists and Liberals. Over the years several others have been created along with 
these three major groups.  
If we look at the number of party groups in the EP, the party system can be 
characterized as a multi-party system. The EP, however, has always been a “two-
party plus many,” with two major party groups dominating the legislative proc-
ess. While the number of the parties has changed at each parliament, the EPP-ED 
and the PES have remained preeminent, and the two-party dominant format has 
been consolidated.
23 These two party groups have coalesced towards the center, 
adopted similar positions towards different issues, and increased intergroup co-
operation. Together the EPP-ED and the PES account for over 60 per cent of the 
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seats in the EP. Although there have been some name changes across the years 
these parties have been temporally consistent with almost no history of splinter 
group secession or internal divisions.
24 
 
Analysis: What to Expect Now? 
 
The EP’s Rules of Procedure provide very clear incentives to form party groups. 
The Rules of Procedures recognize the party groups and grant certain rights and 
material benefits to them. However there has been a tendency in the EP towards 
realignment. The party groups representing one large national party tend to seek 
realignment with one of the two major party groups. It is therefore considered 
that alignment with a larger group increases a party’s prestige and chances of 
influencing of EU policy making from within. 
The new Central and Eastern European members of the EU have also fol-
lowed this trend and joined the ranks of the existing supranational party groups. 
As outlined above, this has increased the internal diversity of the major party 
groups. The question is therefore: How will the party groups respond to the ac-
cession of these new members that have a very different understanding of parti-
san activity than their Western counterparts? 
The ability of the existing party groups to absorb these new members is not 
very clear. When we look at party groups historically, there has been no instance 
of party group split after successive enlargements. However the quantity and the 
quality of this round of enlargement pose significant challenges to the existing 
party groups. Increasing level of ideological diversity within existing groups may 
cause party group disintegration (especially for the EPP-ED) and this may result 
in the end of the grand coalition between the EPP-ED and the PES and the sub-
sequent fragmentation of the supranational party system. This will definitely in-
fluence the role and powers of the EP vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council.  
In terms of party group organization I expect to see similar problems. Al-
though ideological unity seems to be more important than organizational unity, 
internal party organization is crucial in terms of the ability of the party groups to 
continue their critical role as the central administrative unit within the EP. The 
party groups are considered as the EP’s life blood.
25 They have been of central 
importance in the work of the Parliament and played also a pivotal role within 
parliamentary committees. They have become more and more developed, spe-
cialized and more elaborate over time within the EP.
26 If internal organization of 
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parties becomes more fragmented, the ability of the party groups to play these 
crucial roles might be adversely affected and this could weaken the EP as a 
whole.
27 
 
Conclusion 
 
The eastern enlargement is a major challenge to the EP party groups and party 
system. Party systems have both potential of change and persistence. On the one 
hand, they have to adapt to changing environments and new situations to be able 
to survive. At the same time they resist changes because they are sticky. In other 
words, the regularized patterns of behavior that we associate with institutions 
display continuity over time because they embody something like Nash equilib-
rium. That is, individuals adhere to these patterns of behavior because deviation 
will make the individual worse off than will adherence. However, there are also 
some avenues for change within institutions. One way that change is treated by 
historical institutionalists is through the concept of “punctuated equilibria.” There 
is an expectation in this approach that for most of its existence an institution will 
exist in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the decisions made 
at the previous point of punctuation and the punctuations in the equilibrium are 
assumed to occur when there are “rapid bursts of institutional change followed by 
long periods of stasis.”
28  
Another, though very similar way to look at the institutional change is the 
idea of “critical junctures,” that has been used to describe and explain change in 
Latin American governments during much of the twentieth century.
29 The “criti-
cal junctures” are the moments when substantial institutional change takes place 
thereby creating a “branching point” from which historical development moves 
onto a new path.
30 
Whether Eastern enlargement will be a critical juncture in the history 
of the EP and its party system and party groups is not clear yet. It is hard 
to anticipate changes and draw conclusions at this point. Nevertheless, the 
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general idea is that legislative institutions do not hold still, they change.
31 
The ability of the institutions to reformat themselves could be regarded as 
a healthy phenomenon and even could be considered desirable.  
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Introduction 
 
The majority of the new members which joined the European Union on May 1, 
2004, are former post-communist countries. Political changes in these East Cen-
tral European countries involved two overlapping processes: the transformation 
of social, economic, and political systems, and the integration into the Euro-pol-
ity which implied the adoption of the acquis communautaire. The following pa-
per argues that institution building in these new member countries is shaped by 
their transformation which is embedded in the process of European integration. 
While countries bring in their own history and culture, outside influence is perti-
nent with the adaptation to EU rules.
1  
One of the most important areas of institution building is in the field of social 
policy and social institutions. Reshaping state-society relations as well as the 
socio-economic mechanisms became a major challenge after the introduction of 
market economies. Advisory groups and joint research projects explored policy 
concepts for social institutions. New labor and employment laws included a “so-
cial dialogue” which was required by EU-standards, unemployment regulations 
and health policies had to be implemented, and all countries had to establish pa-
rental leave regulation in accordance with EU-norms. Does enlargement there-
fore promote the Europeanization of social policies, or has market liberalization 
resulted in disintegration and diversification in the accession countries? Is there a 
neo-liberal welfare system emerging, or are the countries following their former 
path in terms of larger state involvement? What are the prospects for a “social 
Europe” given the diversity of social systems in Europe? 
The literature on democratization and system transformation has offered two 
competing views of the post-communist world: From an optimistic viewpoint, 
membership in the EU will support the economic and social transition, include 
the region in a vibrant European market and complete its “return to Europe” 
(Spanish model). From a negative perspective, East Central Europe will provide, 
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at best, an arsenal for cheap labor (which, in fact, is the comparative advantage of 
the region), while not alleviating poverty, social exclusion, and discrimination 
over a longer period of time (Latin-Americanization).
2 
The approach proposed here follows a more complex model. The prospects 
of inclusion in the EU establish a framework of reference that constitutes an im-
portant resource in the institutionalization of social policies and social citizenship 
in a variety of dimensions. Institutional and legal adaptation in the candidate 
countries proceed in different ways that correspond to the distinct conditions 
shaping options and choices in the field of social policies, but in all countries the 
EU had leverage to influence policy-making.  
Comparative welfare state analysis has mainly concentrated on the developed 
economies of the OECD-countries, and there is little systematic analytical work 
on the transformation of social institutions in post-communist Europe. In the 
following I seek to identify distinct patterns and problems of the institutionaliza-
tion of social citizenship and social institutions in this region. A key argument is 
that there is greater diversity emerging in the enlarged European Union. The ini-
tial hypothesis is built on the assumption that emerging patterns of social support 
and social security diverge from the typology described in the comparative wel-
fare state literature, inasmuch as the transformation of post-communist societies 
is distinctly different from the building of welfare states in Europe.  
 
The European Process of Integration 
 
In a global economy, larger regions, such as the Europe Union, provide a more 
promising competitive position than the traditional nation state. Thus, policies of 
integration are rooted in the creation and expansion of the internal market. Eco-
nomic and fiscal policies are therefore more prominent than social policy. Yet, 
multi-level governance in the European Union includes social standards and so-
cial rights as an important dimension of post-Maastricht Europe. In one of the 
most influential studies of European social policy in the 1990s, Paul Pierson and 
Stephan Leibfried found: “National welfare states remain the primary institutions 
of European social policy, but they do so in the context of an increasingly con-
straining multi-tiered polity.”
3 The European welfare state constitutes a major 
pillar of the European social model, even in times of crisis and the restructuring 
of welfare state policies. 
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Since the mid 1990s, the EU has assumed a more active role in the field of 
social issues.
4 The EU Commission proposed to construct a “European social 
model” in 1994 (which was not too successful), but in 1997 the Social Protocol 
was finally signed by the British Labour government and included in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The inclusion of new EU member states in the mid 1990s, nota-
bly Sweden, Finland, and Austria, has strengthened the coalition of countries 
supporting the European social model.
5 On a discursive level, “solidarity” figures 
prominently in the universe of common values of the EU. The European Consti-
tution with its “Charter of Fundamental Rights,”
6 designed in 2003 and included 
in the draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU (2004), embraces a full chapter on 
“solidarity,” further lending support to the European “social acquis.” The Social 
Chapter broadens the two “original mandates” -- health and safety in the work-
place, environment and gender equality -- and places them under qualified ma-
jority voting. Social policies are still primarily shaped and sustained by member 
states
 but the “open method of coordination” introduced in the late 1990s allows 
for concerted actions in at least some countries. According to Fritz Scharpf this 
policy mode would allow for an Europeanization of social policy through best-
practice solutions which Scharpf sees based on a model of social learning.
7 In 
terms of policy-making, the Europeanization of social policy would not neces-
sarily imply the transfer of social standards to the EU-level, but a coordination of 
member states around similar policy issues and on various levels of governance.  
 
Transformation in the East Central European Countries 
 
Since the mid 1990s, the EU institutions have actively moved to include the post-
communist countries and to support full membership in the Union. As political 
scientist Frank Schimmelfennig has argued, accession was successfully framed 
by the applicant countries as a “return to Europe,” thus shaming the “brakemen” 
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and promoting compliance with the drivers’ suggestion to open the European 
Union for full membership.
8 In the governance literature, there is some substan-
tial research supporting the claim that cognitive frames serve to adapt to estab-
lished rules once the rules and procedures in social policy are established. The 
driving force in the integration process was the European Commission. In 1998, 
the European Commission approved Accession Partnerships for 10 applicant 
countries in Central Europe, Cyprus, and Turkey, and the first round of accession 
negotiations was opened with Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Re-
public and Cyprus. In December 1999, the Commission proposed an additional 
six countries, including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slova-
kia. The Council of Ministers meeting in Nice (2000) confirmed the prospective 
membership of the 12 countries, and ten countries became full members in 2004, 
with Romania and Bulgaria potentially following in 2007.  
While the speed and scope of economic integration is not matched by social 
integration, the idea of European-wide social standards, or the “social acquis,” 
gained a higher profile in the EU enlargement process. The incorporation of the 
Commission guidelines and directives for social policy into the laws and national 
practices of the candidate countries was considered to be an important precondi-
tion for EU membership. Regular reports, published by the Commission evalu-
ating the progress towards meeting the “Copenhagen criteria” and the imple-
mentation of institutional reforms, showed that by December 2002 ten countries 
had fulfilled the criteria. There were less problems with political criteria (institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy), and significant progress had been made in estab-
lishing a market economy.
9 In the area of social policy, the following areas have 
mainly been addressed in the accession process: health and safety of workers; 
employment; parental leave; social dialogue. Moreover, a new action frame on 
gender mainstreaming has been implemented and requires adjustment in the new 
member countries. Yet, for some time problems remained in the post-communist 
countries regarding legal and institutional adjustment.
10 
While most observers agree that the political transition to establish democ-
ratic rules and procedures in post-communist East Central Europe advanced well, 
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problems remained not only in the realm corruption, but also regarding social 
exclusion and deprivation. Studies conducted in East Central European countries 
have voiced concern about high poverty rates, massive unemployment and new 
social exclusion, as well as the lack of a universal notion of social protection.
11 
Third world-type poverty and a widening gap between the rich and poor raise 
doubts about the scope and depth of economic recovery in the future. Despite the 
promising growth of the annual GDP in recent years, the average per capita pro-
duction is less than half of the EU average in the accession states (with the ex-
ception of Slovenia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic). The building of social 
institutions and the establishment of social rights for citizens has therefore be-
come an issue of high importance to these societies and social policies are linked 
to substantial issues of social cohesion, democracy and social citizenship.  
  
The Quest for a Social Model: What Kind of Social Policy? 
 
In the process of institution building framing social issues not as poor relief, but 
in the context of citizenship rights has an important meaning in the universe of 
the political discourse. The initial hypothesis of our research holds that the pros-
pects of inclusion in the EU establish a framework of reference that provides an 
important cognitive and symbolic resource in the institutionalization of social 
policies. These frames are informed by historically shaped, culturally embedded 
patterns of how problems are conceptualized, how policy choices are confronted, 
and how outcomes are shaped. Yet, the prospect of becoming a member of the 
EU has definitely shaped legal, administrative, and institutional transitions as 
well. Outside influence played an important part in the rebuilding of institutions. 
A key to understanding the different dimensions of social policies and wel-
fare state formation is social citizenship, a concept widely applied in the welfare 
state literature. According to the writings of T. H. Marshall, three forms of rights 
can be distinguished, which developed in a consecutive, albeit complex manner. 
In the first category of rights, Marshall groups civil rights, in example basic hu-
man rights, such as the integrity of body, freedom of speech, religion, which 
emerged in the 18
th century (French Revolution; American Revolution). Political 
rights compose the second group, including the right to vote, universal citizen-
ship, political participation and representation, which developed since the late 
19
th century. Social rights constitute the third group of rights, including the right 
to basic support and income, as well as welfare rights, which became character-
istic in the second half of the 20
th century. Countries follow distinctly different 
paths in establishing these three sets of rights, but it can be stated that the notion 
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of social rights is nowadays deeply embedded in all European countries. It is also 
featured in key documents, including the “Charter of Fundamental Rights,” and 
the draft constitution. Conceptually, the notion of social citizenship presents a 
more encompassing approach to social policy provisions. Social rights and citi-
zenship refer to institutionalized rights and routinized practices of citizenship in a 
given society. On the basis of citizenship rights, social citizenship provisions are 
universal and all-encompassing; they are grounded in a universal notion of citi-
zenship, rather than in ascribed roles and different functions in society.  
From an institutional perspective, four different institutions provide social 
services and support: family, state, market, and civil society. Their combination 
forms the welfare mix in European societies which follows from different his-
torical, political and cultural traditions and informs choices. A project on social 
policy in transition countries conducted at the Institute for Human Sciences in 
Vienna concluded that the welfare mix in East Central European countries varies 
greatly from country to country.
12 In fact, there is no harmonization of social pol-
icy, but great variation regarding institutional and financial arrangements in the 
areas of health, unemployment, pension systems and other social provisions. 
Even the most advanced Eastern accession countries show great variations. 
While EU rules and regulations have definitely had an impact on legal and insti-
tutional changes the outcome is much more complex and less clear-cut. 
 
The New World of Welfare: A Fragmented Welfare Reality 
 
Comparative welfare state analysis found that welfare states are deeply en-
trenched in European politics. At the same time, the institutional and legal set-up 
of welfare policies exhibits great variations from country to country. In order to 
systematically compare and contrast the multi-variant cases, comparative welfare 
state analysis has grouped countries according to the range and scope of welfare 
rights granted to citizens. In one of the most influential works, Esping-Andersen 
distinguishes “three worlds” of welfare capitalism: liberal, conserva-
tive/corporatist, and social democratic.
13 Focusing on the question as to what ex-
tent welfare states enable their citizens to lead an economically and socially 
agreeable life independent from the market, he forms clusters of welfare states 
according to the extent of “decommodification" (reducing the significance of 
being a “commodity,” or reliance on wage labor). The regime typology is built 
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Countries (SOCO)” at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna covered a wide range of issues 
including unemployment, labor market policies, housing policy, pension reform, health care, edu-
cation, poverty, individual and family coping strategies, local social welfare delivery, demographic 
change, disadvantaged groups, regional disparities (www.iwm.at/p-socopp.htm).  
13 Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990). In Search of the Social Europe: The Eastern Enlargement  203 
 
on a power resource model, that is to say, Esping-Andersen assumes that the de-
gree of decommodification depends on the power and influence of social groups 
in society, such as unions and parties on the left. The model hypothesizes a high 
degree of path-dependency. In the social democratic welfare regime type (Swe-
den, Norway) decommodification is highest; whereas, the liberal welfare regime 
type (US, Canada, Great Britain) relies heavily on market-based mechanisms, in 
example private insurance schemes (pensions, education, health). The conserva-
tive regime (Germany, France) is placed in the middle, since it supports some 
groups in society more than others (based on corporatism and a stronger role of 
the church). Another cluster of states can be found in Southern Europe (“Latin 
Rim”).
14 
Social citizenship therefore shows variations in accordance with the welfare 
regime types. Research conducted about changing welfare policies in the past 
two decades shows that policy choices vary even in countries with similar fea-
tures; to what extent this is the case is influenced by a number of internal and as 
well as external factors. Applying the variation hypothesis to East Central 
Europe, preliminary research shows that countries pursue quite different paths, 
notwithstanding the shared communist legacies and similar pressures of privati-
zation. The overlapping processes of transformation and integration were con-
ducted simultaneously and at great speed. There is neither a uniform state-cen-
tered model, nor are the countries following a clear-cut neo-liberal path. Earlier 
empirical research on the transition countries found only incremental changes in 
the area of social policy and social assistance. In comparative studies of welfare 
state development, Ulrike Götting shows, for example, that policy changes in the 
immediate post-communist period were, at best, “moderate.”
15 Influenced by EU 
accession negotiations, legal and administrative reforms, as well as democratiza-
tion and decentralization have meanwhile led to more substantial changes in wel-
fare policies. Initial expectations that a universalist (Swedish) model of welfare 
would replace the paternalistic communist state experience proved unrealistic. 
With states’ capacities to cope with social costs of transformation decreasing and 
poverty rates increasing, social policy arrangements are facing more fundamental 
challenges. Recent reports depict a more complex picture of the development of 
social policies and social citizenship. The welfare systems emerging in the new 
accession countries is highly diverse leaving, at best, fragmented welfare states 
in the region. 
                                                 
14 Stefan Lessenich and Ilona Ostner, eds., Welten des Wohlfahrtskapitalismus (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).  
15 Ulrike Götting, “Destruction, Adjustment, and Innovation: Social Policy Transformation in 
East Central Europe,” ZeS-Working Paper, Bremen, No. 2/94 (1994); and Ulrike Götting, Trans-
formation der Wohlfahrtsstaaten in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Eine Zwischenbilanz, (Opladen: Leske 
and Budrich, 1998). 204  Lemke 
 
Across the region social citizenship is marked by a fragmented, patch-work 
type of policies, under-funding of social programs, and overburdening of social 
institutions, in particular families. Institutional restructuring in the realm of social 
policy involves the (re-) structuring of basic programs, such as establishing un-
employment insurance, a functioning health care system, and new child care fa-
cilities. Yet, the features of these new systems still suffer from the low priority 
given to social tasks in state regulation, as compared to the liberalization of mar-
kets and legal restructuring. Social citizenship is not yet deeply entrenched in the 
political logic and may best be characterized as “low density citizenship.” The 
notion that social support is part of a broader concept of citizenship rights, which 
should not only be need-based, as is the case with respect to classic poor relief 
programs, nor should it be simply left to the markets, is not very well established. 
For example, as Julia Szalai shows for the case of Hungary, the “Social Welfare 
Act” passed in 1993, introduced “contribution-based schemes” for social policy 
provisions and pitted “deserving” and “undeserving” segments of the population 
against each other, opening the space for fierce rivalry between groups for the 
status of “most needy.”
16 Under this scheme, the inverse effects include more 
support for those who are better positioned in the market (commanding more ef-
ficient resources and lobbying more effectively) than for the increasing segment 
of the population in need of temporary or long-term support.  
Drawing on the findings for the Eastern accession countries and the new 
emerging type of welfare regime, the following features pose particular chal-
lenges in this fragmented welfare state. 
 
Redistributive weakness of states  
 
With respect to the different social institutions providing social services, the 
weakness of states to guarantee social rights is one of the most striking features 
of the transition period. This is not only the case with regard to the problem of 
under-funded social programs, an issue in all of the transition countries. Rather, 
there are built-in institutional mechanisms that contribute to the fragile scope of 
social citizenship. First, reports from Hungary, Poland, and other countries show 
that there are conflicting views about the root-causes of social exclusion, poverty 
and increasing income-inequality, resulting in contrasting conceptions about the 
responsibilities of states to offer social protection and prevent poverty. The pre-
dominantly market-driven approach to economic restructuring generally neglects 
deeply-rooted structural causes, and fails to consider comprehensive approaches 
to social integration. Second, processes of lobbying the state clearly favor re-
source-strong and privileged segments of the population. There is substantial 
                                                 
16 Julia Szalai, “Poverty and Social Policy in Hungary in the 1990´s” paper presented at the 
Conference “Rethinking Social Protection: Citizenship and Social Policy in the Global Era,” Center 
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evidence that the legacies of the communist era include unequal access to the 
channels of power and influence. Claims of weaker groups in society, such as 
single mothers or families with several children, are often not well represented in 
the policy process. Third, crucial political decisions for administering social poli-
cies had (often unintended) counterproductive effects for establishing the notion 
of universal social rights. In Poland, for example, decentralization, introduced 
with large-scale administrative reforms in 1999, leaves funding of social assis-
tance and family support to the communities. However, particularly in rural areas 
and in poorer regions of the country, many communities have difficulties meeting 
their obligations, leaving predominantly women and children in conditions of 
great need. After experiencing the first results of institutional reforms, findings 
suggest that states often fail to enforce rights in the realm of social policies even 
when laws exist. Similar indications of state weakness can be found in other 
countries. In Hungary, decentralization of the state has produced severe problems 
for social policies, according to Szalai. The shifting of power from central to lo-
cal and regional administrations led to an unclear division of responsibilities and 
duties within the new democratic system of governance.
17 As a result of 
decentralization there are great discrepancies between the communities, increas-
ing inequalities rather than alleviating them.
18 
 
Defecting firms, segregated markets, and informality 
 
Because of lasting and high rates of unemployment, the establishment of new 
social institutions, such as unemployment insurance, is of prime importance, yet 
insurance schemes are still fragile and companies are reluctant to share in the 
costs of restructuring the workforce. Pressure to reduce the workforce during the 
transition has been high. According to UNICEF data, about 26 million jobs were 
lost in the transition countries. 14 million of these jobs alone were held by 
women. Women constitute the majority of the unemployed; the only exception is 
Hungary, where female unemployment has been lower due to a sharp job segre-
gation and wage discrimination; women’s wages are roughly 30 per cent lower 
than men’s for blue-collar workers, and even 38 percent for white-collar workers, 
according to Heinen.
19 Yet, there are significant shifts in employment as well. 
                                                 
17 The report of the EU-Commission on Hungary (1999), section on regional policy and cohe-
sion, finds that the 1996 law on regional development has not been implemented sufficiently; the 
law reestablished Regional Development Councils but does not allocate financial resources; there 
are still weak regional organizations. – Julia Szalai argues that both, the Social Welfare Act and the 
Act on Local Governments, need amendments to secure coverage. 
18 Zsuzsa Széman, “The Role of NGOs in Social Quality in Different Regions in Hungary. 
Possibility of a New Concern,” SOCO Project paper, Vienna, No. 90 (2002). 
19 Jacqueline Heinen, "East European Transition. Labor Markets and Gender in the Light of 
three Cases: Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria" in The Transition of Gender, Welfare States and De-
mocracy in Europe, Seminar 5 of the EC-Program `Gender and Citizenship´(Göttingen 1999): 41-206  Lemke 
 
Traditional “female” branches of employment, such as textile or food processing, 
had to lay-off workers on a larger scale; sectors expanding are often in areas in 
which men hold leading positions, such as banking and financial services. Re-
training and unemployment support is either weakly institutionalized or under-
funded. Given the high unemployment rates, the social support and survival of 
marginalized groups seemed to function mainly because of the existence of the 
“shadow economy.” In fact, one of the most striking aspects of the new econo-
mies is the large share of the informal economy. The importance of the informal 
sector of the economy in Eastern accession countries has increased significantly 
in recent years; ranging from 18 percent of GDP in 2000-2001 in the Czech Re-
public, to 27 percent in Poland and 39 percent in Estonia. Economists distinguish 
between illegal and informal economy (e. g. economic activity that is not re-
ported to the statistical office, although it should be), and insist that the informal 
economy is not per se a negative phenomenon; rather it is a survival strategy in 
very poor regions.
20  
Another troubling aspect is corruption. While corruption also occurs in west-
ern countries, “corrupt capitalism” exists in all transition countries on a larger 
scale. The problems arising from this development are manifold. First, informal-
ity undermines the fiscal consolidation of the state. Due to black market mecha-
nisms and corruption, firms involved in these practices evade taxes; thus, reduc-
ing the capabilities of states to allocate adequate funds to social programs. More-
over, the existence of a larger informal sector undermines trust in state institu-
tions to provide social support.  
For women, the situation is especially difficult. Higher rates of unemploy-
ment, informality and sex discrimination in the work place make it very difficult 
to find work that sustains a living and provide social security. A wide variety of 
non-governmental organizations, including EU supported programs try to fill the 
gaps of professional retraining and support. A study about women’s organiza-
tions in Poland, for example, found that most NGOs were in some way providing 
social services, often supporting women to work and aiming to enhance their pro-
fessional opportunities in the labor market.
21 These groups tend to be more 
successful when framing their agenda within the European social dimension. 
 
                                                                                                                         
64. 
The EU Commission country report for Poland (2000) states that in the issue of equal oppor-
tunities Poland has made no progress; gender-specific job advertisements and domestic violence are 
explicitly mentioned as areas of concern.  
20 A. Mungiu Pippidi, S. Ionita, D. Mandruta, “In the Shadow Economy,” SOCO Project pa-
per, Vienna No. 80 (2000). 
21 Gesine Fuchs, Die Zivilgesellschaft mitgestalten - Polnische Frauenorganisationen im 
Demokratisierungsprozeß, (Series “Politik und Geschlechterverhältnisse”) (Frankfurt a. M.: Cam-
pus, 2003).  In Search of the Social Europe: The Eastern Enlargement  207 
 
Reprivatization of social cost  
 
In order to buffer the crisis of transition, families have become major fall-back 
institutions of support.
22 Informal family and neighborhood ties  assume an 
increasing role in providing social services and securing survival. In fact, the 
scale of coping strategies ranges from individual exploitation within the family to 
new forms of family support schemes, showing the strength of individual coping 
strategies (as compared to state programs) in securing a decent life. Most often, 
however, there is no legal or economic compensation for the work in providing 
social services. Also, in assessing social support, significant gaps between de jure 
and de facto regulations can be found. This is, for example, the case in granting 
family leave. Influenced by the prospect of entering the EU and adapting to 
European regulations, child-rearing leave in Poland was equally attributed to fa-
thers and mothers; however, there is nearly no money allocated for this 
provision.
23 
 
Weakness and revival of civil society  
 
Overall, the literature on transition found that institutions of civil society are 
rather weak in respect to their impact on social relations and their influence on 
political decisions. Labor unions often fight to preserve privileges for particular 
segments of workers and collective bargaining processes may be malfunctioning. 
In respect to social services, several studies about the Eastern accession countries 
point to a significant increase in social services and support provided by volun-
tary and non-governmental institutions in recent years. Fuchs
24 reports, for exam-
ple, that the field of women’s groups has expanded in the 1990s, with many 
groups focusing on social or employment issues. Széman
25 shows that civil soci-
ety organizations in Hungary have also formed and taken on crucial tasks in 
smaller towns. Regional differences and differences between urban and rural en-
vironments are another problem of NGOs and civil society organizations in the 
social sector. In all Eastern accession countries, civil society institutions, volun-
tary groups and charity organizations primarily serve to fill the gaps left by the 
state and state authority. 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Koncz Katalin Koncz, “The Gender-specific division of Labor in Hungary 
Since the Regime Change,” in Gender and Work in Transition, ed. Regina Becker-Schmidt 
(Opladen: Leske and Budrich 2002). 
23 See Heinen Jacqueline Heinen, "East European Transition. Labor Markets and Gender in the 
Light of three Cases: Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria" in: The Transition of Gender, Welfare States 
and Democracy in Europe, Seminar 5 of the EC-Program `Gender and Citizenship´(Göttingen 
1999): 56. 
24 Fuchs, 2003.  
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Conclusion 
 
EU-enlargement is creating a larger, and powerful economic region in the global 
economy. Europeanization of social policy will be more complex, following new 
methods of coordination – such as “open method of coordination” – since all of 
them established basic rules and regulations for social security and assistance. 
They do so from an economically disadvantaged, but politically enhanced posi-
tion as members of the EU. At the same time, diversity will increase in Europe 
due to the different and differing concepts of social rights, and social systems. 
More research is needed to assess the procedural power of EU norms and regula-
tions on these countries. On a highly symbolic level, the draft European Consti-
tution supports the framing of universal social citizenship. The rights outlined in 
the new document are encompassing, and it can serve as a reference frame in the 
process of institution building.  
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Introduction 
  
After 15 years of transition reforms, the transition in the Baltic States like in 
other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) has to a large extent come 
to its completion with accession into the EU in 2004. By now it is already possi-
ble to analyze the main outcomes of transition reforms and changing role of the 
state (or the size and scope of government), even though it should be acknowl-
edged that changes in informal structures – values and patterns of social behavior 
– will take much longer than formal systemic reforms.  
The process of integration into the EU has been the major factor which has 
increasingly impacted on the transition reforms and their outcomes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The impact of the EU on reforms in CEECs has been first ac-
knowledged by the analysts of transition, mainly by focusing on the aid and trade 
policies of the Union.
2 The role of the EU as a model to be imitated, as a supplier 
of a framework for external economic policies, and, later, of templates for do-
mestic policies, has been increasingly recognized by the analysts of European 
integration and some scholars of transition reforms.
3  
However, most of the studies focusing on the impact of the EU on political 
structures, policy content and outcomes in the CEECs remain fragmented and 
issue specific focusing on the impact of the EU on concrete policy areas or insti-
tutional structures.
4 As one of the most significant contributions to the analysis of 
                                                 
1 The earlier versions of this paper were discussed at the NOPSA conference of 2002 and the 
seminar at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University in November 2002. This is a significantly 
shortened version of the paper presented at the EU enlargement conference in Miami in April 2005. 
2 See M. Lavigne, The Economics of Transition. From Socialist to Market Economy (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
3 See, for example, H. Grabbe, “How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity” Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 4, (2001):1013-
1031; some contributions to the Special Issue on the Enlarged European Union of West European 
Politics 25, no. 2 (April 2002), edited by P. Mair and J. Zielonka. 
4 Rare exceptions include H. Grabbe, “European Integration and Corporate Governance in 
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the most recent EU enlargement suggested, “there is little cross-fertilization be-
tween theoretical studies of the impact of international organizations, the Euro-
peanization literature, the more theoretical literature on the transformations in the 
CEECs and the mainly descriptive literature on the effect of the EU on the candi-
dates which is often limited to single countries and single policy areas.”
5 This 
description of the state of academic affairs in the field is still accurate a couple of 
years later. 
This paper aims at providing a broad analysis of the EU’s impact on the 
CEECs which is not policy specific by focusing on the changing role of state in 
these countries as a result of direct and indirect impact of the EU. It draws on the 
concepts developed by the studies of the two processes of transition and EU ac-
cession, in particular the character and outcomes of their interaction, which have 
for a long time been fragmented and divided into two separate fields. Some ana-
lysts go as far as to claim that, “the two not only pass each other as ships in the 
night, but rarely even sail in the same sea.”
6  
The paper also critically examines the prevailing arguments concerning the 
character of EU’s impact on CEECs and provides a different perspective on the 
issue. The first argument is that the impact of the EU on the CEECs could be best 
described as an exercise of neo-liberal restructuring.
7 In other words, the influ-
ence of the EU has contributed to the shrinking of the state in CEECs, or is 
sometimes even characterized as an “export of a market radical variant of neolib-
eralism.”
8  
The other accepted argument in the literature on EU accession is about the 
strengthening of the regulatory role of the state in CEECs.
9 This is not surprising 
                                                                                                                         
Economic and Political Environment: Trajectories of Institutional Change on the European Conti-
nent, ed. Federowicz, M, Vitols, S., (Berlin: Sigma/Wisseschaftszentrum Berlin, 2002). 
5 Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU enlargement: research fo-
cus, hypotheses, and the state of research” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4, (August 
2002): 507. 
6 A. L. Dimitrova, Enlargement Governance and Institution Building in Central and astern 
Europe: The case of the European Union’s administrative capacity requirement, Draft paper 
(2002): 4. 
7 See A. Bieler, “The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of Euro-
pean integration” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 575-597; D. Bohle, 
“The ties that bind the new Europe: neoliberal restructuring and transnational actors in the deep-
ening and widening of the European Union” Draft paper presented at Workshop 4 “Enlargement 
and European Governance”, ECPR Joint Session Workshops, Turin (22-27 March 2002). 
8 D. Bohle, “The ties that bind the new Europe: neoliberal restructuring and transnational ac-
tors in the deepening and widening of the European Union” Draft paper presented at Workshop 4 
“Enlargement and European Governance”, ECPR Joint Session Workshops, Turin (22-27 March 
2002): 35. 
9 See for example, H. Grabbe, 2002; A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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taking into account that one of the main criteria for joining the EU is the adoption 
of its acquis communautaire which governs (and extends beyond) the cross-bor-
der transactions of EU’s internal market. However, most analysts do not address 
the implications of expanding the regulatory functions of the state in CEECs, 
neither examine this trend in relation with changes in other functions of the state, 
nor place the debate in the context of more general debates on deregulation and 
re-regulation that have been taking place in the EU or OECD countries. 
In addition to filling some of the existing analytical voids, this paper argues 
that the description of EU’s impact on CEECs as a “neoliberal restructuring” in-
complete and misleading. While the focus on trajectories of expanding the regu-
latory functions of the state and importing “regulatory state” from the EU pro-
vides a more accurate description of the process, it still remains incomplete. This 
paper introduces a number of qualifications to these arguments showing that the 
influence of the EU has been causing divergent and sometimes contradictory 
outcomes.  
In terms of its impact on the role of state it has been (1) encouraging the 
shrinking of certain functions (in particular by direct and indirect influence of 
liberalizing external transactions, privatization, de-monopolization and, to some 
extent, restricting the room for stabilization policies) while (2) contributing to the 
expansion of others (in particular, regulatory function and public investments), 
(3) with the unintended consequences of relatively neglecting others (the en-
forcement of property rights, internal order and security, reforms of health, social 
security and education) mostly because of the lack of EU competence in these 
areas and therefore shortage of attention and resources. Therefore, the term 
“weaker guardianship, less direct participation in the economy, status quo in 
welfare promotion and more regulation” rather than the promotion of straight-
forward “neoliberal” policies describes better the impact of the EU. 
The paper is structured by discussing first the roles of the state in general and 
in transition countries, the sources and instruments of EU influence on the role of 
state in the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe and pre-
senting a number of tentative conclusions about EU’s impact. Most empirical 
evidence is based on the observations drawn from the Baltic states.  
The dependent variable is the role of the state while the independent variable 
is the influence of the EU mediated by domestic factors such as state-society re-
lations and institutional structures in the context of rapid change and uncertainty 
which come into play both at the stage of policy decisions and their implementa-
tion. Often the impact of the EU is difficult to differentiate from the general in-
fluence of globalization or the role of domestic factors. However, a number of 
                                                                                                                         
on the economy of a candidate country see R. Vilpišauskas, “The Regulatory Alignment in the 
Context of EU Accession and its Impact on the Functioning of Lithuanian Economy” in Lithuania: 
Country Economic Memorandum: Volume II: Technical Papers, ed. A. Revenga (Washington 
D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 205-246. 212  Vilpišauskas 
 
observations could be made with a satisfactory degree of certainty to draw a 
broad picture of the patterns of EU influence on the role of state in candidate 
CEECs and point to further venues for research. 
 
The Contested Role of the State 
 
The distinction between public and private has many aspects including free ex-
change and authority, competition and hierarchy, laissez-faire and planning, etc. 
while different typologies of roles usually imply both positive and prescriptive 
conclusions concerning functions of the state.
10 Some of them used in public fi-
nance theory refer to technical and economic properties of goods (usually dealing 
with issues of information and incentives), some are based on the argument of 
popular preferences.  
The concept of the role of the state is important in providing an instrument 
that could be used to trace the trajectories of EU influence on transition reforms 
and their outcomes and to evaluate their potential implications. The paper uses 
the metaphors of state which reflect different functions assigned to it:  
(1)  The guardian (minimal) state which represents a metaphor for the func-
tions of law and order enforcement (protection of property rights and en-
forcement of contracts); 
(2)  The stabilizer state which stands for a metaphor of monetary and fiscal 
measures aimed at reducing unemployment and inflation;  
(3)  The welfare state which represents the redistributive and paternalistic 
functions, most often based on the arguments of social justice and merit; 
(4)  The regulatory state which influences the private actors by enforcing 
compulsory rules based on the perceived need to correct “market fail-
ures” (monopoly power, information asymmetries, and negative exter-
nalities). 
These categories are not exclusive, nor they are exhaustive. They do not imply 
that equally balanced assignment of all of these functions is an objective desir-
able in itself, though it could be hypothesized that the successful enforcement of 
protection of property rights and contracts is the necessary prerequisite for the 
functioning of markets and growth of welfare. Rather, they represent a collection 
of paradigms each of which dominated or coexisted at some point of history. 
Moreover, often public and private spheres coexist in fulfilling similar functions, 
or the expansion of private sphere is paralleled by the strengthening of govern-
ment’s role through different means.  
These categories are further used to analyze the influence of the EU on tran-
sition reforms. Importantly, the constraints and opportunities set by the EU for 
                                                 
10 As the World Bank Report maintains, the unique aspects of the state are its powers to tax, to 
prohibit, to punish, and to require participation. The World Bank, World Development Report 1997, 
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the implementation of any of these functions is likely to have significant political 
and economic implications for the new members. 
 
Changing Role of the State in the Baltic Countries 
 
The understanding of the role of the state at the outset of the reforms was rather 
straightforward – transition from control and planning based economies to mar-
ket economies meant reducing radically the scope and size of government activi-
ties. While the political support for reforms has been relatively high at the end of 
1980s and the start of 1990s in the Baltic states where transition reforms have 
been identified with the reestablishment of independence, later the popular sup-
port went down. The accession into the EU has played a role of additional legiti-
mizing factor (although this role should not be overemphasized). 
The debates at the start of economic reforms have concerned mainly the 
speed and sequence of reforms.
11 Later, with the “normalization” of politics they 
moved to the familiar debates about the proper role of the state in a market econ-
omy. The influence of the EU has also been transforming from generally suppor-
tive of the reduction of the role of state to changing the functional nature and 
scope of state activities, and in some cases even reversing the trajectories of tran-
sition reforms. The latter changes differed in every of the Baltic states depending 
on the previous transition policy decisions. 
The role of state has been reduced significantly during the transition reforms, 
mostly during the period of 1990-1995. In particular, its role in price setting and 
direct ownership of factors of production has been restricted through the liberali-
zation of external transactions, reduction of price controls, reduction of subsidies, 
other obstacles to competition, privatization of enterprises and restitution (though 
not so much enforcement) of property rights.  
The stabilization function, which played particularly important role at the 
outset of reforms, was subsequently implemented by restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies. This is especially evident in the Baltic states with Estonia and 
Lithuania establishing currency boards and in the second half of 1990s (in par-
ticular after the financial crisis in Russia in August 1998) pursuing restricted 
budgetary policies. Both Estonia and Lithuania were among the first three new 
members of the EU to join the Exchange rate mechanism II in mid-2004, fol-
lowed in Spring 2005 by Latvia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See, for example, the World Development Report, From Plan to Market (Washington, D. 
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Table 1 
The Baltic States and Poland with Respect to Meeting Maastricht Criteria 
   Criteria  Lithuania  Latvia  Estonia  Poland 
Inflation, 2004 (yearly average)  2,2%*  1,1  6,2 3,0  3,6 
Public sector balance, 2004 
(% of GDP) 
<= 3%  -2,5  -0,8  1,8  -4,8 
State debt, 2004 (% of GDP)  <= 60%  19,7  14,4  4,9  43,6 
Long-term interest rates, March 
2004 - February 2005 
6,2%* 4,34  4,71  4,34  6,75 
Stability of national currency 
with respect to euro, February 
2003-January 2005 
15% 
limit 
Fixed   Fixed with 
1% margin 
for 
fluctuation 
Fixed 12,2 
Source: SEB Vilniaus bankas 
 
The progress in reforms and shifting boundaries between public and private 
spheres can be illustrated by indexes of transition and economic freedom which 
are compiled regularly by institutions such as the EBRD, the Heritage Founda-
tion and Wall Street Journal, the Freedom House and the Fraser Institute.  
These evaluations illustrate that by now a major share of GDP is produced in 
private sector. It should be noted that the current degree of liberalization in the 
Baltic states has been achieved about eight years ago. Less progress is made in 
governance reforms, reforms of infrastructure and areas such as education and 
health care. Also, it should be noted that the share of resources redistributed 
through the budget has been relatively low in the Baltic states and comparable 
only to Ireland’s.  
Figure 1. Overall Fiscal Expenditures as % of GDP 
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Lithuania
Ireland
Latvia
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Estonia
Eurozone
Denmark
Sweden
2001 2002 2003
 
Source: Eurostat, cited in the World Bank (2004) The Political Economy of Baltic States’ Accession into the EU  215 
 
Several observations can be made from these evaluations. First, the Baltic states 
progressed most in liberalization of foreign trade which exceeds comparable in-
dicators of most advanced economies. Second, the fiscal burden of government 
equals respective indicators of EU member states, often being lower if calculated 
as a share of GDP. Third, the least progress is reported in protecting property 
rights and regulatory environment.  
 
The Sources and Instruments of EU Impact  
 
The importance of the EU and its potential to influence transition reforms in the 
Baltic states originated from several factors.  
First, it was the willingness of these countries’ governments to open up to 
the EU influence which was related to both a broad desire “to return to Europe” 
and a concrete foreign policy objective to join the EU. The desire to join the EU 
resulted in the adoption of increasingly concrete policy measures shaping the role 
of the state in the candidate countries. 
Second, the potential of the EU to exert influence on candidate countries re-
sulted from the asymmetrical nature of EU and accession country relationship. 
The governments in the latter expected to reap significant benefits from the ac-
cession, while policy makers in the EU were relatively cautious about the 
enlargement due to relatively less significant potential economic impact on the 
current members as compared with the candidate countries. The chosen method 
of enlargement when the candidates have to adjust to all existing EU norms in-
creased the influence of the EU, represented by the European Commission.
12 
Third, the uncertainty about the conduct of reforms due to their complexity 
and the lack of expertise significantly strengthened the willingness of policy 
makers in the Baltic countries to recreate policy models of the Western countries 
and adopt the explicit prescriptions of external advisors. This has resulted in 
unilateral, or so called “anticipatory adaptation” of regimes governing economic 
relations of industrialized democratic countries which was at the basis of transi-
tion to market economy and democratic governance.
13  
Assistance measures and trade agreements. From the start of transition re-
forms, the most important initial policy measures of the EU towards CEECs con-
sisted of financial assistance program Phare as well as coordination of other in-
ternational assistance measures. However, more significant economic impact has 
                                                 
12 On this point see H Grabbe, “How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity” Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 4, (December 
2001): 1013-1031. 
13 K. Nicolaidis, “East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions 
Matter?” in After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-
1991, eds. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge: Harvard University 
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been made by trade liberalization measures which reduced substantially for trade 
between the EU and CEECs. 
Signing of the Free trade agreements between the EU and the Baltic states in 
1994 contributed significantly to the removal of barriers to trade between those 
countries and the EU. The increasing flows of trade with the EU currently ac-
counting for around 50-70 percent of these countries’ foreign trade turnover have 
resulted to a significant degree from trade liberalization measures. The agree-
ments have also been important in several other respects. By “locking in” the 
level of liberalization achieved they prevented from returning to more protec-
tionist policies after the “normalization” of domestic politics and resurgence of 
interest groups activities.
14  
Moreover, there is ample evidence to argue that these agreements, together 
with the incentives of perspective EU membership and co-ordinatory role of the 
EU, proved to be the major factor behind other free trade agreements concluded 
by the Baltic states.
15 The fact that around 70-80 percent of trade of the Baltic 
states is now conducted with the other EU members and countries with which EU 
has free trade agreements is a result of EU policies. 
Membership criteria, pre-accession process and adoption of acquis com-
munautaire. The influence of the EU on the transition reforms in the Baltic states 
has been strengthened after the EU recognized their candidate country status and 
included them into the pre-accession strategy consisting of Phare, Europe agree-
ments and the White paper on integration into the internal market presented by 
the Commission in 1995.  
The pre-accession strategy followed from the well known Copenhagen crite-
ria of EU membership declared in 1993 representing an innovative measure in 
comparison to the previous EU enlargements. As it has been noted, the condi-
tions set by the Copenhagen Summit go beyond those for any previous applicant 
which provides an opportunity for the EU to involved itself in domestic policy 
making of the candidate CEECs to a degree unprecedented in the current member 
states.
16 It was the adoption of policy measures aimed at meeting the economic 
criteria of “a functioning market economy” and transposition of the acquis which 
contributed most to the changing role of the state in the Baltic countries. 
                                                 
14 For the evidence of this argument in the case of CEFTA countries see B Kaminski, The EU 
Factor in Trade Policies of Central European Countries (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
November 1999). 
15 For a detailed analysis of links between EU policies towards the Baltic states and the eco-
nomic cooperation measures between those three states see R. Vilpišauskas, Regional integration in 
Europe: analyzing intra-Baltic economic co-operation, (Florence: EUI, RSC Working paper No. 
41, 2000). 
16 H Grabbe, “Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accesison Proc-
ess”, chapter to appear in The Politics of Europeanisation, eds. Featherstone, K. Radaelli, C. (Ox-
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Accession negotiations and monitoring of progress in meeting membership 
criteria. It has been noted that “the EU’s most powerful conditionality tool is ac-
cess to different stages in the accession process, particularly achieving candidate 
status and starting negotiations.”
17 The gate keeping role of the Commission has 
been especially evident since the start of accession negotiations through the link-
ages of closing negotiation chapters with concrete policy measures to be under-
taken by candidate countries (for example, in the case of Lithuania the chapter of 
Telecommunications and IT has been closed only after the independent regula-
tory agency was established, the Energy chapter was closed after the commitment 
on decommission the second reactor of Ignalina Nuclear power Plan by 2010 was 
received from the government).  
The influence of the EU has been also increasing due to a wider of use of dif-
ferent policy advice measures, extending beyond the competence of the EU in its 
older member states. The benchmarking and policy advice on the issues such as 
employment strategies, administrative capacities or pressure on the issues 
grouped under the criteria of “the functioning market economy” such as pension 
reforms and land reform allowed exerting additional influence on public policies 
and transition reforms in candidate countries.  
Moreover, there were powerful incentives for policy makers in the former 
candidate countries to attach the EU more significance than it actually had in or-
der to legitimize their own policies, or due to a poor level of information on the 
differences between EU wide and member states’ policy models. Different pre-
scriptions of the EU received divergent attention and varied in terms of the suc-
cess of actual implementation in the candidate countries. The gap between rheto-
ric and actual policy decisions is also important in understanding and explaining 
the trajectories of EU influence on changing role of the state in the candidate 
countries and new members of the EU. The following section presents a number 
of propositions concerning the influence of the EU on transition reforms in the 
Baltic states. 
 
Integration and Transition: the Multifaceted Influence of the EU 
 
First, as it could be expected the influence of the EU on shrinking the role of the 
state is most evident in liberalization of external transactions of the Baltic states. 
The main instruments in this field included the agreements on liberalization of 
trade as well as the membership criteria. However, the extent and speed of liber-
alization has been also dependent on the lobbying of domestic interest groups and 
this trend was actually reversed exactly due to the impact of EU membership, i.e. 
in the case of Estonia (to a lower degree in Latvia and Lithuania) the external 
                                                 
17 H Grabbe, “How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion 
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restrictions to trade actually increased after adopting the common external tariffs 
of the EU.  
Second, the EU contributed to the reduced direct participation of the state in 
the economy by encouraging the privatization of state owned enterprises, reduc-
tion of price regulation and reduction of subsidies. However, the influence of the 
EU should not be overestimated. The different methods of privatization chosen 
(for example, voucher privatization in Lithuania with no foreign participation and 
privatization open to outsiders in Estonia), divergent speed and shares of private 
(and foreign) capital illustrate the limits of EU influence as regards the form of 
ownership.  
Third, despite the inclusion of the establishment and protection of property 
rights into the membership criteria and Accession Partnerships, the actual im-
plementation process in the Baltic countries has been conducted with substantial 
delays.
18 For example, there has been an explicit linkage with a date of 2000 set 
by the Commission for the completion of the restitution of property rights to the 
land in Lithuania. However, this target date has not been met due to the lack of 
recourses, political changes in the government and failures of institutional coor-
dination. Therefore, it could be stated that in the cases where the EU acquis has 
been missing and the policy prescriptions have been based on the general eco-
nomic membership criteria (“the functioning market economy”), the actual influ-
ence of the EU of policy reforms and role of the state has been divergent and de-
pendent on domestic factors.  
Fourth, the EU has increasingly set restrictions on the active role of the state 
in the field of macroeconomic management. Since mid-1990s all three Baltic 
states have implemented restrictive monetary policies, and increasingly restric-
tive fiscal policies. Importantly, the EU in the form of Maastricht criteria (which 
were not directly applicable for the accession into the EU) limited only budgetary 
deficits and the state debt, but did not say anything about the overall size of gov-
ernment expenditures. Likewise, it does not provide strict constraints on taxation 
policy with the exceptions of indirect taxes and recommendation on avoiding the 
“harmful tax competition.” It should be noted, that as a result of aligning VAT 
and excise taxes, the level of indirect taxation has been increasing in the Baltic 
states. On the other hand, the level of direct taxation in the Baltic states (in par-
ticular, company taxation) has been among the lowest in the EU-25. It seems 
quite likely that the need to catch-up and the competition in the Single market 
will preserve the trend towards lower taxation.  
                                                 
18 It should be noted, that due to the existence of acquis a particular group of property rights – 
copyrights, industrial property rights – are given much more attention than the rights to the produc-
tive property. Similarly quite a lot of attention in the process of legal harmonization is given to 
other post-modern issues such as animal welfare which reflect the preferences of rich Western so-
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Fifth, the accession into the EU has been changing the expenditure patterns 
in the Baltic states. The need to prepare for the use of the EU funds and the actual 
co-financing of them changes the priorities of public investment programs. For 
example, after the accession into the EU the absorption of the structural funds 
resulted in the increasing state investments into the private productive sector. The 
absorption of the EU funds in 2005 has become the major factor accounting for 
the growth of public investments and subsidies by 17 percent in Lithuania.  
This poses several questions, namely, the contradictory emphasis on the re-
strictions of state aid stressed during the negotiations on competition policy and a 
current increase in public support to various producer groups in the newly ac-
ceded countries as a result of use of the EU funds. Moreover, the need for co-fi-
nancing in combination with the investments required to meet EU norms, tax 
competition in the Single market, setting up regulatory infrastructure and lack of 
reforms in the public sectors currently absorbing most budgetary resources (i.e. 
education, health, social security) is creating a stress on fiscal policies and com-
plicating the preservation of fiscal balance.  
Sixth, the influence of the EU on the welfare role of the state has been indi-
rect and rather contradictory. Although the Commission has stressed the impor-
tance of pension reform, the EU has little direct influence in this area. This has 
been one of the reasons for the lack of progress in reforming overall system of 
social support and such policies as health care which have been dominated by 
well established domestic interest groups. Therefore, despite a formal support for 
the reforms, the need to invest attention and financial resources into the fields 
directly linked with the acquis and focus on structural funds had an unintended 
side effect of neglecting the reforms of social policies. The influence of the EU 
on agricultural policies in the Baltics illustrates well the main contradictions be-
tween the prescriptions of the EU and its own common policy.  
Seventh, the most significant influence of the EU on the role of state has con-
sisted in widening the scope of regulatory activities in the Baltic states. The 
adoption of the acquis governing the internal market and other common policies 
(in particular, environment, labor relations, agriculture, transport and energy) 
represents a massive re-regulatory exercise in these countries. This is likely to 
have several important implications for these countries. First, the analyses of the 
effects of regulatory alignment on the economies of candidate countries shows 
that the main beneficiaries from regulatory alignment are the export oriented 
large companies which trade with the EU. The main burden of adjustment is 
likely to fall on small and medium sized enterprises operating domestically, in 
particular in most regulated fields such as agriculture. This is likely to create calls 
for the public measures to soften the adjustment pressure created by EU acces-
sion, with resulting state activism.  
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Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the EU’s impact provides enough basis to make two concluding 
observations (one positive, and one normative): (1) the process of accession into 
the EU of the candidate CEECs has resulted in what could be described as 
“weaker guardianship, less direct participation in the economy, status quo in wel-
fare promotion and more regulation;” (2) the diffusion of state activities together 
with the past legacies, interest group activities and relatively inefficient public 
administration results in a “widely present and weak” state slowing down the 
achievement of the main objectives of economic growth and welfare, despite the 
impressive catching-up taking place in the Baltic states since year 2000.  
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Introduction 
 
Following the accession of eight countries from Central and East Europe (CEE) 
into the EU in May 2004, the role played by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economic development of the CEE 
region continues to be a subject for considerable debate. 
Originally attracted by low cost locations, relatively well-educated work-
forces and the attraction of having virtually tariff-free access to the EU from the 
CEE region, MNEs poured into the region. Further attracted by privatization pro-
grams of the post-socialist governments, MNEs had the opportunity to acquire 
and restructure companies across all sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
Greenfield investment took place on a broad scale across the region as MNEs set 
up production facilities for goods to be sold regionally and shipped back to the 
EU. 
In recent years there are several important changes occurring in the region 
that may impact on inward-FDI. First, the privatization pool available to MNEs 
has dried up since most of the Accession-8
1 has sold their state-owned enter-
prises. Second, the relative cost-advantage presented by these countries has been 
eroded as salaries of workers, cost of capital and real estate have risen in line 
with increased demand. Cities such as Prague and Budapest now have cost of 
living being roughly equivalent to neighboring cities such as Vienna.
2 Third, EU 
membership implies increased regulatory controls and therefore costs to compa-
nies if they are to comply with new regulations required by EU membership. 
Fourth, to a limited degree, freedom of movement of persons within the EU will 
allow many citizens from the Accession-8 to find higher paid work in the exist-
ing member states thus reducing the pool of skilled labor available in the CEE 
region. 
                                                 
1 The Accession-8 are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
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These developments pose questions for both the FDI strategies of the MNEs 
already located in the CEE region and the related economic development policies 
of the governments of the region. The main objective therefore of this chapter is 
to consider how and in what ways, the FDI strategies of the MNEs are evolving 
and are likely to be changed by these apparent shifts in CEE competitiveness.  
The paper makes use of detailed open interviews with MNE managers and 
public policymakers in Hungary across a range of sectors in order to develop the 
specific strategic insights relating competitiveness to MNE strategy.  
The principle findings of the research are as follows. First, that Hungarian 
competitiveness is indeed shifting away from the traditional low-labor cost that 
underpinned much of the early FDI in the country. Second, important changes in 
the public policy environment in the field of taxation have had an important in-
fluence on both new FDI and reinvestment in Hungary. Third, Hungary’s rela-
tively skilled labor pool in the information technology and engineering sector is 
beginning to emerge as a nascent technology cluster based around close coopera-
tion between Hungary’s technical universities and MNEs who have already 
committed resources to the country. Fourth, the Hungarian government’s ability 
to offer FDI-friendly regulations is becoming increasingly constrained within the 
context of its EU membership. Fifth, some MNEs are beginning to focus their 
FDI strategies on a regional rather than country-based lens. Indeed as EU mem-
bership has removed barriers to movement across countries within Central 
Europe, MNEs are no longer focusing solely on national resource endowments 
but analyzing ways in which they invest across countries to achieve a more cost-
efficient configuration of their value chains. In this instance, the Visegrad coun-
tries have emerged as regional production locales. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature on FDI motivation and its associated impact is quite extensive. 
This paper does not intend to replicate the previous extensive literature reviews. 
However, it is important to emphasize some aspects of this literature especially 
regarding the East and Central Europe (ECE) region. There have been several 
themes in the ECE literature on FDI. First, the arrival of FDI has been examined 
in the context of economic transition
3. While views on the nature of the contribu-
                                                 
3 See Yusaf Akbar and J. Brad McBride, “Multinational Enterprise Strategy, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Economic Development: The Case of Hungary” Journal of World Business 39 
(2004): 89–105; John Dunning, “The Prospects for Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe” 
in Foreign Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. P. Artisien, M. Rojec and M. Svetličič, 
16–33 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993); Economic Commission for Europe, “Economic 
Growth and Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition Economies” Economic Survey of Europe 1 
(2001): 185-226; Saul Estrin, K. Hughes and S. Todd, S. Foreign Direct Investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Multinationals in Transition (London and Washington, DC: Pinter, 1997); Saul 
Estrin, Xavier Richet and Jorge Brada, (eds) Foreign Direct Investment in Central Eastern Europe: 
Case Studies of Firms in transition (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); N. H. Fabry “The Role of In-Shifting Competitiveness, Evolving Multinational Enterprise Strategies  223 
 
tion of FDI to the process of economic transition and development vary in this 
broad literature, all of the literature recognizes that FDI has played a unique and 
unprecedented role in the process of economic reform and transformation in 
ECE.  
Second, FDI and the issue of technology transfer in ECE has been the focus 
of considerable research.
4 One of the main controversies of the role of FDI on a 
domestic economy has been the role of R&D spillover and technology transfer. 
In particular the issue as to whether MNEs actually transform the technology 
base of recipient countries has been central to this controversy. Scholars have 
highlighted the link between company level value-added, economic growth and 
                                                                                                                         
ward-FDI in the Transition Countries of Europe: an Analytical Framework” Current Politics and 
Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe 16 (2001): 349–77; G. Gorzelak, The Regional 
Dimension of Transformation in Central Europe (London: Jessica  Kingsley Publishers, 1996); 
Gabor Hunya “Central Europe Catching-up Through FDI?”, in G. Hunya (ed.) Integration Through 
Foreign Direct Investment: Making Central European Industries Competitive, (Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2000), 8–27; H. P. Lankes and N. Stern “Capital Flows to Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union” EBRD Working Paper, no. 27 (London: European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1997); Klaus Meyer, “International Production Networks and 
Enterprise Transformation in Central Europe” Comparative Economic Studies 42 (2000): 135–150; 
Petr Pavlínek, “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Privatization and Restructuring of the 
Czech Motor Industry” Post-Communist Economies 14, no. 3 (2002): 360–79; A. Zemplinerová 
“Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Restructuring and Growth in Manufacturing”, Prague 
Economic Papers 7 (1998): pp. 329–45; I. Zloch-Christy ed. Privatization and Foreign Investments 
in Eastern Europe. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). 
4 See M. Bell, “Technology Transfer to Transition Countries: Are There Lessons from the Ex-
perience of the Post-war Industrializing Countries?” in The Technology of Transition: Science and 
Technology Policies for Transition Countries, ed. David Dyker, 63–94 (Budapest: Central Euro-
pean University Press, 1997); David Dyker, “The Dynamic Impact on the Central–Eastern Euro-
pean Economies of Accession to the European Union: Social Capability and Technology Absorp-
tion” Europe–Asia Studies 53 (2001): 1001–21; L. Gokhberg, “The Transformation of R&D in the 
Post-Socialist Countries: Patterns and Trends” in Innovation and Structural Change in Post-So-
cialist Countries: a Quantitative Approach, eds. D.A. Dyker and S. Radosevic, 153–72 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); Y. Kinoshita, “R&D and Technology Spillovers through FDI: 
Innovation and Absorptive Capacity,” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 
2775 (2001); M. Knell and D. Hanzl, “Technology and Industrial Restructuring in Central Europe” 
in Innovation and Structural Change in Post-Socialist Countries: a Quantitative Approach, eds. 
D.A. Dyker and S. Radosevic, 67–86. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); Slavo Ra-
dosevic and L. Auriol “Patterns of Restructuring in Research, Development and Innovation Activi-
ties in Central and Eastern European Countries: an Analysis Based on S&T Indicators” Research 
Policy 28 (1999): 351–76; Margaret Sharp, M. and Michael Barz, “Multinational Companies and 
the Transfer of New Technological Capabilities in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former So-
viet Union” in The Technology of  Transition: Science and Technology Policies for Transition 
Countries, ed. D.A. Dyker, 95–125 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999); Beata 
Smarzynska, “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms: in 
Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages” William Davidson Working Paper No. 548 
(University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2003). 224  Akbar 
 
R&D activity.
5 It is argued that while a considerable amount of R&D activity 
takes place in the home countries of MNEs, theoretically MNE activity in the 
host country leads to R&D spillover through essentially two channels. First, sup-
plier links with local companies can enable local firms to learn and adopt new 
technologies. Second, through the consumption of MNE products and services in 
the host country, consumers can drive demand for product development by local 
companies who compete with the MNEs. The empirical literature on ECE pro-
vides inconclusive evidence on the R&D spillovers and technology transfer bene-
fits of MNEs. Among other explanations, the effects are sensitive to the sector 
examined and the degree of integration between the value-chains of MNEs and 
the local economy. For example, where MNEs based in ECE seek out local sup-
pliers and integrate them into the value-chain, then the learning effects are im-
portant. Moreover if MNEs locate because they wish to access specific knowl-
edge e.g. Ericsson in Hungary, then the ability of MNEs to transform local scien-
tific knowledge into valuable applications can be significant.  
Third, the relationship between FDI and productivity (and competitiveness) 
in ECE has been examined in some detail.
6 One of the main challenges facing the 
transition economies in 1989 and in the years after was the need to replace the 
capital stock inherited from the centrally planned economies. Since domestic 
capital investment capacity was low, FDI provided an opportunity for ECE 
economies to replace the capital stock. Furthermore, one of the major weaknesses 
in the ECE economies at the start of the 1990s was the incredibly poor factor 
productivity (especially labor productivity). Arguably, FDI generated employ-
                                                 
5 See T. Bayoumi, David T. Coe and Elhanan Helpman, “R&D Spillovers and Global Growth” 
Journal of International Economics 47 (1999): 399-428; Ray Barrell, R. and Nigel Pain, “Foreign 
Direct Investment, Technological Change, and Economic Growth within Europe” Economic Jour-
nal 107 (1997): 1770-1786; M. Blomström and Fredrik Sjoholm, “Technology Transfer and Spill-
overs: Does Local Participation with Multinationals Matter?” European Economic Review 43 
(1999): 915-923; D. Coe and E. Helpman “International R&D Spillovers” European Economic 
Review 39 (1995): 859-87; Wilfred Ethier and James R. Markusen, “Multinational Firms, Technol-
ogy Diffusion and Trade” Journal of International Economics 41 (1991): 1-28; Howard Pack and 
Kamal Saggi, “Inflows of Foreign Technology and Indigenous Technological Development” Re-
view of Development Economics 1, no. 1 (1997): 81-98. 
6 S. Djankov and Bernard Hoekman, “Foreign Investment and Productivity Growth in Czech 
Enterprises” World Bank Economic Review 14, no.1 (2000): 49–64; Gabor Hunya, International 
Competitiveness Impacts of FDI in CEECs, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Stud-
ies No. 268, August. (2000); J. Konings, “The effects of foreign direct investment on domestic 
firms: Evidence from firm-level panel data in emerging economies” Economics of Transition 9, no. 
3 (2001): 619-634; J. Mišun and V. Tomšík, “Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe – Does 
it Crowd Out Domestic Investment?” Prague Economic Papers 11, no. 1 (2002): 57–66; M. 
Szanyi, “The Role of FDI in Restructuring and Modernization: an Overview of Literature”, in Inte-
gration Through Foreign Direct Investment: Making Central European Industries Competitive, ed. 
Gabor Hunya,  50–80 (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar 2000); M. Tupy, “EU 
Enlargement: Costs, Benefits, and Strategies for Central and Eastern European Countries” Policy 
Analysis 489, (2003): 2-20. Shifting Competitiveness, Evolving Multinational Enterprise Strategies  225 
 
ment would raise factor productivity because of combining new capital with the 
relatively skilled (but low-cost) labor forces in ECE. Again, the evidence in the 
ECE tends to demonstrate that this is the case. It is important to note however, 
that it was inevitable that factor productivity would rise compared to the centrally 
planned era. A broader issue examined in the literature, especially that associated 
with the competitiveness literature is about the global position of ECE countries. 
Thus the key question is whether ECE countries have been able to maintain their 
competitiveness in comparison to other emerging economies such as China and 
India. In this instance, the evidence is mixed and interestingly one of the issues 
raised in the literature is the impact of EU membership on ECE competitiveness. 
Since the regulatory burden embedded in the acquis communautaire implies 
greater regulations on industry compared to the transition period, this could re-
duce the competitiveness of the ECE economies compared to their global rivals. 
Fourth, taking a step away from mainstream economics and international 
business approaches, the economic geography literature has examined the role of 
FDI and MNE activity in the ECE region. Their principle focus has been on the 
spatial location of activity and its implications for economic growth.
7 These 
scholars largely take the view that if left to itself, the spatial allocation of FDI in 
the ECE region would exacerbate rather than reduce regional and social dispari-
ties. This is because MNEs respond to existing agglomerations or poles of eco-
nomic activity. Thus in the ECE region, most MNEs who have invested in the 
region chose the capital city and the regions close to the capital city as the place 
to invest. This exacerbates the already existing income and social disparities be-
tween the capital and the ‘countryside’ in these countries. Also, FDI flows have 
tended to cluster in areas close to the EU borders of the ECE region. The policy-
making implication of this research is that governments need to adopt pro-active 
regional development strategies to reduce disparities. This is an issue which we 
examine when we consider the Hungarian government’s response to the cluster-
ing of FDI in the Budapest region and around the Budapest-Győr-Sopron 
highway. 
                                                 
7 J. Blažek, “Regional Development and Regional Policy in Central East European Countries 
in the Perspective of the EU Eastern Enlargement” in Geography of Societal Transformation in the 
Czech Republic, ed. M. Hampl, 181-207 (Prague: Department of Social Geography and Regional 
Development, Charles University, 1999); B. Domański, “Structure, Regional Distribution and Se-
lected Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Polish Manufacturing in the 1990s” Wirtschafts-
geographische Studien (Wien) 24/25 (1999): 71–88; J. Hamar “Regional Effects of FDI-Inflows in 
Hungary” Acta Oeconomica 50 (1999): 169–90; J. Hardy, “Cathedrals in the Desert? Transnation-
als, Corporate Strategy and Locality in Wrocław”  Regional  Studies  32 (1998): 639–52; W. Z. 
Michalak, “Foreign Direct Investment and Joint Ventures in East–Central Europe: a Geographical 
Perspective” Environment and Planning A 25 (1993): 1573–91; Adrian Smith and Sonia Ferenčík-
ová, “Inward Investment, Regional Transformations and Uneven Development in Eastern and 
Central Europe: Enterprise Case-studies from Slovakia” European Urban and Regional Studies 5, 
no. 2 (1998): 155–73; S. Young, Neil Hood and E. Peters, “Multinational Enterprises and Regional 
Economic Development” Regional Studies 28 (1994): 657–77. 226  Akbar 
 
Lastly, the link between FDI and EU Enlargement in ECE has been consid-
ered.
8 The literature highlights several related aspects of the impact of EU 
enlargement. First, EU membership implies greater competition for ECE compa-
nies. While Hungarian companies have got used to foreign competition in the 
years prior to EU accession, it is nevertheless argued that existing competition 
will intensify in Hungary as well as other member states in the ECE. Previous 
enlargements to include Spain and Portugal demonstrate clearly that competition 
continued to intensify in product and service markets a long time after these 
countries had joined the EU. Second, EU membership should increase the con-
straints on the government’s incentives programs to attract FDI because of the 
need to adopt EU competition disciplines on State Aid. Third, MNEs based in the 
accession countries will continue to leverage higher product and service stan-
dards in the ECE member states as a means of winning the competition with their 
local rivals in these markets.  
 
FDI, MNE Activity and Hungary at Accession 
 
Figure 1 below shows the evolution of Hungary’s FDI stock over time. As can be 
readily noted from the diagram, Hungary has built up a considerable stock of 
FDI. Of note in this figure has been two periods of substantial growth in FDI – in 
1996-7 and 2001-2. Also, Hungary has experienced a leveling off of the FDI 
stock in 2003. The explanation for this comes from the two sources. First, some 
MNEs have withdrawn their FDI from Hungary such as IBM who moved its hard 
disk drive plant from Hungary to China and also Flextronics who moved their 
production of Microsoft Xbox game consoles.
9 Figures 2 and 3 break out this 
effect in more detail. As can be noted from figure 2, the important change has 
been the sharp fall in inward FDI in 2003 compared to 2002 combined with a 
small amount of FDI outflow. Figure 3 further amplifies this effect. The clear 
downward trend of net FDI at the end of 2002 and into the first quarter of 2003 
illustrates the leveling off of the FDI stock in Figure 1. In a later section, the 
causes for this FDI decline will be examined. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Yusaf Akbar, The Multinational Enterprise and EU Enlargement: The Effects of Regulatory 
Convergence (London: Palgrave, 2003); Dyker (2001) op. cit.; B. Domański, “Poland: Labour and 
the Relocation of Manufacturing from the EU” in CEE Countries in EU Companies’ Strategies of 
Industrial Restructuring and Relocation, ed. G. Gradev, 21–49 (Brussels: European Trade Union 
Institute, 2001); Tupy (2003) op. cit. 
9 “Hungary Falls Behind in FDI Race” Budapest Business Journal 10, no. 28, June 17-23, 
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Figure 1  
Development of FDI Stock in Hungary 1990-2003 
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Source: ITD Hungary and Magyar Nemzeti Bank (National Bank of Hungary). Figures 
include reinvested earnings from 1995 
 
Figure 2 
FDI Flows in Hungary 1996-2002 
 
Source: Data adapted from Hungarian Central Statistical Office sources 228  Akbar 
 
 
Figure 3 
Net FDI July 2002-February 2003 
 
Source: Adapted from Hungarian Central Statistical Office sources 
 
Micro-level and Strategic Data    
 
In our paper we aimed to interview managers across a range of sectors from 
manufacturing, assembly, services and network industries. The methodological 
aim was to offer a broad enough set of industries on a qualitative basis to build 
up as detailed an empirical setting as possible. While econometric, quantitative 
methods provide very important and information-rich material, they arguably 
suffer from the necessary level of abstraction required (and the key assumptions 
of normality of data distribution) to generate systematic data outcomes. Thus we 
argue that while our qualitative approach can in no way fully replace the meth-
odological and empirical strengths of quantitative, regression-based analyses, we 
believe that qualitative interview methods can provide scholars with important 
insights into the thinking and actions of managers which quantitative methods 
cannot always provide us. 
In our interviews we were aiming to generate qualitative responses to the 
following topics and issues. Aside from the basic data on company size, sector of 
activity etc., we were interested in the following. First, what were the original 
motivations for FDI in Hungary of the companies we examined? The aim of this 
was to ascertain whether the FDI fitted into resource-seeking, market-serving, 
strategic-asset seeking or other FDI motivations. It also served as the starting Shifting Competitiveness, Evolving Multinational Enterprise Strategies  229 
 
point for us to understand the changes in strategy (if any) that the MNE was pur-
suing. Second, we sought information on the level of MNE corporate commit-
ment to the FDI project. The aim of this question was to gauge the MNEs time-
horizon for its investment. For example, we were interested in examining 
whether the MNE concerned had developed a strategy beyond resource-seeking 
if that was its initial aim of FDI. Third, we asked questions related to local and 
other MNE competitors and whether they played a role in the FDI strategy of the 
foreign company. These questions were aimed at examining the extent to which 
competitive forces impacted the strategic aspects of the FDI project. Thus for 
example, did the MNE concerned alter its level of FDI commitment in the light 
of new entry of other MNEs or increased competition of local companies?  
Fourth, how did the MNEs consider Hungary’s competitiveness was affect-
ing their strategies in Hungary? Of particular interest for our research was to ex-
amine whether rising labor costs in Hungary were affecting the FDI strategies of 
MNEs based there. Moreover, did the MNE consider other alternatives for in-
vestment in neighboring countries or elsewhere in the world? Fifth, we sought 
managers’ views on how EU membership had impacted their FDI strategy and 
whether EU membership in Hungary had changed the way they considered their 
investment and production strategies in Hungary. In the following section, we 
highlight some of the key issues raised through the interviews. 
 
(i) Public Policy 
 
The most common observation about Hungarian competitiveness among the 
managers and policymakers we interviewed was the role played by public policy 
in several areas in the 1990s. First, in many respects, by taking the lead in priva-
tization in the region through sales to strategic foreign investors, Hungarian poli-
cymakers offered one of the most attractive environments into which MNEs 
could enter the Central European economy. While the reasons for sales to for-
eigners were motivated to a significant degree by macroeconomic pressures, the 
outcome was to allow Hungary to emerge as the leading FDI recipient country 
for several years after 1989.
10 Once the privatization pool had dried up, Hungar-
ian inward-FDI slowed substantially.
11 New areas for privatization and acquisi-
tion appear to be in the agricultural sector despite the politically sensitive nature 
of arable land ownership in Hungary.
12  
Second, Hungary’s tax regime for many years had offered foreign investors 
an attractive fiscal environment.
13 All of the companies we interviewed who had 
                                                 
10 Interview with Csaba Kilian, Investment Director, ITD Hungary, Budapest, June 2004 
11 Op. cit. 3 
12 Interview with Dr. Ivan Gara, Managing Director, Raifeissen Bank Hungary, July 2004 
13 Interview with Robert Gray, Managing Director, Caterpillar Hungary Ltd, July 2004 230  Akbar 
 
entered Hungary on the basis of the tax holiday had fully utilized the opportunity 
to reinvest significant amounts of profits back into the Hungarian subsidiary. 
Third, Hungarian efforts to join the EU and especially successive government 
efforts to implement the acquis communautaire prior to accession had played an 
important role in allowing companies to operate in an EU-compliant regulatory 
environment whilst still benefiting from the relatively low-cost factor environ-
ment. An excellent illustration of this point is the financial services sector where 
the Hungarian government had already de-regulated the sector several years prior 
to EU accession. In this sense, this makes the Hungarian financial services sector 
one of the most competitive in the region.
14 
Another issue for Hungarian public policy raised in the interviews was how 
neighboring countries such as Slovakia and Czech Republic
15 were adapting their 
public policy to become more competitive than Hungary. In many senses, Hun-
gary was an ‘exemplar’ for public policy towards FDI. Nevertheless senior Hun-
garian public policymakers recognize that they have lost ground to neighboring 
countries in this regard.
16 
On the other hand, senior managers at one of the world’s leading internet 
telephone companies headquartered in Budapest expressed concern at the con-
tinuing micro-level bureaucracy that companies face in Hungary. The length of 
time it takes to incorporate a company in Hungary for example takes considera-
bly longer than in Western Europe and North America. Additionally, filing pa-
pers for residency permits continue to cause problems with hiring non-Hungari-
ans to work in Budapest.
17 
 
(ii) Factor Cost Competitiveness 
 
Throughout our interviews, managers emphasized the continuing factor cost 
competitiveness that the Hungarian economy has compared to rivals in Western 
Europe and within Central Europe. 
Obviously, wage costs in Hungary remain low compared to the EU average. 
More importantly, it is the relatively high level of skills in the workforce com-
bined with low wages that remain one of the key sources of competitiveness for 
the Hungarian economy. Close linkages between the Technical University of Bu-
                                                 
14 Op. Cit. 7 
15 The Czech Republic copied Hungary’s tax incentives in 1999. Slovakia introduced a ‘flat 
tax’ for companies. 
16 A point made by Csaba Kilian. He expressed the view that the Hungarian government has 
become aware of this loss of public policy competitiveness and that they will need to reconsider 
current approaches. 
17 Interview with Paul Cheng, Founder and CEO, Ayslum Telecom, Budapest July 2004. Shifting Competitiveness, Evolving Multinational Enterprise Strategies  231 
 
dapest and foreign companies have also facilitated the continued success of Hun-
gary’s skilled pool of scientists and engineers.
18 
However, neighbors and distant competitors in Asia threaten Hungarian cost 
competitiveness, especially at the level of low- to mid-skilled workers.
19 This is 
driven, to a significant degree by labor shortages that have developed as a result 
of the low labor mobility among low-skilled workers in the Eastern counties of 
Hungary.
20 While the labor market remains tight in the Budapest region and 
Western counties, the lack of labor mobility means that companies have to pro-
vide buses to ferry workers between their home and the factories.
21 Given the 
relatively ease with which some productive capital could be moved to neighbor-
ing Slovakia, this is a cause of concern for the Hungarian economy. Evidence of 
this shift towards its neighbors comes from Peugeot’s and Hyundai’s decision to 
locate in Slovakia and Toyota’s to locate in the Czech Republic.  
Despite this concern, MNEs continue to expand their activities in Hungary. 
General Electric has expanded its activities beyond light bulbs
22 to include manu-
facture of turbines, medical services equipment; the development of an R&D 
center for medical equipment research as well as an IT services center.
23 Siemens 
employs over four thousand workers in a cable factory. It was only until the end 
of July 2004 that Siemens decided not move to its mobile phone manufacturing 
to Hungary after German labor unions agreed to substantially increase working 
hours and lower non-wage based salary benefits for its workers. 
One of the unexpected findings from the interviews was that Hungary’s fi-
nancial services sector is one of the most competitive in the region. As an illus-
tration of this, OTP, Hungary’s largest retail bank has begun to make acquisitions 
elsewhere in the region, normally a sign of the financial health of a company. A 
senior banker working for a major Austrian bank suggested that Hungary’s capi-
tal market structure makes it more attractive than some other West European 
markets.
24 This is largely due to the process of consolidation in the sector that 
                                                 
18 Ericsson’s decision to locate its R&D headquarters in Budapest is a reflection of this. 
19 Robert Gray, Managing Director, Caterpillar Hungary emphasized the continuing struggle 
he faces to keep costs down given the relatively unskilled work involved in his company. 
20 A point emphasized by Csaba Kilian. In an earlier article, Akbar and McBride (2004) high-
lighted the weaknesses in the Hungarian mortgage market as a barrier to labor mobility. Recent 
evidence suggests that the development of mortgage market has reduced some of these problems 
for skilled workers who represent a relatively low credit risk for the retail banks.  
21 For Caterpillar, this means a 90-minute commute everyday for some its workers, observed 
Robert Gray, Managing Director of Caterpillar Hungary. 
22 GE acquired Hungarian light bulb manufacturer Tungsram in the early 1990s. 
23 Interview with Csaba Kilian, ITD Hungary. 
24 Comment made by Dr. Ivan Gara, Managing Director, Raiffeisen Bank. 232  Akbar 
 
occurred in the mid-90s when foreign banks acquired local banks and some for-
eign banks that entered the market initially left.
25 
Returning to the issue of skilled labor cost competitiveness; Hungary is de-
veloping as a base for MNE ‘backroom’ activities and outsourced service provi-
sion. The explanation for this can be found in the relatively technology capable; 
financially-skilled and linguistically trained work force combined with a surplus 
of low-cost, high quality office space.
26 There are several examples of significant 
MNE investment in these kinds of activities. Exxon-Mobil has moved its internal 
financial audit and accounting services to Budapest. Diageo, Avis and ING in-
surance have also moved their administrative offices to the capital of Hungary. In 
the case of Diageo, they made approximately 70 percent cost savings compared 
to their previous locations across Europe.
27 EDS/Accenture bases its outsourcing 
services in Hungary intensifying a trend towards outsourcing location in Hun-
gary. Further examples of outsourcing, in manufacturing, are Flextronics and 
Jabill’s outsourcing activities in Hungary.
28 
 
(iii) EU Accession 
 
Previous experience with EU accession in other countries such as Spain, Portugal 
and Greece suggested that EU accession while offering significant market access 
opportunities for companies based in these countries, the increased regulatory 
burden of EU membership on companies led to increased costs and lower com-
petitiveness. Given the history of political and economic transition in ECE, the 
anticipated burden of EU accession on the ability to effectively implement the 
acquis could have reduced the competitiveness of Hungary. Unanimously, man-
agers interviewed for our research underplayed the role and importance of EU 
accession on Hungary’s competitiveness. This could be explained in two ways. 
First, Hungary’s rapid adoption of many of the central obligations of EU mem-
bership such as trade and capital market liberalization early in the process of 
joining the EU meant that MNEs were already operating in an EU-compliant en-
vironment. Second, as Akbar demonstrates,
29 MNEs themselves leverage EU 
regulatory standards as competitive strategy against local companies. They com-
bine low local factor cost with higher quality process and product standards that 
they bring from their operations in the EU. In some sectors such as financial ser-
                                                 
25 Examples of these were Rabobank, ING Bank and most famously ABN-Amro who sold 
their operations to K&H bank. 
26 Op. cit. 17. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Interview with Don Polson, Managing Director, Jabill Central Europe, July 2004. 
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vices, this effect was especially important and the significant foreign ownership 
of the banking intensified this.  
 
(iv) Emerging cross-border regional competitiveness 
 
One of the most important effects of EU market integration has been the devel-
opment of inter-regional economic development. This has been a response both 
to the removal of national barriers to trade but also because of explicit EU-re-
gional cooperation. While it has been pointed out in our research that the re-
emergence of economic cooperation in Central Europe can be seen as a Hapsbur-
gian retour-en-arrière, this integration is a natural consequence of market inte-
gration. The automotive sector is an excellent illustration of this. In a small zone 
of around 400 km, several of the world’s leading automotive assemblers have 
located production. The removal or easing of border controls has allowed MNEs 
to tap a regional labor market with companies bringing workers across national 
borders to work at their assembly facilities.
30 This development mimics similar 
phenomena in the Liège-Maastricht-Aachen triangle. People commonly live and 
work in different countries responding to labor market opportunities - despite the 
linguistic differences where three different languages co-exist.  
 
Future FDI Trends and Hungarian Competitiveness 
 
Given the analysis of events above, the next phase of our research was to enquire 
as to the future trends for competitiveness and FDI in Hungary. Several themes 
emerged when we examined future trends. First, it is obvious that the dramatic 
rate of FDI growth in the decade after 1992 was likely to slow down since the 
privatization pool has essentially dried up. Second, future new inward FDI would 
be focused largely on sectors hitherto underdeveloped such as tourism and agri-
culture.
31 Third, as manufacturing costs rise, due in large part to rising wage costs 
and limits to productivity growth, inward-FDI was likely to shift towards the ser-
vice sector in Hungary. In particular Hungary’s geographic location as a gateway 
between West and East Europe places it in an extremely favorable position to act 
as a logistics hub for transportation companies.
32 Fourth, the concept of national 
competitiveness in the context of EU accession for small economies in Central 
Europe may become redundant. This is largely because of interdependence of 
their economies and their associated economic fortunes. Thus rather than pursue 
beggar-thy-neighbor public policies to attract inward-FDI from each other, com-
petitiveness could rely upon interdependencies between the countries and coordi-
                                                 
30 This is the so-called “frontalier” phenomenon. 
31 Emphasized by both Csaba Kilian and Dr. Ivan Gara. 
32 Interview with Keve Papp, Director of Operations, Asylum Telecom. 234  Akbar 
 
nated policies in the areas of labor and capital market regulation; regional devel-
opment and fiscal regimes. 
 
Research Implications 
 
Our research has examined the complex and multifaceted relationship between 
inward-FDI, MNE strategies and competitiveness in Hungary. Once the leading 
country in the ECE region in terms of per capita inward-FDI, Hungary carved out 
a position as one Europe’s most attractive locations for MNEs. This can be ac-
counted for due to a combination of its tax efficient fiscal regime, a technically 
well-educated workforce, favorable geographic location at the crossroads be-
tween western and eastern regions of Europe and its first-mover decision on pri-
vatization. As Hungary joins the EU, it has become clear that a number of these 
advantages has been eroded by neighboring countries or disappeared completely. 
What are the implications for research into FDI and competitiveness of our 
study? First, Hungary’s experience illustrates how countries move through suc-
cessive phases of economic development. Hungary has begun to leverage the 
skilled aspects of its labor force and on its spatial and geographical advantages 
rather than on marginal labor costs as it may have done initially. Second, our 
study highlights the primordial role played by public policy in shaping competi-
tiveness. Poor public policy can lead to loss of competitiveness and FDI flows. 
Continuing micro-level bureaucracy can cause problems for subsidiaries. While 
this effect may be difficult to measure on a macro-level, on a tactical and opera-
tional level, it can lead to significant inefficiencies.
33 On the other hand, 
appropriate public policy can lead to significant gains for a country’s attempts to 
attract inward-FDI. Anecdotal evidence from this research shows there is a rela-
tionship between lower corporate tax rates and inward-FDI. MNEs respond to 
lower taxes with higher FDI. The FDI experience of Ireland, Hungary and now 
Slovakia continues to support this claim. 
Third, EU accession effects are likely to be less pronounced than initially 
thought – due to the fact that EU accession policy and strategic changes have al-
ready been undertaken by the Hungarian government and business. Rather, we 
should expect that the positive market increasing effects of accession are likely to 
enhance economic performance in Hungary. Hungary’s emergence as a logistics 
hub may illustrate this entrepôt effect. 
Fourth, the role of inter-country, regional competitiveness should become an 
increasing focus of research in this area. This implies a convergence of the eco-
nomic geography and international business literatures. Small open economies, 
faced with the complex strategic reach of MNEs, become involved in process of 
                                                 
33 From the perspective of quantitative research, it is a challenge to quantify this effect. A 
corollary of this kind of bureaucracy effect on operations is ‘X-inefficiency’ observed in large or-
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cross-border economic linkages, wittingly or unwittingly. Understanding how 
MNE strategies foster these linkages would be a substantial contribution to our 
understanding of competitiveness-public policy-strategy research.  
 
Environmental Consequences of Enlargement 
 
 
 
 
Monika Böhm 
 
 
 
Environmental Situation in the New Member States before the Enlargement 
 
On May 1, 2004 ten new Member States accessed the EU. The enlargement was 
seen by the Institutions of the Union and the Member States as a great political 
chance for the protection of the environment and the strengthening of the leading 
position of the EU in environmental protection.
1 One year after the enlargement it 
is time for a resume. What are the consequences of the enlargement? 
Before the enlargement the environmental situation in the new Member 
States was ambivalent. On one hand there were immense pollution problems es-
pecially in the sectors of air and water. The industrial sites were of poor stan-
dards, the per capita emissions of dangerous substances enormously high. On the 
other hand there were extensive green areas with a rich flora and fauna, with spe-
cies endangered in the old Member States. 
How could one preserve this natural heritage against future destruction and 
clean up the existing damages? The EU tried by exporting a legal framework and 
giving financial support for its implementation. How did it work and did it work 
out? 
First, let me give you a short overview on transposition, transition and im-
plementation of EU environmental law. After that I will focus on the costs of 
compliance and the financial support given by the EU. I will end with drawing 
some perspectives for the future development of environmental protection in the 
EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For the expectations of the EU towards the Accession Countries, see: Marta Toporek, 
“Expectations of the EU towards the Accession Countries” in Das EG-Umweltrecht und seine Um-
setzung in Deutschland und Polen, ed. Hans-Joachim Koch and Jan Schürmann, 9 - 18 (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2005). 238  Böhm 
 
Transposition, Transition and Implementation of EU Environmental Law  
in the New Member States 
 
a. Transposition 
 
As a general principle all new Member States had to comply immediately with 
EU environmental laws, with the so called aquis communautaire, which com-
prises nearly 200 regulations and directives. The most important laws have been 
transposed into national law by now. But there are a lot of exceptions. 
 
b. Transition 
 
To allow sufficient time for compliance with some of the EU environmental re-
quirements, transitional periods have been granted to all new Member States, in 
particular for investment-heavy sectors as water, waste and industrial pollution.
2  
The transition measures include detailed intermediate targets that are legally 
binding. Implementation is to be controlled. Where ever possible specific lists of 
measures that have to be installed were recorded. 
The EU accession policy is based on the general principle that transitional 
measures should be limited in time and scope. In consequence no transition was 
granted on: 
-  framework legislation (air, waste, water, impact assessment, access to in-
formation), 
-  nature protection (habitat, birds), 
-  product-related legislation, that is essential for the internal market,  
-  new installations. 
Each transitional measure was to be justified by a detailed and legally bind-
ing implementation plan to make sure that compliance will be reached. Within 
this plan the new Member States were allowed to define intermediate targets. 
Transitional arrangements for the New Member States were laid down as an-
nex to the accession treaty. The most exceptions were made for Poland:
3 
-  sulphur contend of liquid fuels until 2006, 
-  emissions of volatile organic compounds from storage of petrol until 
2005, 
-  recovery and recycling of packaging waste until 2007, 
-  waste landfills until 2012 (for the old Member States it is 2009), 
-  shipment of waste until 2007, 
                                                 
2 For the consequences of transitional periods, see: Ingmar v. Homeyer and Axel Klaphake, 
Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union (Berlin, 2001). 
3 Janina Ciechanowicz-McLean, “The Development of Waste Management Law in Poland” in 
Das EG-Umweltrecht und seine Umsetzung in Deutschland und Polen, ed. Hans-Joachim Koch and 
Jan Schürmann, 73 - 79 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). Enviromanetal Consequences of Enlargement  239 
 
-  treatment of urban waste water until 2015, 
-  discharges of dangerous substances into surface water until 2007, 
-  integrated pollution prevention and control until 2010 (for the old Mem-
ber States it is 2007), 
-  air pollution from large combustion plants until 2017, 
-  health protection of individuals against ionising radiation in relation to 
medical exposure until 2006. 
Similar lists exist for each of the accessing Member States.
4 Further exten-
sions to older EU laws are not possible. But the EU may consider transitional 
measures and technical adaptations to newly adopted environmental legislation.  
 
c) Implementation 
 
It is relatively easy to transpose the EU aquis into national law – you only need a 
few parliament sittings -, but the important part is to implement it. With the help 
of the EU the new Member States could take important steps towards implemen-
tation. The administrative capacity is increasing, especially in inspection offices. 
Environmental agencies and monitoring systems for air and water quality have 
been established. But still there are a lot of things left to be done. And the Com-
mission will not start too soon to take action against any new Member State who 
has not fully implemented the European laws. The costs of compliance will surly 
be taken into consideration. 
 
Costs of Compliance and Financial Support 
 
a. Costs of Compliance 
 
The costs of compliance are estimated to amount to 50-80 billion €.
5 The Urban 
Waste Water Treatment Directive alone will require investments of around 15 
billion €. To achieve full compliance the new Member States will have to spend 
up to 3 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on environmental protection 
for the next years. Up to now their expenditures for environmental measures 
were well below that figure. It is expected that a good part of the money will be 
spent for environmental technology exports from the old Member States. The 
consequences of the accession to the economy of these States are quite positive.  
                                                 
4 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Übergangs-
fristen im Bereich Umwelt, http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ eu_ueber 
gangsfristen.pdf; Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, EU-Erweiterung 2004 – Übergangsfristen, 
http://www.arge28.com/docs/pdf/oesterreich_uebergangsfristen_2004.pdf. 
5 EU-Commission,  “Questions and Answers on enlargement and environment“, MEMO/ 
04/86, (pdf) 2 (Brussels, 19 April 2004), <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=MEMO/04/86&format=HTML&aged= 1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. 240  Böhm 
 
 
b. Financial Support 
 
To help with the costs of compliance of the new Member States the EU devel-
oped several programmes for the improvement of environmental institutions and 
infrastructure mostly in the water and waste sectors before the accession.
6 The 
main pre-accession instrument for supporting environmental infrastructure pro-
jects was called ISPA and has had a budget of 1 billion € a year. 
With the help of the PHARE programme with a budget over 1.5 billion € a 
year the EU provided technical assistance to strengthen institutions and prepare 
implementation of EU laws. A good part of it was spent on the environment, for 
example: out of 108 million € spent for Hungary, nearly 13 million were distrib-
uted to  
-  Investigation of Municipal Sanitary Landfills (4 million €), 
-  Development of the Hungarian Air Quality Monitoring System (3 mil-
lion €), 
-  Implementation of the Water Framework Directive (nearly 6 million €). 
Between 1998 and 2003 so called twinning projects provided help with in-
stitution building and how to enforce laws, establish inspections and environ-
mental investment planning. 
In the twinning program representatives from an administration or an institu-
tion of the old Member States were sent to new Member States often for at least a 
year, helping implementing regulations and directives, developing monitoring 
systems and financial strategies. In addition partnerships between similar institu-
tions were established and special training courses were organised. An example: 
Germany is involved in 58 twinning projects.
7 
About 500 million € per year were spent to agriculture and rural development 
from the SAPARD programme. To improve implementation and enforcement of 
environmental legislation further programmes have been developed. 
Between accession and 2006 the new Member States will receive about 8 
billion €, more than 10  percent of the expected costs of compliance. Further 
money will come from structural fund programmes.  
 
Perspectives 
 
a. Environmental Situation in an enlarged Europe 
                                                 
6 EU-Commission, Questions and Answers on enlargement and environment, MEMO/04/86, 
(pdf) 3 – 5 and annex 2 (Brussels, 19 April 2004) <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases Ac-
tion.do?reference=MEMO/04/86&format=HTML&aged=1&language= EN&guiLanguage=en>. 
7 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Deutsche 
Beteiligung am Twinning-Programm der EU (June 2005) <http://www.bmu.de/europa_und_um 
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In the new Member States significant progress in environmental protection has 
been made. The main air pollutants and organic matter pollution of water have 
declined up to 80 percent, toxic metals by 50 percent. Dramatic improvements 
have been made in the most polluted industrial regions of Poland and the Czech 
Republic. But there is although significant work left to be done in waste man-
agement and industrial pollution. Economic growth in the new Member States 
will generate increases in transport and electricity demand and in consequence in 
emissions. Energy efficiency has to be improved. Not all of the EU laws which 
have been transposed in national law are implemented. Not that they are in the 
old Member States.
8  
 
b. How will the Enlargement influence future EU environmental policy-making? 
 
Regarding this background it is not astonishing that the EU will in the future 
more focus on implementation of existing legislation than on the development of 
new policies. More attention shall be given to the integration of environmental 
considerations in other policies.
9 Economic, social and environmental impact 
assessments are planned. The approach to environmental protection shall become 
more holistic.  
As in a lot of the old Member States the permanent regulative actions taken 
by the EU are criticized more and more, this new approach might help to 
strengthen the principle of subsidiarity. But one cannot conceal fears for the 
weakening of environmental protection in the future. Andreas Troge, the head of 
the german environmental protection agency (UBA) sees the danger of poor 
standards and measures for the environment as the new Member states will now 
fully participate in the EU decision making. In his opinion the development of 
local public transportation should be given more attention not investments in 
road works for individual traffic.
10  
Though very important steps to protect the environment were initiated, in re-
gard of their history of pollution and their economic situation even with further 
financial help the ability of the new Member States to solve environmental prob-
lems is limited. If one puts into consideration that more than 46 percent of the 
European people and more than 62 percent in the new Member States fear to be 
without a job and only 3 percent think that environmental protection is the most 
                                                 
8 Implementation of Community environmental law in 2003 (26 October 2004) 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/ en/lvb/l28148.htm. 
9 European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2004, (pdf) 
51 – 52 (Brussels, 2005), <http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/en/welcome.htm>. 
10 Jörg Michel, “Der Umweltschutz verliert an Bedeutung”, Berliner Zeitung, January 7th, 
2005. 242  Böhm 
 
pressing problem
11 one can imagine that it is not easy to give the protection of the 
environment the attention that is needed.  
 
                                                 
11 EU-Commission - Directorate General Press and Communication, Eurobarometer 62, Q33 
(December 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62first_en.pdf.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Road Ahead: Turkey  
 
Turkey’s Membership Application: Implications for the EU 
 
 
 
 
Neill Nugent
  
 
Introduction 
 
Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987: that is, three years before Cyprus 
and Malta and between seven and nine years before applications were lodged by 
ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Yet, when all but two of 
the post-Turkey applicants became EU members in May 2004, membership 
negotiations not only had yet to be opened with Turkey but they had not even 
been definitely promised.  
For a number of reasons, the Turkish application has not been viewed by the 
EU in the same way as other applications. Rather, it has been seen as being espe-
cially and distinctively problematical. This has been partly because it has been 
thought Turkish membership will create a number of particular difficulties for the 
EU and partly because Turkey as a country has been regarded - much more so 
than have other EU applicant states - as being very “different” from the EU 
“mainstream.” 
This paper seeks to explain how the EU’s position on the Turkish application 
has reached its current position and to provide an overview of the challenges the 
prospect of Turkish membership poses for the EU.
1 A main conclusion of the 
paper is that although the Turkish application clearly does provide major chal-
lenges for the EU, both in terms of managing the accession process and then 
membership itself, there is every reason to suppose that it can be handled suc-
cessfully. A key reason for taking this view is the changes that can be expected to 
occur in both Turkey and the EU in the years before accession takes place.  
  
The Background to the Present Situation 
 
Although the EU has been reluctant to open accession negotiations with Turkey, 
it has long been anxious to maintain good relations with it. Accordingly, the strat-
egy of dealing with Turkey’s desire for membership has, until recently, been to 
establish as close relations with it as possible - short of opening accession 
negotiations. 
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A base to conduct relations in this way existed from 1963, when an associa-
tion agreement was contracted between the EEC and Turkey. The agreement in-
cluded a range of trade, aid, and cultural and political cooperation provisions. It 
also contained a membership perspective, but one that was phrased only in very 
general terms and with no schedule attached. 
In 1995, as part of the strategy of moving closer to Turkey but not offering 
membership, an agreement was reached on concluding the customs union that 
had been foreseen originally in 1963 but which had not been given effect - 
largely because of concerns in EC/EU states over Turkey’s democratic creden-
tials and poor record on human rights. In all probability the customs union would 
not have satisfied Turkey in the long term, but it the event it did not do so in the 
short term either. A key reason for this was the faster track onto which post-Tur-
key membership applicants were placed in 1997. On the basis of recommenda-
tions made by the Commission in its Agenda 2000 document,
2 the European 
Council at its December 1997 meeting in Luxembourg decided that membership 
applications would open with Cyprus and five CEECs in March 1998 and would 
do so with the other CEEC applicants as soon as they were ready (except for 
Malta, which had suspended its application). There were thus to be two enlarge-
ment ‘waves’. But Turkey was deemed ineligible to be considered even for the 
second wave. An attempt was made to head-off possible Turkish adverse reaction 
by emphasizing that it was eligible in principle for accession, that it would be 
judged on the basis of the same criteria as other applicants, and that the EU 
would draw up a strategy to prepare it for accession.
3 But as compared with what 
the other applicant states were being offered, this was very much second best. 
Indeed, the second best status was emphasized in a manner Turkey found to 
be positively insulting by the decision of the Luxembourg summit to create a new 
European gathering – to be called The European Conference – which would 
bring together on an annual basis the leaders of EU states and all applicant states 
including Turkey. The Conference was clearly designed with little purpose other 
than to offer comfort to Turkey. The line towards Turkey was revised at the De-
cember 1999 Helsinki summit, with Turkey being accorded the status of a 
“candidate country.”
4 This accord was partly symbolic, but it had substance too in 
that the language concerning Turkey’s prospect of eventual membership was 
made generally more encouraging and specific provision was made for a pre-
accession strategy embracing an accession partnership.
5 Subsequently, an acces-
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Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 5.97, Luxembourg: EUR-OP. 
3 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12-13 December, 1997.  
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sion partnership designed to assist Turkey to make the changes required so as to 
enable it to meet EU’s accession eligibility conditions - the Copenhagen criteria - 
was adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2001. The priorities identified 
in the partnership were then reflected in Turkey’s own National Programme for 
the Adoption of the Acquis which was adopted, also in March 2001, by the Turk-
ish government. At the December 2001 Laeken summit, The European Council 
declared that “Turkey’s progress towards complying with the political criteria for 
accession….has brought forward the prospect of the opening of negotiations with 
Turkey.”
6 
As the crucial Copenhagen summit approached, pressure on the EU to give 
Turkey a date for the opening of accession negotiations intensified. One source of 
pressure stemmed from the Turkish case being strengthened by recent reforms to 
the Turkish constitution and changes to domestic political and administrative 
practices designed to improve Turkey’s credibility under the democratic and hu-
man rights dimensions of the Copenhagen criteria. Another source was the over-
whelming victory of an Islamic party - the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
– in the Turkish general election of November 2002. The new government 
quickly made clear that it was as resolved as its seemingly more pro-western 
predecessors had been to seek a date for the early opening of accession negotia-
tions. 
At Copenhagen, the leaders of the EU-15 did not quite meet Turkey’s de-
mands to set a definite date for the opening of accession negotiations, but came 
much closer to doing so than had been anticipated. The leaders declared that ‘If 
the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and 
recommendation for the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen 
political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations without 
delay’.
7  
Although it was not laid down as an explicit condition by the EU leaders at 
their December 2002 meeting, it was made clear to Turkey - through both infor-
mal channels and public statements by some EU leaders - that even if the 
Copenhagen political criteria were met, the December 2004 European Council 
would be extremely unlikely to approve the opening of accession negotiations 
unless in the intervening period Turkey was seen to have done what it could to 
help resolve the Cyprus Problem.
8 These ‘warnings’ were issued partly on the 
basis of political choice by those who sympathized with the Greek Cypriot posi-
tion and/or did not wish to see the EU import a potential security problem, and 
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partly on the basis of a recognition of political realities: it was anticipated that the 
government of the Republic of Cyprus would be represented in the European 
Council by December 2004, and it would be likely to exercise a veto on the open-
ing of accession negotiations if Turkey continued to support and underpin the 
division of the country. In November 2003, the Commission, in its first post-Co-
penhagen annual report on the progress towards accession being made by Turkey, 
went further than it ever had before in linking the Cyprus Problem to Turkey’s 
prospect of EU membership. The Commission stated that Turkey ‘should provide 
determined support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cy-
prus problem’.
9 The overall strategy paper on enlargement that was issued along-
side the report on Turkey and reports on the other acceding and applicant coun-
tries was even clearer in emphasizing the importance of Turkey becoming proac-
tively involved in promoting a settlement: “The Commission considers that there 
are favorable conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus’ accession to the EU on 1 May 
2004. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s 
EU aspirations.”
10 
In the period between the December 2002 and December 2004 summits, sev-
eral leading EU practitioners - including national leaders - made clear their 
reservations about proceeding with the Turkish application. For example, the 
President of the Constitutional Convention - the body which largely drafted the 
EU’s Constitutional Treaty - Valery Giscard D’Estaing, warned that Turkish 
accession would be ‘the end of Europe’
11 and ‘would change the nature of the 
European project.” In even more dramatic language, the (outgoing) European 
Commissioner for the Internal Market, the Dutchman Frits Bolkestein, warned of 
the ‘Islamisation of Europe’ and pronounced that should Turkey become an EU 
member ‘The relief of Vienna in 1683 [by a Catholic army from an Ottoman 
siege] will have been in vain’
12 President Chirac of France attempted to canvass 
support for a privileged partnership between the EU and Turkey rather than Turk-
ish EU membership - an idea that was also floated by Giscard D’Estaing and by 
the outgoing Austrian Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler.
13  
The Turkish government was not deflected in its resolution by such open ex-
pressions of concern and doubt from within the EU. The idea of a privileged part-
nership was, for example, flatly rejected by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
Turkey’s position remained to press ahead with making sure that in December 
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10 European Commission, Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the Euro-
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11 The Times, September 23, 2004, 34. 
12 The Guardian, September 22, 2004, 17. 
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2004 the EU leaders would have little option but to give a date for the opening of 
accession negotiations. 
As part of this pressing ahead, Turkey duly ‘fell into line’ on Cyprus, by – 
successfully - urging Turkish Cypriots to support the April 2004 referendum in 
northern Cyprus on the Annan Plan for re-unification of the island. Re-unification 
did not subsequently occur, but this was because in a parallel referendum Greek 
Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan. In consequence, the main responsibility 
for the continuing division of Cyprus was now seen to rest in the eyes of all EU-
25 states - apart, of course, from the Republic of Cyprus itself - with the Greek 
Cypriots rather than with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. 
As for the formal membership criteria, including the troublesome political 
criteria, in October 2004 the Commission duly presented documentation for the 
leaders to be able to take a decision at their December summit. The documenta-
tion was issued in three forms: the required recommendation;
14 the annual Pro-
gress Report
15 and a paper reviewing issues arising from Turkey’s membership 
perspective.
16 The recommendation said that Turkey virtually did now meet the 
Copenhagen criteria, so the opening of accession negotiations was recommended. 
However, no opening date was specified, and - conscious of concerns in several 
member states about the implications for the EU of Turkish membership - the 
Commission advised that the negotiations be conducted on the basis of stricter 
terms that had been imposed on any previous candidate state (see below for more 
on this). The December 2004 summit subsequently accepted the Commission’s 
recommendation and resolved that negotiations be opened in October 2005, sub-
ject to certain conditions. The conditions were agreed only after difficult and 
tense exchanges - mostly outside formal summit sessions, in which Turkey was 
able to insert itself as a negotiator - over how tough the requirements on Turkey 
should be and also over Cyprus’s insistence that Turkey must give the Republic 
of Cyprus full recognition. The two main sets of conditions concerned measures 
to ensure progress would continue with the Turkish reform programme and a re-
quirement that Turkey give implicit recognition to the Republic of Cyprus by 
signing an updated customs union agreement with all twenty five EU states.
17 
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The Perceived Negative Implications of Turkish Membership  
 
Why has the Turkish application been, and why is it still, so problematical from 
the EU’s viewpoint? Why have EU member states so lacked enthusiasm for Turk-
ish membership? The answer to these questions is complex, with a number of 
specific reasons combining in the explanation. The reasons can be split between 
those that can be described as being formal and those that are more informal.  
 
Formal reasons 
 
Because of the sensitivities involved, the EU has preferred to explain its position 
in terms of formal reasons. These were initially given in the Commission’s 1989 
Opinion on the application and since 1998 have reiterated in the Commission’s 
annual reports on progress towards accession. 
Prior to the June 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council, all that 
existed in terms of formal conditions was the very open Article 237 of the EEC 
Treaty which stated “Any European State may apply to become a member of the 
Community…..The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the Treaty 
necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member 
States and the applicant State.” Turkey’s position as a European state was never 
openly questioned, but the EC still made it clear that no agreement on member-
ship would be possible in the foreseeable future. This was stated as being primar-
ily because an unwritten condition of EC accession was that only democratic 
states based on the rule of law could join, and in Turkey democracy was fragile 
and there was a lack of respect for human rights.  
At the 1993 Copenhagen summit, EU national leaders agreed – with 
membership applications from CEECs pending – to formally lay down more spe-
cific conditions that countries aspiring to membership would have to meet. The 
Copenhagen conditions – or criteria as they came to be known – were designed 
partly to ensure there would not be too much of a gap between the political and 
economic systems of existing and new member states. They were designed also 
so that existing member states could satisfy themselves that new members would 
respect and be able to adopt Union laws and policies – the so-called acquis. The 
key paragraph setting out the Copenhagen criteria stated: 
  
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Un-
ion. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.
18 
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From June 1993, the formal reasons given to Turkey for not activating its 
membership application with the opening of accession negotiations amounted to 
saying that it did meet the Copenhagen criteria. In very recent times, as the EU 
has gradually moved towards the opening of accession negotiations, the Commis-
sion’s, and more broadly the EU’s, expressed reservations about Turkey and the 
Copenhagen criteria have gradually been toned down. The general line has be-
come that Turkey has made great strides towards meeting the political and eco-
nomic aspects of the criteria, but there remain important areas where further pro-
gress is necessary. Regarding the political criteria, Turkey’s record on human 
rights has been criticized, especially in relation to the treatment of Turkish Kurds, 
and concerns have been expressed about aspects of the functioning of Turkish 
democracy, including the political role of the military. Regarding the economic 
criteria, Turkey’s economy has been recognized as being based primarily on mar-
ket principles, but there have been concerns that in important respects it is an 
economy that remains fragile. It was, after all, only in 2001 that a major eco-
nomic crisis saw plunging economic growth in Turkey, rampant inflation, and the 
need of a $16 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The EU had 
advised Turkey that further liberalization and modernization are required before 
its economy can meet the rules of, and be able to compete in, the internal market.  
 
Informal reasons 
 
But behind the formal reasons for the skepticism, reservations, and - in the case 
of some member states - strong opposition to Turkish membership, have lurked a 
number of other reasons. These have been less formal, and certainly less openly 
expressed, but they have been strongly felt in some quarters. Occasionally there 
have been attempts to link some of these reasons to the Copenhagen conditions 
that applicants must meet. Occasionally too the reasons have been linked to the 
fourth, often forgotten, Copenhagen criteria for EU expansion: “The Union’s ca-
pacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the 
Union and the candidate countries.”
19 More often than not, however, the reasons 
have been considered and discussed only in private, and given only rare public 
outings. What then are these informal, or unofficial, reasons for the EU having 
been, and still being, so hesitant and doubtful about admitting Turkey? They usu-
ally stem from one, or more commonly several, of the following key features of 
Turkey:   
 
Size. Turkey currently has a population of 70 million, which is projected 
to increase to 100 million by about 2020. By the time of its admission it may 
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have surpassed its current position of being second only to Germany of the 
EU-25 in population size and be the largest EU member state.  
 
Level of economic development. Turkey is a significantly poorer country 
than any of the ten states which joined the EU in May 2004 and is also 
poorer than Bulgaria and Romania which are scheduled to join in 2007. De-
spite its current population accounting for 15 per cent of the EU-25 popula-
tion, its GDP is equivalent to just 2 percent of the EU-25 GDP. Its GDP per 
capita is 28.5 percent of the EU-25 GDP.
20  
 
Geographical location. Most of Turkey is located geographically in Asia 
and has long borders with states that are, or potentially are, unstable and/or 
hostile to the EU. These states are located in the southern Caucacus (Arme-
nia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Syria).  
 
Islamism. Turkey is overwhelmingly an Islamic country, albeit one with a 
secular state structure. Turkish membership would increase the EU’s Islamic 
population from its current 3 percent to around 20 percent.  
 
The cumulative effect of these features has been such as to produce a widely 
shared concern that has been, and still is, widespread amongst existing EU states, 
especially EU-15 states, that Turkey poses not just a challenge but a threat to the 
EU as it now is. As Table 1 shows, most EU-25 states are no better than neutral, 
and several are negative, towards Turkish membership. 
The nature of the threat that Turkey is widely held to pose is seen as taking 
different forms. For example, Turkish accession clearly will impact on EU 
institutions and decision making processes. The Commission will perhaps not be 
overly affected, but existing member states’ presence in the Council and the EP 
most certainly will be, with larger and medium-sized states in particular losing 
presence and voting strengths.  
Another dimension to the perceived threat is that the combined effect of Tur-
key’s size, economic underdevelopment and economic structure are likely to re-
sult in it being a major beneficiary of EU funding Programmes on accession, thus 
creating budgetary problems. Naturally, so far in advance of Turkey’s possible 
entry, estimates of the budgetary implications are necessarily extremely hazy. 
Much depends on the extent to which existing EU “spending policies” remain in 
their present form, the levels of economic growth in Turkey, and the time periods 
over which Turkey becomes a beneficiary of the spending policies – there is a ten 
year phase-in period in the case of the EU-10 states (the states which became 
members in May 2004) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Certainly, 
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however, if major changes from the present state of affairs do not occur and if 
extended phase-in periods are not agreed, then the budgetary implications are 
very considerable, with Turkey set to become a major recipient of EU funding. 
To take the two major areas of EU funding, the CAP and cohesion policy: 
agriculture currently accounts for just over one third of Turkey’s labor force, 
while agricultural output generates 12.2 percent of GDP (the corresponding fig-
ures for the EU-25 are 5 percent and 2.2 percent); the whole of Turkey would 
currently qualify for Objective 1 Structural Fund support (that is, throughout the 
country the GDP per capita is below 75 percent of the EU average). As an indica-
tion of the scale of the budgetary issues that have to be addressed in respect of 
Turkey, the Commission has estimated that, on the basis of the existing acquis 
and assuming there is a ten year phasing-in of direct payments, Turkish member-
ship could cost about €30 billion per annum at 2004 prices. This is equivalent to 
about one quarter of the current budget! 
Of course, the nature and extent of the concerns of individual EU-25 govern-
ments on the particular implications of Turkish membership varies according to 
national circumstances and political choices. For the German government, for 
example, key considerations include: persisting high levels of domestic 
unemployment; fears that Germany will be the main intended country of domi-
cile of Turks wishing to take advantage of free movement of labor (a fear based 
largely on the fact that around 2 million of the 3. 8 million Turkish migrants who 
are thought to be currently resident in the EU are in Germany); apprehensions 
that Turkish membership will impose further pressures on the EU’s budget (Ger-
many remains by far the largest net contributor to the EU budget); and a concern 
that allowing Turkey to join will further undermine Europe’s predominantly 
Christian inheritance and identity (a concern that is expressed even more strongly 
by the opposition CDU/CSU, which is openly against Turkish membership.) 
Concerns of governments are reflected in public concerns. Across the EU as 
whole, public opinion polls show an average of about 35 percent of people being 
in favor of Turkish membership, about 25 percent being against, and about 40 
percent being unsure. In a few states there are actually large majorities against: 
by as much as 2: 1 in Austria, France and Germany. It is no coincidence that in 
two of these states - France and Austria – the governments have sought to reas-
sure their populations, and perhaps also make it more difficult for Turkey to join, 
by promising national referendums on Turkish accession if membership negotia-
tions are completed. (An additional consideration in the French case has been a 
hope that the promise of a referendum on Turkish membership will help avoid 
the issue featuring significantly in the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty.)  
At political elite levels, the main concerns and opposition stem primarily 
from centre right parties (especially those in the Christian Democratic tradition), 
strongly pro-integration parties, and far right parties. The concerns of each of 
these groups are clear enough. For the Christian Democrats, it is as described 
above with the CDU/CSU: weakening Europe’s Christian inheritance and iden-254  Nugent 
 
tity. For pro-integrationists (who overlap with the Christian Democrats), it is the 
perceived potential harmful implications for such things as the smooth function-
ing of EU decision-making processes, the further development of the EU policy 
agenda, and the nature of European consciousness and identity. And for the far 
right, it is a melange of matters related mainly to resistance to the integration 
process as a whole, sovereignty concerns, and ethnicity considerations.  
  It was significant that when the EP held a vote in December 2004 on 
whether or not to open accession negotiations with Turkey, the vote was held by 
secret ballot at the insistence of the centre right European People’s Party (the 
largest party in the Parliament). In the vote, 407 voted for, 262 against, and there 
were 29 abstentions. There was little doubt from where most of the opposition 
votes against came.  
 
The Perceived Positive Implications of Turkish Membership 
 
The potential benefits for Turkey of EU membership are clear. They include bet-
ter access to the EU market, improved prospects for inward investment, more 
financial aid, and participation in an extremely and increasingly important global 
political and economic power. 
But the potential benefits for the EU are less clear, or at least are less recog-
nized amidst the negativity of most of the discussions on the implications for the 
EU of Turkish membership. However, potential benefits do exist. They accrue 
primarily from:  
 
The size of the Turkish market. Turkey’s 70 million – and rapidly grow-
ing – population means that it is a large market. Currently, it is the EU’s sixth 
largest trading partner. The EU-Turkey customs union means that there al-
ready exists reasonably open trade between the two, but barriers and obsta-
cles that remain should gradually be removed as membership approaches. 
Amongst these barriers are a largely closed financial services sector and a 
distinctive framework of corporate law and structures. 
 
The nature of Turkey’s labor market. Turkey has a much younger work-
force than the EU-25 and a much faster growing workforce given its high 
birth rates. According to Commission projections, the EU-25’s total popula-
tion will increase by just 2 percent (458 million to 449 million) between 2005 
and 2025, with its working age population falling by 21 million. From 2005 
to 2030, the number of people over 65 will rise by 52.3 percent while the 15-
64 age group will decrease by 6.8 percent, resulting in the ratio of dependent 
young and old people to people of working age increasing from 49 percent in Turkey’s Membership Application: Implications for the EU  255 
 
2005 to 66 percent in 2030.
21 Movement of labor from Turkey to other EU 
states could thus be vital both to provide working personnel and to help 
maintain welfare systems which could be under severe pressures.  
 
Turkey’s Islamism. Whilst this is viewed by many in negative terms - of-
ten because it is seen as heralding the end of any prospect of the EU being 
based on a  shared sense of identity - it can be viewed in a positive light too. 
The UK government, for example, has based much of its public justification 
for supporting Turkey on the grounds of a real opportunity existing of 
embracing an Islamic country that is looking westwards. Might not, many 
proponents of Turkish membership ask, a moderate Islamic country inside 
the EU serve to demonstrate that Islam, democracy, and western capitalism 
can mix, to encourage moderate Islamism, and to help extend the EU’s ‘soft’ 
influence in other Islamic countries with which it wishes to have better rela-
tions?  
 
Turkey’s strategic political and security position. Turkey occupies a key 
geo-political position. It is physically located close to, and has considerable 
influence in, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
several states of the former Soviet Union. A stable Turkey within the EU 
could have a stabilizing influence within this conflict-prone neighborhood. 
 
At the same time as being located next to politically unstable areas, Tur-
key is a member of virtually all of the major western and European organiza-
tions, with the exception of the EU: the Council of Europe, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and – most importantly of all 
- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As such Turkey already is, 
and as an EU member would have even greater potential to be, an important 
bridge between the West and countries currently on the margins of Western 
influence.   
 
Why is the EU Proceeding towards (Probable) Turkish Membership? 
 
Given the problems and difficulties the Turkish application is widely seen as 
creating for the EU, why are EU decision-makers proceeding with it? There are, 
broadly speaking, three types of explanation for the decision to open accession 
negotiations. All are significant for our purposes here because all suggest that the 
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decision is being taken not on wholly cost-benefit grounds. The three explana-
tions - which are best viewed as complementing, rather than as competing 
against, one another – see the decision as being a consequence of three different 
sorts of factors. 
 
Political Pressures 
 
EU decision-makers have long been pressurized from various quarters to accept 
the Turkish application. The most obvious of these quarters has been Turkey it-
self, which has just refused to give up on its ambitions for membership. As long 
as the Turkish reaction to rebuffs was confined to disappointment, EU govern-
ments did not become overly concerned. This situation changed, however, after 
the EU decided in 1997 to offer a foreseeable membership perspective to all 
applicants except Turkey. It changed because Turkish leaders reacted to the deci-
sion with anger and with statements and comments to the effect that Turkey 
might have to start looking more seriously to its east and south for allies. This 
resulted in many EU leaders coming to view the 1997 decision as having been 
over-dismissive, and indeed as being potentially dangerous if Turkey started to 
edge away from the EU.  
This possibility of Turkey edging away also played a part in stiffening the 
pressures being exerted on EU decision-makers from other political actors. Tur-
key has never benefited from having a strong “sponsor” of its case amongst exist-
ing EU members, in the way in which during the lead-up to the May 2004 
enlargement some “problem countries” did so benefit: Germany’s strong support 
for Poland, for example, or Greece’s support for Cyprus. But Turkey has, 
nonetheless, had “friends” in EU circles, which have played an important role in 
supporting its case. Within the EU itself, the most important of these friends have 
been the UK on the one hand and – in recent times - Greece on the other. UK 
support has been important because of the UK’s position as one of the EU’s large 
states, whilst Greek support has had considerable symbolic significance because 
of the traditional enmity between Greece and Turkey. Outside the EU, the US – 
which for geo-strategic reasons has long been close to Turkey in western power 
circles – has acted virtually as a sponsor of the Turkish case. Indeed, on the eve 
of the crucial December 2002 Copenhagen summit, President Bush even tele-
phoned the summit’s chair, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to 
stress the strategic importance of Turkey,
22 and after an EU-US Summit in June 
2004 he told a press conference “As Turkey meets the EU standards of member-
ship, the European Union should begin talks that will lead to full membership for 
the Republic of Turkey.”
23 
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Table 1 
Attitudes of EU-25 governments towards Turkish membership in the period 
leading up to the December 2004 European Council meting 
Positive Neutral  Unenthusiastic  Negative 
 
Greece 
Italy 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
 
Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Estonia 
Finland, Germany 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
 
France 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
 
Austria 
Cyprus 
 
Rational Calculations 
 
Most, but certainly not all, EU decision-makers would appear to believe privately 
that in terms of the factors that have to be considered when evaluating the likely 
consequences for the EU of Turkish membership, the overall balance sheet is in 
the red rather than the black. That there are potential benefits as well as potential 
costs of Turkish membership is widely recognized, but the latter are seen gener-
ally as being more significant than the former. Surely, then, the rational course of 
action for the EU would have been to attempt to continue with the policy of stay-
ing close to Turkey and cooperating with it on many fronts, but to refuse to open 
accession negotiations? 
The fact that this is not the course of action chosen testifies to the limited use 
of rational decision making models when trying to explain the EU’s position on 
Turkey. Such models rely on the decision maker being able to identify goals, 
recognize the alternative possible ways of achieving the goals, and then weighing 
the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives in a neutral manner. But in 
the EU there are numerous actors involved in decision making processes, and on 
Turkey they have different aims. This means there is no commonly agreed goal 
on the EU’s future relations with Turkey, other than for them to be peaceful and 
for trade between the two to grow. In turn, this means the decision making proc-
ess on Turkey’s wish for membership cannot be a consequence of EU decision 
makers collectively choosing the best course of action to achieve an agreed goal 
on the basis of a careful weighing of the options available.  
This is not, of course, to suggest that the preferences of individual EU actors 
cannot be partly explained in rational decision making terms. Take the case, for 
example, of the UK, which has long been a firm supporter of the Turkish applica-
tion. This support has been given not because of a judgment that Turkish 258  Nugent 
 
membership will create few difficulties but rather, in part at least, precisely be-
cause it is thought that it will do so. In particular, the very fact that Turkey is so 
different is seen as assisting the UK in its goal of ensuring that the EU remains 
relatively loose in organizational terms and does not drift further in a federal 
direction. On this basis, the UK’s position is fully understandable in rational deci-
sion making terms.  
The UK case shows how the presence of rationality as an explanatory con-
cept in helping to explain the decision to move towards the opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey is best seen by disaggregating the different rationalities 
of the various actors. When this is done, one can readily recognize why govern-
ments that are strong supporters of a more integrated Europe have considerable 
reservations about admitting Turkey, and why governments that wish to see the 
integration process slowed and believe Turkish admission will contribute to this 
by making the EU more difficult to manage view Turkish admission more favora-
bly. One can readily recognize too why some governments with reservations are 
prepared to be flexible because they believe the situations of both Turkey and the 
EU will be sufficiently transformed by the time admittance eventually occurs. 
 
Values and unfolding rhetorical entrapment 
 
There is an extensive body of literature testifying to how the decision to enlarge 
the EU to Central and Eastern European countries is best viewed not in pressure 
politics or rational terms but rather in sociological/constructivist terms.
24 Such an 
approach can also be extended to the Turkish application.
25 
The essence of this view as applied to the CEECs is that whilst it was always 
recognized by the EU-15 that the admission of CEECs to the EU would indeed 
bring some benefits to the latter, the overall cost-benefit balance sheet was by no 
means clearly in the black, and for some individual EU states was likely to be in 
the red. Moreover, beyond measurable likely consequences of enlargement – 
found in economic indicators – there were a number of immeasurable possible 
consequences suggesting real dangers for the EU: for example, severe disruption 
of institutional functioning and security problems arising from freer movement of 
peoples. A decision on the CEEC applications based on wholly rational grounds 
would, therefore, constructivist have argued, have resulted in rejections. 
How, therefore, do constructivists explain the enlargement to the CEECs? 
Specific positions vary, but in broad terms the main thrust of the explanation is 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetori-
cal Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union” International Organization, 55, 
no. 1 (2001): 47-80; and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Community and Enlargement: An Event 
History Analysis” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2002): 598-626. 
25 Parts of this section draw on Neill Nugent ed. European Union Enlargement (Basingstoke: 
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found in social identities, norms and values. For Schimmelfennig, a key part of 
the explanation for why the admittance of CEECs was granted is found in 
“rhetorical action,” which describes how actors come “to focus on their collective 
identity and honor their obligations as community members.”
26 In the EU con-
text, the collective identity and the obligations are seen by Schimmelfennig as 
involving a commitment to the integration of all liberal European states. As soon 
as some EU-15 states (for quite rational reasons) began to press for enlargement 
to CEECs, other – less enthusiastic – states became swept up in a rhetorical com-
mitment, which led to a “rhetorical entrapment” involving a process of virtual 
drift toward a policy commitment they did not at heart support. “By argumenta-
tively ‘entrapping’ the opponents of a firm commitment to Eastern enlargement, 
they [the supporters of enlargement] brought about a collective outcome that 
would not have been expected given the constellation of powers and interests.”
27 
Sjursen is similarly persuaded of the importance of values in explaining the 
enlargement to CEECs, but for her the key values were not so much ones of lib-
eral-democratic political rectitude but more ones of “kinship-based duty.”
28 On 
this basis, the 2004 enlargement is to be understood, in part at least, in terms of 
the existence of a community-based identity “that drives enlargement towards 
Eastern Europe and motivates the EU to accept its costs. It shows that the deci-
sion on enlargement is the result of an understanding of who the Europeans are 
and what it means to be European.”
29 This is not to suggest that the notion of 
what is European is forever fixed and cannot shift. But it is to affirm, as Sjursen 
puts it, “that in order to trigger a decision to enlarge, something more than in-
strumental calculations and something less than a selfless concern for human 
rights has been at play.”
30 
Clearly, similar constructivist explanations can be applied to the Turkish ap-
plication. They can help explain why in the second half of the 1990s and the 
early 2000s the EU moved from its preferred policy of being close to Turkey but 
stopping short of holding out the possibility of membership to giving Turkey a 
foreseeable membership perspective. The gradually evolving ‘upgrading” of lan-
guage - evidenced in the extracts from European Council Conclusions that were 
given earlier in the paper - produced a situation that made it progressively diffi-
cult for doubters and opponents to backtrack. But the upgrading was gradual and 
drawn out, which helps to throw light on why the EU has been and is much more 
hesitant towards Turkey than towards the CEECs. For the fact is that notions of 
                                                 
26 Schimmelfennig, 2001, 63. 
27 Schimmelfennig, 2001, 77. 
28 H. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s 
Enlargement Policy” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 508. 
29 Sjursen, 508. 
30 Sjursen, 509. 260  Nugent 
 
collective identity and kinship-based duty are by no means as strong in respect of 
Turkey than they were in respect of CEECs. But some such notions – emanating 
in part from shared membership of European and Western organizations and in 
part too from empathy with Turkey’s liberalizing and democratizing reform pro-
grams - would appear to exist to at least some extent amongst many European 
governing elites.  
 
The Implications of Turkish Membership, Viewed in a Historical Perspective 
 
That the prospect of Turkish membership should be seen in both positive and 
negative lights is not surprising. After all, leaving specifics of the Turkish case 
aside for the moment, this is how all previous enlargement rounds have been seen 
by existing members, apart from the EFTA round, which was generally viewed as 
having few drawbacks. But the negatives in the Turkish case are seen by many 
practitioners and observers as being particularly acute and as making the Turkish 
application particularly problematical. Two points are worth making about this 
from a historical perspective.  
First, the 1973, the Mediterranean, and the 10 + 2 enlargement rounds were 
all seen at the time as being highly problematical: in the 1973 round, particularly 
problems included British budgetary contributions and Commonwealth prefer-
ences; in the Mediterranean round, Structural Fund financing and the Common 
Fisheries Policy loomed large; and in the 10 + 2 round, problems included the 
unprecedented number of applicants and the fact that virtually all of them had 
weak economies and underdeveloped political and administrative systems. But 
notwithstanding these many and varied difficulties, the EU rose to the challenges 
and found solutions. There is no reason to suppose it cannot do so again in re-
spect of most of the particular problems posed by Turkey. After all, are not resil-
ience and adaptability amongst the EU’s most prominent characteristics? 
Second, it is inevitable that the more the EU expands beyond its former 
Western European base the more enlargements will become increasingly 
problematical. The “naturals” for EU membership, the countries that could be 
absorbed with relative ease, are now virtually all members. (The exceptions are 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.) The further east and south the enlargement 
path is taken, the more the EU will encounter problems of under-developed 
economies, fragile democracies, weak administrative and legal systems, and 
variations on Europeanness. But unless the EU’s ultimate boundaries are to be 
defined in some definitive manner, these are problems that will have to be tackled 
for some considerable time to come. There is no sign as yet that applications will 
dry up. Far from it indeed: two of the states of the former Yugoslavia have al-
ready applied (Croatia and Macedonia) and other applications from the Balkans 
can be expected in due course; and it is most unlikely that the European 
Neighborhood Policy will succeed in its aim of deterring applications from the 
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Implications of Turkish Membership, Viewed in a Future Perspective 
 
Overall, the balance sheet of the positives and negatives of future Turkish 
membership of the EU is seen by most policy practitioners as currently being in 
deficit. However, there are reasons for thinking that by the time Turkey becomes 
a member – and 2015 is generally recognized as being the earliest possible year 
by which this will be possible – the situation will have changed considerably. 
There are two main reasons for this: internal changes in Turkey and the EU, and 
the conduct of the accession negotiations.  
 
Internal Changes in Turkey and the EU  
  
Many of the projections on the implications of Turkey becoming an EU member 
are arguably too rooted in Turkey and the EU as they are now rather than as they 
are likely to be when membership is attained. If, however, projections are made 
on the basis of what both ‘sides’ may look like by the time of the accession, then 
some of the difficulties are likely to, if not to have completely withered, at least 
to be less problematical and challenging. 
This point may be illustrated by taking two key features of the integration 
process – Europeanization and increased flexibility - and demonstrating how one 
is already bringing about a significantly different Turkey and the other a signifi-
cantly different EU. 
Europeanization. This word is used in various ways, but is generally under-
stood as the process by which the influence of the EU is increasingly penetrating 
into domestic affairs. More particularly, Europeanization normally refers specifi-
cally to the ways in which the political, administrative and legal systems of the 
EU’s member states and the behavior and actions of the policy practitioners of 
the states are shaped and conditioned by the EU. Europeanization does indicate a 
growing intertwining between the EU and its member states and a significant de-
gree of convergence in some areas of activity.
31  
A key feature of Europeanization is that although it most obviously and most 
extensively applies to the EU’s member states, it is not restricted to them. So, for 
example, the countries of Western Europe that are not members of the EU have 
had little choice but to incorporate significant parts of the internal market acquis 
into their national law. More forcefully, states that aspire to EU membership are 
required to Europeanize in many ways. Even before accession processes formally 
                                                 
31 On Europeanization, see, for example, J. P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization” 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, no. 5 (2002): 921-52; J. P. Olsen, “Europeanization” in 
European Union Politics, ed. M. Cini, 333-48 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and C. M. 
Radaelli,  Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change, online paper 
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begin applicants must meet the Copenhagen criteria and generally be able to 
demonstrate that they can be team players on key EU concerns. Once accession 
processes are launched, they are focused in large part around applicants being 
informed of what they must do to meet the EU’s conditions of membership, and 
then working with the EU - and in particular the Commission - to satisfy the re-
quirements.  
In Turkey, Europeanization is already well under way, largely in response to 
the EU’s stipulations concerning the political dimensions of the Copenhagen 
conditions. This is seen most obviously in the many constitutional and legislative 
changes that have been made since 2001 to align Turkish law with EU values, 
norms and practices. These changes, many of which are part of new Penal and 
Civil Codes, include reforms to the judicial system, stronger protection and rights 
for minorities, a greater emphasis on the importance of individual liberties, and 
the abolition of the death penalty. As the accession process moves from its cur-
rent initial stage into the more advanced stages of screening and then ‘negotia-
tions’, then so will Europeanization increasingly be “imposed” on Turkey as the 
terms of the negotiating chapters have to be met, as the 80,000 or so pages of EU 
law have to be incorporated into Turkish law, and as Turkey increasingly partici-
pates in EU programs. 
Increased Flexibility. As the EU has enlarged over the years, its membership 
has inevitably become more heterogeneous. It has done so both in terms of the 
objective situations of the member states and their political preferences and 
choices on matters ranging from the general nature of the integration process to 
detailed policy issues. 
This growing heterogeneity has raised the possibility of the EU becoming in-
creasingly immobilized in terms of its ability to continue to move the integration 
process forward. To ensure such immobilization has not occurred, two broad 
strategies have been pursued. On the one hand, the revisions of the treaties that 
have been undertaken every five years or so since the mid-1980s have made it 
progressively more difficult for a minority of states to veto actions that have 
majority support. In other words, there has been a progressive reduction in the 
number of the types of decisions that require the unanimous approval of the 
Council and an associated progressive increase in the number that can be ap-
proved by qualified majority vote. On the other hand, there has been a develop-
ing willingness to not insist that all member states must swim absolutely abreast 
on all policy matters. That is to say, a more flexible approach has been taken to 
policy participation. 
This flexibility has taken a number of forms, two of which are especially im-
portant. First, there is the open method of co-ordination (OMC), which involves 
the member states agreeing on general policy goals and instruments but leaving 
most of the decisions on detailed policy implementation to national determina-
tion. Crucially, OMC is not based on legal application but rather on mechanisms 
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sion, and encouragement of best practice. Policy areas in which the OMC is cur-
rently being utilized include employment policy, several Lisbon Process policies, 
and – especially for non eurozone states – aspects of EMU. Clearly the more the 
OMC is developed and used, the more will Turkey be able to ‘slide’ into policy 
areas that might cause difficulties for both it and the EU if a tight and legalistic 
approach is taken. 
Second, there is differentiated, or enhanced, cooperation. This is where pol-
icy initiatives and actions proceed without all EU member states being fully in-
volved, or indeed being involved at all. The most notable examples to date of 
differentiated integration are Schengen, EMU, and the fledgling European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP). It seems likely that this list will expand in the 
future. There are two firm reasons for this, and one possible reason: 
a) Differentiation is most likely in policy areas that display certain 
characteristics, and these characteristics have been, and continue to be, increas-
ingly present as the EU’s policy portfolio grows. The policy areas include: those 
that are not directly related to the internal market; those that are strategically im-
portant for some states; those that are of concern only to some states; and those 
where member states favor different regulatory styles.
32 
b) The Amsterdam Treaty made specific provision for enhanced cooperation 
and the Nice Treaty has made it easier to operationalize. Whereas under the Am-
sterdam provisions “at least a majority” of member states must be involved for 
enhanced cooperation to be able to proceed, under the Nice provisions only a 
“minimum of eight” must be so. 
c) If the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified by any member state or states it 
is likely that more pro-integrationist states will proceed with policy developments 
in specific areas and leave the non ratifiers outside. The notion advanced in some 
Eurosceptic quarters that non ratifications will mean the end of the Treaty is 
probably illusory. Of course, much will depend on which member states do not 
ratify – non ratification by France, for example, will be more damaging for the 
Treaty than non ratification by the Czech Republic. Certainly in the case of the 
state that is seen as being the most likely to not ratify, the UK, it is highly prob-
able that non ratification will encourage some member states – probably led by 
France and Germany – to press ahead by themselves with ever closer union in 
some areas.
33  
The more differentiation does develop in the years prior to Turkey’s acces-
sion, then clearly the greater is the potential for Turkey to become an EU member 
without necessarily involving itself, or at least involving itself fully, in ‘unsuit-
able’ or ‘difficult’ policy areas.  
                                                 
32 K Junge, Does Differentiation Work? An Analysis of Different Methods of European Integra-
tion (Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham, 2002). 
33 On the possible consequences of a UK ‘No’, see C. Grant, What Happens if Britain Votes No? 
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The Conduct of the Accession Process 
 
As was noted above, the requirements of the accession process are such as to 
make extensive Europeanization unavoidable. But in addition to the facilitating 
impact of Europeanization in easing the impact on the EU of Turkish member-
ship, there are also other aspects of the accession process that should make the 
admission of Turkey less problematical than it might appear at present. 
The most obvious aspect is that the accession process clearly will be ex-
tremely protracted. There will, therefore, be considerable time for both Turkey 
and the EU to make what are deemed to be the necessary possible  adjustments. 
Indeed, the process will be by far the longest accession process in the history of 
enlargement. In terms of the period between the submission of a membership 
application and accession, Turkey is already well “in the lead” even though mem-
bership negotiations have yet to be opened. (The next longest periods are the thir-
teen years and ten months for Cyprus and Malta, followed by the ten years and 
one month for Hungary and Poland.) The existing longest periods between the 
formal opening of accession negotiations and accession are the seven years and 
three months for Portugal, six years and eleven months for Spain, and the six 
years and two months for the ‘first wave’ CEECs and Cyprus. Assuming the 
negotiating stage opens with Turkey in October 2005, it is unlikely that the nego-
tiations will be completed before 2013. Indeed, this minimum time period is 
virtually built into the process, with the Commission making it clear that it will 
not be possible for the negotiations to be completed until the EU has agreed on 
its financial perspective for the period from 2014.
34 And then there is the gap be-
tween the closing of the negotiations and final ratification, which could be exten-
sive and by no means assured of success given the controversial nature of the 
matter. (The commitment by the Austrian and French governments to holding 
national referendums on Turkish accession may well be but the first early sign of 
major ratification problems).  
Another aspect of the accession process that is likely to ease possible prob-
lems for the EU is that it is clear the EU will not only take lengthy steps to pro-
tect itself but also, if necessary, unprecedented steps. This is evident from the 
Commission’s October 2004 recommendation on the Turkish application and the 
December 2004 European Council’s Conclusions on the application which were 
based on the Commission’s recommendation.
35 The recommendation and 
Conclusions are studded - in a fashion and to a degree that has not been seen with 
other applicants - with warnings to Turkey about how dependent progress is on 
                                                 
34 European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, Brus-
sels: SEC (2004) 1201, COM (2004) 656 final, October 6, 2004: 10. 
35 European Commission. Ibid, and European Council, Presidency Conclusions,”  European 
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Turkey continuing on its reformist path. Indeed, the Conclusions explicitly state – 
albeit in a manner less explicitly directed toward Turkey than was the case in the 
Commission’s recommendation - that negotiations may be broken off if there are 
any major reversal in Turkey’s reforms: 
 
In the case of a serious and persistent breach in a candidate state of the principles of lib-
erty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law 
on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the re-
quest of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and 
propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decided by qualified 
majority on such a recommendation, after having heard from the candidate state, whether 
to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption.
36 
 
The Conclusions also stated - again for the first time in respect of any candi-
date country - that the negotiations “are an open-ended process, the outcome of 
which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’” (emphasis added).
37 
And, in yet another breach with precedent, the Conclusions not only antici-
pated the possibility of long transitional periods and derogations in some areas, 
which are common enough, but also stated that “permanent safeguard clauses, 
i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, 
may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its pro-
posals for each framework, for areas such as freedom of movement of persons, 
structural policies or agriculture.”
38  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Turkish accession process that is scheduled to formally begin in October 
2005 clearly will be protracted and difficult. It will be so for a combination of 
reasons, some of which are similar to the reasons that made the pre-May 2004 
accession processes relatively long and some of which arise from the distinctive 
nature of the Turkish case. The similar reasons include the sheer volume of de-
tailed and technical matters that need to be covered and the many adaptations that 
Turkey will have to make - some of which will be financially costly - to be able 
to incorporate the acquis and to put in place administrative systems that will sat-
isfy the EU states. The distinctive reasons stem from the wider political, eco-
nomic religious, and cultural concerns about the Turkish application, which are 
likely to incline those member states that harbor doubts about whether the acces-
sion membership should be proceeding at all to ensure the accession process is 
taken at a cautious, not to say drawn-out, pace.  
                                                 
36 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 16-17, 8. 
37 Ibid, 7.  
38 Idem. 266  Nugent 
 
The prospect of Turkish membership does pose an unprecedented challenge 
for the EU and most EU states would - if they were in full control of events - pre-
fer not to be proceeding towards probable Turkish accession. But that said, the 
fact is that Turkey does have much to offer the EU. Furthermore, there is every 
reason to suppose that as both Turkey and the EU continue to evolve over the 
period before Turkey actually assumes membership – which is likely to be a 
minimum of twelve years or so – many of what may now seem to be major obsta-
cles will gradually be seen to be less daunting.    
 
The Process of Europeanization in Turkey 
 
 
 
Atila Eralp 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Turkey’s application to the European Community for full membership in April 
1987 and the response of the Community triggered a reassessment of Turkey’s 
Europeanness both in Europe and Turkey and resulted in the rise of anti-Euro-
pean feelings in Turkey.
1 The changes in the post-Cold War climate and the deci-
sions of the Luxembourg Summit reinforced these feelings. In this climate, the 
issue of full membership for Turkey became a contentious one in the present 
enlargement process of the Union. This paper argues, however, that this prob-
lematic situation was neither to the advantage of the European Union nor to Tur-
key. The paper focuses on the decisions of the EU Summit in Helsinki and dis-
cusses developments during the past five years. It shows how the more inclusion-
ary approach of the EU in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit has helped the 
acceleration of the reform process in Turkey. It examines the reform initiatives of 
the last five years and argues that the incentive of membership in the aftermath of 
the Helsinki Summit was crucial in shaping the reform process in Turkey. It con-
cludes by showing how the reform process in Turkey is turning from a more gen-
eral process of Westernization to a more concrete process of Europeanization. 
 
The Helsinki Summit and its Aftermath 
 
The Helsinki Summit overcame the long-lasting ambiguity surrounding the 
Turkish case, ending the debate over whether Turkey is a European country. Tur-
key was clearly situated in the present enlargement process along with other 
                                                 
1 For a more comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s relations with the European Community dur-
ing the Cold War period see Atila Eralp, “Turkey and the EC in the Changing Post-War Interna-
tional System” in Turkey and Europe, ed. Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams (London: Printer 
1993); Mehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye’nin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1985 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yay-
ınları, 1985); and İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu, 2.vols. (Ankara: Ümit 
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twelve candidate countries.
2 Turkey also became part of the same accession-part-
nerships as the other candidate countries. This is a clear reflection of the willing-
ness of the EU to provide financial and technical supports to prepare Turkey for 
membership as for the other candidate countries. On this issue, there was a major 
difference between Luxembourg Summit and Helsinki Summit. While Turkey 
was treated separately from other candidate countries and put in an ambiguous 
European Strategy in Luxembourg, in Helsinki Turkey was offered an accession-
partnership. The EU also manifested a clear attitude to treat Turkey according to 
the same “Copenhagen Criteria” as the other candidate countries. These resolu-
tions regarding Turkey were drastically different from Luxembourg: they were 
more open, inclusive and less discriminatory. As a result, the Helsinki resolutions 
were perceived quite positively by the Turkish elites, as resolutions correcting the 
“mistakes” of Luxembourg. 
The EU governments and the Commission manifested a greater awareness of 
the strategic dimensions of enlargement in the Helsinki Summit. The European 
Union has focused for a long time on economic and political issues rather than on 
geopolitical considerations. This attitude started to change after the Kosovo cri-
sis. EU officials began to realize that instability in the Balkans would have detri-
mental ramifications on the European integration process. If instability reigns in 
adjacent regions, it would be extremely difficult to create a Europe based on the 
idea of peaceful change. As a result, the EU began to address broader geopoliti-
cal questions, starting with the issue of creating new patterns of cooperation in 
the Balkans. With the adoption of a new Stability Pact in the Balkans, the EU 
focused more on the problems of the region. Such an approach in the Balkans 
necessitated a new relationship between Greece and Turkey. It became quite evi-
dent that the creation of cooperative relationships in the Balkans would be quite 
difficult if conflicts persist between Greece and Turkey. The tragic earthquakes 
in both countries also helped to create a new climate for cooperation and we wit-
nessed an increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Greece as manifested 
by frequent and reciprocal visits of high officials. 
It is no coincidence that Turkish candidacy was offered in a summit in which 
important decisions were taken in consolidating European security and defense. 
The Helsinki Summit decided to create a military force of 50-60,000 in order to 
launch and conduct EU-led operations in response to international crises. This 
attitude showed the determination of the EU to develop an autonomous capacity 
in the field of security in coordination with NATO. It was increasingly difficult 
to overlook Turkey’s role in the security field as the EU developed its common 
policy on security and defense. This also necessitated a more cooperative rela-
tionship between Greece and Turkey. This attitude of the EU indicates the 
growing significance of geopolitical considerations on its agenda. It is quite evi-
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dent that as the attention of the EU turns towards larger geopolitical concerns, the 
case of Turkey draws more inclusive attention. Turkey could either be marginal-
ized or excluded from the emerging European project or could be incorporated 
within the European Union. The Helsinki Summit decided on the latter and this 
decision was to the advantage of both the EU and Turkey. 
The Helsinki framework required a major mental shift of orientation in the 
attitudes of both the EU and Turkish officials to create a more cooperative rela-
tionship.
3 This mental shift was not easy, primarily because Turkish and EU offi-
cials have long been used to an adversarial relationship and treated each other in 
bilateral “us-them” terms. It should, however be mentioned that the Helsinki 
Summit pressured for major political and economic reforms in Turkey. The EU 
actively stimulated these reforms through the publication of its “Accession Part-
nership” (AP) document, which was announced in November 2000. This an-
nouncement was important because it led to the inclusion of Turkey in the acces-
sion-partnership relationship with the EU as with other candidate countries. The 
Commission listed the short and medium-term political and economic priorities 
aimed at the transformation of the Turkish state in line with the Copenhagen crite-
ria. The political measures in the document aimed at creating a more liberal and 
pluralistic order and the economic measures focused on the achievement of 
macro-economic stability and an effective regulatory economic structure. In re-
sponse, to the AP, the Turkish government prepared the “Turkish National Pro-
gram for the Adoption of the Acquis” which was submitted to the EU Commis-
sion in March 2001. The National Program was a major attempt to meet the po-
litical and economic expectations of the EU. From the EU perspective, the Na-
tional Program was a significant progress, yet, EU officials emphasized that the 
state of reforms in the report fell rather short of expectations primarily in the po-
litical field. 
Turkish authorities focused on the implementation of the National Program 
in order to meet the political expectations of the EU in the latter part of 2001 and 
2002. The government used two main instruments in the implementation of the 
political reform process: amendment of the constitution and “harmonization 
laws.” First, 34 amendments to the Constitution were accomplished primarily in 
the area of human rights, freedom of expression and freedom of organization. 
After the constitutional amendments, the Turkish Parliament also adopted a new 
Civil Code and introduced improvements notably on the fields of freedom of as-
sociation and the right to assembly, as well as gender equality and child protec-
tion. These constitutional amendments were followed by “harmonization laws” 
designed to translate the constitutional amendments into concrete action by 
bringing Turkish laws in line with the acquis. The first harmonization package 
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Relations in the post-Helsinki Era” in Turkey and the European Union, eds. Ali Çarkoğlu and 
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focused on freedom of expression and amended previous laws, which were the 
legal basis for the detention and sentencing of many intellectuals for expressing 
their views. The second harmonization package extended further the scope of 
freedom of thought; the freedom of press, the freedom of association and peace-
ful assembly and also reinforced measures for the prevention of torture and ill-
treatment. It further introduced measures against human rights violations by gov-
ernment functionaries. 
 Clearly, these reform measures were quite dramatic compared to previous 
efforts and they were engineered by a relatively weak coalition government of 
three different political orientations, including a nationalist-rightist party (MHP), 
a nationalist-leftist party (DSP) and a liberal center-right party (ANAP). While 
dramatic in Turkish terms, critical areas were still left contested between the EU 
and Turkey, such as the abolishment of the death penalty, extension of cultural 
rights of “minority groups,” the role of the military and the Cyprus question. 
These areas remained thorny not only between the EU and Turkey but they 
were also at the center of domestic debate in Turkey. Actually, EU issues have 
been at the center of political debate in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit. 
While all of the major political parties in Turkey displayed a vague commitment 
on the issue of EU membership, when it came to the sensitive issues mentioned 
above, there was a lack of consensus. The coalition was clearly fragmented on 
these issues. MHP, the nationalist-rightist party opposed the abolition of the 
death penalty, as well as the extension of cultural rights and took a hard-line on 
Cyprus. DSP, the nationalist-leftist party, was more favorable on the abolition of 
death penalty, but had serious reservations on other sensitive matters. It was only 
the liberal Motherland Party (ANAP) which had a clear “pro-EU” attitude. 
Within this climate, it became increasingly difficult for the government to go 
ahead in the reform process on these key political issues. These tensions resulted 
in the disintegration of the coalition government and the call for early elections. 
The early elections on October 3, 2002 ended the coalition government and led to 
a change of government with a clear victory of the pro-religious Justice and De-
velopment Party (AKP). 
In this election climate, the Turkish Grand National Assembly on August 3, 
2002 took some historical decisions in its third package on the political reform 
process in order to show Turkey’s willingness to join the EU. It abolished the 
long contested death penalty as well as granted the rights to broadcast and learn 
one’s “mother tongue.” The decisions on the sensitive matters were taken with 
large majorities in the Grand National Assembly. With these decisions, there was 
an increasing expectation from the EU to set a clearer timetable to start negotia-
tions in 2003 or at the least in the beginning of 2004. 
The AKP government which was formed after the general elections of 3 No-
vember 2002 prepared four “harmonization packages” to bring Turkish legisla-
tion in line with the EU legislation. During this period, we see the acceleration of 
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ages both within the Parliament and in the government and bureaucracy. The 
fourth package of the government focused on the issue of torture and ill treatment 
and declared, “zero tolerance” against torture. It removed all the legal impedi-
ments for the prosecution of public officials who resort to torture and ill treat-
ment. The fifth package focused on the issue of re-trial and expanded the scope 
of re-trial arrangements on the basis of judgments rendered by the European 
Court of Human Rights. The sixth and seventh packages were more comprehen-
sive. They tried to respond to the recommendations made in the revised Acces-
sion Partnership Document of the EU, which was adopted on the 19
th of May 
2003 and to the commitments made by the Turkish government in its revised 
National Programme, which was published on the 24
th of July 2003. The gov-
ernment tried to remove all the legal restrictions on the freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, freedom of press and assembly. In the sixth package it 
introduced measures for TV broadcasting in mother tongues other than Turkish 
in both public and private channels. In the seventh package, the legislative pack-
age focused on civilian-military relationship and changed the character of the 
National Security Council and made it an advisory body. There were amend-
ments on both the functions of the National Security Council to make it a more 
advisory body as well the procedures for the appointment of the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Council. The amendments opened up the possibility to appoint a ci-
vilian as a Secretary General. 
The AKP government believed that Turkey had achieved the “critical mass” 
in terms of legislative harmonization in compliance with the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria. The government stared to focus more on the process of implementa-
tion of these reforms and channel its energy and resources on this issue. A Re-
form Monitoring group is established at the highest political level to overview the 
progress in the implementation of political reforms. This group is chaired by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and will comprise of Minister of Justice and Internal 
Affairs. 
 
Westernization-Europeanization Processes and the EU Accession 
 
In all candidate countries, the political and economic reforms have accelerated as 
the EU provided clearer signals to their accession. It seems that there is an in-
creasing linkage between the reform process in candidate countries and their ac-
cession. As some close observers of the EU integration process have pointed out, 
enlargement has been one of the most successful foreign policy tools of the EU.
4 
                                                 
4 For a more comprehensive analysis of EU’s foreign policy initiatives see John Peterson and 
Helene Sjursen (eds), A common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP 
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The EU has created an environment conducive to the reform process with the 
offer of the membership status. The status of membership has been a major in-
centive provided to the candidate countries and has affected their reform proc-
esses positively. As the analysis in the preceding sections suggest, Turkey’s re-
form process has been somewhat “slow” compared to the other accession coun-
tries. It has been slow in comparison to other countries in the present enlargement 
process primarily because of the ambivalence of the EU regarding Turkey’s ac-
cession coupled with Turkey’s domestic constraints. Turkey the only country, 
which has not fulfilled the political expectations of the EU and therefore it re-
mained the only country without a clear timetable on its accession in the current 
enlargement process.  
Nevertheless, the analysis in the preceding sections also suggests that the re-
form process in Turkey has accelerated as the EU formulated a more inclusionary 
framework with the Helsinki Summit and offered a candidate status to Turkey. 
The reform process has further accelerated after the Copenhagen Summit when it 
was declared that if the European Council in December 2004 decided that Turkey 
fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotia-
tions with Turkey without delay. While the decisions of the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council in December 2002 did not meet Turkey’s expectations; neverthe-
less there was improvement compared to the previous situation in clarifying the 
timetable to start negotiations. 
In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit, the Turkish government has 
formulated four “harmonization laws” as examined in the preceding section, 
which focused on more sensitive issues of the reform process such as the civil-
ian-military relationship and cultural-minority rights. Furthermore, the govern-
ment has increasingly realized that the reform process required not only the 
promulgation of laws, but also their implementation.  
Turkish government functionaries, as was pointed out, were long geared to a 
perception of the Community/Union in adversarial terms. Recently there is men-
tality shift among the government functionaries to see the Union more in coop-
erative terms. It is quite interesting to note that this shift is taking place when a 
religious–rightist party is in power (AKP). The AKP government has adopted a 
clear European stance and has tried to accelerate the reform process in Turkey. 
This attitude of AKP is dramatically different from the previous religious-rightist 
parties. In the 1970s, religious-rightist parties such as National Salvation Party 
depicted the EC as a Christian Community organized to undermine the Islamic 
world and suggested the creation of an alternative Islamic Common Market. This 
attitude has continued in the cases of Welfare Party as well as of Virtue Party in 
the 1980s and the 1990’s. With the Justice and Development Party, there is a 
diametrically opposed new approach to the EU. The EU integration is perceived 
as a process of democratization and the issues of religious right and freedoms are 
seen within the context of the processes of democratization of the EU. With this 
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The religious right is becoming more moderate as it adopts a more pro-EU 
stance. It seems that the EU accession process in Turkey is creating an environ-
ment conducive to the transformation of the religious-rightist political tendencies. 
Such a transformation is quite crucial in an international system where there are 
all kinds of possibilities of tension along cultural/religious lines. Both the EU and 
Turkey have important stakes in creating a world of an increasing dialogue be-
tween cultures and civilizations, rather than a “clash” of them. The transforma-
tion of AKP and the religious right in Turkey opens up a possibility for a meeting 
of Islam and democracy in the political space. It is quite important in this context 
that there should be a legitimate place for moderate Islam in the European politi-
cal space. Turkey’s process of reform within this climate should not be thought 
merely as a technical process of harmonization with the EU acquis. It is a major 
process of transformation, which is leading to the meeting of Islam and democ-
racy and creating a legitimate place for moderate Islam in the European political 
space and therefore consolidating the multicultural basis of the European inte-
gration process. 
We have witnessed critical points and ups and downs in Turkey’s forty-year 
relationship with the Community/Union. Nevertheless, the EU vocation has 
helped Turkey’s project of Westernization, which has been the guiding principle 
of the Turkish Republic. Modernization was defined as Westernization by the 
Turkish elites and closer association with Europe; above all meant a “civilizing 
mission” which would bring an increasing section of the Turkish population into 
contact with Western life styles, behavior and methods. Efforts towards West-
ernization would also bring economic development and greater political stability. 
Turkish elites believed that Europe and the West were main sources of economic 
development as well as models of social change.  
The project of Westernization has been quite crucial in the creation and the 
consolidation of the framework of secularism in the Turkish context. The long-
lasting relationship with the Community/Union has also helped immensely in the 
transformation of the Turkish private sector into a more competitive and global 
oriented one. These are important accomplishments, but they have to be rein-
forced by the transformation of political structures and institutions and the con-
solidation of democracy in Turkey. As the analysis in the preceding sections sug-
gest Turkey has entered a new period of democratization after the Helsinki 
Summit; the political reform process has accelerated as the EU adapted a more 
inclusionary approach to Turkey. In this process, the general project of Westerni-
zation is increasingly turning into one of a concrete project of Europeanization –a 
more complex process of not only adapting of common values but also of trans-
formation of political and economic structures and governance systems. With the 
“harmonization laws” of the last four years, Turkey is changing its political prac-
tices and institutions as well as its approach to political problems, which require a 
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Union. This is a slow and a contested process, but there has been an immense 
progress as mentioned in the more recent reports of the European Commission.
5  
The process has been slower and a contested in the Turkish case because of 
the ambivalence of Turkey’s timetable as well as the availability of the less in-
centives as compared to the other candidate countries in the present enlargement 
process. It is evident that the most important turning point in the reform process 
comes with the start of the negotiations.
6 As the findings related with other acces-
sion countries indicate, the reform process becomes irreversible with the opening 
of negotiations. With the start of the negotiations, as the candidate country har-
monizes its institutional system along the lines of the EU acquis; we witness the 
process of Europeanization of institutional structures and the public administra-
tion of the country.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Turkey-EU relationship was at another historical crossroads in 2005. If Turkey 
started negotiations, the reform process would not only accelerate but also con-
solidate and become irreversible; if not, the process might slow down and it 
might not be easy to sustain the process. The EU has made substantial commit-
ments to Turkey and Turkey has channeled important material and immaterial 
resources to fulfill its requirements in order to start negotiations with the EU. The 
“EU issue” has been the most important issue on the domestic agenda of the 
Turkish public opinion. As a result, a negative decision by the EU would not only 
harm the Union as a credible partner but also will lead to the rise anti-EU feel-
ings in Turkey. The recent discussions related with the possibility to offer a “spe-
cial relationship” to Turkey would not offset (counterbalance) the damage in-
flicted to the relationship. It was too late to offer this status as the Turkish public 
opinion is geared to the start of negotiations at the end of 2005.  
It was a defining moment in the long lasting relationship with the EU. Within 
an intense climate of debate all over Europe, the EU Council decided October 3 
that Turkey has met political criteria sufficiently and the EU was willing to start 
negotiations with Turkey. It also declared that this process was an open-ended 
process and the outcome will depend both on Turkey’s adoption and implemen-
tation of the EU “acquis” as well as on the EU’s absorption capacity. The EU 
Council also adopted a different framework for negotiations with Turkey, taking 
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into account both some of the lessons derived from the previous enlargement 
process as well as emphasizing the difference of Turkey on political, economic, 
social and other factors. The emphasis by the EU on “difference” created a cli-
mate of resentment in Turkey; public opinion formers promoting that the EU was 
not only treating Turkey differently from other accession countries but also in a 
more discriminatory manner. The emphasis on open-endedness of the accession 
negotiations, the possibility of referenda in some EU countries as well as the idea 
of permanent safeguards in some sensitive issues such as free movement of per-
sons, structural funds and agricultural policy are some of the areas of friction be-
fore the EU and Turkey. In addition to these issues, there is also the problem of 
Cyprus. Since Cyprus became the member of the EU without the solution of the 
Cyprus problem, there is a potential for Cyprus to block the process of negotia-
tions with Turkey on the opening and closing of each chapter of the EU acquis. 
Amid all these problems, Turkey has entered the screening process on sev-
eral chapters of acquis at the end of 2005 and is planning to start negotiations in 
the first half of 2006. It seems that this process will be a long, contested and a 
challenging one both for Turkey and the EU. It will be a challenging for Turkey, 
because Turkey will adopt the multilevel governance system of the EU and will 
act within the larger context of the EU. Turkey will increasingly define itself 
within the process of Europeanization in the context of Wider Europe and 
neighborhood issues. This process will also consolidate the project of Westerni-
zation pursued since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. It is chal-
lenging project for the EU, because it will include a country, which has far a long 
time considered as the “other” of Europe. However, The EU has faced many 
challenges in the past and has been successful; it can also meet the present chal-
lenge. 
 
For Europe’s Sake: Securitizing Turkey’s EU Membership 
 
 
 
 
Nuray Ibryamova 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The latest round of enlargement was undoubtedly a project without a precedent in 
the brief history of European integration in terms of its scope and transforma-
tional effect. It added to the complexity of the EU, reached new neighbors, and 
established a more complex power in the world. The prospect of membership for 
Turkey puts the European Union at another historical junction, both for the inte-
gration project as well as the future of the continent. Security and stability argu-
ments were frequently used to justify and legitimize the eastern expansion of the 
European Union. In a similar vein, security concerns play an important role in the 
Turkish candidacy for membership.  
This paper will look at some of the discursive links between security and 
Turkey’s candidacy for membership. It will argue that both support and opposi-
tion to Turkish accession are based on notions of security, whether military or 
societal. The paper will begin by discussing the security considerations in the 
eastern enlargement of the Union. It will then take a look at how security has 
been implicated in the debate surrounding Turkey’s membership. Finally, it will 
discuss some of the differences in the treatment of the two expansions evident in 
the predominant discourses.  
 
Security and the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement 
 
The EU’s expansion to the east was a form of foreign policy that was intimately 
tied to maintaining peace and stability on the continent. From its inception the 
eastern enlargement was legitimized as a tool for achieving lasting peace, as well 
as conditioned by the ability of the candidate states to maintain such relations. 
Policy instruments and decisive measures designed to further enlargement were 
called in the name of European peace and security.  
This paper draws on the broader security framework developed by Buzan, 
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as a “speech act.”
1 As such, security is not necessarily objective; instead, it is 
“when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated refer-
ent object.”
2 It “is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above poli-
tics.”
3 While various actors may engage in such securitizing moves, an issue be-
comes securitized only if the audience accepts it as a matter of existential threat. 
On the other hand, this fundamentally intersubjective process can potentially 
have substantial political impact, since it allows the securitizing actors to call for 
and employ extraordinary measures. 
Following the collapse of communist regimes in the Central and Eastern 
European countries, the potential for ethnic conflicts, economic disruptions, po-
litical instability and their spillover effects on the then European Community led 
Western European leaders to emphasize the need for promoting good neighborly 
relations among these countries, helping stabilize their economies, and improve 
minority rights, among others. According to the Commission “enlargement – 
both for the EU, the candidate states and their neighbors - is rightly viewed as 
being part of an overall security endeavor on the European continent as is 
enlargement of NATO.”
4 Even though security concerns are hardly mentioned in 
the admission criteria, those played a prominent role in the enlargement process. 
For example, at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, when the decision 
to enlarge was announced, the European Commission stated that the prospect of 
membership would “provide an element of stability against a background of con-
tinuing turbulence in the former Soviet Union and the tragedy unfolding in the 
former Yugoslavia and diminish tension in a region where confidence and stabil-
ity are suffering from the absence of a viable security architecture.”
5 Hence, the 
possibility of accession in the European Union, albeit at a distant future date, was 
seen as an incentive for the associated countries to continue to transform their 
political as well as economic systems, and as an instrument for maintaining sta-
bility in the eastern part of the continent.  
The rationale behind the security argument for enlargement lies in the per-
ception of the indivisibility of European security. Advocates of enlargement 
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noted that a secure and stable Eastern Europe meant secure and stable Western 
Europe. In some ways the fall of the Berlin Wall represented a serious loss of 
security for Western Europe, particularly to the countries bordering Central and 
Eastern Europe.
6 National as well as EU leaders often evoked the need for an EU 
eastward expansion because rising nationalism, coupled with economic collapse, 
political volatility, and organized crime all led to increased levels of instability in 
the region. At the same time, the wars in Yugoslavia and the far more difficult 
transitions in Russia and Ukraine added to the fears of spillover into Central and 
Eastern Europe. Hence, political and economic disintegration in the East could 
have had ramifications for the societies of the European Union.
7 
Perhaps the strongest arguments for enlargement were the warnings of ensu-
ing chaos that would take place if the EU did not open its doors for the CEECs; 
these were also the clearest examples of securitizing moves by various actors. In 
other words, proponents of expansion argued that if prospects for membership 
did not exist at all, or if that were to occur only after a prolonged period of time, 
then unrest may result. The argument was that the lack of an alternative political 
anchor and the disillusionment of broad segments of the population of the trans-
formation process might have led lead to political instability and economic dis-
integration.
8  
If the prospect of membership was the incentive for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe to continue with the political and economic reforms and 
thereby become politically and democratically stable, enlargement was the 
mechanism intended to deal with the problems of peace and stability in the area, 
and by extension, Europe as a whole. Referring to the problems that would ensue 
should membership is denied or deferred, European leaders advocated enlarge-
ment by pointing out its necessity, and thereby desecuritizing it. “Desecuritiza-
tion,” according to Buzan et al, refers to a process in which issues are shifted out 
of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political 
sphere.
9 For example, integration is often presented as the solution to the 
                                                 
6 The division of Europe – and Germany – was seen as a security guarantee. Douglas Hurd, 
British Foreign Secretary, echoed many political leaders when he described the Cold War as a sys-
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new dividing line on the continent; the threats emanating from the Kosovo crisis and its potential 
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fragmentation and violence of Europe’s past, i.e., integration is the desecuritized 
effect of the securitized threat. Enlargement, as a continuation and geographical 
expansion of integration, suggests expanding this project of ensuring peace and 
security to the eastern part of the continent. More specific security concerns re-
garding good neighborly relations and minority rights became de facto accession 
preconditions with the Pact on Stability in Europe, which was signed in 1995. 
The Pact, which was a joint action under the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy of the EU, promised a framework for “lasting good-neighborliness” in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. This policy instrument was another step, which linked 
enlargement to security.
10 
If the eastern enlargement was successfully presented as a step toward en-
suring Europe’s security, certain aspects of the opening of the eastern bloc have 
been viewed far less benignly. While potential territorial disputes or ethnic prob-
lems may have constituted a cause for concern, in the latter stages of the acces-
sion process it was primarily non-traditional security concerns emanating from 
Central and Eastern Europe that caused growing anxiety in the EU. Among those, 
migration, organized crime, drug-trafficking and human smuggling gradually 
came to the forefront of the debate. Enlargement was seen both as the solution to 
some of these problems and as the source, due to the permeability of the candi-
date countries’ borders. As Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that, “Without 
enlargement western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, 
conflict and mass migration on its borders.”
11 In this particular case, Mr. Blair 
presents enlargement as the solution to the threats of instability, conflict and mi-
gration, thereby making the link between enlargement and internal security. This 
securitizing move leads to a desecuritizing effect, whereby enlargement is pre-
sented as the necessary solution to these problems. In the meantime, the new 
eastern border is perceived as the source of some of the main security threats to 
the EU, since the new members are countries of transit for illegal immigrants and 
drug- and human-traffickers from further east.
12  
                                                 
10 For a detailed analysis of the discursive links between the eastern enlargement of the EU 
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The next section will touch upon some of the security concerns surrounding 
the debate on Turkey’s candidacy. It will look at the rationale for its membership, 
as well as the discursive links that both proponents and opponents of its member-
ship have created with security. 
 
Security and Turkey’s Candidacy for EU Membership 
 
Having applied for full membership in the European Community in 1987 and 
signed Customs Union with the European Union in 1995, Turkey received the 
status of an official candidate at the Helsinki European Council of 1999. While 
not yet meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the Council declared that Turkey was a 
candidate “destined to join the Union.”
13 Prior to the Nice summit in December 
2000, the EU agreed on an initial accession partnership, but the opening of nego-
tiations with Turkey remained contingent upon fulfilling the political criteria set 
in Copenhagen. In October 2004, the European Commission found that Turkey 
had made sufficient progress toward meeting the extensive political criteria to 
open accession negotiations. Based upon this recommendation, the Copenhagen 
European Council decided that negotiations would start in October 2005, but ac-
cession could not be guaranteed. For the first time in the history of EU expan-
sion, the Union did not presume that the outcome of the negotiations would nec-
essarily end in accession.  
Support for the country’s accession has often contained references to its 
strategic importance, particularly in an era dominated by the “war on terror.” For 
instance, in its Communication to the Council and the Parliament on Turkey’s 
progress, the Commission noted that that the country had the potential “to con-
tribute to regional and international stability;” it was also seen as “an important 
model of a country with a majority Muslim population adhering to such funda-
mental principles as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, and the rule of law.”
14 Former Commissioner for enlargement 
Gunter Verheugen made frequent references to Turkey’s strategic value. In 1999, 
for instance, while pointing out that the country did not fulfill the Copenhagen 
criteria, he supported giving Turkey the status of an official candidate arguing 
that, “At the same time there are the geopolitical and strategic arguments that 
make it imperative to support Turkey’s affiliation with Europe…If we deprive 
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Turkey of the prospect of accession, we will be held responsible for everything 
that goes wrong in the country. Then the question might become: ‘who lost Tur-
key?”
15 In this case, Commissioner Verheugen’s statement is a clear securitizing 
move as it appears to warn of the consequences non-accession. In 2001, Ver-
heugen again pointed out that, “in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, it is 
clearer than ever that Turkey and the EU need each other. The EU is indispensa-
ble for Turkey, and Turkey is indispensable for the EU.”
16 During the same year, 
Commissioner Verheugen again noted that “the EU needs Turkey more than 
Turkey needs the EU.”
17 Similarly, Javier Solana, the High Representative for 
CFSP, has pointed out that Turkey’s place in Europe had been guaranteed by the 
EU’s decision to give it a candidate status: “No one can challenge it today on the 
grounds of geography. To do so would endanger the enlargement process and the 
principle of inclusiveness that has sustained it.”
18 
National leaders have also made numerous securitizing moves regarding 
EU’s rejection of Turkey. Former Chancellor Schroeder, who in recent years has 
argued in favor of Turkey by stressing the importance of “underpinning Muslim 
Turkey at a time of growing threats from Islamic militants.”
19 Schroeder also 
pointed out that for him the strategic and security policy arguments for Ankara’s 
bid for EU membership were decisive. If its reforms further developed, “we 
could then stabilize the land and create a link between European enlightenment 
and non-fundamentalist Islam.”
20 UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw, has also 
pointed that Turkey’s membership was of “huge importance to the stability not 
just of Europe but of much of the rest of the world.”
21 Finally, the former prime 
minister of Greece, once a staunch opponent to opening the EU door to Turkey, 
argued that, “Our attitude also serves as a litmus test of the type of Europe we 
choose to live in. To deny Turkey a European future on the grounds of religion is 
                                                 
15 Speech by Gunter Verheugen of the European Commission, “Enlargement: Speed and Qual-
ity” at the conference “The Second Decade towards a New and Integrated Europe” Den Haag, No-
vember 4, 1999. 
16 Gunter Verheugen Member of the European Commission Responsible for Enlargement 
Launch of EU-Turkish Foundation Inaugural Meeting of the EU-Turkey Foundation Brussels, 17 
October 2001; available from http://europa.eu.int. 
17 “Decision Time for Turkey,” Financial Times, February 13, 2001; available from 
www.ft.com 
18 Javier Solana, “Turkey’s EU Future,” The New York Times, December 9, 2002; Section A 
27. 
19 Haig Simonian, “Chirac, Schroeder to Back Date for Turkish-EU Talks,” Financial Times, 
December 5, 2002; available from www.ft.com. 
20 “Merkel Calls for Petition Against Turkish Membership,” Deutsche Welle, October 11, 
2004; available from www.dw-world.de 
21 Judy Dempsey, “Berlin, Paris Push for 2005 EU-Turkish Entry Talks,” Financial Times, 
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to deny the existing diversity in Europe. Welcoming a country that shares our 
democratic values, irrespective of ethnicity or religion, will send a positive signal 
to the Muslim world and strengthen global security.”
22 
These examples allow us to conclude that Turkey’s membership is also 
largely, although not exclusively, based on utility arguments, whether security or 
otherwise. In contrast to the eastern enlargement, arguments based on moral or 
historical obligation are by and large absent. European leaders also frequently 
pointed out membership for the CEECs would end the artificial division of 
Europe that resulted from the Cold War. In the case of Turkey, however, possible 
accession cannot be justified based on moral arguments towards those who were 
part of “us,” as was the case of Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, support for 
membership appears to be based primarily on Turkey’s strategic value as an ally, 
and particularly one that shares fundamental democratic principals. Hence, secu-
rity arguments played a role both in the case of the eastern enlargement (as ex-
tending the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity) and in the case of Turkey (as 
a strategic partner in the fight against terrorism). 
The examples above also suggest that both EU officials and leaders of mem-
ber states have engaged in securitizing rhetoric, whereby rejection of Turkey was 
presented as endangering Europe’s security and stability by failing to anchor 
Turkey in the European project and thus creating a link with the Muslim world. 
Occasionally, even Europe’s own future as multiethnic, diverse, and tolerant so-
ciety based upon civic values embedded in liberal democracy is said to be at 
stake should the EU not fulfill its pledges of membership. Hence, Turkish mem-
bership is presented as a necessity in the face of threats that both the EU and 
Turkey confront. This suggests that Turkey is considered to be an important 
strategic partner that needs to be anchored into European integration as a means 
for strengthening its democracy. As such, Turkey can be a reliable foreign policy 
and security partner, play a constructive role in the fight against terrorism and the 
EU’s relations with the Muslim world, and contribute to European stability. This 
list of examples also indicates that both leaders of member states as well as EU 
institutions have engaged in rhetoric where securitizing moves ultimately lead to 
desecuritizing effects; in other words, membership was presented as the “ex-
traordinary measure” that is the necessary solution to the threat in question.  
 
Turkish Membership as a Threat to Europe 
 
Turkey’s candidacy presents problems that stem form its size and level of eco-
nomic development. As a large country – and if it accedes, possibly the EU’s 
largest member by 2020 – it should also have the largest share of votes in the 
Council. Size coupled with wealth would suggest that Turkey would be able to 
                                                 
22 George A. Papandreaou, “Join the Club,” The Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2002: A 
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make significant claims on the budget of the Union, and potentially unleash a 
wave of immigrants. Further, Turkey’s population size – currently second only to 
Germany’s – and its demographic dynamics means that it would hold a corre-
sponding number of votes in the Council, giving Europe’s historical enemy a 
substantial influence in the Union. Both of these factors were less important in 
the case of the eastern enlargement as smaller states were considered easier to 
integrate in the institutional framework of the Union and would require less fi-
nancial transfers. It is secular Turkey’s overwhelmingly Muslim population, 
however, that separates it from all other members. It is also this particular char-
acteristic that often becomes the focal point of the opposition to its membership.  
For instance, in addition to suspending the negotiations should Turkey falter 
on its commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
23 in 2004, the 
Commission recommended that the Union consider permanent safeguard clause 
on one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU – freedom of movement – should 
Turkey become a member. The latter is a case where potential increased immi-
gration from Turkey is securitized - a process where “the issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure.”
24 As mentioned above, the potential 
for rising immigration from Central and Eastern Europe following the accession 
was also securitized. This process, however, occurred primarily along the lines of 
economic and internal security discourses, whereas in the Turkish case there is 
also the identity factor. Hence, it can be expected that concerns about the impact 
of Turkish membership on the societal security of the Union will continue 
throughout the accession process.
25 
Security considerations are evident in some of the policy instruments the EU 
has created along the enlargement process. For instance, the resolution of any 
outstanding border disputes, or at least “making every effort” to do so was espe-
cially applicable in the case of Turkey because of its role in Northern Cyprus.
26 
                                                 
23 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress Towards Accession. Brussels,” 6 October 2004; available from http://europa.eu.int. 
24 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 23-24. 
25 The existing discourses on migration in Europe have been grouped along four different 
dimensions: the economic discourse of threat, which focuses on job losses and the financial burden 
of immigration; discourses of solidarity, which focus on democratic values and human rights; dis-
course of security, with emphasizes criminality and social security; and the discourse of positive 
diversity, which includes multiculturalism, and brain drain from the “push” regions, among others. 
Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk, “Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in 
Six European States,” in Agnieszka Weinar, Securitization and Humanitarianism – Polish Migra-
tion Policy and the Communities of Meaning, Paper presented at the CGES Conference, February 
20-21, 2004, Washington, DC. 
26 As stipulated by the Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency 
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While not part of the explicit Copenhagen criteria, the resolution of the Cyprus 
problem was a de facto condition for Turkey to open negotiations, similar to the 
Balladur Pact for Central and Eastern Europe. 
While both Central and Eastern European leaders pushing for enlargement 
and their supporters within the European Union argued that expanding would in 
effect be the “reuniting of Europe” after the division caused by the Cold War, 
Turkey does not have the same arguments at its disposal. On the contrary, his-
torically Turkey has been Europe’s “other” – a referent in the definition of 
Europe by defining what it isn’t. Iver Neumann and Jennifer Walsh, for instance, 
have argued that Turkey has often played the role of Europe’s antithesis, a state 
which cannot be considered as part of the European ethos, even if political rela-
tions with it are amicable. Much of the opposition for Turkish membership, in 
fact, comes from the differences evident in its identity, norms, traditions, and 
values, which influence the way of doing things, including political culture. As 
such, Turkish membership is seen as a threat to Europe’s identity, social cohe-
siveness, the functioning of EU’s institutions, and ultimately, to the goals of 
European integration. 
Perhaps the best-known example of the threat perception of the Turkish can-
didacy was provided by former French president Valery Giscard D’Estaing, who 
in 2002, then as the chairman of the Convention on the Constitution of Europe 
argued that admitting Turkey would be “the end of the European Union,” while 
those who pushed hardest for its membership were “enemies of the EU.” He con-
sidered Turkey to be “a country that is close to Europe, an important coun-
try…but it is not a European country,” with “a different culture, a different ap-
proach, a different way of life.”
27 More recently, former French prime minister 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin framed the question of Turkish membership in rather strik-
ing terms: “Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?”
28 
Pointing to the gulf between the EU’s Western norms and those of Muslim Tur-
key, Mr. Raffarin expressed doubts over the ability of Turkish society to embrace 
Europe’s human-rights values.
29 In a similar vein, the new German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel has continuously supported a close relationship with Turkey – 
outside of the EU. According to Merkel, “Europe’s geographic expansion should 
align with common values and historic experience.”
30  
                                                 
27 Ian Black, “Turkey Must be Kept Out of the Union,’ Giscard Says,” The Guardian, Novem-
ber 9, 2002; available from www.guardian.co.uk. 
28 John Carreyrou, “Raffarin Demurs on Turkey’s EU Bid,” The Wall Street Journal, Septem-
ber 23, 2004: A13. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Carola Schlagheck, “Schroeder Promises to Support Turkey,” International Herald Tribune, 
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These examples imply that Turkey is different, in example, it does not have 
the same historical experience, value, culture, and a way of life, and in essence, it 
is not European. It is these differences that, if brought into the EU, would disrupt, 
if not end the integration project. While not always explicitly stated, it is under-
stood that the main source of these differences is Turkey’s Muslim character. As 
such, Turkey’s accession could mean a challenge to the European Union’s iden-
tity, and ipso facto, as threat to its societies. Indeed, most of the opposition to 
Turkish membership is rooted in perceived threats to societal security, which re-
fers to the preservation of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, 
and religious and national identity. In other words, according to Buzan et al., so-
cietal security is about “large, self-sustaining identity groups.”
31 The Turkish 
candidacy, then, is securitized as a threat to the identity, cohesiveness, and future 
of the EU as an “ever closer union.” This argument is not difficult to sustain in 
view of the problems Europe has had integrating its own Muslim minorities, as 
has become evident recently, and which have led to the rise of political fortunes 
of extreme right-wing parties, and anti-immigration sentiments to the mainstream 
of political discourse during the past decade or so.  
These differences also affect political and bureaucratic culture in a given 
state, and as such, it is often argued that the Turkish membership would impede 
the process of further integration, lending support to a form of integrations that 
falls short of full membership. Arguing in favor of an alternative form of ac-
commodation, Buzan and Diez have stated that 
 
going much further than this runs into the barriers of what might be called ‘identity poli-
tics’ or ‘societal security.’…Further integration between Turkey and the EU threatens the 
social and political self-identification of each to an unsustainable degree. Domestic dif-
ferences…become unacceptable when the prospect is a quite deep integration of econ-
omy, law and politics such as that being undertaken by the members of the EU.
32  
  
In addition to the rational impulses driving the securitization of Turkish 
membership, it can be considered that opposition to Turkish membership in the 
EU because of potentially detrimental effect to the ideational cohesiveness and 
the very future of united Europe, seems to be based on a pre-existing European 
identity, which appears to include, among other elements, incompatibility with 
Islamic societies per se. The challenges these pose to the social fabric of the EU 
as well as the functioning of its institutions are seen as incompatible with the 
goals of deeper integration. As a result, an alternative form of affiliation, in the 
form of a “privileged partnership” has taken on a considerable support, including 
from Germany’s Angela Merkel and the Austrian government.  
                                                 
31 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 119. 
32 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey” Survival 41 , no. 1, 
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Conclusion 
 
Security and stability arguments were of primary importance in the eastern 
enlargement process. European leaders argued that unpredictability, instability, 
rising nationalism, and potential violence that would result from the Union’s un-
willingness to offer membership. Enlargement was seen as the solution to these 
problems, and as such an extension of European integration. 
While it is too early to predict whether security will be as present in Turkey’s 
roadmap to the EU as it was in the case of the eastern enlargement, security ar-
guments play a pivotal role in the discussions on Turkey’s possible accession. 
This paper looked at some of the discursive links between security and the op-
posing viewpoints on Turkey’s EU membership bid. Advocates of its member-
ship often point out that its accession would be a major step in combating terror-
ism, while its opponents submit that the cultural and ideational differences that 
Turkey would bring to the Union would be critically detrimental to the EU’s fu-
ture as a cohesive unit.  
The eastern border of the European Union currently divides the continent in 
two, with the “other” Europe being either anxious to get in, or feeling excluded. 
Since the eastern enlargement was an intermittent step toward the final reaches of 
the European Union, its future, and perhaps final, borders are still a matter of 
speculation. As the dividing line between those who are on the “inside” and those 
on the “outside,” the eastern border is also a contributor to the identity definition 
of those on both sides of the border. Turkey’s road to accession may define not 
only Turkey’s, but also Europe’s own identity and future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 About the Authors  
 
 
Abraham, David (University of Miami) 
David Abraham, Professor of Law, received a B.A. in 1968, an M.A. in history in 
1972, and a Ph.D. in history in 1977, all from the University of Chicago, and a 
J.D. in 1989 from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Prior to entering 
law school, Professor Abraham taught for many years in the history department 
of Princeton University. Following graduation from law school, he served as law 
clerk to Judge Leonard Garth of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
and as an associate with Simpson Thacher & Bartlett. He joined the Miami fac-
ulty in 1991. Professor Abraham teaches Property, Immigration, Citizenship 
Law, Citizenship and Identity, and Law and Transition to Capitalism. 
 
Akbar, Yusaf (Southern New Hampshire University) 
Professor Yusaf Akbar is presently an Associate Professor in International Busi-
ness at Southern New Hampshire University in New Hampshire, US. He earned 
his Ph.D. from the Sussex European Institute at University of Sussex, UK, and is 
the author of various publications, including two recent books in 2003 - The 
Multinational Enterprise, EU Enlargement and Central Europe (Palgrave) and 
Global Antitrust (Ashgate). He has published in numerous peer-reviewed jour-
nals including Journal of World Business,  World Competition,  Business and 
Politics,  Global Governance and Thunderbird International Business Review. 
Professor Akbar has guest professorships at Thunderbird Garvin Graduate School 
of International Management, American University in Bulgaria, MIB School of 
Management Trieste, ESSCA Budapest and KMBS-Kiev in Ukraine. He is also 
Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Emerging Markets. 
 
Böhm, Monika (Marburg University, Germany) 
Monika Böhm is professor of State and Administrative Law at the Philipps-Uni-
versität in Marburg (Germany). An expert on environmental law, the European 
Union, and on administrative law, she has served as a member of several com-
missions for the German federal government, state governments, and private in-
stitutions, including the German Risk Commission. Professor Böhm’s extensive 
publications are primarily in the field of environmental protection. She is espe-
cially well known for her work on wastewater regulation and taxation, but has 
also written on such topics as nuclear energy, toxic substances in food, non-
regulatory approaches to environmental protection, carcinogens in air emissions, 
and waste disposal. She has also written extensively on administrative and con-
stitutional law and the law of the European Union. She was a Visiting Professor 
at the University of Miami in 2004. 290  About the Authors 
 
 
Crawford, Beverly (University of California at Berkeley) 
Dr. Crawford is the Associate Director of the Institute of European Studies at the 
University of California at Berkeley. She has written extensively on topics such 
as ethnic conflict, European politics and EU integration, the Euro-Med Partner-
ship, German foreign policy, technology transfer policy, and post-communist 
transitions. She is the author of Economic Vulnerability in International Rela-
tions, the co-editor of The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, and most recently, the co-
editor of Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region.  
She has advised the German Government on issues of American foreign policy, 
the U.S. government on German foreign policy, the Mayor’s Office of Economic 
Development for the City of San Francisco on job training for low income San 
Francisco residents in the IT industry, and consulted with numerous non-profit 
organizations. She teaches International Political Economy and American For-
eign Policy in International and Area Studies at the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
 
Domínguez, Roberto (Suffolk University) 
Roberto Domínguez holds a Ph.D in International Studies from University of Mi-
ami and an M.A. from Ortega y Gasset Foundation, Spain. He was professor of 
International Relations at UNAM, México (1996-1999) as well as editor of the 
Journal Relaciones Internacionales. Likewise, he has been visiting Professor at 
University of Quintana Roo and Teikyo University, Maastricht, Holland. From 
1999 to 2002, he was research assistant at The North South Center and since 
2002 research associate at the Miami European Union Center. Among his publi-
cations, he has coordinated the following books: with Joaquín Roy and Alejandro 
Chanona, La Unión Europea y el TLCAN: Integración Regional Comparada y 
Relaciones Mutuas (2004); with Joaquín Roy, Relaciones Exteriores de la Unión 
Europea (2001), and with Alejandro Chanona, Europa en Transformación: pro-
cesos políticos, económicos y sociales (2000); Cooperación e Integración en la 
Organización Regional Europea (2000). Dr. Domínguez was also a weekly col-
umnist of the magazine Siempre (1998-2000) and is currently a frequent analyst 
for La Jornada newspaper. He was political analyst at Radio Educación (1998-
2001) and since 2004 has been political commentator at America en Vivo News 
(Telemundo-NBC Network). He was also advisor and speech writer for the Gov-
ernor of the State of Mexico (1994-1995), head of the Department of Press 
Analysis at the Education Secretariat (1994), and head of the Department of In-
ternational Press Analysis at the Foreign Affairs Secretariat (1990-1993). 
 
Eralp, Atila (Middle East Technical University) 
Atila ERALP is the Jean Monnet Chair and the Director of Centre for European 
Studies, METU. He is also the Head of the Department of International Rela-
tions, METU. He graduated from METU, Department of Public Administration, About the authors  291 
 
and he completed his MA in the School of International Relations, University of 
Southern California, USA (1974-1975) and his Ph.D. in the School of Interna-
tional Relations, USA (1975-1983). His research interests concerning the Euro-
pean integration issues are politics of European integration, enlargement process 
of the EU, theories of European integration, comprehensive security, European 
security, and Euro-Mediterranean Relationship. He has been Jean Monnet Pro-
fessor on European Political Integration since 2002. In the last twenty years he 
has written extensively on different aspects of Turkey-EU relations. Some exam-
ples of his publications can be listed as follows: “Turkey and the European Un-
ion,” The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris 
Keridis (eds.), MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts (2004); “Turkey and the 
Enlargement of the EU,” in Europe Bound: Faultlines and Frontlines of Security 
in the Balkans, Jody Jensen (ed.), Szombathely: Savaria University Press (2003); 
“Turkey and the EU in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Turkey's New World, Alan 
Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.), The Washington Institute: Washington D.C. 
(2000); Turkey and Europe (Turkiye ve Avrupa in Turkish), Remzi: Ankara, 
1998; “Turkey and the European Community: Forging New Identities Along Old 
Lines,” Toward a European Nation? Political Trends in Europe: East and West, 
Max Haller and Rudolph Richter (eds.), Library of Congress: New York (1994); 
“Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International 
System,” in Turkey and Europe, Canan Balkir and Allan Williams (eds.), Pinter 
Publishers: London (1993). 
 
Granell, Francesc (Universidad de Barcelona) 
Dr. Granell is professor of Economic International Organization at University of 
Barcelona and Honoree General Director of the European Commission. His aca-
demic background comprises a Ph. D. in Political, Economic and Trade Sciences 
at University of Barcelona and studies in the same are at the Institute of European 
Studies (Geneva), the International Marketing Institute (Cambridge), and the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has also been visiting professor at 
Georgetown University. Among his professional activities in the European 
Commission, he was head of the Commission negotiating team for the accession 
of Finland as well as head of the area of relations with the Pacific, Caribbean and 
Indic countries. He has published an extensive number of articles on external 
trade, economic international relations and European integration. 
 
Gungor, Gaye (Florida International University) 
Gaye Gungor is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at 
Florida International University. She holds a B.A. in International Relations from 
Middle East Technical University and an M.A. in Political Science from FIU. 
Her area of specialization is comparative politics with an emphasis on the Euro-
pean Union, and the European Parliament specifically. She is currently writing 292  About the Authors 
 
her dissertation on the supranational party groups and party system of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
 
Ibryamova, Nuray (University of North Carolina-Wilmington) 
Nuray Ibryamova received a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University 
of Miami. Her research interests are in the areas of European Union enlargement, 
foreign policy and security, and transatlantic relations. She is the author and co-
author of several articles and book chapters on security and the enlargement of 
the European Union, and the democratization processes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Recent publications include (with Roger E. Kanet), “Eastern Enlarge-
ment and the European Union’s Security Agenda,” in Roger Kanet, ed., The New 
Security Environment: The Impact on Russia, Central and Eastern Europe (Al-
dershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2005), and “NATO, the European Union, and Euro-
pean Security,” in Howard M. Hensel, ed., The United States and Europe: Policy 
Imperatives in a Globalizing World.” (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2003). She 
is currently working on a project examining the linkages between identity, bor-
ders and further EU enlargement. 
 
Ilcheva, Maria (Florida International University) 
Maria Ilcheva is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Florida International 
University writing her dissertation on ethnic minority policies in Central and East-
ern Europe. She received her Bachelors Degree from the American University on 
Bulgaria with a degree in Political Science/International Relations in 2000. Her 
primary areas of interest are Comparative Politics, International Relations and 
European Politics. She is currently working as a research assistant at the Metro-
politan Center at Florida International University. 
 
Krok-Paszkowska, Ania (Cyprus College, Nicosia) 
Dr. Krok-Paszkowska studied geography at University College, University of 
London (1971-1974). She went on to study at the College of Europe, Bruges 
(1975-1976). In 1977 she completed a six month stage with the European Com-
mission. She worked at the University of Leiden, Documentation Office for East 
European Law (1978-1989) as editorial assistant, and at the University of Leu-
ven, Central and East European Studies (1990-1992). She was a research assis-
tant at the Department of Political Science, University of Leiden (Ph.D. 2000). 
She was a visiting fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
(European University Institute in Florence) (2001-2002), and is now visiting 
lecturer in the European Studies Program, Cyprus College, Nicosia. Her current 
work focuses mainly on the European Union and enlargement. Recent publica-
tions include “Public Attitudes towards the EU in Candidate Countries” (2003), 
“Poland’s Road to the European Union” (co-authored 2004), and “The European 
Union’s Policies Towards Russia” (co-authored 2005).  
 About the authors  293 
 
Laursen, Finn (University of Southern Denmark) 
Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science, Univer-
sity of Southern Denmark, Odense. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of 
Pennsylvania (1980). He has held research fellowships at the European Univer-
sity Institute, Florence, and Princeton University. Previous appointments include 
the London School of Economics (1985-88) and the European Institute of Public 
Administration, Maastricht (1988-95). He is currently Director of the Centre for 
European Studies (CFES) at the University of Southern Denmark. He also holds 
a Jean Monnet Chair in Political Economy of European Integration. The latest 
books he has edited are: The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, 
Interstate Bargaining and Outcome (Odense: Odense University Press, 2002) and 
Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives (Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2003). An edited book on the Treaty of Nice is forthcoming. 
 
Lemke, Christiane (University of Hannover, Germany) 
Christiane Lemke is University Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Hannover/Germany and Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Science. She 
received her PhD (1978) and Habilitation (1989) at the Free University of Berlin. 
She was a Visiting Professor at Suffolk University in 2006, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1988-1991, 2004, and 2005, and Harvard Uni-
versity in 1991-92 and 2001. Her current research is in comparative politics and 
European integration, including citizenship and governance in the European 
Union. 
 
Maas, Willem (York University, Canada) 
Willem Maas is Assistant Professor of Politics and European Studies at York 
University. He did his undergraduate work in political science and geography at 
the University of British Columbia and holds an M.A. in political science from 
Leiden University, The Netherlands. Dr. Maas received his M.A., M.Phil., and 
Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, where he wrote his dissertation 
on “Creating European Citizens.” In his research, Maas focuses on citizenship, 
European integration, migration, sovereignty, democratic theory, and federalism. 
He was Assistant Professor at New York University, where he taught the gradu-
ate and undergraduate research seminars in European Studies and graduate 
courses on European citizenship, comparative European politics, and the Euro-
pean Union. 
 
Nugent, Neill (Manchester Metropolitan University) 
Dr. Neill Nugent is Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European 
Integration at Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom. Books in-
clude  European Union Enlargement, (editor), Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004; The 
Government and Politics of the European Union, Duke University Press, 5
th edi-
tion, 2003; The European Commission, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2001; At the Heart 294  About the Authors 
 
of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (editor), St Martin’s Press, 2
nd 
edn, 2000; Developments in the European Union (co-editor) Macmillan, 1999; 
The European Union. Volume I and II: Perspectives and Theoretical Interpreta-
tions (editor), Dartmouth, 1997; The European Business Environment (co-editor), 
Macmillan, 1994. Numerous book chapters and articles in journals including 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Public Policy and Administration, Journal 
of European Public Policy, and Political Quarterly. Co-editor of two book series 
published by Palgrave-Macmillan: The European Union Series and Palgrave 
Studies in European Union Politics. EU Fulbright Scholar at SUNY Fredo-
nia/University at Buffalo in 2003 and Visiting Professor at University of Michi-
gan’s EU Centre in 2002. Co-director of the Transatlantic Consortium for Euro-
pean Union Studies and Simulations. 
 
Roy, Joaquín (University of Miami) 
Joaquin Roy holds a law degree from the University of Barcelona, and a Ph.D. from 
Georgetown University. He is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, 
Director of University of Miami European Union Center and Co-Director of the 
Miami European Union Center. He has published over 200 academic articles and 
reviews, and he is the author , editor, or co-editor of 25 books, among them The 
Reconstruction of Central America: the Role of the European Community (North-
South Center, 1991), The Ibero-American Space/ El Espacio Iberoamericano 
(U.Miami/University of Barcelona, 1996), Cuba, the U.S. and the Helms-Burton 
Doctrine: International Reactions (University of Florida Press, 2000), Las 
relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea (México: UNAM, 2001), Retos de la 
integración regional: Europa y América (México: UNAM, 2003), and La Unión 
Europea y el TLCAN (México: UNAM, 2004). He has also published over 1,200 
columns and essays in newspapers and magazines. Among his awards is the 
Encomienda of the Order of Merit bestowed by King Juan Carlos of Spain. 
 
Royo, Sebastián (Suffolk University) 
Dr. Royo is the Director of the Suffolk University Madrid Campus. He is an As-
sociate Professor in the Government Department at Suffolk University in Boston 
and affiliate and co-chair of the Iberian Study Group at the Minda de Gunzburg 
Center for European Studies at Harvard University. He received a 5-year Law 
degree from the University of Madrid, and a Master in Business Administration, 
a Masters in International Relations, and a Ph.D. from Boston University. Royo's 
articles and reviews on Southern European and Latin American politics have ap-
peared in South European Society & Politics, West European Politics, SELA, 
Democratization, Perspectives in Politics, Mediterranean Quarterly, and other 
publications. Publications include: “From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism: 
The Consequences of Party Hegemony in Spain, 1982-1996” (St. Martin's Press 
2000); “A New Century of Corporatism? Corporatism in Southern Europe.” About the authors  295 
 
(Prager 2003); “Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen 
Years” co-edited with Paul. C. Manuel. (Frank Cass 2003).  
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) 
Dr. Schimmelfennig obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Tübingen in 1995. 
He was Senior Research Fellow at the Mannheim Center for European Social 
Research, University of Mannheim from 2002 to 2005. Schimmelfennig has 
published widely on the international politics of Europe. Recent books include 
The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge 
University Press and winner of the first European Union Studies Association 
book prize for the best book published in 2003 and 2004), The Europeanization 
of Central and Eastern Europe (co-edited with Ulrich Sedelmeier, Cornell Uni-
versity Press 2005), and The Politics of EU Enlargement. Theoretical Ap-
proaches (co-edited with Ulrich Sedelmeier, Routledge 2005). His articles have 
appeared inter alia in European Journal of International Relations, International 
Organization, Journal of Common Market Studies, and Journal of European Pub-
lic Policy. 
 
Thiel, Markus (University of Miami) 
Markus Thiel holds Ph.D. in International Studies at University of Miami writing 
on the impact of European integration in the post-Maastricht period on trans-na-
tional identities. His research interests include trans-national and European iden-
tities, the Europeanization of public spheres and European social policy. Previ-
ously he worked for the EU-Socrates/Erasmus program at the University of Ap-
plied Sciences in Munich, Germany.  
 
Vilpišauskas, Ramūnas (Vilnius University) 
Dr. Ramūnas Vilpišauskas is an Associate Professor at the Institute of the 
International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. The main 
areas of his scholarly interest include European integration, international 
political economy and policy analysis. He studied and did research in a 
number of scholarly institutions including Oslo University, Lancaster 
University in Britain, European University Institute in Florence and Co-
lumbia University where he stayed as a Fulbright Scholar. In 2002-2003 
he was a Visiting Fellow at the EU Center, GAI, Syracuse University 
where he taught a course on EU Enlargement. During the EU accession 
negotiations, he has been a consultant to the Lithuanian Government. 
Since 2003, he has been a president of the Lithuanian Political Science 
Association and a member of the board of the Open Society Foundation. 
Since November 2004, he has been a Chief Economic Advisor to the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania. He has an extensive list of publi-
cations on EU enlargement, transition and European integration policies. 